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ABSTRACT
This thesis sets out to examine the role played by the Conservative 
Party in the evolution of the state education system between 1918 
and 1944. The early chapters provide a chronological account of 
ministerial policy and party attitudes towards secondary and 
elementary education between the wars. This is followed by assessments 
of the party's approach to the dual system of council and church schools, 
and to the problems of ' education for employment '. The manner in 
which Conservative education policy operated locally is then examined 
with particular reference to the area of London; and the arguments 
put forward are brought together finally by an analysis of the party's 
responsibility for, and reaction to, the 1944 Education Act.
The two main themes of the thesis are the working of the modern 
Conservative Party and the history of education as a political issue, 
which has arguably been over-simplified in existing accounts. It 
is demonstrated here that Conservative ministerial policy contributed 
more to the development of state schools than has been realised, 
especially in the case of Lord Eustace Percy; and that party opinion - 
though traditionally hostile or indifferent to education - became 
more receptive to the need for reform during the 1930s. In this light, 
it appears that ministers such as Percy saw education as a means of 
transforming the Conservative approach to social reform, and that 
the politics of education were characterised by continuity and 
growing party agreement. These forces came together most conspicuously 
in the Second World War. R.A. Butler's reform of 1944 looked forward 
to a more positive party role in social policy, but was based on ideas 
popularised between the wars; it was accepted by Labour as the 
realisation of minimum demands made over the past twenty years, and 
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This thesis sets out to examine the role played by the Conservative 
Party in the evolution of the modern education system, which underwent 
an important transformation in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Before the First World War, the two main types of school provided 
by the state - secondary and elementary - were largely separate and 
distinct. It was only after the passage of the 1902 Education Act 
that a small number of children had for the first time attended state- 
aided secondary schools. The Act offered the old independent foundation 
schools the option of receiving financial aid from the Exchequer, 
and also empowered the newly created local education authorities to 
set up additional municipal schools. As a result a fee-paying minority, 
usually entering from private preparatory schools, were offered the 
benefits of an academic curriculum in preparation for higher, university 
education or for a career in the professions. In the meantime, the 
great majority of the nation's children remained in the public elementary 
schools, which operated under an inferior code of administrative 
regulations at the discretion of either local authorities or voluntary, 
church, organisations. The elementary school pupil received only 
basic instruction and left to seek employment at the age of twelve 
or thirteen, rather than proceeding to any form of further education.
The Edwardian period witnessed the first, tentative attempts to relate 
two forms of schooling hitherto divided rigidly along lines of social 
class. The free place regulations of 1907 reflected the contemporary 
concern to create an educational 'ladder', available to all to climb
irrespective of background: thereafter at least a quarter of all 
secondary school places were to be provided free of charge to elementary 
pupils. In addition, some local authorities sought to improve facilities 
for the older and more able children attending the elementary schools, 
either by introducing 'senior classes' within the all-age school or 
by setting up separate institutions, pioneered in London and Manchester 
under the name of central schools. The growth of this 'advanced 
elementary instruction' was handicapped, however, both by regulation 
and tradition; and at the outbreak of war in 1914 the horizontal 
stratification of the education system had been neither eroded nor 
seriously challenged.
In the period between 1918 and 1944, which was bounded by two 
major educational reforms, the notion of separate and parallel types 
of state school was gradually blurred and ultimately broken down.
Fisher's Education Act of 1918 pointed the way by encouraging the 
expansion of both secondary and advanced or post-elementary education.
As concern about 'the education of the adolescent' came to dominate 
debate, increasing criticism was directed at the absence of an intrinsic 
connection between the secondary and elementary schools. In particular, 
the term 'secondary education for all' was used to embody the demand 
that every child should receive a connected course of training. All 
children, it was suggested, should receive elementary, or primary, 
education to the age of eleven, followed by four or five years of 
secondary instruction in one of several types of school - one of which 
would be the traditional secondary school - conducted under a single 
code of statutory regulations. The concept of two successive stages 
of a unified educational process was not, however, adopted as national 
policy between the wars. Under the impact of a series of economic 
recessions, the need to control educational expenditure became a major
priority for inter-war governments and ruled out the possibility of 
significant advances. As far as the adolescent was concerned, 
successive administrations concentrated on modest improvements within 
the existing framework. The policy of elementary ’reorganisation', 
for example, improved standards for the older children by dividing 
schools into junior and senior departments, but this process - though 
well advanced by 1939 - still took place within the context of the 
inferior regulations governing elementary education. The idea of 
abolishing the regulations which underpinned the existing system was 
in fact only taken up during the Second World War, which provided 
a fresh impetus to reform proposals. Amongst its many provisions, 
the 1944 Education Act laid down that in future all children would 
attend first primary and then secondary schools, thereby marking official 
acceptance of the view that the two stages of education were not separate 
entities but sequential phases of the same process.
The following account is concerned with the contribution which 
the Conservative Party made to the development of the state system 
between 1918 and 1944. The early chapters provide a chronological 
account of ministerial policy and party attitudes towards secondary 
and elementary education between the wars. The issue known to 
contemporaries as the education of the adolescent provides the main 
connecting theme for these chapters, which concentrate on two questions 
in particular - the extent of access to the traditional secondary 
school, and the form and scope of post-elementary education provided 
for the remainder of adolescents. The issue of education for the 
adolescent was itself intimately linked with two further problems 
examined in the following chapters: the difficulties posed by the
'dual system' of church and council elementary schools, and the 
ill-defined question of relating education to employment, which
involves consideration of other types of provision such as technical 
education and 'continuation* schooling. The manner in which Conservatives 
locally tackled the various issues affecting those between the ages 
of five and eighteen is then raised, with particular reference to 
the area of London. Finally, the main arguments put forward are brought 
together by an analysis of the party's responsibility for, and reaction 
to, the 1944 Act. The evolution of the modern education system was 
of course the product of a wide range of factors, and the approach 
adopted here does not allow full treatment to be given to the complex 
administrative, professional and popular pressures which helped to 
shape the school structure after the First World War. These forces 
are dealt with primarily where they impinge upon the main concerns 
of this study, which are twofold. The first is to examine the history 
of education as a political issue, with particular emphasis on the 
role which Conservatives played in the development of the state 
education system; and the second is to contribute to an understanding 
of the ideas and practice of the Conservative Party, or Unionist Party 
as it was known until 1924. Before explaining how these concerns 
can be linked and pursued, it is necessary to review the treatment 
of educational and political issues provided by historians in existing 
accounts.
II
The labour movement has dominated writings on the history of 
education as a political issue in the early twentieth century. Labour's 
contribution to the creation of a national network of primary and 
secondary schools has been widely discussed, and the work of Rodney 
Barker and Brian Simon in particular has established the Labour Party 
as the main political force behind educational reform during the
periodJ In recent years attempts have also been made to trace the
influence of particular groups within the labour movement - the
parliamentary Labour Party, the Fabian Society, local Labour Party
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organisations, and the Trades Union Congress. The emphasis on Labour 
policies has provided a useful framework for understanding education 
as a political issue, but the preoccupation with a single body of 
opinion - especially in the period between the wars when Labour was 
only briefly in office - provides an incomplete picture of the evolution 
of the school system. A fuller appreciation of this development has 
been made possible by recent studies of individual legislative reforms, 
notably the Acts of 1918 and 1944, and by more detailed analysis of 
those civil servants at the Board of Education closely involved in 
the formulation of national policy.^ There remains a need, however, 
for systematic study of the Liberal and Conservative administrations 
which dominated British politics before the Second World War.^ The 
neglect of Conservative policies, upon which this work focuses, has 
occurred despite not only the party’s electoral dominance, but also 
the role of the Conservatives in carrying the 1944 Act.
1. R.S. Barker, Education and politics, 1900-1951: a study of the 
Labour Party (Oxford, 1972); B. Simon, Education and the labour 
movement, 1870-1920 (London, 1965), and The politics of educational 
reform, 1920-1940 (London, 1974).
2. M.H. Parkinson, The Labour Party and the organisation of secondary 
education, 1918-1965 (London, 1970); E.J.T. Brennan (ed.). Education 
for National Efficiency: the contribution of Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb (London, 1975); G.C. Fidler, ‘Aspects of the history of the 
labour movement in Liverpool in relation to education, c.1870-1920’, 
unpublished McGill University Ph.D. thesis, 1979; C. Griggs, The 
Trades Union Congress and the struggle for education, 1868-1925 
(Brighton, 19Ü3).
3. L. Andrews, The Education Act, 1918 (London, 1976); P.H.J.H. Gosden, 
Education in the Second World War: "a study in policy and administration 
(London, 1976); G.L. Savage, 'Social class and social policy: the 
civil service and secondary education in England during the interwar 
period’. Journal of Contemporary History, 18 (1983).
4. An exception to the neglect of Liberal policies, which also examines 
the influence of Board of Education officials, is G.E. Sherington, 
English education, social change and war, 1911-20 (Manchester, 
j'9'8T)':
Any basis for the judgement of Conservative education policy after
1918 must first take into account some of the controversies which
have arisen over the ideas of Labour. In the first major study of
Labour education policy, Rodney Barker has indicated that it is not
enough to simply identify the party as the chief agent of reform.
He goes beyond this to examine the differences between the various
sections of Labour opinion, and identifies the tension between the
egalitarian aims of certain groups and individuals and the meritocratic
tradition of social engineering which underpinned party policy in
office. This tension is used to provide a framework for understanding
many of Labour’s post-war policies: the cautious response given to
the Education Act in 1918; the envious acceptance of the selective
and academic tradition of the secondary schools, while seeking to
make them more accessible to working-class children; the absence of
any commitment to abolish private education or alter the curriculum
of the state schools; the endorsement given to elementary reorganisation,
despite this falling short of the demand for a restructured system
of regulations; and the acceptance of the ’tripartite’ structure of
grammar, technical and modern schools implicit in the 1944 Act, rather
than the more radical common or multilateral secondary school. These
policies are used to illustrate a wider conclusion about Labour: the
party derived its ambitions not from socialist principles but from
practical experience and ’labourist’ views. The Labour Party sought
5
fairness within the existing system, not wholesale reconstruction.
Rodney Barker’s persuasive case for interpreting Labour policy 
has subsequently been disputed, in particular by Brian Simon, who 
emphasises the idea that the party offered a consistent and radical
5. Barker, op.cit., p. 26ff.
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alternative in the inter-war period. The short-lived Labour governments, 
he claims, made significant headway in the face of considerable 
opposition, and the party's desire to abolish the distinction between 
parallel systems of secondary and elementary education above all marked 
Labour off from its political rivals. The development of this argument, 
however, suffers from an inability to clarify the precise meaning 
of Labour attitudes, especially on the issue of 'secondary education 
for all'. Professor Simon ignores the evidence which suggests that 
for most party members, this catch-phrase meant expanding the existing 
secondary schools for academically minded children, while providing 
new and broadly equivalent facilities in central and technical schools 
for children hitherto restricted to the all-age elementary school.
Instead he stresses the importance of those sections of party opinion 
which, especially during the 1930s, pressed for the introduction of 
multilateral schools. Again this ignores the reasons for thinking 
that although the idea of multilateralism attracted some support before 
the passage of the 1944 Act, this was primarily in the context of 
an addition - not an alternative - to the varied structure of secondary 
education which Labour sought to create.^ Brian Simon's work is of 
course concerned with the wider development of official education 
policy between the wars, but in so far as he concentrates on Labour 
policy, there is little sense of the need to qualify the party's desire 
for reform.
The arguments of both Rodney Barker and Brian Simon have themselves 
become the subject of recent criticism, notably in a review of educational
6. Simon, The politics of educational reform, esp. pp. 294-333.
A similar case is made, though again without demonstrating that 
multilateralism was regarded as an alternative, by R.G. Wallace, 
'Labour, the Board of Education and the preparation of the 1944 
Education Act', unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 
1980.
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development during the 1920s by Nigel Haslewood. This maintains that 
Labour's achievements in the period have been underestimated, and 
that previous accounts have directed unfair criticism at the party's 
leading educational publicist, R.H. Tawney.*^  It can be argued, however, 
that Nigel Haslewood's critique itself fails to distinguish clearly 
between the two different historical approaches under review. The 
claim that Brian Simon 'appears to accept' the existence of major 
differences between the parties over education, for example, seriously 
distorts the letter's case. In this instance, Tawney is portrayed 
as a leading exponent of reform, and criticised only on the single 
issue of adhering to a varied system of secondary schools, rather 
than to the multilateral idea - a further indication of Simon's concern
g
with the origins of what later became the comprehensive school.
By contrast, Rodney Barker has sought to place the thinking of 
R.H. Tawney firmly in the context of the period. Tawney, he shows, 
both invoked the theoretical ideals of equality and social justice, 
and at the same time took many of his actual proposals from the
Q
existing educational world. Nigel Haslewood's point about sharp 
differences between the parties has more substance in the case of 
Dr Barker, who provides only incidental references to Liberal and 
Conservative policy. Haslewood's own reappraisal of Labour achievements 
in the 1920s, however, ironically falls back on familiar claims about 
the party's distinctiveness, thus bringing the argument full circle. 
Labour's interest in educational reform has been established beyond 
doubt, but the available evidence also indicates the importance of
7. N. Haslewood, 'Tawney, the Labour Party and educational policy
in the 1920s. A reappraisal', in R. Lowe (ed.). Labour and education: 
some early twentieth century studies (Leicester, 19Ü1).
8. See B. Simon and b. Üubinstein, The evolution of the comprehensive 
school, 1926-1966 (London, 1969).
9. Barker, op.cit.,pp.43-4.
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bringing out the complexity and ambiguity of party policy. The extent 
to which this is necessary will depend in part upon judgements of 
a crucially related, but hitherto neglected, area of study - the 
corresponding policies pursued by the Conservative Party.
In contrast to the labour movement, only a limited range of the
Conservative Party’s activities after the First World War have attracted
attention among historians. The main focus has been on the leading
political issues which faced successive Conservative administrations,
and on the development of party organisation nationally and locally,
with little emphasis being placed on domestic policies.One result
of this has been to enhance the assumption that, compared to Labour's
association with educational reform. Conservative policy between the
wars was dominated by two simple themes - reducing spending whenever
possible, and resisting improvements to the state schools. The sterile
nature of the party’s policy has been stressed particularly in relation
to finance, with the claim that Conservative education ministers were
agents of the Treasury, responsible for carrying out the demands for
11reduced spending which continually restricted progress. Conservative 
governments have also been accused of seeking to maintain a nineteenth 
century conception of the education service, as reflected in opposition 
to the idea of abolishing the statutory division between secondary 
and elementary education. For Brian Simon in particular, the inter-
10. R. Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 
1970); Lord Butler (ed.). The Conservatives: a history~from their 
origins to 1965 (London, 1977); J.A. Ramsden, The age of Balfout^ 
and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London, 1978), and The making of Conservative 
Party policy, 'ihe Conservative Research Department since 192^ 
ILondon, I960). For an exception to the neglect of domesticpolicy, 
see D.W. Dean, ’Conservatism and the national education system, 
1922-40’, Journal of Contemporary History, 6, 2 (1971).
11. N. Middleton and S. Weitzman, A place for everyone (London, 1976), 
p.334.
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war years provided a clear-cut case of Labour demands to introduce 
'secondary education for all* being frustrated by the hostility of
12Conservatives.
Ill
This thesis does not attempt to reverse the well-established 
outline of the contribution to educational reform made by the political 
parties. In the most general of terms, the interest of Labour members 
in the national education system was not shared by Conservatives, 
many of whom had not attended state schools. In the same way as 
it is necessary to clarify the Labour P,arty's concern with reform, 
however, so it is possible to challenge existing assumptions about 
Conservative policy as being over-simplified. The aims of the following 
account are therefore to modify existing accounts of Conservative 
policy and opinion towards state education in the period between 1918 
and 1944, and in turn to shed new light on the working of the 
Conservative Party and the nature of education as a political issue.
The main arguments presented here can in fact be developed in four 
general directions: by examining the detail of Conservative ministerial 
policy after the First World War, especially towards secondary and 
elementary education; by bringing out the complexity of party opinion - 
nationally and locally - towards a wide range of policy issues; by 
using the example of education to highlight the changing nature of 
Conservatism between the wars; and by establishing a framework for
12. Simon, op.cit., p.lOff.
13. J. Stevenson, British society, 1914-45 (Harmondsworth, 1984), 
p.350, notes that bB per cent of Conservative M.P.s during the 
period between 1920 and 1940 were educated at public schools, 
over a quarter of them at Eton.
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understanding education as a political issue which goes beyond the 
idea of radical demands being cynically and systematically distorted.
The first point which will be emphasised here is that Conservative
education ministers after the war did not simply endorse the Treasury
desire for economy. Although there were differences between individuals
as to their intentions and active involvement in policy-making,
Conservative ministers as a whole sought to resist Treasury demands
in order to promote the education of the adolescent. Edward Wood,
for example, the first Unionist minister to serve at the Board of
Education after 1918, was broadly concerned to increase the number
of secondary school places and to provide post-elementary instruction
14for at least some children. This approach was considerably extended 
after 1924 by Lord Eustace Percy, who not only endorsed the policy 
of elementary reorganisation, but also urged as a logical consequence 
the abolition of the existing statutory regulations and the creation 
of a single code governing 'higher* education. In the 1930s, by 
contrast. Conservative ministers continued the process of dividing 
the elementary schools but retreated from the idea of amending the 
law to unify post-primary education. The desirability of creating 
a single system of primary and secondary schools was taken up again 
during the Second World War, initially by Herwald Ramsbotham and later 
by R.A. Butler, who was of course to take the credit for implementing 
reform in 1944. Similar distinctions also emerge on the issue of 
religious education, where Eustace Percy's desire to restructure the 
dual system foreshadowed the new settlement achieved by Butler during 
the war; and on the problem of education for employment, towards which
14. See Appendix I, 'Ministers and leading officials at the Board 
of Education, 1918-1944*.
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Percy presented several distinctive ideas never fully followed through, 
even by the 1944 Act. The general assumptions about Conservative 
ministerial policy therefore require modification: there were, it 
will be argued here, a wide variety of individual approaches towards 
policy for the adolescent, but the ideas of Eustace Percy in particular 
stand out as central to an understanding of the reforms later carried 
by Butler.
The second area in which this study seeks to modify existing
accounts concerns the attitude of the Conservative Party as a whole
towards state education, which has been depicted as one of uniform
hostility. In the first place, it is possible to indicate the
complexity of party views by identifying several groupings or shades
of opinion, often distinct in outlook though never mutually exclusive.
At one extreme, for example, a small number of Conservative M.P.s,
usually led by Lady Astor, were constantly critical at the lack of
15educational change between the wars. These social reformers were 
counterbalanced, however, by a minority of 'die-hards' who consistently 
opposed any reform. Between these two extremes, several other groups 
could be identified: ministers and party officials, who were primarily 
concerned about the electoral implications of policy; those 
professionally involved in the educational world as teachers, academics 
or local authority representatives; and the broad mass of Conservative 
supporters, who showed little interest in education and veered from 
hostility to indifference according to circumstances. Despite this 
variety of viewpoints, certain ideas could be regarded as characteristic
15. For further information about Lady Astor and other Conservatives 
mentioned hereafter, see Appendix II, 'Conservative education 
policy: biographical details of ministers, M.P.s and party 
supporters'.
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of party opinion overall, but the significance of these common 
assumptions has also been missed by existing accounts. In brief, 
Conservatives were preoccupied after 1918 with preserving the position 
of the traditional secondary school; as a result of this obsession, 
reforms of the elementary system - for example reorganisation or the 
raising of the compulsory leaving age - were considered to be 
unnecessary. This general position began to change, however, gradually 
and partially during the 1930s. Conservatives now began to accept, 
some more enthusiastically than others, that all children should benefit 
from post-primary education and that some at least should remain at 
school until the age of fifteen, thus paving the way for the party's 
acceptance of reform in 1944. The similar movement of opinion on 
the dual system and education for employment, and in the policy of 
local party members in London, reinforces the conclusion about 
Conservative attitudes which can be drawn from the following account.
The party as a whole was opposed to educational reform between the 
wars, but there were individual exceptions from an early stage, and 
the imperceptible shift which took place in attitudes towards the 
adolescent once more points to the importance of pre-war events in 
understanding the 1944 Act.
The educational policies and opinions of Conservatives can be 
used thirdly to illustrate certain points about the working of the 
party after the First World War. At first sight, the case of education 
appears to indicate that policy decisions within the party rested 
almost exclusively with ministers and leading party officials. Eustace 
Percy, for example, was able to publicise his scheme of 'higher education 
for all' as official Conservative policy in the 1920s, despite the 
objections of leading party supporters. Percy's inability to implement 
his scheme, however, though due to a variety of circumstances.
17
indicated the manner in which successful ministerial initiatives were 
always dependent upon party endorsement. This was illustrated by 
the raising of the school-leaving age in 1936, when Conservative 
ministers deliberately included a generous system of exemptions in 
deference to the party's industrial and agricultural supporters; 
and by the 1944 Act itself, which Butler consciously shaped in order 
to secure the acquiescence of the Conservative parliamentary party, 
the largest force in the wartime coalition. A wide range of pressures - 
administrative and professional, local and national, as well as party 
political - ultimately contributed to the form of policy undertaken 
by Conservative ministers towards the adolescent.
The example of education can also be used to shed light on the 
relationship between Conservative thinking and practice. The views 
of party members on education have been regarded - at least for the 
period of the Second World War - as the product of certain ideological 
positions, stemming from either paternalistic 'Tory' or 'Neo-Liberal' 
ideas.This line of argument is disputed here both on the grounds 
that Conservative opinion was divided into complex, overlapping 
groupings, and in view of the importance of social background and 
practical experience in shaping particular attitudes. For example, 
many of the values which Conservatives wished to uphold in the state 
schools - such as hierarchy and excellence, the training of character 
and the place of religious education - were, it will be argued, a 
reflection of their own public school training. Education did, however, 
highlight certain political ideas, especially in relation to the role
16. H. Kopsch, 'The approach of the Conservative Party to social 
policy during World War Two', unpublished University of London 
Ph.D. thesis, 1970.
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of the state. The party's preoccupation with the secondary schools,
for example, could be seen in a wider context as a means of defending
the existing social and political order. Conservatives believed that
the most gifted children should be able to climb the educational ladder,
but as the remainder were to have a fixed role in society, there was
no point in the state actively intervening to improve the elementary
system. This inflexible approach was of course held by Conservatives
to varying degrees, and as the responsibilities of the state were
17gradually extended, so individuals began to encourage a more active 
role for the state. As far as education ministers were concerned, 
Eustace Percy clearly led the way in this respect, attempting in the 
1920s - though with very little support from his party - to use 
education as a means of altering the social structure in order to 
achieve parity between all professions and occupations. The only 
other Conservative to emulate this approach was R.A. Butler, who 
believed that the abolition of the old division between secondary 
and elementary education was crucial in eradicating the inherited 
idea of 'two nations'. The 1944 Act owed much to the minister's 
perception of party needs: he hoped that reform in education would 
help the Conservatives in adapting to wartime circumstances by 
competing on new terms with Labour. At the same time, Butler's reform 
foreshadowed the style of policy which the Conservative Party was 
to adopt after 1945, accepting a more active role for the state in 
domestic policy and encouraging the creation of a more flexible, 
meritocratic social order.
By bringing together the themes which characterised the Conservative 
Party, and adding what is known about Labour's approach to education.
17. R.S. Barker, Political ideas in modern Britain (London, 1978), 
pp.126-34; Stevenson, op.cit., pp.jUb-l2.
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it becomes possible to comment finally on the operation of education 
as a political issue. In any comparison of overall party attitudes 
to education, there were of course significant differences between 
the parties. The Liberals placed much hope in the continuation school, 
and the Labour aims of extending free access to secondary education, 
raising the school-leaving age and abolishing the existing statutory 
regulations were opposed by most Conservatives between the wars.
This does not go far, however, in explaining the actual course of 
events, and it does not follow that the politics of education consisted 
purely of concerted hostility to radical demands. In the first place, 
the ambiguities of Labour policy in office and the aims of Conservative 
ministers such as Eustace Percy point to an element of continuity 
between successive administrations. This was particularly evident 
in the concern to improve secondary and post-elementary instruction, 
in the desire for a compromise solution to the dual system, and in 
the inability to tackle the problems of education for employment.
When set against the constraints which faced all governments, notably 
the low priority of education, the Treasury's insistence on economy 
and administrative inertia, a somewhat different conclusion emerges: 
that the choice of policy towards the adolescent was effectively 
narrowed, and contained within limits well recognised by front-bench 
ministers. In addition, although Labour opinion clearly provided 
the main political pressure for reform, the subtle changes in 
Conservative attitudes during the 1930s implied a slow convergence 
of party views on certain demands concerning the adolescent. These 
two characteristic features of education as a political issue - the 
similarities between successive ministerial policies and the increased 
overlap in party views - were in fact central to the creation of the 
modern education system, and came together most conspicuously during
20
the Second World War. The 1944 Act was consciously based on ideas 
popularised in the inter-war period; it was accepted by Conservatives 
as the logical extension of policies they had latterly endorsed, 




THE UNIONIST PARTY AND THE 1918 EDUCATION ACT
The pattern of development within the state school system at 
the end of the First World War was largely dictated by the 1918 Education 
Act. This measure left untouched many of the features familiar during 
the Edwardian period and enshrined in Balfour's legislation of 1902, 
notably the administrative structure of local education authorities, 
the conditions governing financial aid to voluntary schools, and the 
rigid statutory division between secondary and elementary education.
The Act did, however, propose various improvements in the education 
provided for adolescents. In the area of higher education, the limit 
on the rate which could be levied locally for the purpose of higher 
instruction was removed, and in response to greatly increased public 
demand local authorities were charged with providing secondary 
education for those children capable of benefiting but debarred by 
inability to meet the cost. The public elementary schools were also 
to be improved through the introduction of a standardised, percentage 
grant from the Exchequer on all approved expenditure, which was now 
to include the raising of the compulsory school-leaving age to fourteen, 
the abolition of the notorious 'half-time' system of child employment, 
and the systematic provision of advanced elementary education. Finally, 
local authorities were to be responsible for planning and implementing 
a network of day continuation schools - an extension of the existing 
education system which required all adolescents who had left school
22
at fourteen to attend on a part-time basis until the age of sixteen J
The movement for educational reform culminating in the passage 
of the government's legislation has traditionally been identified 
with the individual influence of the Liberal minister, H.A.L. Fisher.^
The recent findings of Gdoffrey Sherington, however, indicate that
Fisher - who served as President of the Board of Education between
1916 and 1922 - can no longer be regarded as the main architect of
the 1918 Act. Fisher was essentially an upper-middle class intellectual 
who had little desire for radical reform: he favoured cautious change 
which would extend opportunities for the great majority who attended 
elementary schools without challenging the selective and academic 
tradition of the secondary schools. The minister personally argued 
in favour of continuation schools, although these had been recommended 
by a departmental committee on education and employment in 1917, and 
overall his influence on the content of the Act was limited by a 
dependence oh the well-defined views of senior civil servants at the 
Board of Education. The Board's pre-war plans to extend educational 
facilities had been carefully guided by the Permanent Secretary, Sir 
Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, whose influence was equally apparent in 
the legislation finally adopted by parliament. The First World War 
thus produced no fundamental alteration in the direction of education 
policy: the introduction of a measure largely worked out by Board
1. A general account of the background, terms and importance of the 
1918 Act is provided by L. Andrews, The Education Act, 1918.
2. See, for example, D.W. Dean, 'H.A.L. Fisher, Reconstruction and 
the development of the 1918 Education Act', British Journal of 
Educational Studies, XVIII, 3 (1970), p.261; and L.O. Ward,
'An investigation into the educational ideas and contribution of 
the British political parties, 1870-1918', unpublished University 
of London Ph.D. thesis, 1970, p.364.
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officials and advocated by the Liberal government before 1914 reinforced 
earlier trends and ensured a high degree of continuity in the education
q
system.
This line of argument clearly sheds important light on the origins 
of the 1918 Act, although it arguably understates the political 
contribution made by the minister. Fisher brought little new thinking 
to the Board of Education and his contribution to the content of the 
government's legislation was minimal, but he was one of few education 
ministers with a genuine interest in the work of the department, and 
without his determination to exploit the movement for wartime 
reconstruction there was no guarantee that reform of any sort would 
have reached the statute book. The relative influence of civil servants 
and politicians at the Board of Education provides, however, only 
an incidental theme to the main concern of this chapter - the educational 
ideas and opinions of the Unionist Party. By examining the involvement 
in, and response of, the party to the 1918 Education Act, this account 
seeks to provide a basis for understanding Conservative education 
policy between the wars. In particular, it aims to illustrate the 
manner in which the party formulated education policy and the assumptions 
which underpinned the Unionist approach to the secondary and elementary 
schools at the end of the First World War. The wider object of 
highlighting the operation of education as a party political issue 
at national level can also be served by an analysis of the Act in 
two main contexts: in the first place looking at the role and influence 
of Unionist Party leaders, who occupied prominent positions in the
3. G.E. Sherington, 'The 1918 Education Act: origins, aims and 
development', British Journal of Educational Studies, XXIV, 1 
(1976), PP.66-Ü3; and English education, social change and war, 
esp. chs. II-V.
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second coalition government of December 1916; and secondly concentrating 
on the reception given to the education bill by party members in 
parliament.
II
The origins of the 1918 Education Act cannot be located simply
in the thinking of ministers and civil servants at the Board of Education.
The measure must also be regarded as the product of the circumstances
of wartime politics, in particular as one outcome of the coalition
which the Unionist "farty formed with Lloyd George and his Liberal
supporters in order to facilitate a more effective prosecution of
the war. In this context, the Act was to some extent a product of
the movement for 'reconstruction* commonly identified with the Liberal
wing of the coalition. During 1916 the Asquith government had already
undertaken cabinet investigations into possible areas of social reform,
and after taking over as Prime Minister Lloyd George furthered this
process by establishing a Ministry of Reconstruction under Christopher
Addison. The actual details of Fisher's legislation remained the
departmental concern of the Board of Education and , owed little
to the government's reconstruction machinery, but the bill was
nevertheless associated with a reforming Liberal minister and presented
as a contribution to the reconstruction ideal of creating greater 
4social justice. In the context of wartime politics, however, the 
education bill was at the same time an agreed measure between Liberals
4. On reconstruction as a whole, see P.B. Johnson, Land fit for heroes 
(London and Chicago, 1968). The bill was described as 'part of 
a comprehensive scheme of Reconstruction' by the Reconstruction 
Committee in its 'Memorandum on the education bill 1917', June 
1917; Public Record Office, Cabinet papers (P.R.O. CAB) 24/19.
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and Unionists, for whom the whole issue of education had been politically 
divisive before 1914. This makes it important to examine in the first 
place the reasons behind the support given to Fisher by Unionist Party 
leaders, especially Andrew Bonar Law, who after December 1916 became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, leader of the House of Commons and 
de facto deputy Prime Minister.^
As leader of the Unionist Party since 1911 Law had displayed 
an open toughness in his relations with the Liberal government, 
especially on the issues of Ulster and tariff reform. The outbreak 
of war, however, required greater flexibility of approach, and in 
order to enhance Unionist involvement in the running of the war effort 
Law negotiated agreements first with Asquith and then with Lloyd
g
George. His acceptance of Fisher's education bill stemmed to a 
considerable extent from the manner in which the second coalition 
had been formed. During the period of political uncertainty in early 
December 1916, Law decided against the possibility of attempting to 
form a government himself and opted instead to work with Lloyd George 
as an alternative Liberal leader. After this decision had been taken.
Law would have placed himself in an impossible position by opposing 
the new Prime Minister: Lloyd George's support for the idea of 
educational reform thus made it virtually certain that the Unionist 
leader would follow suit, especially as Fisher made known his willingness 
to avoid controversial areas of policy. This reaction was itself 
only one example of Law's desire to tie Unionist fortunes to Lloyd
5. J.A. Ramsden, %e age of Balfour and Baldwin, p.114.
6. R.N.W. Blake, The unknown Prime Minister. The life and times of 
Andrew Bonar Law, lb5Ü-1923 (London, 1955), esp. p.342; M. Pugh, 
'Asquith, Bonar Law and the first Coalition', The Historical 
Journal, XVII, 4 (1974); Ramsden, op.cit., pp.131-2.
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George, a strategy more fully formulated after the passage of the 
education bill when Law decided to preserve the coalition as a means 
of retaining a share of political power, countering the threat of 
labour, and ensuring that 'the reforms which undoubtedly will be 
necessary should be made in a way which was as little revolutionary 
as possible'. In the short-term. Law had more to lose than to gain 
by opposing educational reform, and having little personal interest 
in the problems of state schooling, he adopted an attitude of firm 
but detached backing for Fisher. In his capacity as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Law gave assurances that the Treasury would provide 
funds for implementing Fisher's proposals soon after taking up office. 
He pledged to concerned M.P.s that the education bill would receive 
priority in the following session when the measure ran into early 
difficulties at the end of 1917; and he later urged the Prime Minister 
to keep Fisher at the Board of Education until the bill became law
o
in the face of calls for cabinet changes.
Law's attitude to the education bill was shared by other prominent 
Unionist leaders. Fisher later noted the practical help provided 
by A.J. Balfour, who suggested ways of guiding the bill through the 
intricacies of the committee stage in the House of Commons; and in 
early 1917 Milner provided the important service of circumventing 
Unionist attempts to raise controversial questions about religious
7. The President's desire to avoid controversy is noted in his 
'Memorandum on the education bill 1917', 16 May 1917, P.R.O. CAB 
24/13. For the later Unionist strategy, see A. Bonar Law to 
A.J. Balfour, 5 Oct. 1918, Balfour papers, British Library, Add. 
Mss. 49693, fos.276-9 .
8. 'Report of a deputation of M.P.s to the Prime Minister', 26 Nov. 
1917, Lloyd George papers. House of Lords Record Office (H.L.R.O), 
F/225/3; Law to Lloyd George, 2 Mar. 1918, Lloyd George papers,
F/30/2/29. See also Law to F.E. Smith, 1 Apr. 1918, Bonar Law 
papers, H.L.R.O., 78/3/13, for Law's role in the legislation 'now 
considered necessary'.
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instruction which the education minister sought to avoid.^ The leading
Unionist peer in the cabinet, Lord Curzon, was less enthusiastic in
his acquiescence, having earlier declined,the offer of membership
of a government reviewing committee for education, but like other
ministers he raised no major objections when the war cabinet gave
Fisher permission to proceed with the drafting of a bill in May 1917.^ ^
This decision to go ahead with legislation diverted attention away
from ministers at the centre to the likely reaction amongst the press,
educationists and the political parties generally. As far as the
Unionists were concerned, large sections of the party shared the
leaderships' lack of interest in the details of educational reform:
this applied both to the important central bodies such as the National
Union and to local constituency associations, which were preoccupied
with the war, although such indifference did not always characterise
11local education authorities under Unionist control. The main focus 
of attention therefore centred on the party in parliament, which had 
effectively been brought over onto the government side by Law's 
alliance with Lloyd George, leaving opposition in the Commons primarily 
to the Liberal followers of Asquith. The Unionists were unlikely 
to jeopardise the war effort by now defeating government proposals 
in parliament, but the party nevertheless occupied a crucial position 
in the formulation of wartime policies. The existence of a hard core 
of Coalition Liberals prepared to support Lloyd George's leadership, 
even when traditional Liberal sentiments appeared threatened, meant
9. Fisher diary, 14 Mar. 1918, Fisher papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, 
unclassified series; unsigned letter to Mr. Oates, 16 May 1917, 
Public Record Office, Board of Education papers (P.R.O. ED) 24/1470.
10. Minutes of the War Cabinet, 30 May 1917, P.R.O. CAB 23/2.
11. For the example of the Unionist controlled London County Council, 
see below, pp. 233-4.
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that the major danger to the cohesion of the coalition inside
parliament after December 1916 came from dissident elements on the
12Unionist back-benches. As a result the need to maintain acceptable 
levels of party support was always a crucial consideration for government 
ministers: the education bill had been shaped by a variety of forces 
and was presented as a Liberal initiative, but it could not have 
proceeded as an agreed measure in parliament without the endorsement 
of Unionist M.P.s.
Ill
The government's education bill was first introduced into the 
House of Commons in August 1917. Although the bill was generally 
well received among politicians and educationists, it was unable to 
make any significant progress in parliament before the end of the 
session. This was partly due to the pressures of parliamentary business 
and partly the result of opposition to two key sections of the measure: 
the local education authorities objected to the framing of the 
administrative clauses, and representatives of industry were opposed 
to the idea of releasing their young employees during working hours 
in order to attend continuation classes. As a result the bill was 
withdrawn and ultimately modified in both respects by the President.
The wording of the administrative clauses was toned down, although 
Fisher retained the principle of a closer working relationship between 
the Board and local authorities; and after the réintroduction of the 
bill in March 1918, the original plan for continuation schools was
12. E. David, 'The Liberal Party divided, 1916-1918', The Historical 
Journal, XIII, 3 (1970), pp.509-33.
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altered by reducing the minimum number of teaching hours every year 
and by making compulsion apply for the first seven years of operation 
only to those between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, rather than 
up to eighteen. After these important modifications, the government’s 
education proposals passed rapidly through the committee stage in 
the Commons and reached the statute book during the summer.^  ^
The response of the Unionist Party to Fisher’s bill was of course
partly conditioned by the circumstances of wartime coalition. The
continuance of the second coalition, and with it the prosecution of
the war effort, would have been endangered by any displays of outright
opposition in the Commons, and to an extent the reaction of individual
Unionists was dictated by the pressures of party management and the
desire not to jeopardise the government's position. At the same time
certain wartime legislation after 1916 did result in dissent from
the official policy adopted by party leaders, and isolated acts of
defiance were clearly possible in the case of relatively uncontroversial
measures such as the education bill, when there appeared to be no
14imminent danger to the coalition's large majority. The bulk of 
the amendments put forward in parliament to modify Fisher's proposals 
were in fact made by Unionist M.P.s, an indication that the response 
of back-benchers was not pre-empted simply by the need to keep Lloyd 
George in office. In the event only a small number of party members 
took any active part in the debates on the bill, a reflection of both 
the low political priority accorded to education and the general
13. Andrews, op.cit., chs. 2 and 3.
14. The opposition of Unionists to the Representation of the People 
Act, for example, is recorded in D.H. Close, 'The collapse of 
resistance to democracy: Conservatives, adult suffrage, and 
second chamber reform, 1911-1928', The Historical Journal, 20,
4 (1977), pp.893-918.
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preoccupation with the war. Many members were either absent on military 
service or else, in the words of one observer, 'too busy in the smoking 
rooms and on the terrace airing their opinions of the Allied strategy 
to pay attention to the proceedings within the House'.^  ^ Amongst 
those Unionists who did remain in the House, however, the education 
bill was acceptable both as part of the strategy for maintaining 
co-operation with the Liberals and as a measure in its own right, 
although this collective acceptance was itself set within a framework 
of widely varying individual attitudes.
At one extreme a small minority of Unionists were resolutely
hostile to education in general and Fisher's ideas in particular.
This body of opinion was most strongly articulated by Sir Frederick
Banbury, a stockbroker representing the City of London, who had
acquired a reputation for his unbending opposition to increased social
provision and public expenditure. Banbury's technique was simply
to adopt and magnify every objection raised to the bill: educational
reform was unrelated to the central task of winning the war and was
inadmissible pending fresh parliamentary elections; the introduction
of continuation schools would cause serious damage to industry; and
the increased power likely to be vested in the Board of Education
even posed the danger of 'going back to the days of Charles I and 
16Cromwell'. Banbury was thus an arch exponent of die-hard 
Conservatism, obstructing the government's bill wherever possible 
and rejecting outri^t the principle of improving state education.
15. Punch, 5 June 1918. Ramsden, op.cit., p.112, notes that at least 
one Hundred Unionist M.P.s were on active service throughout the 
war ;
16, Volume 104 House of Commons Debates, 5th series, columns 430-5 
(104 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.430-5), 13 Mar. 1918.
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His objections overlapped with a separate but related form of Unionist 
opposition which viewed the bill entirely in terms of its likely 
effect on employers and industry. Basil Peto, for example, a back­
bencher with mining and construction interests, complained that the 
elementary schools could not be linked with industrial needs if
continuation classes imposed a 'Rhondda ration of education' on every 
17 . .child. He was joined by other members who formally conveyed the
reservations of the Federation of British Industries, and who threw
their weight behind the movement to postpone or modify the continuation
18scheme in an attempt to preserve child labour.
The intransigence of men such as Banbury and Peto certainly
provided a persistent and recognisible element within Conservative
educational opinion during the First World War, distinguished from
the other parties above all by the denial of the need to advance the
cause of education. This form of blatant hostility, however, was
neither the only Unionist response to Fisher's bill nor - as much
of the existing literature implies - the most representative reaction.
The attacks of the die-hard wing of the party on the government had
been muted after the formation of the second coalition in December
1916, which removed the main anxiety of ineffectiveness in prosecuting
the war. Banbury consequently stood alone in his unrepentant opposition,
'so much a Die-Hard', in the words of one colleague, 'that he was
19almost a caricature'. Similarly only two members with industrial
17. Ibid., C.353.
18. For a fuller account of Unionists representing the F.B.I., and 
the distinction between these and other sections of party opinion, 
see below, pp. 192-5. <
19. 'The House of Commons and the party system', draft of unpublished 
autobiography, n.d.. Lady Astor papers, Reading University 
Library, 1416/1/6/88.
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constituencies were prepared to echo Peto’s threat to defy the
government whip in the event of a division on the second reading.
As a result the outright opponents of the education bill were left
to propose a series of ineffectual amendments at the committee stage
which attracted little support even within Unionist ranks. Peto's
efforts to incorporate military drill in continuation schools and
practical teaching in rural schools, for example, were backed for
the most part only by M.P.s with military and agricultural 
20connections - an indication of the strength of the forces which
combined to ensure overall party endorsement of the minister's proposals
As one parliamentary commentator noted, the case for the education
bill was such that it was never seriously challenged by 'Mr. Peto's
objection that certain plays by Shakespeare and Sir James Barrie could
not be produced if child labour were prohibited; or by the frank
obscurantism of Sir Frederick Banbury, who declared that higher
21education was a positive hindrance to a business man'.
The most characteristic response of those Unionists who spoke 
in the parliamentary debates was one of overall sympathy. This was 
not solely or even primarily due to the educational enthusiasm of 
back-benchers: in addition to the hidden influence of party management, 
the prospect of serious Unionist opposition had been largely removed 
by Fisher's conscious effort to avoid legislation that was likely 
to revive party political controversy. In particular, he was aware 
that the price to be paid for obtaining an agreed measure with the 
Unionists was to leave untouched the basic foundations of Balfour's 
1902 Act - the selective system of secondary schools, the administrative
20. 105 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.2223-6 and 2265-8, 8 May 1918.
21. Punch, 20 Mar. 1918.
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structure of local authorities, and the religious settlement which
earlier Liberal governments had sought to amend. In 1917 the minister
vent as far as addressing a meeting of the National Union of the
Conservative and Unionist Associations to reassure them of his desire
to avoid sensitive areas of policy^^ - an indication of the important
sense in which Unionists accepted the government's bill because it
did not offend their traditional values and assumptions. . On the other
hand, several spokesmen were more positive in supporting Fisher's
ideas, especially those local authority representatives, educationists,
teachers and academics whose professional interest led them to take
an active role in clarifying party attitudes. To these men proposals
such as a compulsory school-leaving age of fourteen, improved access
to secondary schools and the introduction of continuation classes
had long been acceptable and necessary. They were, in the words of
the back-bench academic J.A.R. Marriott, 'the commonplace of educational 
23reformers'. Thus although Fisher's bill was strongly based on 
pre-war Liberal thinking, a combination of negative and positive factors 
made its central provisions acceptable to both the major parties.
The general support provided by Unionists for the education bill 
itself took on a variety of forms. Some M.P.s were largely uncritical 
and simply provided practical assistance wherever possible: this 
applied particularly to men such as Sir George Reid in the Commons, 
whose help was later contrasted favourably by Fisher with the attitude 
of many Labour members; and to the Earl of Lytton in the Lords, who
22. The Times Educational Supplement, 4 Jan. 1917.
23. J.A.R. Marriott, 'Educational reconstruction', The Hibbert Journal, 
15 (1917), p.550.
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assumed responsiblity for guiding the bill through its later stages.
A more typical reaction, however, was for Unionist members to welcome
the underlying principles of Fisher's scheme while not hesitating
to criticise individual aspects or clauses. This applied even to
those closely associated with education, highlighting the complexity
of Unionist responses and the difficulties of defining clear-cut sections
of party opinion. Marriott, for example, having pledged his support
for the bill on the second reading, proceeded to vote against the
government on several amendments during the committee stage, especially
those concerned with maintaining parental responsibility, enhancing
voluntary effort and preserving individual liberty through diversity
in educational institutions. The support of Unionists was therefore
tempered on occasions by a suspicion of individual clauses which fell
outside their own educational experience. Marriott was a good example
of this experience as a product of Repton and Oxford, having little
personal contact with state schools as a university lecturer, and
proposing amendments in parliament that clearly reflected the values
pfiof independent or public school education.
The determination of back-benchers to defend deeply held beliefs 
resulted in occasional acts of defiance which threatened party 
political controversy. This was most apparent in the case of two 
amendments: in the first place an attempt by Marriott to cancel out
24. Fisher, An unfinished autobiography, (London, 1940), p.108;
30 H.L. Deb., 5s., c.lOÛü, 23 July 1918: the reception among 
Unionists in the Lords was generally favourable. See also Sir 
G.H. Reid, 'Mr. Herbert Fisher and his chances'. The Nineteenth 
Century, 81 (1917), pp.1144-7.
25. e.g. 106 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.923, 29 May 1918.
26. In his own education he mixed with the 'sons of squires, parsons, 
soldiers, lawyers and other professional men... mostly from good 
homes'. J.A.R. Marriott, Memories of four score years (London 
and Glasgow, 1946), p.21.
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the clause abolishing all fees in elementary schools; and secondly 
in an amendment by the Scottish educationist Sir Henry Craik, moving 
that local authorities should not be charged with providing advanced 
elementary instruction where adequate local provision already existed. 
Both these amendments were couched in terras of preserving diversity 
and choice, although the main underlying motive was a concern to maintain 
the importance of religious instruction by strengthening the position 
of the voluntary schools within the state system. Many Unionists 
regarded the abolition of fees as the removal of a bulwark against 
the introduction of secular education, and Craik's ultimate intention 
was that new higher elementary schools should not overshadow the 
existing equivalent provided by the Church of England and the Roman 
Catholics. The voting pattern on Craik's amendment in particular 
illustrated the existence of an undercurrent of party hostility despite 
the coalition: Unionist critics and supporters of Fisher alike joined 
together to defy the party whip in order to defend religious education, 
but were narrowly defeated by a majority which embraced both government
28and opposition Liberals. As one supporter of Asquith noted, he 
had not intended to oppose the amendment until seeing 'the cloven 
hoof behind it'^^  - an indication of the survival of Nonconformist 
grievances within the divided Liberal ranks. This pattern of voting, 
however, was never repeated and rarely threatened during the course 
of the debates on the education bill. The fact that Craik's amendment 
provided the only example of more Unionists opposing the government 
than supporting it indicated not only the party's attachment to
27. 107 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1590, 2 July 1918; 105 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2044, 
7 May 1918.
28. 105 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.2051-2, 7 May 1918.
29. Ibid., C.2049.
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voluntary schools, but also the widespread backing which the government 
could command.
A more direct challenge to the education bill was evident on
those issues which transcended party lines, notably the reservations
of local authorities and the opposition to continuation classes.
Unionist members were involved in both these movements, although often
as supporters of Fisher who challenged these particular clauses as
representatives of their constituency or interest group. Henry Hibbert,
for example. Unionist M.P. for the Chorley division of Lancashire,
played a leading role in the discussions to amend the administrative
sections of the bill as a member of the County Councils Association,
and he was also prominent in the movement to modify Fisher's scheme
of continuation schools. In alliance with Labour back-benchers from
Lancashire representing the cotton and textile industries, Hibbert
and his associates were responsible for forcing the minister to make
important concessions in the scale of the continuation school experiment
There was nevertheless a clear distinction between Hibbert and the
official spokesmen for industrial bodies such as the Federation of
British Industries. Whereas the latter consistently opposed all
aspects of educational reform, Hibbert had spoken out during the war
on the need for improved education. He denied any suggestion that
Lancashire members were seeking to wreck the education bill, and
himself put forward an alternative plan for continuation schools in
31an attempt to satisfy both educationists and industrialists.^ In 
his capacity as chairman of the Education Committee on the Lancashire
30. Andrews, op.cit., pp.52-4.
31. For further details of Hibbert's views and the alternative scheme 
of continuation which he presented, see below, pp.194-5.
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County Council, Hibbert was also interested in introducing free 
secondary education throughout the administrative county, an idea 
which proved far too advanced for the Board of Education.The 
curtailment of Fisher's initial plan therefore reflected the power 
of vested interests in determining policy, with part of the opposition 
to continuation being channelled through the Unionist Party; for men 
such as Banbury and Peto the result was a cause for celebration, but 
for Hibbert it was more a case of reconciling individual preferences 
with the wishes of constituents. Like his Labour P arty counterparts 
who opposed the continuation schools, Hibbert was guilty of political
oo
opportunism rather than reactionary opinions.
A final distinctive reaction among those Unionists who sympathised 
with Fisher's legislation was to provide active support while claiming 
that the bill could have gone further in improving educational facilities, 
This small body of opinion was spearheaded by Lord Henry Cavendish- 
Bentinck, who took the lead in backing up improving amendments put 
forward by either opposition Liberals or the Labour Party. He was 
the only Unionist to vote against the government on an amendment 
designed to introduce a school-leaving age of sixteen and comprehensive 
maintenance allowances for continuation schools, and himself put forward 
a proposal to restrict the hours of child labour for those attending 
continuation classes.In the latter case Bentinck was supported 
by other Unionists such as J.W. Hills, who spoke of the absurdity
32. H. Hibbert to Fisher, 9 Sep. 1918, P.R.O. ED 24/1640;
N.D. Bosworth-Smith to Hibbert, 12 Sep. 1918, ibid.
33. R.S. Barker, 'The educational policies of the Labour Party, 
1900-1961', unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1968, 
p.84.
34. 106 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.868-76, 29 May 1918. Bentinck was described 
by Fisher as a 'Tory idealist of rare purity and elevation of 
character' - Fisher, op.cit., p.110.
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of 'bringing a boy who is overtired from his work to his school
Both Bentinck and Hills had previously been members of the Unionist
Social Reform Committee, a back-bench pressure group established before
the war with the aim of modernising the Unionists' policy machinery.
The Committee had made little impact on the pre-war party leadership,
although at the end of the war a smaller group of ex-members still
met regularly with the intention of 'acting together' in parliament
This group contained in men such as Charles Bathurst, Mark Sykes and
Edward Wood some of the strongest advocates of the government's bill.
Bathurst, for example, was amongst those who urged the réintroduction
of the bill after it was held up in 1917 and later welcomed the measure
on behalf of agricultural interests; and Edward Wood - in what Fisher
described as the best speech on the second reading - linked the bill
to wider concerns about post-war reconstruction by speaking of the
need to 'repair and recreate the waste of war by such things as health,
37housing and... education'.
The enthusiasm of former Unionist Social Reform Committee members 
provided an obvious contrast to the hostility of Banbury and Peto, 
and illustrated the diverse range of attitudes embraced in Unionist 
circles. Wood, who was later to succeed Fisher as President of the 
Board of Education, in fact made a deliberate point of stating that
35. 106 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2002, 10 June 1918.
36. R.A. Sanders diary, 5 Nov. 1917. See J.A. Ramsden (ed.). Real 
old Tory politics. The political diaries of Robert Sanders,
Lord Rayford, I9IQ- 1935 (London, 1984), p.91. On the role and 
influence of the Unionist Social Reform Committee, see J.A. Ramsden, 
The making of Conservative party policy, pp.15-21.
37. See R. Adelson, Mark Sykes. Portrait or an amateur (London, 1975), 
p.263. For Bathurst*s views, see 'Report of a deputation of M.P.s 
to the Prime Minister', 26 Nov. 1917, Lloyd George papers, F/225/3, 
and 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.382, 13 Mar. 1918. The President's 
comment on Wood is recorded in his diary, I8 Mar. 1918, Fisher 
papers, unclassified.
39
the hostile critics within the party would have little success in 
seeking to reject the education bill outright. This commitment did 
not, however, imply the existence of a closely knit and influential 
social reforming group in Unionist ranks. Edward Wood’s warm reception 
for the bill on the second reading did not prevent him putting the 
voluntary schools before advanced elementary instruction by voting 
with Craik's amendment; and by comparison with the modifications put 
forward by M.P.s such as Marriott, a single amendment relating to 
child labour was not much to show for a body of progressive social 
thinking. In effect the active Unionist supporters of Fisher’s bill 
were an unofficial ginger group, motivated by a combination of personal, 
theoretical, electoral and political considerations, and much more
38
concerned with other aspects of social policy at the end of the war. 
Henry Bentinck had long stood out as a maverick in his party, and 
his imitation of Liberal back-benchers in seeking to go beyond the 
Board of Education’s intentions made him just as exceptional in Unionist 
terms as Banbury at the other extreme. The social reformers, like 
the die-hard element within the party, occupied only a marginal position 
in shaping the most widely held Unionist attitudes towards the state 
education system.
IV
An examination of the parliamentary debates which preceded the 
passage of the 1918 Education Act demonstrates that at the end of 
the First World War there was no easily identifiable Unionist education
38. The main concern was with the creation of a government ministry 
to tackle issues of health, as was indicated in the Sanders diary, 
20 Jan. 1918.
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policy. The main reasons for this were the absence of any direct 
ministerial lead from members of the coalition, which was compounded 
by the fact that no Unionist minister had served at the Board of 
Education since 1905; and the general lack of interest in education 
throughout the party as a whole. The Unionists had paid little attention 
to social issues during the Edwardian period, and after 1914 there 
were few signs of any wholesale change in policies and priorities: 
individual members on occasion played an active part in the movement 
for social reconstruction, but the party overall was preoccupied with 
winning the war and many supported the education bill primarily as 
a means of maintaining co-operation with the Lloyd George Liberals.
The Unionist response to the bill, however, cannot be seen entirely 
in terms of a tactical manoeuvre arising out of the political 
circumstances of 1917. The parliamentary party was unlikely to reject 
a measure agreed by Bonar Law and the party leadership, but it was 
able to express genuinely held views on issues raised by Fisher and 
the Board. These views varied from hostility to warm endorsement 
and indicated many overlapping approaches to educational problems, 
although this does not imply that Unionist opinion amounted to nothing 
more than a disjointed collection of individual views. Despite the 
existence of complex and competing individual attitudes, there remained 
considerable areas of agreement among Unionist M.P.s about the basic 
structure and purposes of state education.
The concern which most clearly united all shades of Unionist 
opinion was the determination to preserve the selective and academic 
nature of the existing secondary schools. Although the public demand 
for this form of education had risen dramatically in the past few 
years. Unionists remained convinced that in order to maintain 
educational standards it must remain a minority provision. Philip
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Magnus, for example, the former Director of the City and Guilds’ London 
Institute, was a prominent Unionist supporter of Fisher, but he still 
warned against the tendency to provide secondary education for increasing 
numbers of working-class children.The retention of fee-paying 
was also regarded as an important means of maintaining the traditional 
functions of the secondary school, a view expressed at one point by 
Banbury’s profession of horror at the idea of secondary education 
being ’given free to people who cannot afford to pay for it’
These beliefs were not always held in such strident fashion, and many 
back-benchers accepted both that the overall number of secondary places 
should be increased in line with public demand and that the provision 
of scholarships and free places would increase correspondingly.^^
The Unionist Party as a whole, however, was agreed that secondary 
education was essentially a training for advanced study at university 
or for a professional career, and must accordingly remain available 
only to limited numbers of gifted children. For the remainder of 
children in the elementary schools. Unionists had given lukewarm 
approval to the principal lines of improvement suggested by the 1918 
Act. The need to improve the upper stages of the elementary course 
through the introduction of advanced instruction had attracted little 
support, and was clearly given a lower priority than the strengthening 
of religious education within the elementary system. Similarly the 
day continuation schools had been accepted by the party as a whole, 
but received no enthusiastic endorsement.
39. F. Foden, Philip Magnus. Victorian educational pioneer (London, 
1970), p.239.
40. 105 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2010, 7 May 1918.
41. See especially the comments of Marriott, Bathurst and Wood on 
the second reading debate.
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The assumptions shared by party members pointed to some of the
wider political concerns of Unionists at the end of the war. Many
back-benchers, for example, expressed their anxiety that in education,
as in other areas, the power of the state was steadily superseding
voluntary initiative. One M.P. unsuccessfully moved an amendment
aimed at making attendance at continuation schools optional, and another
complained that with young people now catered for to the age of eighteen,
'the state will soon be doing something or other for them in the interval
42between that age and the receipt of an old age pension'. These 
complaints were not of course made exclusively by Unionists, but the 
force with which they were expressed indicated some of the party’s 
particular concerns. In the first place, the commitment to the 
educational ’ladder’ - enabling clever children to reach secondary 
education irrespective of social background - was such that any reform 
of the elementary system was considered unnecessary. As the debates 
on Fisher’s legislation indicated, the main interest for Unionists 
in the elementary sphere was to uphold voluntary initiative. The 
continuation schools had been given lukewarm approval, but only as 
a means towards the pragmatic end of fitting young people for their 
working lives. These views, when taken together, imply a wider point: 
that in spite of the wartime concern about social reconstruction, 
the Unionist Party still embraced a limited view of the state’s 
responsibility in promoting reform. In the case of education, many 
of the party’s attitudes had been developed and formulated long before 
1914. Indeed prominent figures such as Marriott, Craik and Magnus 
all had public careers behind them stretching back to the Victorian 
period. The Unionist response to the 1918 Act was thus underpinned
42. J.D. Rees - 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., 0.744, 18 Mar. 1918.
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by a desire to preserve pre-war values. The advances proposed by 
Fisher had been accepted, but it was still expected that policy would 
continue along well-established lines, and that the power of the state 
would not be used to produce any fundamental change in the structure 
of the education system.
Education had not, however, become any more divisive between 
the political parties than it had been before the war. Behind the 
facade of coalition government. Unionists and Liberals were obviously 
entrenched in their views of the dual system - a point reinforced 
in 1918 when the National Liberal Federation committed itself to public 
control of all maintained schools.On purely educational issues 
there was much greater scope for agreement. The Unionist desire to 
extend but preserve the exclusive nature of secondary education was 
shared by Fisher, and it was also agreed that continuation schools 
should be established and that some children at least might benefit 
from advanced elementary instruction. In the meantime, the Labour 
Party's reaction as the third force in parliament had been characterised 
overall by 'cautious support' for the education bill.^^ The most 
obvious divisions over education were therefore not along straight 
party lines. Instead there were distinctions between the minority 
of Unionists who believed that education, in the words of Frederick 
Banbury, 'is so much thrown away'; the broad body of Unionist, Liberal 
and Labour members who sympathised with the education bill, despite 
reservations on particular points; and the small body of Liberal and 
Labour back-benchers who regarded the 1918 Act as inadequate, especially 
in not challenging the horizontal division between secondary and
4 3. Sherington, English education, social change and war, pp.117-8.
44. R.S. Barker,"Education and politics, p.32.
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elementary education.  ^ In the early post-war years, however, these 
shadings of political opinion were to shift considerably, as attention 
in the educational world moved on to the practical difficulties of 
implementing the new legislation.
45. Banbury, 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.435, 13 Mar. 1918. The extent 
of the general consensus of opinion was indicated by the 
parliamentary commentator of Punch, 13 Mar. 1918, who observed 
that the debate on the education bill ’was one long eulogy, 
in various keys, of its author*. Amendments sponsored by the 
Liberals Joseph King and J.H. Whitehouse aimed at raising the 
school-leaving age to sixteen and increasing the provision of 
free places in secondary schools were supported by Labour members 
See Barker, op.cit., p.31.
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CHAPTER 3
educational economy and the formation
OF UNIONIST POLICY, 1918-1924
The enthusiasm which accompanied the passage of the 1918 Education 
Act was overshadowed in the immediate post-war years by a concern 
to reduce expenditure on the social services. In the face of a worsening 
economic recession, many of Fisher's projected reforms were never 
translated into reality, and discussions about the nature of educational 
reform were constantly underpinned by financial difficulties. This 
failure to fully implement the 1918 reforms itself facilitated a greater 
emphasis in the educational world on the problems facing children 
between the ages of eleven and sixteen. The greatly increased demand 
for secondary education far exceeded the number of places available, 
which actually fell as a result of economic difficulties after 1919, 
with the result that thousands of children were confined to the various 
types of advanced courses being evolved in the elementary schools.
The provision of advanced elementary instruction, which had been 
incorporated in Fisher's Act, was also regarded as important because 
many of the older children were already considered to be 'marking 
time' under the elementary curriculum - a problem exacerbated by the 
failure of the continuation schools.^  By 1924 the issue of 'the 
education of the adolescent' thus came to occupy a central place on 
the educational agenda: the selective secondary schools could not 
offer places to all those qualified to attend, and the efforts of
1. G.E. Sherington, English education, social change and war, pp.155-71.
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local authorities to improve their facilities for the older and more 
capable elementary pupils were handicapped by regulation and tradition. 
In these circumstances, party policy-making increasingly revolved 
around the nature and extent of post-elementary instruction and its 
relationship with secondary education; and the aim of this chapter 
is to examine the ways in which the Unionist Party responded to this 
problem in its early stages. This requires examining in turn the 
policies of successive post-war governments: the Lloyd George 
coalition of Liberals and Unionists, which remained in power for four 
years after the 'coupon election'; the Unionist administrations of 
1922 to 1924; and the short-lived Labour government of 1924, which 
marked the eclipse of the Liberals as the second major party in the 
state.
II
For eighteen months after the end of the war, H.A.L. Fisher as 
President of the Board of Education built steadily on the foundations 
laid by the legislation he had recently guided through parliament.
The early establishment of continuation schools was encouraged in 
several areas, and the new percentage grant from the government 
provided an incentive to local authorities to expand their education 
service. During the winter of 1920, however, the social policies 
of the Lloyd George coalition first slowed down and then went into 
reverse. In December 1920 the cabinet suddenly announced that any 
schemes involving increased public spending were to be suspended.
In education this decision was followed by the publication of Circular 
1190, asserting that for the time being the Board of Education would 
consider only urgent local schemes. The drive for economy continued
2. K.O. Morgan, Consensus and disunity. The Lloyd George coalition 
government, 191d-1922 (Oxford, 1979), p.96.
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throughout 1921 in the wake of a worsening economic recession. The 
Prime Minister attempted to tackle this situation by appointing a 
special committee under Sir Eric Geddes to recommend further reductions 
over the whole range of government services; and when this committee 
reported in February 1922, it suggested drastic economies in the education 
estimates amounting to eighteen million pounds.^ These proposals 
aroused widespread opposition and enabled Fisher to soften the effect 
of reductions. When he left office in October 1922 many of the hopes 
of 1918 nevertheless remained unfulfilled: the idea of a national 
network of continuation schools was abandoned, and there were large 
reductions in teachers' salaries and special services for disabled 
children. In view of the prominent role which the Unionist Party 
pls-ysd in the coalition with the Lloyd George Liberals, the reversal 
of educational policy in the immediate post-war years raises important 
questions about the Unionist approach to education, firstly in relation 
to those party members serving in prominent government positions.
The campaign to reduce educational spending was undoubtedly led 
from within the cabinet by Unionist ministers. In particular Austen 
Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer until replacing Law as party 
leader in March 1921, used his position as chairman of the cabinet's 
finance committee to press for large reductions in expenditure.
Chamberlain was, in the words of one colleague, 'not the man for new 
finance', and as early as January 1920 he was complaining to the 
cabinet about 'the immense growth of expenditure in education since
3. B. Simon, The politics of educational reform, pp.37-40,
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the Act of 1918, and the huge liabilities in prospect * At the end
of the year Chamberlain made strenuous efforts to prevent the opening
of the small number of continuation schools for which plans had already
been accepted; and when Fisher's opposition forced him to concede
for the time being, he made it clear that in return the Treasury
expected the education department to make corresponding economies 
5
elsewhere. After the publication of the Geddes Report, it was
Chamberlain - now the Lord Privy Seal - who once more led the assault
on Fisher's plan for cuts of three million pounds as wholly inadequate.
He wanted to implement the full Geddes proposals if possible, arguing
that there was no other way of balancing the budget, reducing taxation
and stimulating trade.^ A similar line was taken by Chamberlain's
successor at the Treasury, Sir Robert Horne, who voiced the claims
of the business community in stating that the recommendations of the
Geddes Report were themselves too modest. After further cabinet
consultations which revealed the difficulties of abandoning the
percentage grant or breaching the legally binding Burnham agreement
on teachers' salaries, Horne was left to announce somewhat reluctantly
in March 1922 that a total reduction of just under seven million pounds
7
was being made in education spending.
4. Sir C. Petrie, The life ^ d  letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen 
Chamberlain (London, 1940), p.134, notes that Chamberlain was reluctant 
to take on the position of Chancellor because of the difficulty of 
curbing national expenditure. The quote by Waldorf Astor about 
Chamberlain is cited in Morgan, op.cit., p.82, who also notes (p.97) 
that the premature retirement of Law tipped the balance decisively 
against the social reformers in the cabinet.
5. 'Expenditure on education', memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to the finance committee, 21 Dec. 1920, P.R.O. CAB 27/71;
A. Chamberlain to Fisher, 30 Dec. 1920, P.R.O. ED 24/1258.
6. Minutes of the cabinet committee on parts II and III of the interim 
report of the committee on national expenditure, 10 Jan. 1922, P.R.O. 
CAB 27/165.
7. 'Education estimates', memorandum by the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, n.d., P.R.O. ED 24/1310; Cabinet minutes, 15 Feb. 1922,
P.R.O. CAB 23/29; 151 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.431-3, 1 Mar. 1922.
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These reductions were generally accepted by the Unionist Party 
as a whole. In January 1922 Lloyd George was warned by Fisher's deputy 
at the Board of Education that to implement the Geddes Report in full 
would lead to considerable opposition in parliament from Labour members, 
both wings of the Liberal Party, and 'a by no means negligible 
proportion of Conservatives - those especially who are interested 
in social reform, and also those associated in the work of local
Q
government'. This forecast was borne out by the complaints of Henry 
Bentinck and Major Ernest Gray, a former President of the National 
Union of Teachers, who argued that 'the axe is altogether far too 
clumsy a weapon with which to attack a delicate organisation like 
the education of the children of this country' The Unionist opponents 
of drastic cuts contributed to the political atmosphere which resulted 
in only the partial implementation of the Geddes Report ; but their 
influence was more than offset by those sections of party opinion 
which threw their weight behind the most far-reaching reductions 
possible. As far back as 1920 a small group of Unionist die-hards 
in the Commons had begun attacking Fisher as an extravagant minister, 
and the force of this view was strengthened as the economic situation 
deteriorated at the end of the year. A specially formed 'Unionist 
Restriction Committee' called for the immediate suspension of the
8. J.H. Lewis to Lloyd George, 17 Jan. 1922, Lloyd George papers, 
F/32/1/31.
9. Bentinck argued that if the Government stopped wasting money in 
Ireland and elsewhere there would be plenty for education -
139 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2224, 21 Mar. 1921. For the views of Gray, 
see 152 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.498, 1 Mar. 1922, and 'Education and 
economv'. The Nineteenth Century, 91 (1922), pp.945-51. See also 
Walter Elliot, ‘The return to'pirty politics'. The Nineteenth 
Century, 90 (1921), p.197: 'an aggressive, orchidaceous, high 
Nationalist, high Protectionist, damnigger Toryism, hacking down 
education and research to feed the guns, would meet no more 
devoted opponents than the Conservative members Mr. Hills and 
Mr. Ormsby-Gore'.
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Education Act, and a parliamentary ccmmittee chaired by one of the
leading Unionist die-hards. Colonel John Gretton, attacked the percentage
grant for creating a ’vicious circle of divided financial responsibility'.^^
The die-hards provided support during 1921 for Lord Rothermere's Anti-
Waste League, which alarmed the government with a series of by-election
victories; and they subsequently greeted the findings of Geddes with
calls for the implementation of 'the Report, the whole Report, and
11nothing but the Report'. By this stage, however, the influence 
of the die-hard voice was receding, partly because the cry for economy 
had come to be accepted by nearly all sections of Unionist opinion.
The most characteristic party response after 1920 was simply to regard 
economies in education, as in all fields of public spending, as 
inevitable once economic recession had set in. This view was held 
most strongly by the industrialists and businessmen who arrived in 
the Commons in such large numbers after the 1918 election, but it 
applied equally to many of those who had earlier supported Fisher.
J.A.R. Marriott, for example, now warned against the financial 
implications of the Education Act: he believed that Austen Chamberlain 
was not sufficiently alive to the need for retrenchment, and he later 
defended the reductions which followed the Geddes Report as 'inevitable
I 12and necessary'.
10. e.g. Sir Henry Page-Croft, founder of the right-wing National 
Party - 131 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2591, 15 July 1920; The Daily 
Telegraph, 10 Nov. 1920; Seventh report of the select committee 
on national expenditure, Cmd. 24d (1920).
11. M. Cowling, The impacT^of Labour, 1920-1924 (London, 1971), esp. 
DO.45-59; The Spectator, 1b Feb. 1922.
12. J.A.R. Marriott,' ‘An Historic budget?', The Nineteenth Century, 
85 (1919), p.1219; 153 H.C. Deb., 5s., C.Ü03, 27 Apr. 1922.
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The Unionist Party thus played a central role in the events which 
overtook the education system in the post-war years. In order to 
preserve the position of the coalition, Lloyd George had little 
alternative other than to concur with the demands of his leading 
cabinet colleagues once the severity of the economic situation became 
clear. The Unionist Party in parliament, which far outnumbered the 
Liberal supporters of the coalition, quickly became impatient with 
the government's inability to face up to the new circumstances. At 
the beginning of 1921, the government only narrowly avoided defeat 
on a set of departmental estimates at the hands of Unionist dissidents; 
and the insistence of the Treasury under Chamberlain about stopping 
the continuation schools was underpinned by the belief that without 
such a step, the cabinet would be unable to 'show their Unionist supporters
IQ
any saving on educational expenditure'. In the final analysis, 
however. Unionists were the loudest but not the only advocates of 
economy. The belief that reduced public spending was essential in 
order to lower taxation, free money for the expansion of trade and 
in turn alleviate unemployment, embraced all sections of political 
opinion in the early 1920s. Within the government. Liberal ministers 
such as Fisher questioned only the scale, not the necessity for, economies; 
and in parliament, the demands for reductions became so widespread
14that one commentator referred to the Commons as a 'House of Economists'.
The economy measures which overshadowed the final years of the Lloyd 
George coalition resulted in an absence of discussion about the general 
principles of educational reform. In 1920 for example, the important
13. Morgan, op.cit., p.104; L.A. Selby-Bigge to Fisher, 11 Dec. 1920,
P.R.O. ED 24/1258.
14. 'National expenditure on education', memorandum by Fisher, 1 Jan. 
1921, P.R.O. ED 24/1257; Punch, 22 Dec. 1920.
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report of a departmental committee under Hilton Young into scholarships 
and free places at secondary schools went largely unnoticed by the 
political parties,  ^ The repercussions of economy did, however, 
facilitate one move which highlighted the problems of education for 
the adolescent in 1922. In the aftermath of the failure of continuation 
schools, the Labour publicist R.H. Tawney provided a radical new 
assessment of the necessary direction of reform in his seminal work. 
Secondary education for all. Tawney expressed the belief of the Labour 
Party's education advisory committee that in place of the present 
divided system all children should receive primary education to the 
age of eleven, followed by a course of secondary education, equal 
in quality and prestige to that already in existence and conducted 
under regulations for 'higher', rather than 'elementary' schools.
Hence by 1922 Labour appeared to offer a clear alternative to the 
two major parties: Fisher and the Liberals now stood alone in their 
commitment to the discredited continuation schools, while the Unionist 
Party fell back upon an extension of the 'ladder' as the primary object 
of education policy.
15. Report of the departmental committee on scholarships, free places 
and maintenance allowances, Cmd.968 (1920). This suggested that 
three quarters of the child population were capable of benefiting 
from secondary education, although the medium term target it 
proposed was twenty secondary school places per thousand of the 
population. It also advocated an increase in the minimum number 
of free places in grant-aided secondary schools from 25% to 40%.
See G. Sutherland, Ability, merit and measurement: mental testing 
and English education 1ÜÜ0-194U (forthcoming).
16. R.H. Tawney (ed.), Secondary~education for all (London, 1922).
Tawney did not mean education for all in the existing secondary 
schools, rather a distinct course or phase of secondary education 
after the age of eleven, conducted in a variety of types of school. 
The term 'secondary' was thus coming to have two uses in the 1920s, 
and as the idea of a secondary stage of education developed, so 
existing secondary schools were increasingly called grammar schools. 
Hereafter 'secondary' refers to the grammar schools unless otherwise 
stated. The terms 'advanced elementary instruction', 'post- 
elementary' and'post-primary' all refer to children aged over 




The collapse of the Lloyd George coalition brought the Unionist 
Party to power in its own right for the first time since 1905. The 
new government was to remain in office for little more than a year 
before being defeated in a further election called on the tariff issue, 
although during this period responsibility for education policy now 
rested with a Unionist minister, Edward Wood. The administration 
of Bonar Law and his successor in May 1923, Stanley Baldwin, provides 
the first opportunity to examine the educational policies pursued 
by Unionists at ministerial level between the wars; as distinct from 
the attitudes and opinions expressed by different sections of the 
party. The worst features of Unionist involvement in educational 
affairs have certainly been detected in Edward Wood’s term as President 
of the Board of Education. The official biographer of Wood, later 
the first earl of Halifax, has noted that he was preoccupied with 
hunting on the family estates in Yorkshire, and that civil servants 
were largely responsible for the conduct of policy. Wood himself 
had ’little, if any, interest in educational problems, past or 
present’. T h i s  assessment has been used as part of a wider attack 
on the Unionist approach to state education, particularly in relation 
to expenditure. The uninspired administration of Law and Baldwin, 
it has been claimed, did nothing to reverse the policy of strict 
economy in public spending pursued by the coalition, and it required 
the advent of a Labour government in 1924 to relieve economy and point 
the way to future educational developments.^^ The combination of
17. Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax. The life of Lord Halifax (London, 
1965), p.149. This was later confirmed by a colleague of Halifax - 
see Lord*Butler, The art of memory (London, 1982), p.31.
18. Simon, op.cit., pp.bb-Yl. ~
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personal and political arguments has tended towards the conclusion 
that Edward Wood was one of the least successful occupants of the 
Board of Education The object of this section is to modify such 
claims by placing Wood's terra of office within the context of the 
existing economic and political conditions, and by tracing the response 
of Unionists to the new concern with the education of the adolescent.
The idea of Wood's indifference to education has been, if not
exaggerated, then at least mis-stated. The Halifax family had always
possessed a strong whig and liberal tradition, and after entering
parliament as the Conservative member for Ripon in 1910, Wood had
become associated with the younger, progressive wing of the party.
Before the First World War he was a member of the Unionist Social
Reform Committee, and he remained loyal to the traditions of this
group by standing out in 1918 as one of the staunchest Unionist
supporters of Fisher's Education Act. Wood welcomed the Act as a
measure of social reconstruction, and he particularly favoured the
provisions designed to improve elementary education: the abolition
of the half-time system of child labour, the raising of the school-
leaving age to fourteen, and the establishment of part-time continuation 
20schools. A few months later Wood published a short work entitled 
The great opportunity, which confirmed his awareness of the problems 
facing the education system. In this he argued that the educational 
ladder, which allowed children from the elementary schools to advance 
to the grant-aided secondary schools, needed to be broadened for the
19. D.W. Dean, 'The political parties and the development of their 
attitude to educational problems, 1918-1942', unpublished University 
of London M.Phil thesis, 1968, p.62.
20. A.C. Johnson, Viscount Halifax (London, 1941), pp.86-7; Viscount 
Halifax, Fulness of days CLondon, 1957), pp.84-7. For Wood on 
the 1918 Act, see above/ p.38.
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in education. The concern with foreign affairs which dominated his 
later career had already become a nmjor political interest, reinforced
was typical of the gentleman amateur in politics, preferring his 
estates to the duties of public office. This did not mean, however, 
that he would prove an unsuccessful minister, or that he could not 
be identified with a particular section of Unionist opinion. Bonar 
Law s choice of ministers was of course partly restricted in November 
1922 by the refusal of the Conservative coalitionists to take office 
after the Carlton Club meeting, but in view of his party's lack of 
interest in education, Edward Wood went to the Board of Education 
with a better claim than most Unionists and with a past record of 
supporting modest reform.
When Wood arrived at the Board, prospects for any major reforms
in education were not encouraging. This was partly due to the low 
political priority of education, especially under a Unionist government. 
The President himself had to wait several months before he was allowed 
the assistance of a junior minister. ’On the advice of the Treasury*, 
the Prime Minister informed him, ’I have hitherto gone on the supposition 
that it would not be necessary to fill the post of Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Education. My idea has been that this is 
one of the posts in regard to which we mi^t economise ’. The advice 
of the Treasury was of course the most powerful restraint on educational
21. Sir George Lloyd and Edward Wood, The great opportunity (London, 
1918), pp.92-3.
22. Bonar Law to Wood, 22 Nov. 1922,'Bonar Law papers, H.L.R.O. 
111/32/153.
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'sexpenditure, and this points to the economic context in which Wood': 
policy must be considered. After the Geddes 'axe' had fallen on 
education earlier in the year, many of the problems facing the coalition 
had been passed on, and the change of government did not affect the 
seriousness of the economic position. The Unionists in fact inherited 
a prospective budget deficit of sixty five million pounds in 1922, 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer made it clear that further reductions 
in the spending of all departments were necessary simply to avoid 
increased taxation.^3 In these circumstances Wood could do little 
more than imitate his predecessor Fisher, who since early 1921 had 
been reduced to the role of resisting Treasury demands for further 
spending cuts. In the face of such clearly defined financial constraints. 
Wood’s work as an education minister must be judged firstly by his 
inclination and ability to stand up against the Treasury.
The concern with economy which overshadowed Wood’s term at the 
Board of Education brought the minister into conflict with Treasury 
officials on several occasions. The most prominent of these, in terms 
of its possible implications for educational finance, concerned the 
moves to introduce parliamentary legislation in 1923. The coalition 
government had earlier sponsored an economy bill which contained clauses 
designed to give legislative effect to the educational proposals of 
the Geddes committee. The main recommendation was for a reduction 
of parliamentary grant, in effect overriding the obligation of the 
Exchequer to pay a percentage of all approved local authority spending.
The introduction of a separate education measure to pursue this idea 
was considered when the Unionists came to office, but Wood took a 
firm stand against any form of legislative reduction. He was influenced
23. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin: a biography (London, 1969), 
p.127.
57
at this stage by the views of the Municipal Reform (Conservative) 
majority on the London County Council, who had long campaigned for 
the introduction of the percentage grant; and he informed the cabinet 
that local authorities were already subject to restrictions on their 
spending and would resent a violation of the 1918 Act which placed 
greater authority in central government.The President’s argument
I
eventually secured the withdrawal of the offending clause, despite 
protests from the Treasury that the prospect of tighter control over 
educational expenditure was being abandoned.
The pattern of this incident was repeated later in 1923, when 
Baldwin’s decision to call for a general election was preceded by 
an investigation into the possible ways of adjusting the educational 
system to counter the effects of juvenile unemployment. Wood responded 
by calling in the first place for a small advance in secondary 
education. In particular the President sought to make up the recent 
reduction in secondary admissions by amending the Board’s policy on 
free places, which remained fixed at a minimum of twenty five per cent 
in every grant-aided school, despite the advice of the Hilton Young 
Committee. In practice the decline in total admissions was automatically 
resulting in fewer free places, and in July 1922 the cabinet had declared 
that the existing proportion of these places in each individual school 
should not be increased. Wood sought to improve this situation by 
requesting a more flexible attitude from the Treasury, but at first 
he received only an unpublicised assurance that free places could 
be increased in areas of particular economic hardship. In the
24. ’Economy (miscellaneous provisions) bill’, memorandum by the 
President of the Board of Education, 25 Jan. 1923, P.R.O. CAB 
27/211.
25. G.L. Barstow to Selby-Bigge, 18 Jan. 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/989.
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discussions on juvenile unemployment, the President repeated his 
suggestion as part of a scheme ’to give rather more freedom in the 
working of well-established educational principles which we have been 
constrained to check under the stress of e c o n o m y T h e  Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, subsequently agreed that an 
extra five thousand free places could be created in order to prevent 
many able children from becoming competitors in the labour market
In the context of juvenile unemployment. Wood also concentrated 
on the issue of maintenance allowances for children receiving advanced 
instruction in the elementary schools. The acute shortage of places 
in the existing secondary schools had intensified the efforts of local 
authorities to provide advanced courses, but the reliance of many 
families on the industrial earnings of their children often resulted 
in failure to attend senior classes or central schools. The 1918 
Act had made only limited provision for the payment of allowances 
to maintain children for longer periods at school, and in the aftermath 
of the Geddes axe the Treasury had further insisted that spending
28on this service should remain static for at least three years.
Wood argued against this decision in cabinet discussions at the end 
of 1923. He claimed that the case for maintenance allowances and 
remission of secondary school fees was far stronger in the existing 
climate of unemployment, and he referred to the number of children
29
debarred by poverty from attending courses of advanced instruction.
26. Wood to N. Chamberlain, 31 Dec. 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1645.
2 7. Report of the cabinet juvenile unemployment committee (chairman, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer), Jan. 1924, P.R.O. CAB 27/228. 
For a fuller discussion of the government’s approach to juvenile
unemployment, see below, pp.203-4. ,
2 8. This decision was publicised by Board of Education, Circular 1265,
6 June 1922.
29. Wood to Chamberlain, 31 Dec. 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1265.
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The Chancellor was persuaded by Wood that it was necessary to remove 
restrictions on the provision of maintenance allowances in order to 
avoid a hostile reaction among local authorities. This further success 
for the President was once more secured in the face of protests from 
Treasury officials, in this instance over the cost of an extensive 
system of state grants and allowances.
In the event the President's ideas for an increase in free places 
and maintenance allowances were not implemented by the Unionist government, 
Instead the cabinet decided to reserve judgement on this and other 
aspects of policy, as the election defeat of December 1923 made the 
government's survival improbable. This failure to carry out the 
proposals does not, however, detract from their importance in highlighting 
the distinction between the determination of the Treasury to reduce 
spending and the willingness of Wood to defend his departmental 
interests. In the circumstances of continuing financial restrictions, 
the President's concern to defend at least the framework of the 1918 
Act meant that his whole term of office was overshadowed by the struggle 
to wring small concessions from the Treasury. Even Wood's political 
opponents noticed that he introduced the reduction in the education 
estimates for 1923 with mixed feelings; and shortly before leaving 
the Board, he increased the figure prepared by civil servants for 
the following estimates on the grounds that further reductions would 
be unacceptable to local authorities.^  This limited and defensive
30, Report of the cabinet juvenile unemployment committee (chairman,
the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Walter Guinness),
15 Dec. 1923, P.R.O. CAB 27/228. _  ^
31 See the speeches of Morgan Jones (Labour) and Fisher (Liberal)
‘ in 164 H.C. Deb., 5s., co.1523-35, 31 May 1923. Wood's suggested 
increase in the estimates was recalled later in 'Board of Education 
estimates 1925-1926', memorandum by H.W. Orange, 6 Dec. 1924,
P.R.O. ED 24/1290.
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role in resisting Treasury encroachments itself reflected the 
assumption that deflationary measures offered the only remedy for 
dealing with industrial and economic recession. Wood himself believed 
that it was not possible to think of spending unlimited sums of public 
money when the nation was bankrupt. He told one party colleague that 
'It IS difficult, if not impossible, to set a term to the educational 
expansion that is theoretically possible and even desirable. Any 
educational administrator, therefore, who seeks to pursue counsels 
of moderation will inevitably, wherever he draws the line, be the 
target of attack'.The tone of Edward Wood's approach to educational 
finance was thus set by a combination of economic orthodoxy and 
commitment to moderate reform; his declared aim was to apply limited 
funds to the best advantage by steering a middle course between those 
enthusiasts who called for unlimited spending, and those reactionaries 
who argued that money was being wasted on state education.
During Wood's term of office the Unionist Party in parliament 
inclined towards the latter rather than the former view. There were 
individual back-benchers who complained about the likely effects of 
further reductions in spending, such as Oliver Stanley, one of a small 
group of younger Unionist M.P.s calling for a more positive approach 
to social policy overall.These complaints, however, were isolated 
and echoed only by those traditionally identified with the education 
issue: in particular Henry Bentinck and Nancy Astor, who was shouted 
down at the party's annual conference in 1922 for suggesting that 
unless educational facilities were improved, thousands of children
32. Wood to E. Cadogan, 13 Dec. 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1757.
33. 162 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.804, 29 Mar. 1923.
34. 0. Stanley, 'The kaleidoscope of Socialism', The Nineteenth Century, 
93 (1923), p.829.
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turned out of school at fourteen would become 'red-hot Socialists'.^^
The short shrift given to Astor's views pointed to the pressure which 
Wood came under from the opposite extreme of party opinion - those 
who advocated further cuts in expenditure to meet the national emergency, 
These attacks occurred both in parliament and behind the scenes, 
notably when a deputation of Unionist back-benchers visited the Prime 
Minister in July 1923 to air their grievances. The deputation included 
many of the die-hards who had called for the full implementation of 
the Geddes Report, and the general tone was set by John Gretton, who 
spoke of the 'wild plan of expenditure which had been launched, by.
Mr. Fisher's Act*. The remedies favoured by members of the deputation 
were voiced by its leader, Francis Harrison, an expert in currency 
affairs who argued that the overriding importance of reducing taxation 
necessitated changes in all aspects of the minister's policy. He 
was particularly outspoken on elementary education, where he called 
for a raising of the school entry age to six and the reduction of 
grants to special schools, on the grounds that 'mentally deficient 
children would probably be better killed' . Harrison further claimed 
that he could have mustered at least two hundred Unionist M.P.s to 
support his deputation, althou#i it was unlikely that such a number 
shared his extreme views. The extent to which the die-hards felt 
compelled to press their case suggests that unlike the period associated 
with the Geddes axe, when the cry for economy had been taken up by
35. Untitled notes, n.d. (1922), Astor papers, 1416/1/6/88; National 
Unionist Association, Annual Conference minutes, 1922, p. 10.
36. 'Report of deputation of Conservative Members of Parliament to 
the Prime Minister', 11 July 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1259. On the 
parliamentary criticism of Wood, see for example Sir William 
Davison, M.P. for Kensington - 159 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.3127,
14 Dec. 1922, and Davison (Lord Broughshane) papers, Kensington 
and Chelsea Central Library, 2nd. series, vol.4, pp.85-6.
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a u  sections of the party, there was no longer a widespread commitment
to extreme reductions. With Edward Wood carefully holding the line
between the two extremes, there was little reason for the broad body
of Unionist opinion to complain. As one newspaper noted, for the
majority of party members, the 'safe middle way is so broad and 
obvious'.
The concern with economy dominated Wood's terra at the Board, 
but it did not entirely preclude discussion of the underlying trend 
and assumptions of education policy. In particular, the need to improve 
education for the adolescent was becoming an increasing focus of 
attention. The secondary schools were unable to accommodate many 
of those qualified to attend, and the elementary schools were continually 
handicapped in providing advanced instruction; and the inadequacy 
of adolescent education which this situation produced had of course 
been the theme of Tawney's recent initiative on behalf of the Labour 
party. Edward Wood, although he did not address the question of the 
relationship between the two separately administered forms of state 
schooling, was conscious of the new problems facing the adolescent.
The great opportunity had already indicated his desire to make secondary 
education more accessible, and in office Wood's declared aims were 
to reverse the decline in secondary admissions while ensuring that 
no child of adequate intellectual merit was debarred by poverty from 
attaining the best education the state could provide. When asked 
whether he intended to provide universal secondary education at no 
cost or to allow free secondary schooling only to brilliant working- 
class children, the President replied that these two alternatives 
were not exhaustive and that he was not prepared to embrace either
37. The Daily Telegraph, 2 June 1923.
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of them. The proposal to increase the number of free places at 
the end of 1923 was a direct reflection of Wood’s view of secondary 
education, through such means he hoped to make the selective tradition 
of secondary schooling compatible with a broader base for the educational 
ladder. By the time he left office, Wood had taken a small step in 
this direction by securing in the face of Treasury opposition a slight 
increase in the number of secondary school places.
The President's policy towards the secondary schools, which
reflected the traditional Unionist adherence to the idea of the ladder,
was accompanied by a recognition of the need to improve post-elementary
instruction as an essential part of policy towards the adolescent.
The continuation schools established under the 1918 Act had already
been effectively abandoned before Wood arrived in office, and financial
circumstances made it equally unlikely that school life would be
extended by an increase in the compulsory leaving age. Wood himself
warned against the expense of such a measure, which he knew was
40unacceptable to both Board officials and Unionist opinion, although 
he remained flexible when this issue was raised at local level. Several 
requests to raise the school-leaving age locally under the terms of 
the 1918 Act had been rejected during Fisher's last year at the Board, 
and Wood's desire to reverse this trend by allowing one local proposal 
to go ahead in 1923 was in fact prevented only by the intransigence 
of the Chancellor.In the meantime, the President preferred advanced 
instruction as the best means of improving the upper stages of the
38. 159 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1221, 4 Dec. 1922.
39. Board of Education, Report of the Board of Education for the year 
1922-23, Cmd.2179 (London, iy24J, p.iu. '
40 Report of the Chancellor's juvenile unemployment committee,
Jan. 1924, P.R.O. CAB 27/228.
41. Chamberlain to Wood, 26 Sep. 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1537.
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elementary system. His advocacy of increased maintenance allowances
reflected a belief that the central schools in London offered a suitable
means of providing children with something better than ordinary
42
elementary education. In this context Wood also referred to the 
need to face up to the problems of the ’dual system’ : the existence 
of church schools alongside local authority provision was likely to 
obstruct the spread of advanced instruction as the voluntary bodies 
lacked the financial resources to make improvements - an important 
recognition by a higb church Anglican in view of the party’s attitude 
in 1918.^  ^ A final indication of Wood’s interest in post-elementary 
reform was provided by the approval he gave for an investigation into 
adolescent education, other than in the secondary schools, by the 
Board of Education's Consultative Committee in December 1923. This 
incident highlighted the limitations and significance of Wood's 
approach: he characteristically played no part in originating the 
idea of a national investigation into post-elementary reform, the 
development of which in 1923 was negligible; but a new concern for 
reform was being taken on board by the Unionist party for the first 
time, and Wood was to refer to the importance of the Committee's
. 44
investigation long before its findings were published in 1926.
Edward Wood's term at the Board of Education appeared to many 
in the educational world as an extension of the period of restrictions 
associated with the Geddes axe. Circular 1190 was not withdrawn, 
and many of the provisions of the 1918 Act remained inoperative.
42. 164 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1510, 31 May 1923.
4 3. Ibid., C.I507. See below, pp. 154-6 , for an account of Wood's 
policy towards the church schools.
44. Wood's reference to the investigation in 1924 was made during
the estimates debate - 176 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1182-3, 22 July 1924.
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the minister personally had displayed little genuine 
interest in educational problems. He did refer in vagie terms to the 
or an educated democracy, and he clearly attached considerable 
value to religious instruction as the basis of any schooling; but 
for the most part Wood had been content to echo the views and policies 
of leading officials at the Board. These limitations must, however, 
set against the political and economic constraints of the period, 
especially the power of the Treasury in restricting the spending of 
all departments. By putting forward departmental views in defiance 
of the Treasury, Wood was responsible for a slight shift in official 
Unionist policy towards the adolescent. The privileged position of 
the secondary school was still to be defended, but for the first time 
a Unionist minister promoted the idea that this was not incompatible 
with the development of advanced elementary instruction. This shift 
went unnoticed by many Unionists, who played little part in the formation 
of policy and were more concerned that Wood complied with the government's 
cautious i m a g e i t  nevertheless provided the basis for a Unionist 
policy towards the adolescent to rival the aspirations of the Labour 
Party, which now took charge of the nation's educational affairs for 
the first time.
IV
The formation of the first Labour government early in 1924 coincided 
with a significant improvement in the financial conditions affecting 
the education service, owing to both a fall in school numbers and 
the termination of the government's obligation to assist ex-service
45. J.A. Ramsden, The age of Balfour and Baldwin, p. 177.
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students. As a result Wood’s successor at the Board of Education,
Charles Trevelyan, immediately secured the withdrawal of Circular 
1190 and set about 'reversing the engines' after three years of extreme 
stringency. The Labour government's policy towards the adolescent 
represented something of a compromise between two views held within 
party ranks: the egalitarianism of Tawney and Labour's education advisory 
committee, which now sought to go beyond Fisher's Act, and the more 
meritocratic tradition which had defended the framework of the Act 
and still regarded the improvement of access to the superior standard 
of the secondary school as a primary object of policy. Trevelyan, 
who had affinities with the progressives Liberals prominent in their 
criticism of the 1918 Act, began by planning to increase the number 
of secondary school places, doubling the target of attainment to 
twenty places per thousand of the population. He did not adopt Hilton 
Young's suggestion of providing forty per cent of places free of charge, 
but he did introduce a special grant for any free places awarded in 
excess of the present minimum, and also made known his willingness 
to consider plans from authorities who wanted to abolish fees altogether. 
In the sphere of elementary education, Trevelyan was less successful 
in encouraging local schemes to raise the school-leaving age to fifteen, 
and he concentrated instead on providing administrative backing for 
advanced elementary instruction. Tawney and his associates had originally 
condemned the development of senior classes and central schools as 
'reformism', as they were invariably conducted by law under the inferior 
elementary regulations. The popularity of such development in the 
educational world, however, led the advisory committee to drop their 
objections; and during the year many local authorities began submitting 
schemes of development which included provision for advanced instruction.
46. Simon, op.cit., pp.78-84.
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Unlike many of his colleagues, Trevelyan was considered to be a success 
when the short-lived Labour administration came to an end in November
1924.47
The Unionist response to Uüxxir policy in 1924 was to produce 
a more detailed statement of aims zuid priorities than in any previous 
party pronouncement. The recommendations put forward in the Unionist 
election manifesto at the end of the yer themselves represented a 
rare example of different sections of the party working together in 
order to formulate policy. This process was itself part of the wider 
stimulus to policy-making and organisation provided by the shock of 
electoral defeat in 1923: as one newspaper declared in March 1924, 
more thinking about the nature of Unionism had taken place since Labour 
came to power than in the entire previous decade.The party leadership 
now established a 'shadow cabinet', with former ministers and leading 
members presiding over a system of parliamentary committees which 
sought to devise more coherent policies for a whole range of issues.
In the case of education, Edward Wood played an important advisory 
role, although he was now giving greater attention to the problems 
of agriculture; and this absence of a strong lead from national leaders 
allowed a greater influence than hitherto for back-benchers, organised 
for the first time in the 'Unionist Education Committee'. In addition 
to this group, ideas also filtered upwards from a body of teachers 
sympathetic to the Unionist cause who, after being called together 
at the party's Central Office early in 1924, decided to form the 
'Conservative Teachers'Advisory Committee'. Under the leadership
47. R.S. Barker, Education and politics, pp.40-55.
48. The Times, 14 Mar. 1924. ~
49. J.A. Ramsden, The making of Conservative Party policy, pp.22-5.
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of C.W. Crook, a prominent member of the National Union of Teachers 
as well as a Unionist M.P., this committee ensured that the party's
manifesto in 1924 contained a commitment to obligatory salary scales
50 '
for teachers. It also provided backing for the policy now espoused
towards the adolescent: an increase in the number of secondary school
places, with a corresponding increase of scholarships and free places,
and the development of central schools and other forms of advanced
elementary instruction.^ ^
The Unionist manifesto indicated a general willingness to accept
the main lines of Labour education policy. From the opposition benches,
Edward Wood agreed with Trevelyan's emphasis on the need for continuous
national advance, and added that 'there is really no big ground of
controversy on the educational field at the present moment by which
we are divided '. On behalf of his party, Wood accepted the need for
an expansion of secondary places, which Trevelyan had adapted from
the findings of the Hilton Young Committee; and he referred to the
central schools as the best means of remedying the inadequate provision
made for the majority who attended elementary schools. It was in
this context that Wood noted the importance of the investigation
52currently being undertaken by the Consultative Committee. These 
views were echoed by other Unionist spokesmen such as Annesley 
Somerville, an ex-master at Eton and a figure who was to remain
50. On the Unionist education committee, see the later comment of
R.P. Hudson to Nancy Astor, 1 Dec. 1926, Astor papers, 1416/1/1/198. 
For the C.T.A.C., see C.W. Crook to Cap. H. Jessel, 17 Nov. 1923, 
P.R.O. ED 24/1757; The Teacher's World, 12 Nov.1924; and The 
Times Educational Supplement, 9 Jan. T926, which recounts the 
origins of the group and claims that it was influential behind 
the scenes in the drafting of the 1924 manifesto.
51. National Unionist Association, Tracts and leaflets, no.2443, 
Baldwin's election address (London, 1924).
52. 176 H.C. Deb.7 5s., cc.fT74-82 , 22 July 1924.
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influential in the parliamentary education group throughout the inter­
war period. Somerville illustrated the close connection which had 
arisen between front- and back-bench opinion in opposition by emphasising 
the urgency of both more secondary schools and an extension of the 
London central schools in order to tackle the problems of education 
and unemployment for those between eleven and fifteen.This response 
was characteristic of the absence of parliamentary criticism which 
persisted throughout the short period of Trevelyan's tenure of the 
Board of Education. The extent to which party priorities overlapped 
in 1924 was recognised by the Labour minister himself, who observed
that the Unionists had objected very little to the spirit of his 
54administration.
V
The six years after the end of the First World War had produced 
minor changes in Unionist Party policy and attitudes towards education. 
At ministerial level, Edward Wood had provided a lead by encouraging 
the development of advanced elementary instruction, thus widening 
the party's previously exclusive concern with the traditional secondary 
school. This initiative had not been received enthusiastically by 
Unionists as a whole, but this did not mean that the party's approach 
consisted of uniform hostility. The configuration of party views 
remained in fact highly complex. At one extreme, a minority of die- 
hards continued to oppose reform in an uncompromising fashion. 
Trevelyan's estimates in 1924 were interrupted by one M.P. who, on
53. Ibid., C O .1218-20. Somerville's position as the acknowledged 
leader of the education group in the Commons was later noted in 
Education, 8 Jan. 1926.
54. The Times, 20 Oct. 1924.
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behalf of industrial interests, condemned the high level of education 
spending 'root and branchConversely, a small number of back­
benchers were critical of successive governments for not pursuing 
a sufficiently active policy. Bentinck and Astor stood out in this 
context, emphasising their distinctiveness in 1924 by proposing private 
members' bills aimed at raising the school-leaving age to sixteen.
A greater sympathy for the minister was shown by a further identifiable 
group: those involved in education as local authority representatives 
or teachers, now organised along more formal lines both inside and 
outside parliament. For many Unionists, however, the key concern 
in education since the war had been to hold down expenditure in difficult 
financial circumstances. The majority of party members were in fact 
either indifferent to educational issues or - by virtue of their back­
ground and experience of private education - incapable of addressing 
the problems of the state system. This was illustrated most conspicuously 
by Sir Martin Conway, M.P. for Cambridge University, who in the course
of a rambling speech in 1924 concentrated primarily on his recollection
57of 'the days of his youth, when ambitious boys ran away to sea'.
Unionist opinion in the early 1920s showed few signs of encouraging 
a more active role by the state in promoting educational reform.
The post-war years had important implications finally for education 
as a political issue. The emergence of education for the adolescent 
as a key issue had in particular helped to clarify party policies.
In comparison to the debates on the 1918 Act, when cross-party agreement 
had been frequent, the experience of sustained economy hardened divisions
55. Harry Becker - 176 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1215, 22 July 1924.
56. The Times Educational Supplement, 1 Mar. 1924; The Times, 11 Aug,
79241
57. Punch, 30 July 1924.
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and made it possible to identify specific party approaches to the 
adolescent. The Liberal Party alone continued to place faith in the 
continuation school: Fisher maintained that with parents still
dependent on the industrial earnings of their children, it was necessary 
to combine full-time training for limited numbers in secondary schools 
with part-time training for the majority at continuation classes.
The Liberals, however, had been displaced in 1924 by the Labour farty, 
which sought the extension of free secondary education and the 
reorganisation of the elementary system, ultimately to a point where 
all adolescent education would be of equal standard.^ 9 The Unionists, 
by contrast,. had accepted the need to provide more places in the 
secondary schools, but were still unclear as to how far and in what 
ways the benefits of post-elementary instruction should be extended. 
Despite these obvious differences, the actual course of events in 
the immediate post-war years was dictated by a variety of political 
and economic factors, in particular the financial downturn which 
took place after 1919. The practical constraints of government in 
fact produced a degree of continuity in the policies of successive 
administrations, with ministers from each of the three main parties 
espousing the development of secondary and post-elementary education 
in the face of persistent economic difficulties. In 1924 Lord Eustace 
Percy, who served as Parliamentary Secretary at the Board of Education 
under Edward Wood, was able to claim that the need for continuous
58. See Fisher's conments during the estimates debate, as well as 
his article, 'Lines of educational advance'. Contemporary Review, 
124 (1923), pp.443-4.
59. Barker, op.cit., p.55.
60. The emphasis in party literature was still focused on the secondary 
school, e.g. National Unionist Association, Looking ahead (London, 
1924) p.12. The party's concern with this was reflected in the 
fact that the only mild criticism of Trevelyan in 1924 concerned 
the possible dilution of grammar school standards through the 
hasty extension of scholarship places - see Sir Charles Yate,
175 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.573, 26 June 1924.
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advance proclaimed by Trevelyan had already been recognised by the 
previous Unionist administration.^  ^ Percy was soon to have the 
opportunity of demonstrating his commitment to a policy of continuity, 
for he was to succeed Trevelyan as President of the Board after the 
subsequent defeat of the Labour government.
61. 176 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1255, 22 July 1924.
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chapter 4
EUSTACE PERCY, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND 
*THE EDUCATION OF THE ADOLESCENT*, 1924-1929
The problems of how best to educate children in their adolescence, 
which had come to occupy a prominent position in educational debate 
after the First World War, continued to provide a focus of attention 
during the second half of the 1920s. With the failure of the 
continuation schools and the persistent scarcity of secondary school 
places, particular interest centred on possible ways of improving 
the education of older children in the public elementary schools - 
the subject of a thorough investigation by the Board of Education's 
Consultative Committee. The findings of this investigation, which 
were eventually published in the influential 'Hadow Report' of 1926,' 
did much to popularise the idea that elementary and secondary education 
should be regarded not as distinct types of schooling, but as successive 
stages of the same process. This new and more widespread interest 
in the relationship between two forms of education hitherto divided 
along lines of social class produced no radical departures in policy; 
and the responsibility for this has been primarily attributed to the 
Conservative government elected in 1924 and in power until May 1929.
This government, it has been claimed, not only set its face against 
the main findings of the Hadow Report, but also launched a fresh 
offensive against educational expenditure in an attempt to control 
public spending, thereby demonstrating the party's contempt for state 
schooling.^
1. B. Simon, The politics of educational reform, pp.84-141; N. Middleton 
and S. Weitzman, A place tor everyone, pp.lb2-5.
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The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the existing 
accounts of Baldwin's second government, more so than any other period 
between the wars, provide an over-simplified account of education 
as a party political issue. Ihe argument pursued here does not seek 
to overturn completely the well-established outline of the interest 
in educational reform shown by the political parties. Many members 
of the Conservative Party, which dropped the name Unionist in 1924, 
continued to display little interest in social issues: this applied 
both at the leadership level - in the cabinet and at Central Office - 
and throughout the lower ranks of the party nationally and locally.
An attitude of indifference reflected in part the low political priority 
accorded to education, which was not considered to be a vote-winner 
in the same way as other aspects of social reform in the period such 
as housing or unemployment benefit.^ This low political priority 
provides the basic context in which Conservative education policy 
must be considered; and to it should be added the perennial difficulties 
posed by the power of the Treasury and the well-established views 
of leading civil servants at the Board of Education. When these 
constraints are taken into account, it becomes possible to establish 
an alternative framework for analysing education and politics, in 
which some at least of the existing assumptions about Conservative 
policy in the 1920s must be modified. This framework can be established 
by concentrating in the following account on the policies of the 
Conservative minister who served continuously at the Board of Education 
after 1924, Lord Eustace Percy. His term of office fell into three 
broad phases: the first year after the electoral victory of 1924; 
the period of late 1925 and 1926, which was overshadowed by the
2. B.B. Gilbert, British social policy, 1914-1939 (London, 1970), 
p.viii.
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threat of major reductions in spending; and the two years following 
the publication of the Hadow Report. One general issue united and 
underpinned each of these three stages - the issue known to 
contemporaries by the general term 'the education of the adolescent'.
II
The immediate post-war years had witnessed two party initiatives 
to tackle the problems of education for the adolescent. The Liberal 
Party under H.A.L. Fisher had promoted the idea of compulsory 
continuation schools, although the attempt to introduce part-time 
instruction for all children leaving the elementary schools at fourteen 
on a national scale had proved unsuccessful. In the aftermath of 
this failure, the Labour Party now offered a more direct challenge 
to the horizontal division between secondary and elementary education 
in the form of Tawney's Secondary education for all. The Conservative 
Party, by contrast, embraced neither of these policies, although Edward 
Wood's term of office had indicated a slight post-war shift in party 
opinion - still defending the privileged position of the secondary 
school while recognising the need to provide advanced elementary 
instruction. The idea of two successive stages of a single process, 
linking primary and secondary education, bore little relation to the 
educational realities of the early 1920s, though it is against such 
a standard that Conservative policy during the period has usually 
been condemned. The election of Baldwin's Conservative government 
in October 1924, for example, is said to have marked the return to 
a long-term strategy of containment after the advances planned by 
the previous Labour administration. Lord Eustace Percy, depicted 
as an undistinguished education minister whose aristocratic background
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made him incapable of understanding the needs of the state schools, 
reinforced this strategy from the outset by dismissing a Labour Party 
motion in parliament calling for some form of secondary education 
for all children up to the age of sixteen.^  The idea of a negative 
strategy of containment towards the adolescent, in both the existing 
secondary schools and the advanced stage of elementary education, 
is central to criticisms of Conservative policy between the wars.
It provides the main connecting theme of this chapter, and requires 
examination firstly with reference to Eustace Percy's early months 
at the Board of Education.
After a distinguished academic record at Oxford and an early
career in the diplomatic service. Lord Eustace Percy - the youngest
son of the seventh duke of Northumberland - had entered politics as
a Municipal Reform member of the London County Council. In 1921 he
was elected to parliament as Conservative member for Hastings, and
quickly received promotion to junior ministerial positions at the
Ministry of Health and the Board of Education. Percy soon became
identified with a sharp intellect and a vigorous, sometimes abrasive,
manner in political debate: Trevelyan was later to refer to his 'well
4developed facility for disintegrating political co-operation'. His 
rapid rise to the cabinet as President of the Board of Education in 
1924 - becoming the youngest member of Baldwin's team of ministers - 
was partly due to the lack of interest shown by Conservatives in
3. Simon, op.cit., p.117.
4. 202 H.CV DeBT, 5s., c.1064, 16 Feb. 1927. This was a judgement 
formed after Labour's attitude towards the government's education 
policy had changed - see below, pp. 87-9 . Percy's style did, 
however, cause some misgivings even among his Conservative colleagues, 
such as F.E. Smith, Lord Birkenhead, who thought him 'somewhat
of an intellectual snob' - R. Rhodes James (ed.). Memoirs of a 
Conservative. J.C.C. Davidson's memoirs and papers, 1910-1937 
(London, 19b9J, p.^ 02.
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education, and the absence of suitable alternatives after Edward Wood 
had opted for the more congenial post of Minister of Agriculture.^
At the same time, Percy also had the personal backing of the Prime 
Minister, which itself derived in part from an identification with 
the more progressive elements of the Conservative Party. Like many 
young party members who had experienced the war, Percy believed that 
Conservatism needed to be redefined if it was to survive, becoming 
more flexible in economic and social policy in particular. His 
attitude towards education was underpinned by the belief - which like 
much else he shared with his Liberal predecessor Fisher - that the 
creation of an educated democracy was essential to the stability of 
an advanced industrial nation.  ^ These views brought Percy particularly 
close to the Prime Minister, in outlook if not in temperament ; and 
he brought to office Baldwin's preference for national priorities 
over class prejudices. This approach was necessary in education,
Percy later recorded, as the elementary schools in the 1920s were 
'as much "finishing" schools for manual workers as Miss Pinkerton's 
academy was a finishing school for young ladies; and a "class" education 
of this kind was coming to be increasingly suspected and resented'.
In Eustace Percy, the Board of Education had acquired a Conservative 
minister with an unusual degree of interest in social reform; an
7
advocate of Baldwin's 'New Conservatism'.
5. K. Middlemas (ed.), Thomas Jones : Whitehall Diary (London, 1969), 
p.301, records that Baldwin asked whether there was anybody in 
the party sufficiently interested to take up the post.
6. Eustace Percy, Some memories (London, 1958), esp. ch. VI;
P Gatland 'Conservative radicals and the search for a new policy 
in Britain', London University Ph.D. in preparation, confirms 
Percy's association with dissatisfied back-benchers in 1921 and
1922.
7. Percy, op.cit., p.95; Ramsden, op.cit., chs. 9 and 12 - for an 
analysis of Ehe meaning and impact of 'New Conservatism'.
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new President s main concern in his early months at the Board 
was to pursue the idea of continuous advance in national policy towards 
the adolescent, as expounded in 1924 by Trevelyan. Shortly after 
coming to office Percy informed the Permanent Secretary, Selby-Bigge, 
that he wanted to avoid any breach of continuity with his predecessor's 
policy while holding down expenditure for some time, pending the 
réintroduction of the idea contained in the 1918 Act that local 
authorities should submit planned schemes of educational development
g
for their areas. One of the President's first actions was to cancel, 
primarily on administrative grounds, the special grant introduced 
by Trevelyan to encourage free places in addition to the minimum 
required in state-aided secondary schools.^  This, however, marked 
the only real departure from Labour's policy. Thereafter Percy both 
extended traditional secondary education by creating eight thousand 
new school places within a year, and consolidated the regulations 
which encouraged the reorganisation of elementary schools into junior 
and senior departments with a break at the age of eleven.This 
policy led the Board of Education to sanction a larger amount of capital 
expenditure than in any year since the war, and reflected the small 
adjustment which had taken place in Conservative thinking towards 
the adolescent. For the time being the new minister could claim 
simultaneously that selection would remain, despite the increased 
number of grammar school places, and that the most pressing need of
8. Percy memorandum to the Secretary, 15 Nov. 1924, P.P.O. ED 24/1290.
See also The Times, 29 Nov. 1924, for Percy's public emphasis on 
the need for continuity.
9. Board of Education, Circular 1352, Free place grant, 9 Feb. 1925.
10. Percy to T. Jones, 19 Jan. 1926, Duchess of Atholl papers, Blair 
Castle, Scotland, file 3, where the minister reviews his early 
months at the Board. See also Board of Education, Circular 1350,
28 Jan. 1925; and Circular 1358, Programmes of educational development, 
31 Mar. 1925.
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the education system was to improve the upper stages of the
unreconstructed elementary schools.^ ^ There were signs that in the
latter context Percy would go beyond his initial preoccupation with
selective central schools as the best means of improving elementary
instruction. In April 1925, when the House of Commons discussed the
Labour motion in favour of a secondary course for all children over
the age of eleven, the President referred to the relevance of his
administrative regulations and added that his aim was to provide advanced
instruction for all children where possible. Far from dismissing
the Labour motion, Eustace Percy took the responsibility for ensuring
that Conservative back-benchers withdrew their own more limited
amendment, thereby enabling the motion to be carried with the blessing
12of both major parties.
The motion sponsored by Conservative M.P.s in April 1925 provided 
a clear indication of the extent to which party opinion lagged behind 
official policy. In pursuing the idea of continuity, Percy had 
attracted a measure of support from Conservatives in parliament, 
especially those most actively involved in the educational world and 
those who had stood out against the drastic economies of the Geddes 
p e r i o d . For the most part, however, the trend of the minister's 
policy was greeted with scepticism and sometimes alarm. Lord Hugh 
Cecil in particular, an important figure in the party, made a savage
11. The Times, 7 Feb. 1925; 186 H.C. Deb., 5s., 0.2454, 23 July 1925.
12. 182 H.lT'Deb., 5s., cc.2381-2, 8 Apr. 1925. Brian Simon (op.cit., 
p.117), says that Percy dismissed the Labour resolution as being 
merely''pious', although what he said was that both Labour and 
Conservative 'resolutions were pious, 'not in the sense of being 
hypocritical but in the sense of being very far-sighted and looking 
very far ahead'.
13 See, for example, the support given by Annesley Somerville, a
prominent member of the education group in the Commons - 18b H.C.Deb., 
5s., C.2553, 23 July 1925.
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attack on what he perceived as the 'doctrine of educational
equalitarianism', arguing that to provide 'equality of opportunity
for unequal persons is like providing equal buttonholes for unequal 
14
buttons'. Cecil's concern with maintaining privilege and hierarchy
was equally evident in the debate of April 1925, when Conservative
members concentrated on the need to widen access to the grammar school
rather than improving standards for the majority.This reflected
the continuing strength of the pre-war idea that the extension of
the educational ladder alone provided an adequate policy. The Morning
Post, perhaps the most strident of the party's supporters among the
national newspapers, encapsulated this view when it claimed, 'an
educational ladder that the talents shall be free to climb is one
thing; but a system which is based on the assumption that schooling
for all can profitably be extended beyond a very elementary level
1 f \
is both wasteful and futile '. In denying this proposition, Eustace 
Percy was pursuing his policy towards the adolescent in spite of, 
rather than because of, the views of his party colleagues.
The President's personal contribution must of course be set 
against other factors which dictated the nature of the government's 
policy during Percy's first year at the Board of Education. In this 
context, the relaxation of extreme financial restrictions during 1924 
had been crucial in allowing cautious progress. The carefully 
articulated views of leading officials at the Board, notably the
14. Ibid., cc.2383-4. _ _ . ,
15. The Conservative amendment called for the provision of sufficient 
secondary schools with an adequate number of free places, the 
provision of central schools to accommodate all those primary 
school pupils... who are not accommodated... and facilities for 
transfer' - 182 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2365, 8 Apr. 1925.
16. The Morning Post , 24 July 1925.
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long-serving Permanent Secretary, were also vital to the shaping of
policy, especially in view of Percy's inexperience. Nevertheless,
the manner in which the minister had taken up and extended Edward
Wood s approach had important implications for the politics of education.
In party terms, there remained obvious differences between the
intentions of Secondary education for all and the policy of the Board,
and still more Conservative Party opinion as a whole. The Labour
Party wanted to improve access to the existing secondary schools by
abolishing fees wherever possible, and in the long-term hoped to
create a new and equitable school system for all children over eleven.
By contrast, Percy had been reluctant to encourage a rapid increase
of free places in the grammar schools, and in so far as he advocated
advanced instruction for all adolescents in 1925, he was against the
17introduction of one 'dead high school level'. These distinctions 
must, however, be considered alongside the similarities which existed 
in practice between the Conservative minister and his Labour predecessor. 
The policy of both administrations was shaped by a complex combination 
of political, economic and administrative pressures. In broad terms, 
both were concerned to meet the increased public demand for secondary 
education by working towards the standard of twenty places per thousand 
of the population, as set by the Hilton Young Committee; while at 
the same time tackling the inadequate provision for the remainder
18
of adolescents by encouraging all forms of post-elementary instruction. 
This element of continuity was reflected in a deliberate absence of 
parliamentary criticism by the Labour opposition in 1925, sn education 
official who visited Labour's annual conference was even informed 
by prominent party members of their private belief that the
1^. Perc^to wt'^ChurchmJ^D^o! 1924,7!L’o. ED 24/1389, outlines 
these broad similarities as part of the process of continuity.
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Conservatives at last supported educational reform.With Eustace 
Percy in office, the differences between the parties operated within . 
a framework which accepted the importance of opening up secondary 
education and improving the general standard of elementary instruction.
Ill
The settled nature of educational politics was interrupted in
November 1925 by a sudden campaign for economy, signalled by the
publication of a notorious Board of Education circular to local
authorities. This document. Circular 1371,' proposed an immediate
reduction in spending and the replacement of the existing method of
financing the education service; and has been depicted as a return
to the philistine policy of retrenchment associated with the Geddes
axe of the early 1920s. The withdrawal of the circular some months
later was the result of sustained public protests and is said to have
owed little to the President of the Board of Education, whose continued
attempts to introduce a restrictive block grant system marked one
of several identical efforts between the wars to gain full control
20of educational finance in the interests of economy. The second 
year of the Baldwin government, and in particular the episode of 
Circular 1371, therefore raises the question of whether Eustace Percy 
complies with the model of Conservative ministers as agents of the 
Treasury intent on restricting expenditure; and how far the events 
qF the period altered the government's policy towards the adolescent.
19 'The present educational position', memorandum by the Duchess 
* of Atholl, 26 Feb. 1926, Baldwin papers, Cambridge University
Library, vol.10, f.33.
20. Simon, op.cit., pp.86-112.
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A reversion to the restrictions associated with the Geddes Committee 
was clearly threatened when the economy took a new downturn during
5, and.the Treasury announced a large prospective budget deficit.
The Treasury's obsession with a balanced budget had of course acted
as the most powerful restraint on government spending since the end
of the war, and the education department in particular was unlikely
to receive encouragement from the new Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Winston Churchill's feelings about education reminded Eustace Percy
of 'Person's famous comment on Gibbon's attitude to Christianity;
he seemed to "hate it so cordially that he might seem to revenge some
personal injury'". Percy added that this contempt was partly the
result of a lack of interest in local, as opposed to national, affairs:
'whether it were the extension of the great Manchester College of
Technology or the improvement of what he once described to me, in
one of his baroque moments, as "village schools with a few half-naked
children rolling in the dust". Churchill's country owes much to his
baroque moods, but it is unfortunately not a style of architecture
that suits educational building'. The insurance scheme which
Churchill supported in 1925 could itself only go ahead if other spending
departments were restricted for at least two years; and in addition
to this, the Chancellor himself chaired a cabinet committee after
July 1925 which was set up to remedy the budget deficit by securing
23economies in all departments. The Board of Education's approach 
to educational finance during this period must be considered within 
a twin context: the low political priority which education traditionally
21. D.E. Moggridge, British monetary policy, 1924-1931 (Cambridge, 
1972), pp.141-2.
22. Percy, op.cit., pp.96-7.
23. H. Polling, Winston Churchill (London, 1974), ch.15.
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received was now to be set alongside renewed pressure in Whitehall 
for economy.
The Board's circular was the direct result of the cabinet
committee's request for a large reduction in the 1926 education estimates
The President reacted initially by outlining three possible methods
of making large savings, each of which was open to serious political
objection. He added that the conmittee's demand would involve a period
of restriction at odds with the party's election manifesto, and urged
the government to face up to the fact that increased spending on
higher education, in which he included senior elementary as well as
P4secondary schools, was inevitable. Churchill remarked in turn that 
the President's proposals should be adopted if it was intended to
oc
create the maximum amount of political discontent. This set the
tone for a long series of heated debates in the cabinet committee.
Percy continued to claim that educational expenditure could not be
stabilised at its present figure, and at one point the Secretary of
State for India, F.E. Smith, accused the education minister of favouring
increased taxation as an alternative to economy.One government
27member noted the 'F.E. atmosphere' in the cabinet, which was likely 
to work against the Board of Education in discussions on economy.
Treasury officials insisted upon a large, immediate reduction in 
spending; and in order to provide notice of this intention to local
24. 'A general memorandum on alternative methods of reducing educational 
expenditure' , memorandum by the President of the Board of Education,
2 Nov. 1925. P.R.O. ED 24/1198.
25 Cabinet standing committee on expenditure, 5th meeting, 10 Nov.
1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/303.
26. Cabinet standing committee on expenditure, 5th meeting, 12 Nov.
27. BaroA iTOiA to Marquis of Salisbury, 9 Got. 1925, fourth Marquis 
of Salisbury papers, Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, 4M 123/4.
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authorities about to submit three year programmes of development, 
it was agreed to issue a circular.
The two main proposals of Circular 1371 provided an important 
insight into Eustace Percy's overall strategy for education. The 
demand for immediate reductions of at least two million pounds threatened 
severe disruption to the elementary schools, althou^ at the same 
time this did not imply an abandonment of the Board's policy of post- 
elementary reform. Percy made it clear in the cabinet discussions 
that he wanted any review of local authority spending to be based 
on the three year progranmes due to commence in April 1927 - this 
procedure had been deliberately revived in order to allow continuous 
educational development and prevent periodic economy campaigns.
The Treasury's insistence upon immediate reductions overruled the 
President's wish, but the published circular nevertheless made a point 
of stressing that there would be no return to the indiscriminate economies 
associated with the Geddes era. It argued instead that a review of 
existing services was now essential, 'if the Nation is to be able 
to finance new projects designed to provide additional facilities 
for Higher Education and to improve the instruction of the older 
children in Elementary S c h o o l s ' . Hence the original proposals 
presented by Percy and rejected out of hand by Churchill, the complex 
series of draft documents to the cabinet and even the final version 
of Circular 1371 were all based on the same assumption: that any short 
term restrictions on the education service would not entail the 
abandonment of the policy embodied in the administrative regulations
of 1925.
28. Cabinet minutes, 25 Nov. 1925, P.R.O. CAB 23/51.
29 Cabinet standing committee on expenditure, 6th meeting, 12 Nov
1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/303.
30. Board of Education, Circular 1371, 25 Nov. 1925.
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The second objective of the circular was to introduce a block
grant in place of the existing obligation of the Exchequer to pay
a percentage of all approved expenditure of local authorities. As
far back as 1923, when serving as a junior minister at the Board,
Percy had argued against the retention of the percentage grant. He
believed that 'no system could possibly be devised outside "Alice
in Wonderland" which could so certainly ensure the promotion of
expenditure without the promotion of educational improvement'.^^
As President he only agreed to issue a circular on the condition that
it would be the first step towards replacing the percentage grant:
the aim was to introduce a block grant based on the legitimate
expectations of local authority spending on the adolescent. This
plan was arbitrarily proposed without consulting those who would have
to administer the system locally, but was nevertheless at variance
with the Treasury's advocacy of a grant independent of possible
expenditure and explicitly designed to encourage local authorities
in making economies. These differences resulted in further disputes
within the government, with Percy arguing for the introduction of
his version of the block grant to coincide with the commencement of
the local authority programmes. It was eventually decided in 1927,
however, that education grants would continue on a percentage basis
and would not be incorporated in the Minister of Health's forthcoming
34reform of local government.
31. 'Possibilities of financial decontrol', memorandum by Percy,
9 May 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1326; 189 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.17l6,
17 Dec. 1925. . . . . .
32. See Percy's attitude in the cabinet committee and his later comments 
in, for example, his correspondence with Churchill, 12 Apr. 1926,
P.R.O. ED 24/1198.
33. 'Board of Education estimates', note by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 26 Oct. 1925, P.H.O. CAB 27/305.
34 For the role of the Parliamentary Secretary in this episode, see 
‘ Duchess of Atholl to Baldwin, 19 Jan. 1927, Baldwin papers, vol.4, 
f.15; and the Duchess of Atholl, Working partnership (London,
4958), p.158.
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In the meantime, the publication of Circular 1371 caused a storm
of protest among educationists and in the labour movement. This
was even given voice by Conservative back-benchers in
parliament, where several members - including those identified with
the progressive ginger group known as the Y.M.C.A. - abstained from
voting on a Labour motion attacking the circular.The sustained
level of protest, and subsequent discussions with local authority
representatives, soon convinced Eustace Percy that it was not possible
to hold down the 1926 estimates at the level provisionally set by
the cabinet committee. At this point he urged the Prime Minister
to recognise the need to launch an education programme involving
'substantial extra expenditure'.^^  Baldwin, however, was still being
pressed to make reductions by Treasury officials, and sought a
compromise by the appointment of a special committee under Lord Colwyn,
who had arbitrated in an earlier dispute over departmental estimates.
When this committee recommended large scale economies throughout the
education service, the President dismissed the idea of indiscriminate
cuts as 'a waste of time', and threatened to resign if any such
37proposals were introduced. This threat carried Percy's approach 
in cabinet to its logical conclusion, and was enough to secure the 
support of the Prime Minister, who was unwilling to lose one of his 
closest supporters. The infamous circular was then withdrawn in March
35. The Conservative protests in the Commons were led as usual by Nancy 
Astor, who laid all the blame for reactionary measures on Churchill; 
she was shouted down when claiming that most of her colleagues 
realised that the circular was a 'crashing blunder' - 189 H.C. Deb., 
5s. C.1771, 17 Dec. 1925. Astor abstained from voting on the
Labour motion along with younger members such as Duff Cooper, 
although the only Conservative back-bencher to vote against the 
government was C.W. Crook, Secretary of the Conservative Teachers
Advisory Committee. ^
36. Percy to Baldwin, 18 Dec. 1925, Baldwin papers, vol. 't. f-56.
37 'Report of the Colwyn committee', 16 Feb. 1926, P.R.O. CAB 27/305; 
Percy to Baldwin, 17 Feb. 1926, Baldwin papers, vol.4, f.71.
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1926, after causing considerable alarm but little practical damage 
to the schools. The estimates were set by the Board of Education 
at the same figure as in the previous year, and the Treasury was left 
to design alternative methods of holding down expenditure.^^
The events surrounding Circular 1371 highlighted the political 
and economic constraints within which education policy had to be framed 
in the mid-1920s, The main thrust for economy in Whitehall had been 
made by the Treasury, and the tension which this produced with the 
Board operated throughout the entire period of Baldwin’s administration. 
Winston Churchill had first complained that the education department 
was resisting economies in December 1924, and after the experience 
of the circular, he expressed his private concern that 'they are 
determined - as Percy has repeatedly avowed - to commit us to very 
much larger expenditure and to a new extensive programme before this 
Parliament is over'.^  ^ Treasury officials were equally concerned 
about the financial implications of education policy in general since 
the end of the war; and towards the end of the government's term of 
office the Chancellor was still attacking 'Lord Useless Percy', as 
he called him, for outlining the largest projected increase among
38. Cabinet standing committee on expenditure, I6th meeting, 26 Feb. 1926, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/303; Board of Education, Memorandum on the estimates, 
1927 Cmd.2885 (London, 1927). Brian Simon claims that the 
government's economy bill of 1926 represented a further devious 
attempt to enforce economy and supersede the percentage grant, but 
that after the withdrawal of the circular, its provisions lapsed.
In fact the economy bill, which was not as far-reaching as its 
predecessor of 1922, came into force and was used to clarify certain 
duties of local authorities by disallowing expenditure such as 
duplicate aid to secondary schools and maintenance allowances beyond 
the statutory limit. See Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
1926, 16 & 17 Geo.5.
39. Churchill to Percy, 4 Dec. 1924, P.R.O. ED 24/1389; Churchill to 
Baldwin, 28 Mar. 1926, Baldwin papers, vol.4, f.87.
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hadthe spending departments.*0 %e publication of the circular 
certainly demonstrated the President's inexperience and arbitrary 
political style, especially on the block grant issue, which was still 
being reviewed by an official committee under Lord Meston. Churchill 
mentioned his suspicion of an attempt to emulate the practice of Lord 
Haldane, who had once discredited the advocates of army retrenchment 
by staging a ceremony at which the King bade farewell to a disbanded 
battalion of Scots Guards. Percy later admitted, however, that the 
hasty publication of his circular was more influenced by a saying 
of Theodore Roosevelt, that all unpleasant political fences should 
be taken at a gallop.The frustration of Treasury aims in 1926 
was not entirely fortuitous, although this impression was no doubt 
fostered by the consequences of Eustace Percy's impetuosity, which 
were to damage his own political reputation, to obscure his concern 
for improving the education of the adolescent, and to undermine the 
support of the labour movement for his policies.
IV
The remainder of Eustace Percy's terra at the Board of Education 
was dominated by the Hadow Report. The Board's Consultative Committee 
under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Hadow, Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield 
University, had been conducting a long investigation into education 
for children over eleven in the public elementary schools; and its
40. 'Lord Eustace Percy's memorandum on education policy', minute 
by A.W. Hurst, 20 Dec. 1926, P.R.O. Treasury papers 161/247
s.26524/2; Churchill to Clementine Churchill, 30 Oct. 1927, cited 
in M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Companion vol.V, Pt.1,
The Exchequer years, 1922-29 (London, 1979), p.1082.
41. Percy, Some memories, pp.97-8.
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influential report published in December 1926, The education of the 
adolescent, recommended that many of the developments now taking place 
locally should become national practice. The compulsory school-leaving 
age should be raised to fifteen within six years; a stage of primary 
education to the age of eleven should be followed by a distinct course 
of post-primary instruction for all children, either in grammar schools, 
central schools (to be renamed modern schools), or the senior departments 
of existing elementary schools; and ultimately all adolescent education 
should be governed by similar statutory regulations.^ ^ The government's 
response to this comprehensive report has been harshly criticised.
The Labour Party's enthusiasm for a document which echoed much of 
its own policy has been contrasted with Percy's dismissal of the need 
to raise the school-leaving age and his alleged mis-definition of 
the concept of post-primary reform. By simply dividing the elementary 
schools into junior and senior departments, the President was said 
to be constructing a new post-primary system still based on the inferior 
regulations for elementary education, and so perpetuated in a more 
subtle and mischievous fashion the distinctiveness of elite secondary 
schools. These claims must be considered firstly in connection 
with the Board of Education's immediate reaction to the Hadow Report, 
which under Percy indicated an intimate connection between extending 
school life and reforming the post-primary system.
In December 1926 the education minister informed Sir Henry Hadow 
that he was unable to give a firm date for raising the school-leaving
42. Board of Education, Report of the Consultative Committee on the 
education of the adolescent lLondon, 192b), pp.87-92. For a 
full discussion of the background and implications of the Hadow 
Report, see B. Doherty, 'The Hadow Report, 1926', Durham Research 
Review, 4, 15 (1964); R.J.W. Selleck, 'The Hadow Report: a study
in ambiguity', Melbourne Studies in Education (1972); and J. Firmager, 
'The Consultative committee under the chairmanship of Sir Henry 
Hadow: the education of the adolescent', History of Education,
10, 4 (1981).
43. Simon, op.cit., pp.125-37.
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age. He argued that his whole policy towards the adolescent had started 
from the recognised assumption that many children were already 'marking 
time in the upper stages of all-age elementary schools; to extend 
compulsory attendance before the general standard of eleven plus 
education had been improved would simply compound the problem.'*'*
This attitude lay behind Percy's criticisms of both the Labour Party, 
for becoming obsessed with the 'red herrir^ ' of the school-leaving 
age after 1926; and his own Conservative colleagues, for proposing 
at the annual conference in 1927 to dissociate the party from any 
desire to extend the school course. Percy’s proposed amendment to 
the conference resolution asserted that the government should continue 
to prepare for the next advance in compulsory attendance by improving 
and extending the post-primary curriculum. The chairman of the conference 
noted that the delegates - anxious to support the government following 
the General Strike - were prepared to vote for the minister's amendment 
despite being very unsympathetic.^ Hence there was an important 
distinction between the attitude of the party, aware of the electoral 
unpopularity of raising the age, and the policy of the minister, 
conscious of the practical difficulties inherent in a proposal he 
did not regard as the major priority. Percy's real error in the short­
term was once more that of political judgement, saying the wrong thing 
at the wrong time. He later recorded that his refusal to set a firm 
date had been unnecessary, when the school age issue 'could have been 
allowed to remain, what it had long been in the teaching profession.
44. Percy to Sir Henry Hadow, 16 Dec. 1926, reprinted in The Times 
Educational Supplement, 8 Jan. 1927.
45. National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations (N.U.C.U.A.), 
Annual Conference, minutes, 1927, pp.43-4; Sanders diary, 10 Nov.
1927 - J.A. Ramsden (ed.). Real old Tory politics, p.234.
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a cherished aspiration the attainment of which must be postponed for 
severely practical reasons'.
In the meantime the President gave a much warmer reception to
the ideas for post-primary reform embodied in the Hadow Report, pointing
out that the division of elementary schools into junior and senior
departments was already taking place under his earlier administrative 
47
regulations. In 1928 the Board went one stage further by issuing
a pamphlet entitled The new prospect in education, which formally
committed the government to a wholesale policy of 'Hadow reorganisation'
the division of all public elementary schools into junior and senior
departments with a break at the age of eleven. Local authorities
were urged to introduce four year courses of senior education for
all children within five years, when further consideration could be
48given to the necessity of raising the compulsory leaving age. The 
adoption of Hadow reorganisation marked the most important shift in 
Conservative policy towards the adolescent during the 1920s. Instead 
of pressing for advanced elementary instruction for limited numbers 
in central schools, the government now officially advocated a distinct 
course of education for all children over eleven, although important 
sections of party opinion were still unconvinced of the merits of 
this r e f o r m . The unrecognised novelty of Eustace Percy's strategy 
after 1927 lay in his realisation that the administrative logic of 
Hadow reorganisation would ultimately prove insufficient, especially
46. Percy, op.cit., p.100.
47. 202 H.C. DeBT, 5s., c.1059, 16 Feb. 1927.
48 Board of Education, Pamphlet No. 60, The new prospect in education
(London, 1928). See also Board of Education, Circular 1397,
18 May 1928. c . n
49 This applied both at national and local level. See below,
pp. 250-1 , for the example of the Conservative controlled London
County Council.
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as it left untouched the thorny problem of the relative status and
functions of the various post-primary schools. In this context the
Labour Party had recently reversed its attitude towards central schools,
which generated much more intense feelings of injustice than the senior 
50
departments. As long as the central schools remained inferior in
staffing, equipment and accommodation under the elementary regulations,
it was difficult to justify the claim of The new prospect that these
schools did not simply provide a cheap substitute for real secondary
education. Percy sensed that this situation could only be remedied
by abolishing higher and elementary education as separate statutory
categories, so bringing the regulations into line with developments
in post-primary education since the war. In May 1927 he suggested
to his civil servants the need for legislation in the present parliament
defining elementary education as ending at the age of eleven: this
would not resolve the exact status of the modern schools proposed
by Hadow, but it would help to remove the stigma of social inferiority
81attached to the central schools. By the time of the 1929 general 
election, the President had refined his ideas on reshaping the law 
into a policy which was to be presented to the electorate as 'higher 
education for all'.
Throughout 1928 Percy investigated ways of amending the law, 
as he told one cabinet colleague, in the direction 'of getting rid 
of the statutory distinction between Elementary and Higher Education 
and substituting for it a distinction between Primary Education up
President described as 'one of my provocative minutes'.
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to 11 and various forms of Secondary Education after that age'.^^
As the election came closer, the Parliamentary Secretary at the Board
of Education, the Duchess of Atholl, urged the minister to proceed
cautiously. The Duchess had for the most part given Percy quiet
and unobtrusive support for his policies, with the exception of the
block grant issue; but at this stage she sided with cautious officials
and pointed to the serious obstacles - administrative, religious,
financial and political - which stood in the way of a move towards
'higher education for all* The restructuring of the administrative
system of local education authorities, for example, was certain to
provoke strong resistance from those non-county boroughs with powers
over elementary education only. With his plans at such an early stage,
Percy was able to do little more than encourage the trend whereby
the so-called 'Part III Authorities' transferred their powers to the
county councils, thereby hoping that they would not prove intractable
54when legislation was brought forward. The church schools posed
an even more fundamental problem, for experience had shown that any
attempt to alter the balance of the religious settlement enshrined
in the 1902 Act raised the possibility of reviving denominational
bitterness. Percy nevertheless faced this issue, and during 1928
began devising ways of reaching a new agreement on the religious issue
55as an essential part of an amendment of the law.
52. Percy to Sir L. Worthington-Evans, 15 Mar. 1928, Worthington-Evans 
papers, Bodleian Library, Mss. Eng. Hist, c.896, fos.5-6.
53. Atholl to Percy, 18 Mar. 1929, Atholl papers, file 41.
54. The President was aware of this problem from an early stage.
See for example, Percy to Worthington-Evans, 28 Jan. 1928, P.R.O.
ED 24/1408.  ^ 1
55. For a fuller discussion of Percy's approach to the voluntary
schools, see below, pp. 160-72.
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The major problem which the President faced in a political context 
was the obvious lack of sympathy for his ideas within his own party.
In the cabinet the main opposition came from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, who warned of the ultimate cost of a measure which would 
stimulate demands for the abolition of fees in higher education and 
the assimilation of teachers' salaries. The Minister of Health,
Neville Chamberlain, was also a fierce critic, and made powerful claims 
on any available funds for his department in the belief that Conservative 
opinion favoured more spending on housing and health but economies
56in education. This judgement certainly applied to the parliamentary
party, which as a whole remained indifferent to educational issues ;
in 1928 the estimates debate was interrupted by a Labour M.P. who
questioned whether it was in order to continue when - with the exception
of Percy and Atholl on the front-bench - there were no Conservative
57members in the chamber. The President could command some backing 
from those party members closely identified with education. The loosely 
organised education group in the Commons, for example, the successor 
of the Unionist Education Committee, supported Percy's attitude towards 
the Hadow Report by calling on the Board to take 'all practicable 
steps to develop a system of post-primary education for children 
over 11'.^ ® This group, however, formed only a small section of the 
large body of M.P.s which swelled the government's majority; and in
56. Cabinet minutes, 12 Mar. 1929, P.R.O. CAB 23/78; Percy, op.oit.,
P • 95 •
57. 217 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1124, 16 May 1928.
58. The motion was introduced by three members of the group:
Somerville, Edward Cadogan and Robert Hudson - 202 H.C. Deb.,
5s c 1036, 16 Feb. 1927. Lady Astor was the only Conservative 
to*vote with the opposition on the Hadow Report, and her complaints 
so exasperated Percy that he called her 'very ignorant about the 
facts of education' - Percy to Nancy Astor, 22 Feb. 1927, Astor 
papers, 1416/1/1/201.
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so far as education was ever considered by this majority, there still 
remained a distinction between the value of extending the ladder to 
the grammar school and the futility of education for all beyond a 
minimum standard. One anonymous pamphlet, in a direct reference to 
the alarming implications of Eustace Percy's policy, defended the 
need for elite training on the grounds that 'there is a good deal 
of difference between equal opportunity for all and equal opportunity 
for all of equal capacity'
'Higher education for all' was nevertheless made the cornerstone 
of the government's education programme for the 1929 election. The 
official statement of Conservative policy claimed that the Board of 
Education had been working towards legislation 'which there has not 
been time in the life of this parliament to carry through - the placing 
of every child over 11 under Higher Education regulations - a measure 
which would end by law, as it is now being ended in fact, the outworn 
"elementary" s y s t e m ' A  similar commitment was made to immediate 
measures enabling denominational schools to receive further financial 
aid, and to a permanent settlement of the religious issue designed 
to allow the church schools to participate fully in the new post-primary
C 4
structure. Percy had also taken steps towards ensuring the 
implementation of this electoral rhetoric in the event of his party 
returning to power. He had set 1931 as a target date for carrying
59. 'Raising the school-leaving age. Attitude of the Conservative 
party', n.d., Salisbury papers, 4M 139/1. Much of the party's 
interest in education, especially after the General Strike, 
amounted to little more than anti—socialism. Regional teachers 
QQ_rcles, for example, were set up to counter alleged communist 
infiltration in the teaching profession; and were tacitly 
supported by the party chairman J.C.C. Davidson — The Times,
26 Feb. 1927.  ^ ,
60. N.U.C.U.A., Official statement of Conservative educational
61. CTT^^A?f^To all engaged in the work of education (1929).
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an amendment of the law through parliament, as this coincided with 
the reassessment of teachers' salaries which would take place under 
the Burnham agreements; he had undertaken a careful series of negotiations 
with Anglican, Roman Catholic and Nonconformist representatives in 
order to prepare the ground for a religious settlement; and he had 
even secured Treasury approval for assisting the voluntary bodies 
with the repair or replacement of their existing schools over a five 
year period.
The electoral programme of 1929 marked the most crucial aspect 
of Eustace Percy's policy towards the adolescent, although its 
significance was to be largely obscured by Labour's success and the 
return of Trevelyan to the Board. The idea of 'higher education for 
all' indicated a willingness to go beyond Hadow reorganisation, and 
a recognition that a system of post-primary schools for all children 
could only be effectively developed by abolishing the statutory 
distinction between secondary and elementary education. Percy's own 
conception of the status and functions of the new post-primary schools 
certainly differed in several respects from the assumptions underlying 
R.H. Tawney's plan for a closely linked, two-stage educational process.
The traditional value attached by the Conservative Party to religious 
instruction, for example, was reflected in the minister's belief that 
a redefinition of education over the age of eleven would remove many 
of the financial disabilities of the church schools.  ^ The most 
fundamental point of difference was highlighted by Percy's desire 
to keep certain schools under separate regulations within the amended
62. Untitled notes, A.V. Symonds, Feb. 1929, Atholl papers, file 41; 
note of interview with Treasury officials, 23 Mar. 1929, P.R.O.
63. 'Church schools', memorandum by Percy, 26 Sep. 1928, P.R.O. CAB 
' 24/197.
98
higher education category. This pointed to the crucial aim for Percy 
of eradicating the anti-vocational element in English education: his
concern was not for parity between all post-primary schools, but for 
the creation of parity between two educational ladders, one leading
from the secombryscho^ to the miva^âtyandthe asherfYom Urn
senior and technical schools to the college of technology.These 
differences, however, must be set against the basic acceptance of 
the need to overhaul the regulations which underpinned an education 
system divided horizontally along lines of social class. When asked 
shortly before the election whether he meant the same things by the 
terms secondary and higher education for all, the President replied 
that 'all senior or modern schools should fall into the same 
statutory category as the existing secondary schools', and added that 
*I hope all senior schools will play the secondary schools at football 
and beat them'
V
A close examination of the government's policy in the 1920s points 
in the first place to the need for a revision of existing judgements 
about Lord Eustace Percy as President of the Board of Education.
Percy, who has been regarded as a remote and undistinguished minister, 
was acknowledged even by his political opponents as one of few
64. Percy, op.cit., p.101. For an account of Percy's policy towards 
technical education, and its relationship with the post-primary 
system, see below, pp. 209-11.
65. The Teachers' World, 10 Apr. 1929. The aim of the Conservative 
government, Percy had earlier said, 'is to provide for all 
children a course of education of a secondary character as part 
of their ordinary school life' - N.U.C.U.A., What the Conservative 
government has done for education, 1925-28 (192b;, p.5.
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ministers with a genuine interest in the work of the department 
He certainly brought a distinctive style to office and was more willing 
to act independently of official advice than many ministers. The 
policy of 'higher education for all' in particular was devised in 
the face of Board reluctance by Percy, who became known in the 
department as 'the only Minister who is his own Permanent Secretary'.^7 
Within his own party he was considered to be a progressive, although 
this often entailed criticism from traditional supporters of 
Conservatism: The Daily Mail, for example, conducted a long campaign
against Percy as a 'squandermaniac', attacking him as a 'socialist' 
or 'pink' member of the cabinet.Percy's energetic approach to 
social reform resulted in part from a personal belief in the need 
for a more coherent party strategy, suited to modern social and 
industrial conditions; he later referred to the feeling 'that inclines 
me to side with my father rather than with Beatrice Webb, though in 
terms of national policies I might agree more often with her than
69
with him'. At the same time, he was also motivated by the desire 
to appeal to the electorate, and on the eve of the 1929 election he 
justified his education policy to the cabinet on the grounds that 
if the Conservatives did not act now, others would take credit for
66. The Labour M.P. and N.U.T. official Leah Manning, for example, 
recalled that Percy was 'dedicated to the position', adding that 
Fisher was the only other pre-1945 minister of whom this could 
be said. See A life for education (London, 1970), p.235.
67. G.A.N. Lowndes, The silent sociaTrevolution, 3rd edn., (London, 
1969), p.324. This outcome may have resulted from the fact that 
Symonds, who became Permanent Secretary in 1925, came from outside 
the department and so lacked the long experience of Selby-Bigge. 
This point was made by Dr. Gillian Sutherland, whom I would like
to thank for commenting on drafts of this and the previous chapter.
68. The Daily Mail, 30 Jan. 1925, had said that Percy was a 'public 
danger' in calling for increased spending on education. See also 
the paper's comments on 23 June 1927.
6 9. Percy, op.cit., p.214.
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the inevitable expansion of educational facilities in the next decade. 
Hence both personal and political motives combined to lead Eustace 
Percy towards a cautious programme of expansion in the 1920s,
The most important obstacle to such a programme had been provided
by the power of the Treasury. On the issue of educational finance
in general, Percy had continuously resisted Treasury demands for
reduced spending, and in such a way as to indicate more than routine
defence of departmental commitments. In spite of this, he never
succeeded in countering the impression that Conservative governments
traditionally restricted funds for education. This was due not only
to the President's clumsy handling of Circular 1371, but also to
the rigid policy of 'limiting standards' imposed on local authorities
after 1927. When taken together, in the context of the limited amount
the government was prepared to spend, these policies ensured that
educational expenditure increased only modestly over the period of
71the Baldwin administration. Percy later observed that to carry 
conviction, an education policy 'had to be administered with generosity, 
and it was, no doubt, just that impression of generosity that I failed 
to convey'.72 In effect the President's options for expanding the 
education service were narrowed by a network of economic and political 
constraints, and by the widely held assumption that public spending 
had to be reduced at times of economic depression pending a trade 
revival. For Eustace Percy, this assumption was tempered by a desire 
to improve the standard of education provided for the adolescent.
70. Percy to Churchill, 1 Oct. 1928, P.R.O. ED 24/1389.
71. On 'limiting standards', see Board of Education, Circular 1388, 
14 Feb 1927. The Board's net expenditure rose from £39,148,064 
in 1925 to £40,299,899 in 1929 - Board of Education, Memorandum 
on the estimates, 193#, Cmd. 5678 (London, 1938).
72. Percy, op.cit., p.201.
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When he came to office in 1924, the President's first concern 
for the adolescent had been to build slowly on the framework provided 
by the 1918 Education Act, The Hadow Report, however, acted as a 
watershed which convinced him that an effective course of education 
for all children over the age of eleven required a fundamental 
adjustment of the existing regulations. This recognition, when seen 
in conjunction with the accompanying aim of a shift in emphasis from 
academic to technical training, gave the government a distinctive 
policy at the end of the 1920s, Percy's interest in a universal, 
differentiated system of higher education was unprecedented among 
Conservative education ministers, and marked him out as predecessor 
of R.A. Butler, whose legislation in 1944 eventually introduced a 
national system of primary and secondary schools. Eustace Percy 
shared, if not the same political flexibility as Butler, then at 
least an awareness of the possible party advantage to be gained from 
a forward education policy, as well as an adherence to a one-nation, 
Baldwinite brand of Conservatism. The practical impact of Percy's 
approach on conditions for the adolescent nevertheless revealed the 
limitations of 'New Conservatism' in the 1920s. The value attached 
by Conservatives to diversity, religious instruction and technical 
training had been safeguarded, and the party's electoral defeat meant 
that 'higher education for all' remained only a statement of future 
intentions. In the meantime competition for scarce places in the 
grammar schools continued to be fierce, and by the time Percy left 
office only twelve per cent of children over the age of eleven had 
been placed in central or senior schools under the scheme of Hadow 
reorganisation.7^  As one newspaper editorial remarked of the
73. Memorandum by the Duchess of Atholl, n.d. (1929), Atholl papers,
* file 41.
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government’s electoral programme, 'it was one thing to adopt a policy
and another to carry it out’.7^  The obvious discrepancy between
the rhetoric and the reality of the government's policy reflected
not only the seriousness of the obstacles preventing reform, but
also the inability of the education minister to carry his case
convincingly to either the electorate as a whole or even to Conservative 
75opinion.
There was little contemporary evidence which supported Eustace 
Percy's later contention that during the 1920s Conservative opinion 
was first awakened to the importance of education.7^  His policy 
of 'higher education for all' was officially put forward as the 
party's programme, although this indicated the power of ministers 
to formulate policy, rather than the preference of Conservative 
supporters. In so far as party members had paid attention to educational 
issues, they were not sympathetic to the prospect of altering the 
relationship between secondary and elementary education. The traditional 
commitment to an elite secondary training for the able minority remained 
strong, and to this section of opinion it was futile to improve the 
elementary system beyond increased opportunities for climbing the 
ladder. There was now a second body of opinion, dominated by the 
education group in parliament, which agreed with the need to develop 
post-primary instruction; but the adherents of this view were both 
small in number and - unlike Percy - openly prepared to defend the
74. The Times 9 May 1929: 'What the present administration has done', 
' to continue Percy's football analogy, 'has been to set the ball
rolling, or rather to kick it towards the goal'.
75. This was partly due to Percy's style: many of his ideas were 
difficult to understand and poorly communicated, and one of his 
cabinet colleagues concluded that he was 'hopelessly academic'. 
Neville Chamberlain diary, 8 Dec. 1929, Chamberlain papers, 
Birmingham University Library, NC2/22.
76. Percy, op.cit., p.96.
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position of the grammar school within any developing post-primary 
77
system. The period of the Baldwin government thus brings together 
many of the main ideas about the Conservative Party implied by this 
study. The ministerial policy of the party has been particularly 
misunderstood by existing accounts in the case of Percy. His concept 
of higher education for all foreshadowed the later success of R.A. Butler, 
and in a wider context he embraced a unique conception of the state's 
responsibilities which included the use of education to promote parity 
between all forms of employment. Conservative opinion as a whole, 
however, though divided along more complex lines than realised, still 
baulked at the prospect of a more active role for the state; and 
defended the existing education system as a means of preserving the 
established social order. The interaction between ministerial policy 
and party opinion was particularly instructive in this instance. 
Conservatives had accepted the President's highly individual proposals 
as a basis for fighting the 1929 election: whether they would have 
sanctioned reform along such lines in the event of electoral victory 
was much more doubtful.
Eustace Percy's record indicates finally the need to modify 
the established framework for assessing education as a political 
issue. The Labour Party in opposition clearly continued to advocate 
the most far-reaching reforms. In 1929 Labour campaigned on a platform 
of raising the school-leaving age and rapidly opening up free access 
to the gramnar schools - both of which were anathema to mainstream 
Conservative opinion. If Percy's policy is used as a yardstick.
77 e.g. Edward Cadogan, a supporter of Percy who attacked 'the 
fallacious notion that the endless multiplication of places in 
secondary schools., was the panacea of all evils' — 202 H.C. 
Deb., 5s., C.1045, 16 Feb. 1927.
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however, a much more ambiguous conclusion emerges. He was responsible 
for committing the Conservatives to a reform which came close in 
outline to what many Labour supporters understood by the term 'secondary 
education for all' - an expansion of secondary education for the 
academically minded and the development of central and technical 
schools for those hitherto restricted to the all-age elementary
* 78
school. There were of course outstanding differences even on this
basis, notably over the status and functions of post-primary education,
but Percy's approach nevertheless reinforces the conclusion that
an element of continuity existed in the policy of successive
administrations. This was indicated most clearly after Trevelyan
returned to the Board of Education in 1929, when Percy began to argue
that Labour's overriding commitment to raise the school-leaving age
within two years was hindering the cause of post-primary reform.
The new government, he claimed, was ignoring the move towards a
comprehensive revision of the present law in favour of an undifferentiated
79elementary system governed by the old regulations. Trevelyan side­
stepped this criticism by proceeding with Hadow reorganisation, and 
was soon to reflect that preparations for extending compulsory 
attendance had caused such concern at the Treasury that no further 
funds were available for the second major aim of improving access
80to the grammar schools. This interchange pointed to the basic 
characteristics of education as a political issue in the 1920s:
7 8. Barker, op.cit., chs. Ill and IV, establishes that equality of 
opportunity was widely interpreted to mean universal and free 
access to different types of school, conducted under similar 
statutory regulations; and that it was not until the 1930s that 
small sections of Labour opinion began to advocate a single form 
of secondary education for all in multilateral schools.
79. 'The school-leaving age', Eustace Percy, The Empire Review, 50,
345 (1929), pp.265-6.
8 0. C.P. Trevelyan to P. Snowden, 29 Oct. 1929, P.R.O. ED 24/1393.
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against a background of shifting economic, political and administrative 
constraints, the choice of policy towards the adolescent was narrowed 
and contained within limits well recognised by ministers at the Board.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM, 1929-1939
The decade following Eustace Percy’s departure from the Board 
of Education produced few new developments in education for the 
adolescent. The tone for much of this period was set by the second 
Labour administration, which shifted attention away from the idea 
of restructuring the regulations governing adolescent education and 
concentrated instead on attempting to improve the elementary system 
by raising the compulsory school-leaving age to fifteen. Labour's 
efforts were eventually overtaken by the severe economic crisis of 
the early 1930s, but in 1936 the reconstituted National government 
returned to the same theme. The school-leaving age was raised with 
exemptions for 'beneficial employment', and the voluntary schools 
were provided with building grants to enable them to participate 
in the new reforms. The 1936 Act, however, never came fully into 
operation and was eventually suspended on the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The problems of secondary education in the meantime - 
with the important exception of the replacement of free places in 
1932 - remained largely in the background. The grammar schools were 
the subject of a further long investigation by the Board's Consultative 
Committee, and the question of the relationship between secondary 
and elementary schooling only returned to the agenda with the 
publication in 1938 of the Spens Report, upon which no action was 
taken before the war. The object of this chapter is to examine the 
(j0Y0iopment of Conservative ministerial policy and party opinion
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towards the major issues which arose during the years after 1929.
This requires looking in particular at the policy pursued by Trevelyan 
in his second spell at the Board; the economy measures which over­
shadowed the period of the first National government ; the introduction 
and reception of the 1936 Act; and the pre-war developments which 
culminated in the Spens Report. From an analysis of these developments, 
a subtle shift in Conservative policy emerges: although successive 
ministers were inclined or forced to proceed cautiously in improving 
conditions for the adolescent, party opinion as a whole slowly came 
to embrace reforms which had been resolutely resisted when first 
discussed in the 1920s.
II
After returning to the Board of Education in 1929, C.P. Trevelyan 
spent some time in attempting to extend further free secondary 
education, but he found his energies increasingly absorbed by a single 
issue - that of raising the school-leaving age. The Labour Party's 
commitment to this reform had deepened since the publication of the 
Hadow Report, and the new initiatives introduced by Trevelyan for 
the elementary schools - notably a special increase in local authority 
grants - were usually linked with the government's proposed legislation. 
After six months in office Trevelyan introduced a short bill into 
parliament, designed to raise the compulsory leaving age to fifteen 
by April 1931 and to provide maintenance allowances to certain children 
during their extra year of school attendance. The bill never proceeded, 
however, largely because of cabinet hesitation and widespread opposition 
to the omission of any reference to the position of the voluntary 
schools. In May 1930 the bill was withdrawn and immediately replaced 
by a second measure which provided both for the raising of the school
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age and for the provision of special grants to the church schools.
The government, with the support of the Liberal Party, made some 
progress with this second bill in parliament, but in the absence 
of complete agreement among the denominations, Trevelyan decided 
to withdraw the measure and revert instead to his original proposal.
In early 1931 the President's third school attendance bill suffered 
defeats in both the Commons and the House of Lords, and shortly 
afterwards Trevelyan resigned from office, protesting against the 
government's failure to introduce meaningful social reform.^  It 
is first necessary to examine the role played by the Conservative 
îarty in the defeat of Labour's legislation, and in the process to 
establish the extent to which Conservative opinion altered on the 
wider questions concerning adolescent education.
The response of the Conservative opposition in the early stages
was led by Eustace Percy, who after serving at the Board for five
years was the party's natural spokesman in parliament. Before the
introduction of Trevelyan's first bill in December 1929, Percy's
attitude - as has already been shown - was to caution against the
abandonment of his own line of policy. The opposition, he claimed,
should 'offer the Government whole-hearted support in carrying through
a comprehensive revision of the Education Act in which the question
of the proper length of school life shall occupy its proper place
as an important consideration but as subordinate to the supreme
2
question of providing a good education'. In November 1929 this
1. For a general account of these events, see D.W. Dean, 'The difficulties 
of a Labour education policy: the failure of the Trevelyan bill, 
1929-31', British Journal of Educational Studies, XVII, 3 (1969).
On the Conservative party's reaction to developments on the religious
issue, see below, pp. 173-7. . _
2. 'The school-leaving age'. Empire Review, 50, 345 (1929), p.270.
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open minded attitude was reflected in the unopposed passage which
the Conservatives gave to a Liberal motion in favour of the early
introduction of legislation.^  After Christmas, however, when it
became clear that the government intended to concentrate on the single
issue of the leaving age, Percy's attitude hardened perceptibly.
This was partly due to the alarm shown by many of his party colleagues.
Percy himself echoed some of these concerns, notably the absence
of any reference to the church schools and the hostility to maintenance
allowances as a costly and illogical expedient. Conservative policy,
he said, was to provide suitable teaching and accommodation for children
up to the age of fifteen, but 'to compel, or to bribe, parents to
accept that offer must tend to social injustice and administrative 
4
chaos'. Percy's real anxiety, though, stemmed from his overall 
definition of the needs of the adolescent. Initially this focused 
on the rejection of his electoral proposals: for Percy, reorganisation 
into senior schools governed by higher education regulations was 
essential if an increased school life was to benefit the majority; 
Trevelyan believed conversely that the raising of the school age 
was crucial if reorganisation was to have any value. During 1930 
Percy's dissatisfaction increasingly shifted with circumstances to 
focus on the school-leaving age as one method of tackling juvenile 
unemployment and linking up educational with industrial needs.
3. 231 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2054, 13 Nov. 1929.
4. The Times Educational Supplement, 8 Mar. 1930. Percy wrote to 
one party supporter: 'it is a curious fact that the Socialists 
never seem able to distinguish between the statement that all 
children ought to be offered a good education up to the age of 
fifteen, and the statement that all children should be compelled 
to stay at school up to the age of fifteen' - Percy to E.M.H. 
Galbraith, 11 Mar. 1930, Conservative Research Department papers, 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, Education: folder 1G.
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Indeed by the time of the second reading of Labour's bill in May,
Percy was concentrating exclusively on Trevelyan's failure to meet 
the central need of adolescence - a smooth passage between school 
and work.
The former minister's arguments found some sympathy with other
Conservatives during the second reading. This applied particularly
to Percy's adherents in the education group, such as William Ormsby-Gore,
who attacked the government for crowding children into the elementary
schools to 'mark time' as part of a 'thoroughly unscientific
unemployment relief process',^  Many other back-benchers, however,
found less sophisticated reasons for objecting to the bill. Michael
Beaumont, for example, a well-known advocate of retrenchment, objected
purely on the grounds of cost - thus indicating the continued existence
of the view earlier championed by Banbury, which regarded public
7expenditure on education as intrinsically wasteful. Beaumont was 
joined in his hostile attitude by representatives from the Lancashire 
constituencies, who complained that a higher school-leaving age would 
adversely affect the supply of juvenile labour in the textile 
industries. This body of opinion was led by Vernon Davies, who backed 
up his argument with the claim that the raising of the school age
g
was 'definitely contrary to the Hadow Report'. In contrast to this 
intransigence, some back-benchers stood out in support of Trevelyan's 
bill. Nancy Astor, the most persistent advocate of reform, was now
5. R.S. Barker, Education and politics, p.62, notes the distinction 
between Percy’s belief that a bad education was worse than no 
education, and Trevelyan's that any education was better than
none.
6. 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.l6l8, 29 May 1930.
7. 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.l653, 30 May 1929.
8 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1600-5, 29 May 1930. The links between
Davies and the Federation of British Industries are noted below,
p. 216.
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joined in particular by John Buchan, representing the Scottish 
Universities. Buchan agreed with the Labour claim that on educational 
grounds the passage of the bill was urgent, and he subsequently acted 
in defiance of the party whip by abstaining from the vote on the 
second reading.^  The opposition were defeated in this vote, but 
their hope that reform would not go ahead was soon realised. Some 
Labour M.P.s complained about the inadequacy of the proposed system 
of maintenance allowances, and the growing dissatisfaction with the 
clauses affecting church schools was being channelled through both 
the Labour and Liberal parties. In these circumstances, the President 
withdrew his school attendance bill, but repeated his pledge to 
carry legislation by the end of the year.^ ^
By the time Trevelyan introduced his third bill in November 
1930, the range of opinion on the Conservative benches had narrowed, 
and the party had become united in its determination to resist reform. 
This hardening of attitudes resulted partly from the absence of any 
reference to the church schools, but was primarily due to the 
deterioration of the national economy in the second half of the year.
The downturn in the economy enabled Conservatives to place much greater 
emphasis on the prohibitive cost of providing extra school accommodation 
and teachers. Michael Beaumont, in repeating his earlier objections, 
was no longer alone amongst his colleagues, and on the second reading 
he was joined by two of the party's leading spokesmen on finance.
9. Ibid., cc.1574-5; J.A. Smith, John Buchan (London, 1965), p.315. 
Punch I 4 June 1930, observed that 'there seemed to be no great 
enthusiasm for the Bill among the Government's supporters., but 
after Mr. John Buchan had blessed it from the Conservative back­
benches, they cheered up'.
10. Dean, op.cit.,pp.291-4.
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Robert Horne and Edward Hilton Young.The new circumstances also
influenced those who had earlier supported Trevelyan. John Buchan
agreed that the bill should not go ahead in such grave conditions,
and Nancy Astor - who had always expressed reservations about the
inclusion of maintenance allowances in order to 'placate hon. Members
from the Clyde' - declared that she could now vote against the measure
1 ?
with a clear conscience. Eustace Percy's criticisms had also become
more forceful, although characteristically for reasons different
to those of his colleagues. Percy had recently become involved in
a controversy with the Rothermere press, and this led him to proclaim
more insistently his preference for 'liberty' over 'compulsion'.
Moreover, the economic situation heightened Percy's opposition to
the Labour bill, not because of the likely cost, but owing to the
continued failure to ensure that children went up 'a steady incline..
into life instead of having to change.. gears violently from school
to factory'. This explains why at the committee stage Percy objected
so strongly to the decision to delay the operation of the bill for
eighteen months, which he claimed removed any pretence of acting
13urgently to assist the young unemployed.
11. 244 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1139 and 93, 6 Nov. 1930: Hilton Young 
commented that the country might recover from industrial depression 
and perhaps even from the misfortune of the present government, 
but was unlikely to emerge unscathed from 'that co-incidence
of calamities, the two at once'.
12. Ibid., cc.1129-30; 244 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1578-9, 11 Nov. 1930; 
'Education (school attendance) bill', n.d.. Lady Astor papers, 
1416/1/1/210.
13. On the press controversy, with Percy being accused of making 
political capital from a measure he earlier supported, see the 
Daily Mail, 3 Nov. 1930. For Percy's objections to the third 
bill 366^ 244 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1105, 6 Nov. 1930, and The Times 
Educational Supplement, 6 Dec. 1930. Punch, 4 June 1930, had 
already noted tha'f tHe additional burden on the taxpayers did 
not seem to worry him'.
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The Conservative opposition once more had cause for optimism
as the committee stage of the bill dragged on. Labour members were
still resentful of the possibility of a means test to determine
eligibility for maintenance allowances, and Liberal support for the
government was being undermined by the economic situation. Moreover,
proceedings in the Commons had to be delayed until the new year in
the hope of pacifying Roman Catholic M.P.s, who were threatening
to vote against the government unless some provision was made for
financial assistance to the voluntary bodies. With the failure of
negotiations to produce a workable compromise on the religious issue,
the way was open for Conservatives to press home their opposition.
In January 1931 the party voted with the Labour dissidents to ensure
the pas sage of the so-called ’Scurr amendment’, which rendered the
bill inoperative pending a concrete agreement enabling church schools
14to participate in the raising of the school age. Trevelyan intended 
to push ahead despite this setback, although it was now widely rumoured 
that the Conservatives would use their majority in the House of Lords 
to further block reform. The passage of the Scurr amendment did, 
in fact, have the ironic effect of causing some uncertainty among 
Conservative leaders as to the best method of proceeding. The opposition 
peers had recently become intent on defeating the government in order 
to force a general election, but a protracted debate now ensued between 
those who stuck to the tactical importance of embarrassing the Labour 
administration and those who felt that the opportunity to assist 
the church schools should not be thrown away.^^  With the support 
of Percy and the front-bench peers, party political considerations 
ultimately prevailed, and the Conservative leader in the upper
14. See below, p.177.
15. The Times, 30 Jan. 1931.
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chamber, Lord Hailsham, successfully moved the rejection of the bill 
on the grounds of financial extravagance. This effectively marked 
the final defeat of Labour’s efforts to raise the leaving age: although 
the government threatened to proceed under the parliament act, no 
further action was taken before the government was replaced in the 
autumn of 1931 by a coalition of Conservative, Liberal and National 
Labour supporters.
Trevelyan’s efforts to raise the school-leaving age were of
course unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. He had been given
only lukewarm support by members of the cabinet, in particular the
Prime Minister and Philip Snowden, the Chancellor, who was rumoured
in 1931 to have ordered the bill 'to die., as being one more superfluous 
17mouth to feed'. The President himself must also bear some
responsibility, both for underestimating the government’s reliance
on Liberal support and for acting prematurely on the religious issue
in the absence of full agreement. The Conservative Party had
nevertheless played a crucial role in thwarting the minister's
ambitions for reform. This hostility to raising the leaving age
was itself the product of several interrelated factors, some of which
revolved around political rather than educational considerations.
In this context, the tactical consideration of undermining a minority
administration was evident from the outset, when Trevelyan called
for early action on the grounds that the 'Tories see good business'
l8in cabinet hesitation. An equally important consideration of this
16. Lord Hailsham to Salisbury, 4 Feb. 1931, Salisbury papers, 4M 
139/75; 79 H.L. Deb., 5s., cc.1104-64, 18 Feb. 1931.
17. Punch, 25 Feb. 1931. See also A.J.A. Morris, C.P. Trevelyan, 
1870-1958. Portrait of a radical (Belfast, 1977), pp.181-4.
18. Trevelyan to J.k. Macbonald, 11 July 1929, Ramsay MacDonald 
papers. Public Record Office, P.R.O. 30/69/251.
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sort was the belief that raising the leaving age was an unpopular 
measure with the electorate: the desire to win votes on the issue 
was particularly evident in the condemnation of maintenance allowances 
as a 'bribe’ to parents.Beyond these common factors, a whole 
range of objections were put forward by Conservatives, reflecting 
a variety of experiences and expectations. Reservations had been 
made on financial, industrial and even agricultural grounds, in 
addition to the educational case against the bill made by Percy and 
his supporters. When combined, these considerations and attitudes 
indicated that Conservative policy on this issue remained unbending: 
the raising of the school-leaving age in 1930 would, in the words
20of one leading Conservative, have split the party down the middle.
On the remaining aspects of Labour policy for the adolescent - the
increase of free places in the grammar schools and the encouragement
of elementary reorganisation - Conservative opinion had similarly
shownT few signs of shifting. For many party members the extension
of secondary education for selected children continued to be the
primary object of policy. The education group in parliament were
more flexible in their attitude to post-primary reform, but
themselves remained one step behind the thinking of Eustace Percy,
who alone amongst Conservatives in the early 1930s continued to call
21for far-reaching reforms in the education of the adolescent.
19. Eustace Percy, Some memories, p.100: 'To be suspected of a desire 
to keep children longer at school was a black mark against 
parliamentary candidates in the constituencies in 1929 and later; 
and.. none were more eager to foment such suspicions than Labour 
canvassers'. Even a supporter of reform such as John Buchan 
claimed that allowances had 'the ugly look of being a bribe to 
parents' - 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1577, 29 May 1930.
20. The Times Educational Supplement, 22 Nov. 1930, for Conservative 
amendments designed to secure exemptions from attending school 
for those working in agriculture; Salisbury to Baldwin, 10 May 
1930, Baldwin papers, vol.10, f.385.
21. See below, pp. 216-22.
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III
The educational policy of the first National government was
overshadowed by the theme of economy. The debates about reform,
including those concerning the school-leaving age, were subordinated
until at least 1934 by the seriousness of the economic recession.
The tone for much of the period was set by the Committee established
in 1931 under Sir George May, which recommended widespread economies
of some twelve million pounds in educational spending. The May Report
suggested wholesale economies throughout the education service -
the abandonment of Fisher's percentage grant to local authorities,
the reduction of teachers' salaries, and the replacement of free
places in the secondary schools with means tested 'special places'.
The assumptions upon which the May Report were based justify the
claim that its philosophy was the most regressive of the inter-war
years, although it does not follow that the renewed economies of
22the 1930s represented the 'traditional Conservative panacea'.
Conservatives were of course enthusiastic advocates of retrenchment,
but the assumption that deflationary measures alone could remedy
industrial stagnation was still widely shared by all sections of
political opinion. The majority of the May Report had already been
accepted by Trevelyan's successor, H.B. Lees-Smith, before the fall
of the Labour government; and the introduction of the Board's
restrictive circular, number 1431, was carried out by the Liberal
minister, Sir Donald Maclean, who echoed the idea that sacrifices
23were now inevitable. In practice, then, successive governments
22. B. Simon, The politics of educational reform, pp.171-92.
23. 'Cabinet committee on the Report of the committee on national 
expenditure', memorandum by the President of the Board of Education, 
Aug. 1931, P.R.O. CAB 24/223; 'Interview between the President
and representatives of local education authorities on 4th September 
1931', Sir Donald Maclean papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, c.468, 
fos.147-56.
117
were again hamstrung by economic orthodoxy and the Treasury's
insistence on maximum reductions in spending; shortly before his
unexpected death in June 1932, Maclean was warned by the Treasury
24that further sweeping reductions in spending were necessary. It 
was in these familiar circumstances that Edward Wood, now Lord Irwin, 
was appointed for a second term as President of the Board.
In 1932 Irwin was clearly reluctant to resume cabinet
responsibilities after his spell as Viceroy of India. He noted in
private that 'little as one wants to do it, it would not be right
25to refuse to take a hand if they think one can help '. This reluctance
was not wholly the product of a lack of interest in education. Irwin
was extremely reluctant to abandon the renewed enjoyment of his family
estates in Yorkshire, and had turned down the position of Foreign
Secretary on such grounds in 1931; he later recorded that he would
much prefer the position of master of the local fox-hunt to that
26
of Prime Minister. Despite this reticence, Irwin was carefully 
chosen in the summer of 1932. Ramsay MacDonald was anxious that 
Maclean's death should not lead to an alteration in the balance of 
the coalition, but found that no Liberals of cabinet rank were available 
for promotion. He believed that the present agitation about cuts 
in education would be exacerbated by the appointment of a minister 
closely identified with the Conservative position - ruling Eustace 
Percy out on such grounds - and after consulting Baldwin and 
Chamberlain, settled on Irwin as a minister capable of 'effecting
24. Chamberlain to Maclean, 1 June 1932, P.R.O. ED 24/1260.
25. Cited in Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax, p.323.
26. A.C. Johnson, Viscount Halifax, p.355.
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27accommodation and compromise '. ' With Irwin now in the House of 
Lords, the brunt of this burden was borne by the Parliamentary 
Secretary, Herwald Ramsbotham, who had been appointed in November 
1931. Ramsbotham, a former merchant banker, had only entered 
parliament in 1929 as Conservative M.P. for Lancaster, and owed his 
rapid promotion to a non-partisan style of politics which appealed
28to Baldwin as party leader. The task facing the new ministers 
for the foreseeable future was both limited and predictable: as long 
as the financial situation showed no signs of improving, the Board 
had to impose restrictions without completely alienating political 
and educational opinion.
The constraints imposed upon Irwin and Ramsbotham were illustrated
firstly by the introduction of ’special places’ in September 1932.
Treasury officials had long complained that the entry of pupils free
of charge to secondary schools was wasteful of public funds, and
the May Report endorsed this view by suggesting that free places
29be made conditional upon a means test. Under Treasury instructions, 
the Board had been working on ways of implementing this recommendation 
while Maclean was in office. Irwin was thus left to publicise an 
unpopular policy which he inherited, although with the backing of 
the Parliamentary Secretary he did override the wish of Board officials
27. MacDonald to Baldwin, 21 June 1932, MacDonald papers, P.R.O. 
30/69/678 (Pt.1), f.l80.
28. N. Middleton and S. Weitzman, A place for everyone, p.230; 
MacDonald to Baldwin, 21 June 1932, MacDonald papers, fos.l80-1, 
where Baldwin is reported as saying that Ramsbotham’s claim to 
office would have been difficult to ignore had not other political 
considerations been involved.
29. 'Secondary schools', memorandum by H.B. Wallis, Apr. 1931, P.R.O. 
ED 24/1207; Report of the committee on national expenditure (May 
Report), Cmd. 3920 (1931), which also implicitly criticised the 
Conservative party for increased spending on higher education 
since 1927.
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to throw open competition for places to schools outside the public
system.The President met the storm of criticism which followed
the publication of Circular 1421 with the claim that the Board intended
to fill places 'by open competition, the parents of successful
candidates being hereafter asked to make such contribution to the
31cost as it may be in their power to afford'. In practice, however,
the new policy did not produce the savings of £400,000 estimated
by the Treasury, which was similarly frustrated in its efforts to
impose further drastic reductions on local expenditure. The Committee
set up for this purpose under Sir William Ray, Conservative M.P.
for Richmond, called for further savings of over three million
pounds by measures such as the closure of small schools, an additional
reduction in teachers' salaries and the introduction of fees in certain 
32central schools. Acting on the advice of the Permanent Secretary, 
E.H. Pelham, the President protested against the probable intensifi­
cation of public disquiet by the implementation of the 'controversial' 
Ray Report. The réintroduction of fees in any elementary school,
he noted in particular, would reverse a well-established principle
33and would prove 'acutely contentious'. In this way the most extreme 
demands of the Treasury were fended off: savings were made from the 
closure of small schools with the agreement of the voluntary bodies, 
but the majority of the recommendations made by the Ray Report were
30. MacDonald to E.G. Herwill, 1 Jan. 1933, Astor papers, 1416/1/1/994; 
Ramsbotham to Irwin, (?) Sep. 1932, P.R.O. ED 12/353; Board of 
Education, Circular 1421, Secondary schools, 15 Sep. 1932.
31. Irwin, 'Secondary education. Thirty years'development'. The 
Newsletter (Dec. 1932), p.6.
32. Report of the committee on local expenditure in England and Wales 
(Ray Report), Cmd.4200 (1932).
33. 'Further economies in education', note by E.H. Pelham, 22 Nov.
1932, P.R.O. ED 24/1261; Irwin to Chamberlain, 6 Dec. 1932, ibid.
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ignored and Irwin promised only to consider giving effect to some
of the minor proposals.
Restrictions in spending nevertheless overshadowed the policy 
of the first National government. The Conservative ministers at 
the Board, while objecting to wholesale economies, were prepared 
to sanction a significant change in the free place system which they 
regarded as politically defensible, despite its unpopularity in the 
educational world. The main thrust for economy within the government 
had predictably come from the Treasury, but in this instance an extra 
ingredient was provided by the calculated hostility of the Chancellor. 
In the 1920s, Neville Chamberlain had made no secret of his dislike 
for the projected expansion of education envisaged by Eustace Percy, 
and this attitude clearly persisted when he became the 'executive 
arm' of the coalition government after 1931. In February 1933 the 
Chancellor personally endorsed a claim by the Minister of Health, 
Hilton Young, that new projects involving capital expenditure would 
not be automatically ruled out, even though the Ministry was 
operating under the same restrictions applied to the Board of 
Education. This resulted in local authority complaints that the 
Board was being unduly restrictive, but Irwin's requests for a more 
flexible approach were initially rebuffed by Chamberlain's insistence 
on avoiding new commitments wherever possible. The Chancellor gave 
way only after being convinoed that intransigence now would lead to 
much larger demands on capital expenditure at a later date, though 
he continued to maintain that substantial cuts in education spending
34. Memorandum by E.J.S., n.d., ibid.
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were still required.Chamberlain thus had well-defined priorities 
in social policy: 'in many parts of the country', he told the President, 
there was 'a clear demand that other services, such as housing and 
slum clearance, should have preference over education if substantial 
new expenditure were to be incurred on the social services’
Education, which had traditionally been accorded a low political 
priority, therefore suffered in the 1930s from the additional 
constraints imposed by a hostile Chancellor, who was to remain a 
powerful force in the government throughout the decade.
The economies introduced in the early 1930s were overwhelmingly
endorsed by the Conservative Party. There were isolated individuals
who stood out against this trend, notably Eustace Percy, who took
no part in the debates on economy measures. In addition, those
professionally involved in the educational world once more complained
that reductions were too severe. R.H. Morgan, for example, a former
headmaster and representative of the National Union of Teachers,
was the only Conservative M.P. to vote against the government's
37introduction of 'special places'. The party as a whole, however, 
was adamant that reductions in spending were necessary. Chamberlain
35. J.A. Ramsden, The age of Balfour and Baldwin, p.331, notes 
Chamberlain's powerful position in the government and cites his 
diary comment that 'it amuses me to find a new policy for each 
of my colleagues in turn'. On the controversy over capital 
expenditure, see 'Notes on Board's policy as regards sanctioning 
fresh capital expenditure', E.H. Pelham, 25 Apr. 1933, P.R.O.
ED 24/1261; Irwin to Chamberlain, 6 Nov. and 5 Dec. 1933, and 
Chamberlain to Irwin, 21 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1933, ibid.
36. Chamberlain to Halifax, 6 Feb. 1934, P.R.O. ED 24/1550. In 1934 
the Chancellor in fact attempted to launch a new housing programme, 
and in the following year was able to secure the appointment
of one of his close adherents, Kingsley Wood, to the Ministry 
of Health, with instructions to carry out such a scheme - 
J.A. Ramsden, The making of Conservative Party policy, p.71.
37. 270 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1211-4, 16 Nov. 1931.
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was able to appeal to the belief of many that education, like all 
other services, must suffer at a time of national crisis, although 
the mixed reception given to the hard line report of a private members’ 
economy committee indicated the limits to which Conservatives generally 
wished to go. For seme party members, the education service was 
an obvious area to be singled out for harsh treatment. This applied 
to the Conservative Research Department, which had close working 
links with the Chancellor; and to individual back-benchers such as 
Michael Beaumont, who urged the réintroduction of fees in elementary 
schools, castigated the Hadow Report, and declared a willingness 
to ’accept the name of reactionary if that is the tone of my policy’ 
Despite his eccentricity, Beaumont indicated the mood amongst 
Conservatives, who had to be satisfied as the largest body of 
government supporters. In 1933 several speakers noted during the 
estimates debate that Ramsbotham’s main concern was to defend himself 
against those who criticised the high levels of expenditure on 
education, a mentality reflected in the loud cheering which accompanied 
any reference to the economies carried out.^ ^
38. The economy committee had been set up at the Chancellor's request 
to outline possible areas of further economy, but many back­
benchers eventually dissociated themselves from the drastic 
remedies proposed. See J.A. Ramsden, The age of Balfour and 
Baldwin, pp.337-8.
39. 'Education policy and economy', memorandum by Henry Brooke,
7 Oct. 1932, Conservative Research Department papers. Education: 
folder 1G; 280 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1141-3, 12 July 1933. Nancy 
Astor called this 'a very stupid speech' - 'Summary of education 
estimates', 12 July 1933, Astor papers, 1416/1/1/994.
40. e.g. Ernest Evans, 290 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.24l, 30 May 1934. The 
Labour spokesman W.G. Cove asked: 'Is the truth that while Mr. 
Ramsbotham asservates and reasservates his love of education., 
that this love is not shared by the Government he so faithfully 
serves?' - ibid., c.204.
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The preoccupation with economy measures did not completely eclipse 
discussion of educational issues. In secondary education, the Board’s 
policy was of course dominated by the need to defend the introduction 
of special places. For Ramsbotham in particular, this move was logical 
in the sense that completely free secondary education had never been 
proposed by any government. Apart from this, little change was envisaged 
in the short-term, and the Board was content to wait upon the findings 
of the Consultative Coiranittee, which began an investigation into 
secondary education in 1933. As far as the elementary system was 
concerned, the Board gave continued encouragement to the process 
of Hadow reorganisation. Irwin argued that funds should be concentrated 
on this reform when they became available, and in 1934 Ramsbotham 
was able to claim that despite economies, over fifty per cent of 
all children now attended senior departments, and that further
42proposals in this direction would be sympathetically considered.
The Parliamentary Secretary was in fact the only Conservative minister
apart fran Percy to consider long-term reforms which would transcend
the existing division between secondary and elementary education.
43He was reported as claiming in one important speech, that
’some day or other, when we had improved the technique of our 
senior schools, particularly on the practical side, and when 
financial conditions permitted, the compulsory school-leaving 
age might be raised and we should have post-primary education 
for all. There was no reason to suppose that the post-primary 
education then given in the senior schools would be in any way 
less desirable or inferior to the post-primary education now 
given between 11 and 16 years of age in the secondary schools.
The establishment of our senior schools was probably the 
greatest educational reform of the twentieth century.
Experience had shown that in many cases reorganisation could
41. 270 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1174, 16 Nov. 1932.
42. Irwin to MacDonald, 30 Aug. 1933, MacDonald papers, P.R.O. 30/69/6
(Pt.1), f.6; 290 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.189-90, 30 May 1934.
43. The Times Educational Supplement, 21 Oct. 1933.
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be achieved without any appreciable net increase to public 
expenditure, and local authorities would resemble foolish 
virgins if they should be found with no oil in their lamps 
when the Treasury announced that it was prepared to supply 
the matches *.
For the time being, however, the Board concentrated on much less 
sweeping reforms for the adolescent. As economic circumstances slowly 
improved, Irwin sensed that political and educational opinion favoured 
a more positive approach, preferably picking up where Trevelyan had 
left off. By early 1934, the President was therefore considering 
ways of tackling the linked problems of the school-leaving age and 
grants to the church schools.
Party political opinion, in the meantime, had altered very little
on questions concerning the education of the adolescent. Labour
thinking at this time was, in the words of Rodney Barker, characterised
by 'greater violence of language on the one hand, and more vigorous
insistence on traditional demands on the other'. Hence the party
denounced Circular 1421 as 'class persecution' and a threat to working-
class access to the grammar schools, but in 1934 was still calling
for a common code of post-primary regulations and the raising of
44the leaving age to ensure equality between all schools. In the 
Conservative Party, the obsession with economy meant that the concerns 
of the adolescent received even less attention than usual. The 
exception to this was once more Eustace Percy, who in the course 
of giving evidence to the Spens Committee departed from his earlier 
ideas by suggesting the abolition of the grammar school in its 
existing form. Percy argued that because the competitive examination 
at the age of eleven was 'educationally deleterious and politically
44. Barker, op.cit., pp.69-70, who also notes the new, but as yet
limited, interest in the multilateral or common secondary school.
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unfair*, it would be preferable for all children to go to 
'intermediate schools' for four years. These would have a variety 
of biases, but should be equal in status, generally free of charge 
and all conducted under the regulations for higher education. At 
fifteen pupils could then go on either to hi^er secondary schools 
as a preparation for university training, or to senior technical
he
schools preparing for industry or hi^er technological studies.
Percy's concern with two educational ladders was of course in direct
contrast to the attitude of most Conservative Party supporters.
The Education Committee in parliament had given some backing to the
former minister, but was unlikely to share his attitude towards
grammar school selection. For the majority of Conservatives, moreover,
the maintenance of secondary education as an elite training remained
the primary concern. In response to enquiries in 1933, the party's
Central Office gave the reply that it would be a mistake to subject
all children over the age of eleven to secondary education, though
it should be made progressively more available to children of parents
46unable to afford fees. This indicated the extent to which 
Conservative opinion remained dominated by the traditional ladder 
concept and the need to preserve fee-paying, elite secondary training. 
By contrast, the elementary system held little interest: the party 
had been openly hostile to the raising of the compulsory leaving 
age, and showed no enthusiasm for post-primary reorganisation. These 
attitudes were only to show the first, tentative signs of alteration 
in the second half of the 1930s.
45. Board of Education Consultative Committee, Paper No.U.5(20), 
Memorandum by the Right. Hon. the Lord Eustace Percy, (?) May 
1934, P.R.O. ED 10/151.
46. W.C. Cleary to P. Cohen, 24 Nov. 1933, P.R.O. ED 24/1395.
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IV
In October 1935 the National government was re-elected for a 
second term as a coalition between Conservatives, MacDonald's Labour 
supporters and Liberal Nationals. One of the first measures which 
the new administration carried through parliament was the 1936 Education 
Act, which introduced certain building grants for voluntary schools 
and raised the school-leaving age to fifteen with exemptions for 
'beneficial employment', applicable to those in their final year 
of school attendance. The origins of this reform clearly went back 
to the period of the first coalition: as the economic situation 
slowly improved, so public agitation for a more advanced education 
policy revived, and concentrated in particular on the improvement 
of the elementary system favoured by Trevelyan. The Board of Education, 
for a variety of reasons, chose to ignore the popular opinion in 
favour of the universal extension of the leaving age and opted instead 
for a generous system of exemptions. When the Board's plans were 
presented to parliament early in 1936, there was widespread agreement 
about the need to assist the voluntary schools in preparing for a 
higher leaving age and furthering reorganisation, but considerable
47controversy over the scope and definition of 'beneficial employment'.
It is therefore necessary to trace the origins of the 1936 Act and 
to focus on two questions in particular - the motives which led 
Conservative ministers at the Board to contemplate reform of the 
leaving age, and the response of Conservatives generally to the Act 
and the implications which this had for the party's attitude towards 
the adolescent.
47. Simon, op.cit., pp.196-224.
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The renewed demands for an extension of the elementary school 
course after 1933 were led by educationists and Labour Party 
spokesmen. The Conservative Party's minor role in this public 
agitation, however, has gone unnoticed, and operated on two levels.
In the first place. Conservative controlled local authorities were 
amongst those who were now considering the raising of the leaving 
age under the bye-law procedure of the 1921 Act. The majority of 
those areas who had already adopted this course were in fact dominated 
by Conservatives, and the movement for reform along these lines was 
much strengthened in 1933 by the commitment of the Lancashire County
no
Council to a graduated scheme for extending school life. The 
second element of Conservative involvement was provided by a private 
members' bill introduced into the Commons in December 1933, which 
was designed to raise the school age to fifteen by 1937 while allowing 
exemptions for those obtaining 'suitable employment'. This measure 
was put forward in the name of the Liberal spokesman Percy Harris, 
but he acknowledged that the real author was Eustace Percy, who 
immodestly suggested that his own earlier draft bill had been superior 
by containing the proviso that all exempted children should attend
llQ
continuation classes until the age of sixteen. The Harris bill, 
which was only narrowly defeated in a thin House, reflected above 
all Eustace Percy's new found concern with industrial 'planning', 
and for this reason his main support amongst Conservatives came from 
those who were similarly interested in controlling the flow of
48. 'Notes on the operation of the bye-laws in the existing fifteen 
bye-law areas', D. Du B. Davidson, 16 Dec. 1935, P.R.O. ED 136/64: 
nine were Conservative controlled, and only two Labour. On the 
situation in Lancashire, see The Times Educational Supplement,
9 Dec. 1933.
49. 283 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1229, 1 Dec. 1933. For further details 
of the Harris bill, and its relationship to the problems of 
education for employment, see below, p. 217.
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juvenile labour from the schools into industry. He was nevertheless
backed up by party educationists also, notably Edward Cadogan,
R.H. Morgan and Annesley Somerville, who agreed that it was necessary
to look at the problem of the school-leaving age from a new perspective.^ ^
This sympathy for reform which would involve a higher leaving age
was of course offset by the continued hostility of many back-benchers.
Herbert Williams denounced the idea as another ’madcap scheme that
would increase public expenditure *, although the Board of Education's
rejection of the Harris bill was ultimately based on administrative
51and educational objections.
Within two months of the debates on the Harris bill, the 
President - who became Viscount Halifax after the death of his father 
in January 1934 - was ironically urging his cabinet colleagues to 
contemplate a similar sort of measure. His reasons for doing so 
were twofold. In educational terms, he noted that there was a strong 
case for returning to the issues which had preoccupied Trevelyan.
The process of reorganisation, to which the Board was canmitted, 
could not proceed much further without raising the question of how 
the voluntary bodies were to find the funds necessary to reorganise 
their schools, and whether the full benefits of senior education 
were to be realised by a four year course. The second, and more 
pressing concern for Halifax, was the political danger of 'attempting
50. Labour supported the bill 'as a necessary step in the right 
direction': W.G. Cove - 283 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1233, 1 Dec. 1933.
For Somerville - ibid., c.1243. The bill was defeated by ten 
votes. It was opposed by 68 government supporters (65 Conservative, 
3 National Liberal), and attracted support from 34 opposition 
members (17 Labour, 16 Liberal, 1 Independent) as well as 24
M.P.s on the government side (20 Conservative, 1 National Liberal,
2 National Labour, 1 Independent National) - ibid., cc.1275-8.
51. Williams - ibid., c.1209; Ramsbotham - ibid., cc.1265-72.
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to continue a process of severe and mechanical restriction in the
educational field'. He argued that large savings had already been
made, and that the Board’s record was likely to be criticised as
unduly restrictive as the economy improved, especially when compared
with measures now being sanctioned by other departments. In this
context Halifax referred both to the disquiet shown by the ’responsible’
authority in Lancashire, and to the recent interest in the school-
leaving age as a method of tackling juvenile unemployment - a clear
52reference to the Harris bill. The remedy suggested by the President,
tentatively at this stage, was to introduce legislation in the present
parliament which would raise the leaving age with generous exemptions,
whilst also providing building grants for the voluntary schools.
By linking the two issues it was hoped that Nonconformists, teachers
and local authorities would accept building grants in return for
raising the leaving age; while for Conservatives it was hoped that
’the presence of one would blunt the edge of unpopularity of the
other’, and the cost would be much reduced by excluding maintenance 
53allowances. This new initiative at'the beginning of 1934 provided 
a good indication of Halifax’s style as President: he was sensitive 
to the electoral implications of public disquiet with the government’s 
policy, and now favoured a measure of reform which would be both 
politically acceptable and financially practicable.
The President's hopes for early action were frustrated throughout 
1934 by the reticence of his cabinet colleagues. The cabinet
52. Irwin to Chamberlain, 12 Jan. 1934, P.R.O. ED 24/1395; 'Future 
educational policy', memorandum by the President of the Board 
of Education, 8 Feb. 1934, P.R.O. CAB 24/247.
53. Cabinet educational policy committee, first meeting, 1 Mar. 1934, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/574.
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committee set up to review education policy highlighted the constraints
within which the minister operated, for he found no allies in seeking
to tackle the question of the school-leaving age. This was partly
due to the low priority of education. Chamberlain in particular
repeated the argument that 'the man in the street' already considered
education spending to be too high, and he secured acceptance of the
view that at best the Board should only devise a policy to present
54at the next election. Halifax also suffered at this stage from
departmental rivalry and the priority attached to other government
reforms. The Ministry of Labour feared that any reference to raising
the school-leaving age might hamper the work of the recently revived
Junior Instruction Centres; and with the Chancellor's backing, it
was agreed that the government had done enough for the time being
55by the introduction of its Unemployment bill. Instead of pushing 
ahead with reform proposals, the President was therefore restricted 
by cabinet opposition to informal discussions with other government 
departments. When the government's attitude towards the school age 
was brought up in the House of Lords in July 1934, he was even instructed 
to modify his speech in order to emphasise the importance of the 
instruction centres.Under mounting public pressure, however - 
especially from the School Age Council led by John Buchan - Halifax 
finally managed to extract a promise of future action from his 
unsympathetic colleagues. In February 1935 the Prime Minister received 
a powerful deputation from the School Age Council, and the cabinet 
committee conceded that a declaration of policy would be required
54. Ibid.
55. Cabinet educational policy committee, second meeting, 27 June 
1934, P.R.O. CAB 27/574.
56. Ibid.; 93 H.L. Deb., 5s., c.497, 11 July 1934.
131
for the forthcaning election. Their recommendation, subsequently
endorsed by the full cabinet, was that the President should form
a departmental policy before consulting outside bodies, giving special
consideration to the issue of finance and to the interests of industry 
57and agriculture.
These considerations were to remain uppermost as the Board set
about devising the actual detail of its reform proposals. An office
committee under the Deputy Secretary, Maurice Holmes, had in fact
already been considering the question of education after the age
of fourteen, and argued that in order to minimise dislocation to
industry, the school age should be raised with exemptions for
'beneficial employment'. These were to be worked out by local
authorities under the bye-law procedure of the 1921 Act, using much
tighter safeguards than those suggested by the Harris bill;
authorities were also to be given permissive powers to compel
attendance of exempted children at continuation schools until the 
58age of sixteen. Halifax had certain reservations about the report 
of the Holmes committee, notably over the absence of even a limited 
scheme of maintenance allowances and the preference for permissive 
rather than compulsory attendance at day classes. These objections 
were overruled, however, on the grounds of cost, and the Board of 
Education thereafter entered into a series of informal negotiations
57. On the School Age Council, see Simon, op.cit., pp.200-1. See 
also Cabinet educational policy committee, first Report, 1 Feb. 
1935, P.R.O. CAB 24/253; and Cabinet minutes, 6 Feb. 1935, P.R,0. 
CAB 23/81. This result owed much to pressure by Halifax for
an overall scheme of educational advance including several 
items - such as an increased grant for elementary reorganisation - 
which were carried out after he left office - Halifax minute 
to Pelham, n.d. (Dec. 1934), P.R.O. ED 24/1395.
58. 'Compulsory education beyond 14', Report of the Office committee, 
Feb. 1935, P.R.O. ED 24/1551.
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having already determined the likely shape of legislation.^^  The
various deputations visiting the Board were questioned about whether
they favoured the raising of the leaving age for all children, the
development of continuation schools or ’the middle course advocated
by Lord Eustace Percy and others' - the raising of the leaving age
with exemptions and subject to attendance at further part-time classes.
The great majority sought the extension of school life for all children
with maintenance allowances attached, but this did not prevent the
Board from giving a sympathetic hearing to the representatives of
agriculture and industry. The National Farmers Union was one of
only two delegations openly to state a preference for exemptions,
and the President informed them that he was fully aware of the
difficulties of the agricultural interest - an assurance repeated
fin
in even stronger terms to employers' representatives.
In June 1935 MacDonald was replaced as Prime Minister by Stanley 
Baldwin, who moved Halifax to the more senior post of Secretary of 
State for War and installed at the Board of Education another young 
minister identified with the intellectual left of his party, Oliver 
Stanley. Within weeks of assuming office, Stanley presented to the 
reconstituted cabinet committee the legislative proposal already 
worked out by the Board, whilst adding that if finance had not been
59. 'Rough notes by the President on the Holmes Report', 25 Feb. 
1935, ibid. See also the notes by G.G. Williams, 6 and 26 Feb. 
1935, P.R.O. ED 24/1550, which claim that in the forthcoming 
consultations, the Board would 'test the soundness of their own 
proposals'.
60. 'Raising of school age. Some points for discussions', note by 
Pelham, 6 Mar. 1935, P.R.O. ED 24/1557; Compulsory education 
beyond 14 - National Farmers Union, 19 Mar. 1935, ibid. On 
industrialists, see below, p. 220 , and also Duchess of Atholl 
to Chamberlain, 20 Oct. 1935, P.R.O. T 172/1739.
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so crucial, he would have advocated the flat raising of the leaving
age to fifteen.Stanley’s forceful presentation of his case helped
to secure a more sympathetic attitude to educational reform. The
new President could now rely on support from both Halifax and Eustace
Percy, who returned to ministerial office after Baldwin became Prime
Minister; and in the absence of Neville Chamberlain, the committee
agreed that the Board’s scheme could be included as part of the
government’s electoral programme.After the return of the National
government, however, the final meetings of the cabinet committee
highlighted continuing disagreement over the proposed scheme of
exemptions. The Board had now retreated from the idea of requiring
exempted children to attend further instruction, on the grounds that
neither local authorities nor employers were enthusiastic. Halifax
and Percy both protested against this decision, but the legislation
introduced into parliament early in 1936 referred only vaguely to
the need for local authorities to consider ’the opportunities to
be afforded., for further education’ when granting employment
certificates. This final whittling down of the scope of reform
underlined the limitations of the government’s ambitions. The 1936
Act did not represent, as it has been called, the return of the
discredited practice of half-time or the implementation of Halifax’s
64’own. Conservative, idea’ of exemptions. In educational terms.
61. ’Compulsory education beyond 14’, memorandum by the President 
of the Board of Education, 27 June 1935, P.R.O. CAB 27/574.
62. Cabinet educational policy committee, fifth meeting, 4 July 1935, 
ibid.
63. ’Compulsory education beyond 14+. Requirements as to further 
education for exempted pupils', minute by M.G. Holmes, 30 Oct.
1935, P.R.O. ED 24/1549; Cabinet educational policy committee, 
seventh meeting, 5 Dec. 1935, P.R.O. CAB 27/574; Education Act,
1936. 26 Geo.5&1 Edw.8. Cl.41, Sec.2(4). For Percy's equivocal 
attitude towards the 1936 Act, see below, p.222.
64. Simon, op.cit., p.202.
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it marked the national adoption by the Board of the local procedure 
enshrined in the 1921 Act, and owed more to Eustace Percy’s desire 
to link education and industry than to the thinking of Halifax. 
Politically, the measure went as far as Conservative ministers were 
able to go in the circumstances. Halifax and Stanley, while realising 
the need to act, were determined that the considerations of finance, 
agriculture and industry would remain paramount - in short, they 
had to ensure that reform was acceptable to Conservative supporters.
In parliament the school-leaving age remained, as it had been
since Trevelyan's second term at the Board, a major source of division
between the parties. The Labour P arty was still firmly committed
to the raising of the age for all children, and after the introduction
of the government's bill poured scorn on the idea of 'beneficial
employment' as unjust and unworkable.The attitude of Conservatives
had of course been the complete reverse: as recently as 1934
Ramsbotham had argued against tackling the problem, on the grounds
that 'no Unionist member is, so far as I am aware, pledged to raising
fi7
the school-leaving age '. The idea of exemptions did in fact receive 
criticism from what the press termed the 'Left Wing of the government's 
supporters' in 1936. Nancy Astor claimed that this provision ruined 
a good bill, and Harold Macmillan played a prominent role in a 
series of public protests organised by educational bodies. More 
surprisingly, these critics were given strong backing by members
65. Stanley was particularly conscious of appealing to the 'electorally 
important sections of the community - parents and employers' - 
memorandum by the President, 27 June 1935, P.R.O. CAB 27/574.
66. e.g. H.B. Lees-Smith - 308 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1186-8, 13 Feb. 1936.
67. Ramsbotham to Pelham, 14 Jan. 1934, P.R.O. ED 24/1550: 'though 
socially and educationally there are very strong reasons for 
raising it, I am rather doubtful as to its value as a political 
asset'.
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of the party's education committee. Annesley Somerville, for example,
criticised the procedure of exemptions as cumbersome; and a stinging
attack on this part of the bill was made by William Duckworth, who
voiced the reservations of the Association of Education Committees.
In spite of these criticisms about not going far enough, most
Conservatives remained reluctant to endorse any reform which raised
the compulsory leaving age. This reticence had now been overcome,
however, both by the simultaneous assistance given to the voluntary
schools and by the generous system of exemptions provided in deference
to the wishes of parents, agriculture and industry. Hence there
was never any threat to the government's large majority: Macmillan
was the only Conservative back-bencher to enter the opposition lobby
on the second reading, and at the committee stage the education group
contented itself with amendments aimed at improving the exemption 
69procedure. Although the parliamentary party accepted the education 
bill without enthusiasm, the passage of the 1936 Act nevertheless 
marked an underlying change in Conservative thinking towards the 
adolescent. The party had now acquiesced in a reform which went 
some of the way towards the measure resisted firmly when attempted 
by Trevelyan. Those closely involved in the educational world had 
moved to the opinion that a flat raising of the leaving age would 
be most beneficial; and amongst the majority for whom exemptions 
were vital in securing support, the assumption that only children
68. The Times Educational Supplement, 15 Feb. and 7 Mar. 1936;
Astor - 30b H.C. Deb., 5s., c.iSfl, 13 Feb. 1936; Somerville - 
ibid., c.1231 ; Duckworth - ibid., c. 1193.
69. e.g. the introduction of a clause ensuring that employment 
certificates could only be granted at the end of a school
term - 'Notes on amendments. Committee - Commons', n.d., P.R.O.
ED 136/51. These amendments had often been worked out in agreement 
with the President. See the minute by Pelham, 21 Feb. 1936,
P.R.O. ED 136/47, recording the visit of a deputation from the 
Conservative education committee.
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selected by academic ability should remain at school after fourteen 
had been seriously undermined. This small but perceptible shift 
was soon to be mirrored in other aspects of policy for the adolescent,
V
The raising of the compulsory leaving age was due to come into
operation three years after the passage of the 1936 Act, but was
suspended with the outbreak of the Second World War. In the meantime.
Board policy for the adolescent continued along well-established
lines. Steady progress was made under the terms of Circular 1444,
which removed restrictions on the upper limit of special places in
secondary schools and reintroduced a higher level of grant to encourage
70elementary reorganisation. The long-awaited report of the Consultative
Committee on secondary education, which was finally published in
December 1938, had the effect of raising officially the whole issue
of relating secondary and elementary education for the first time
since Percy left office. The Spens Report argued that a school-leaving
age of sixteen was ultimately desirable; that all children should
attend schools conducted under the secondary code of regulations;
and that notwithstanding experiments in multilateral schooling, the
main aim was for 'parity of esteem' between the various types of 
71secondary school. This restatement of the neglected intentions 
of Hadow was coolly received by senior Board officials, however, 
both on financial and administrative grounds. In early 1939 it was
70. Oliver Stanley, 'The new policy in education'. Politics in Review 
(Jan. - Mar. 1936), p.5.
71. Board of Education, Report of the Consultative Committee with 
special reference to grammar and technical high schools (Spens 
Report), 11938), pp.xx-xxii.
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announced in parliament that there would be no attempt in the
foreseeable future either to introduce experimental multilateral
schools or to subject all post-primary education to one set of
regulations. This attitude reflected not only the continuing
reluctance of ministers and officials at the Board to contemplate
major reform, but also the renewed threat of economy, which increased
72as spending on rearmament was stepped up.
In the Conservative Party, interest in education for the adolescent
remained at a low level during the period of the second National
government. This was partly due to the absence of any direct
ministerial lead after Baldwin retired and was replaced by Neville
Chamberlain in May 1937. In contrast to the sort of appointments
made by Baldwin, the new Prime Minister ensured that the Board of
Education was entrusted to peers, first Earl Stanhope and later
Earl de la Warr, a National Labour supporter. Chamberlain's own
associates were given priority in domestic affairs, notably in launching
a new housing programme ; and in 1938 the government was criticised
for making the Board the ' Cinderalla of the Cabinet ', used as a
73convenient staging post in any government reshuffle. The lack 
of interest on the front-bench was compounded by the decision of 
Eustace Percy to follow the example of Baldwin in retiring from 
political life, having spent two fruitless years as Minister without
72. R.G. Wallace, 'Labour, the Board of Education and the preparation 
of the 1944 Education Act', unpublished University of London 
Ph.D. thesis, 1980, pp.16-8. For the Treasury's insistence on 
economies, see Earl de la Warr to Sir John Simon, 19 June 1939, 
P.R.O. ED 136/146.
73. J.A. Ramsden, The age of Balfour and Baldwin, pp.362-3: there 
was no mention of education when Chamberlain recalled that he 
entered politics to improve conditions for 'the people' through 
better wages, housing, health and leisure. For the comments
of Percy Harris, see 337 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.765, 20 June 1938.
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74Portfolio. The combination of these circumstances meant that for
the first time since the Lloyd George coalition, Conservative education
policy was shaped primarily by a random collection of parliamentary
views. This naturally allowed greater prominence for widely divergent
and eccentric expressions of individual opinion. At one extreme
Herbert Williams continued to attack any measure which involved
increased spending on education; while Nancy Astor - the most
unrelenting Conservative reformer between the wars - was now arguing
the case for a 'Ten Year Plan' to recondition school buildings and
develop nursery education, claiming amongst other things that doctors
75knew very little about health. Despite the continued indifference 
of most party members to educational issues, however, there were 
signs that underlying changes were slowly taking place in Conservative 
attitudes towards reorganisation in particular as a crucial part 
of the elementary system.
The shift in Conservative attitudes was once more most pronounced 
in the Education Committee, which since Eustace Percy's term of office 
had expressed sympathy for post-primary reform without clarifying 
the ultimate status of senior education. In the second half of the 
1930s, members of this group began to advocate more openly changes 
in the law which would unify and remodel adolescent education.
Edward Cobb, for example, who had earlier presided over the Education 
Committee of the London County Council, was now calling for a 
tripartite structure with all children attending senior, secondary 
or technical schools; and Annesley Somerville went one better by
74. Percy, Some memories, pp.163-4.
75. Williams' -' '3'36' If.U:' Deb., 5s., c.1387 , 26 May 1938; Astor - The 
Manchester Guardian, 12 Feb. 1936.
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echoing Labour calls for experiments in multilateral schooling, aimed
at emulating the French example by combining classical, modern and
technical sides in a single building.Moreover, party opinion
as a whole was beginning to move towards the position taken up by
the education group after reorganisation had been initiated. At
the 1935 general election Central Office supported the concept of
post-primary education for all children, although this was not regarded
as inconsistent with the defence of the grammar school within an
77extended senior system. The practical successes of senior classes
and central schools reinforced the new acceptance amongst
Conservatives that it was necessary to provide something better than
old style elementary education for the majority. The debates on
the Spens Report also indicated a more flexible attitude towards
reform, with Kenneth Pickthorn - by no means the most progressive
member of the education group - concluding that 'on the whole it
78is probably a good report'. The second National government therefore 
produced few developments in policy and no wider interest in education 
among Conservatives than before. It did however, mark the point 
when Conservative opinion came to accept certain reforms for the 
adolescent as inevitable or necessary. The party's defence of grammar 
school standards remained a primary but not exclusive concern, and 
could be considered as compatible with two widely canvassed changes 
in the elementary schools - the raising of the leaving age for 
unspecified numbers, and the provision of senior education for all.
76 . Cobb - 325 H.C. Deb., 5 s . ,  cc.103-4, 14 June 1937; Somerville - 
ibid., C.126.
7 7 . Cabinet emergency business committee, 7 Nov. 1935, P.R.O. CAB 
27 /5 90 .
78. 343 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1787, 15 Feb. 1939.
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VI
In comparison with the ambitious plans outlined by Eustace Percy 
when in office, Conservative ministers at the Board of Education 
in the 1930s had produced few innovations in policy for the adolescent. 
The process of dividing the elementary schools into junior and senior 
departments had been continued, but there were no indications that 
Percy’s desire to end the separate statutory categories of secondary 
and elementary education would be followed as a logical progression. 
Both Halifax and Oliver Stanley chose instead to follow official 
advice in concentrating on the related problems of grants to voluntary 
schools and raising the compulsory leaving age - issues which had 
been given urgency by public and educational concern. Although Halifax 
in particular had defended his department against the most excessive 
demands of the Treasury, the difficulties for education ministers 
in the 1930s were compounded by the attitude of powerful government 
figures such as Neville Chamberlain. In his capacity as first 
Chancellor and later Prime Minister, Chamberlain was able to ensure 
that educational reform was constantly accorded a low political 
priority. At the 1935 election, for example, he compiled in order 
of importance a list of proposals for inclusion in the government's 
manifesto; the Board's plans for education were placed at the bottom 
of the listC^  Against this background, ministerial policy in the 
decade after 1929 was able to produce only limited and familiar 
improvements for the adolescent. The number of grammar school places 
increased slowly, and elementary reorganisation made some impact 
in church as well as council schools. The existing administrative 
regulations emphasised the inferior status of the new senior schools.
79. Cabinet policy committee. Report, 23 Oct. 1935, P.R.O. CAB 
27/591.
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however, and the only attempted departure in policy - the raising 
of the school-leaving age - was to be restricted to unspecified numbers 
of children and never of course came into operation.
The 1930s were more important for alterations in overall party 
attitudes to education than for Conservative ministerial initiatives.
The actual configuration of party views remained as complex as at 
any time since the First World War. The hostility of certain die-hards, 
though abetted at the highest level by Chamberlain, was still counter­
balanced in the party as a whole by reformers such as Nancy Astor 
and Education Committee members in parliament. In addition, many 
party members still found it difficult to focus on the problems of 
state schooling, which fell so far outside their own experience.
The views of Michael Beaumont, said one of his colleagues, belonged 
'to the days of Lady Clara Vere de Vere, who thought that education 
began and finished by teaching the orphan boy to read, or teaching 
the orphan girl to sew, and then pray Heaven for a humble heart'.^ ^
This should not obscure, however, a small shift in opinion concerning 
the adolescent. Conservatives had traditionally focused so exclusively 
on secondary education that reforms of the elementary system had 
been considered unnecessary. After 1935 the first signs of a modified 
approach began to appear. When put forward by Conservative ministers, 
party members accepted that some children at least should remain 
at school until fifteen. At the same time, the proven success of 
experiments in senior elementary education had the effect of removing
80. Board of Education, Education in 1938: report of the Board of 
Education and statistics of public education for England and 
Wales. Cmd. 6013 (London. 193^).
81. R.A. Spencer, Conservative M.P. for St. Helens - 280 H.C. Deb., 
5s., C.1152, 12 July 1933.
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suspicions about a universal, differentiated system of education 
for all children over eleven. To an extent this shift represented 
a move from hostility to indifference; an acquiescence in reforms 
now considered to be inevitable. The first, tentative indications 
were nevertheless given in the late 1930s that Conservatives would 
accept a remodelled system of education for the adolescent.
The movanent of Conservative opinion points finally to a significant
underlying change in the nature of education as a political issue.
With the further division of Liberal forces under successive coalition
governments, the Labour Party continued to press for the most fundamental
changes in the education system. In the short-term, Labour wanted
to abolish grammar school fees and extend the elementary course to
fifteen for all children. The ultimate aim was for every child to
attend different, but broadly equal, secondary schools under a unified
code of regulations. These policies had remained constant for the
past decade, however, and the Conservative Party was slowly coming
to accept at least the minimum demands of Labour. In fact as party
attitudes began to converge in certain respects, so new lines of
demarcation were emerging. By 1939 Labour had become publicly
identified with the idea of multilateralism, primarily as an addition
to a varied secondary structure, whereas Conservatives had made known
their reservations about possible reforms thrown up by the Spens
Report. Kenneth Pickthorn, for example, defended the direct-grant
grammar school as 'almost the most glorious thing in the whole history
of our education'; and Annesley Somerville - in his capacity as
President of the Independent Schools Association - argued that the
82public schools must at all costs remain free of state control.
82. 343 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1783-4, 15 Feb. 1939; ibid., c.1757.
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The implications of these shifts in party opinion were only to emerge 
fully during the Second World War, when Conservatives accepted the 
provision of secondary education for all children up to fifteen, 
but stood out against reform of the direct-grant or public schools. 
Hence in the 1920s the policy of Eustace Percy had foreshadowed the 
later role of R.A. Butler; in the 1930s it was an imperceptible shift 
in party attitudes which paved the way for acceptance of the 1944 
Act. This central theme - the importance of Conservative policy 
and opinion between the wars in understanding the 1944 Act - can 
be reinforced by turning to an issue intimately linked with the 
education of the adolescent: the problem of religious education.
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CHAPTER 6
THE 'DUAL SYSTEM' OF CHURCH AND COUNCIL SCHOOLS: 
CONSERVATISM AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION BETWEEN THE WARS
The politics of education before the First World War had been 
dominated by controversy over the 'dual system'. After the Education 
Act of 1870, the educational provision previously made by the voluntary 
bodies - mainly the Church of England and the Roman Catholic church - 
had been supplemented for the first time by elementary education 
in the newly established Board schools. In political terms, the 
establishment of this dual system of elementary education represented 
a compromise between the Conservative supporters of religious instruction 
and the Liberal champions of state-provided education. The Conservative 
Party's close allegiance to the Anglican church manifested itself 
in attempts to preserve and strengthen the position of the voluntary 
schools; whilst the Liberals took up the complaints of their 
Nonconformist supporters, notably about state funds being used to 
bolster voluntary bodies who continued to manage and staff their 
schools free from any public control. In the years after 1870, the 
financial dimension of the religious issue had become increasingly 
complex and contentious. The Board schools developed gradually with 
support from both the Exchequer and local rates, but the church schools 
received only modest grants from central government and had to rely 
heavily on contributions from their congregations. The growing desire 
of the voluntary bodies to provide their schools with local financial 
aid on a permanent basis was taken up by the Conservatives and reflected
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in the 1902 Education Act, which both replaced the School Boards 
with local education authorities and introduced rate aid for the 
voluntary bodies without imposing new conditions for the appointment 
of teachers or control of denominational teaching. This legislation 
was resisted fiercely by the Liberal opposition, and was followed 
by the refusal of Nonconformists in certain areas to pay rates for 
what they regarded as the subsidising of sectarian religious 
instruction. The efforts of later Liberal governments to bring all 
elementary schools under public control, while allowing ’contracting 
out' facilities for the denominations, were resisted in turn by the 
Unionists; with this failure to dismantle Balfour's Act, the settlement 
of 1902 remained intact as the basis of the dual systan at the outbreak 
of war.^
This chapter is concerned to examine the changing nature and 
importance of the religious issue in English education between the 
wars. The problems of a dual system of church and council schools 
were central to any reform of elementary education, and were raised 
in particular by the new development of post-primary instruction 
during the period. The following account concentrates on the attempts 
made after 1918 to reach a new agreement among the main interest 
groups - the voluntary bodies, political parties, local authorities 
and teachers' representatives. Within this overall context, attention 
focuses on the extent to which religious education remained a source 
of divisiveness between and within political parties. The decline 
of the Liberal Party after the war necessitates some consideration
1. For a comprehensive study of the dual system after I87O, see 
M.A. Cruickshank, Church and state in English education, I87O 
to the present day \ London, 19b3). See also J. Murphy, Church, 
state and schooIs~in Britain, 1800-1970 (London, 1971).
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of the Labour "Party's approach to the voluntary schools; and points 
to the question of how far denominational differences remained 
intimately linked with social and political divisions, as they had 
been before 1914. The Conservative Party's attitude towards religious 
instruction, which provides the main connecting theme of the chapter, 
itself raises several issues. The relationship between Conservative 
policy in office and party opinion as a whole, for example - which 
has been traced in preceding chapters for secondary and elementary 
education generally - was complicated in this instance by the party's 
close involvement with the bodies officially representing the church 
schools, the Anglican National Society and the Catholic Education 
Council. This account will therefore seek to assess the manner in 
which the various shades of denominational opinion were channelled 
into both Conservative ministerial policy and wider party attitudes.
By looking finally at the value which party members placed on religious 
instruction as part of the school curriculum, it becomes possible 
to link two important problems : the changing nature of the dual system 
as a policy issue in the inter-war period, and the motives and 
assumptions which underpinned the close association between Conservatism 
and religious education.
II
At the end of the First World War, the financial position of 
the voluntary schools caused considerable concern among the church 
bodies. Although the voluntary, or non-provided, schools still formed 
half of the elementary system, the growth of population in recent 
years faced the churches with demands for new schools which were 
difficult to meet. In addition, the rise in building costs since
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the turn of the century was exacerbated by the effects of the war,
which left a legacy of many defective school buildings; and under
the terms of the 1918 Education Act, the denominations were further
required to consider the extra accommodation necessary for advanced
elementary instruction. In these circumstances, the financial terms
agreed in 1902 were no longer considered to be adequate. The voluntary
bodies had difficulty simply in repairing their old school buildings,
many of which were built before M i t ,  and would be unable to participate
in reform of the elementary system without a further measure of financial
aid from the state. This, of course, required a new national agreement.
The existing terms laid down that local authorities could only levy
rates for the internal repair of church schools, not for the actual
structure of the school buildings. At the same time, they were unable
to compel voluntary school managers to spend money on their buildings,
and had little effective control over the appointment of teachers.
From the viewpoint of the local authorities, who required control
over the management of buildings and teachers in order to stimulate
advanced elementary education, the continuance of the dual system
in its existing form was thus becoming identified at the end of the
2war as an obstacle to general progress. The debates on the dual 
system in the years immediately after the war were in fact to show 
that although some of the intensity of previous controversy had 
died down, there was still not sufficient agreement to allow a major 
restructuring of the 1902 settlement.
The 1918 Education Act left the position and ri^ts of the 
voluntary schools unaltered. The Liberal minister Fisher was aware 
that any direct reference to the dual system could revive sectarian
2. Cruickshank, op.cit., p.114.
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bitterness and so jeopardise his plans for improving the council 
elementary schools, especially in the circumstances of wartime 
coalition. At one point the President reassured Unionists in public 
that he did not intend to tackle the religious issue - a recognition 
of the necessary price to be paid for an agreed party measure.^
The parliamentary debates on the bill provided some justification 
for Fisher’s reticence, as Unionist back-benchers made their views 
clear whenever the position of the church schools was indirectly 
affected. In particular, an amendment moved by Sir Henry Craik to 
modify the clause relating to advanced elementary instruction attracted 
support from both the critics and friends of Fisher’s bill. The 
Craik amendment was backed most forcefully by Sir Clement Anderson 
Montague-Barlow, an Anglican who had earlier defended the 1902 settlement 
and who was now acting as an official spokesman for the National 
Society. Barlow put the case that ’when a statutory obligation is 
laid on a local authority to provide central schools, it shall not 
be exclusive of the provision of adequate central schools by the 
Church or Roman Catholic bodies’. For the only time during the 
committee stage of the bill, more Unionists voted against than with 
the government, and it required an alliance of Unionists loyal to 
the coalition with supporters of both Asquith and Lloyd George to 
ensure the defeat of the amendment. Even then, the matter was not 
allowed to rest, and the National Society pursued its case in the 
House of Lords, where the government eventually conceded a technical 
point to the church position.^ Fisher also gave way on certain
3. The Times Educational Supplement, 4 Jan. 1917.
4. See above, pp. jb-b 1 For Barlow’s point, see 105 H.C. Deb., 
5s., C.2046, 7 May 1918.
5. C-A.M- Barlow and R. Holland, The Education Act, 1918 (London, 
1918), p.9; 31 H.L. Deb., 5s., c.202, 31 July 1910.
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smaller issues which indirectly affected the voluntary bodies. The 
Unionist M.P, Mark Sykes, for example, on behalf of the Catholic 
Education Council, was able to insert a conscieTict clause to the effect 
that no young person should be required to attend instruction 'contrary 
or offensive to his religious belief' in the new continuation schools, 
whether established solely by local authorities or partly with 
voluntary assistance.^
The passage of the 1918 Act indicated that although some of 
the previous animosity had been removed from debates about the dual 
system as a result of the war, the religious issue continued for 
the most part to be discussed in pre-1914 terras. Beneath the surface 
of agreement created by the conditions of coalition, the dual system 
persisted as a divisive issue on which the various interest groups 
held firm to their entrenched positions. The Liberal minister had 
been prepared not to jeopardise the continuance of the coalition 
by avoiding the problem in the short-term, but this did not mean 
that party members had modified their views on the need for public 
control. Hence the National Liberal Federation, in welcoming Fisher's 
Act, also called for an end to the 'grievances' of 1902 and for all 
publicly maintained schools to be controlled and managed by public 
bodies. The Unionist Party, despite its overall support for the 
education bill, was equally prepared to employ the rhetoric of past 
debates. Unionist back-benchers had acted as the official representatives 
of both the major denominations, and the Craik amendment had shown 
widespread sympathy for the assumption that the place of religious 
education within an extended elementary system must be protected.
Within the context of general support, however, there did exist
6. 108 H.C. Deb., 5s., oo.803-4, 15 July 1918.
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conflicting views among party members over the future direction of 
the dual system: these differences were to emerge more clearly in 
the years after 1918.
Although H.A.L. Fisher made no attempt to raise the religious 
issue in 1918, he was aware that the implementation of his Act would 
inevitably revive concern about the dual system. During the early 
part of the post-war coalition with the Unionists, the Liberal minister 
sanctioned a series of conferences between Anglican and Free Church 
representatives, aimed at finding sufficient agreement to allow 
legislation. The conferences concentrated on pre-war Liberal ideas, 
whereby all non-provided schools were to be controlled by the local 
authorities, who in return would be obliged to provide 'facilities’ 
for denominational instruction in all their schools at the request 
of parents. The amount of common ground amongst the representatives 
indicated the softening of views in the previous decade, but Fisher 
discovered to his cost that the publication of his ideas in March 
1920 was still premature. Although the National Society of the Anglican 
Church gave restrained approval, the other major interested parties 
were far more critical. Militant Nonconformists reacted with hostility, 
especially to the possible surrender of the 'Cowper-Temple* clause, 
which since I87O had ensured that undenominational teaching only 
could be given in state-maintained elementary schools. The Roman 
Catholic community, having played no part in the negotiations, was 
equally emphatic in rejecting Fisher's scheme. The Catholics were 
primarily concerned with maintaining the distinctive religious 
atmosphere of their own schools: they had no interest in transferring 
children to council schools, and even regarded the concession of 
'contracting out' in certain cases as inadequate to compensate for 
the loss of the terms secured in 1902. In addition, any slim prospect
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of progress in 1920 ran up against the implacable opposition of teachers’ 
unions, who objected both to the prospect of religious tests for 
teachers and to the possibility of ’right of entry' - bringing in 
clerics or laymen from outside to give denominational instruction 
in the local authority schools. The reaction to Fisher's ideas, 
and the economic recession which followed, together ensured that 
no further action was taken by the Lloyd George coalition; Fisher 
was left to reflect that unity of educational administration was 
not worth the price of another period of violent religious controversy.^
The Unionist response to the government's tentative proposals 
was primarily to defend the case of denominational religious teaching. 
Some back-benchers reflected the fears of their Roman Catholic 
constituents, although the main reaction of party members was closely 
linked with a division of opinion amongst Anglicans as to the necessary 
direction of future policy. With many Church of England schools 
closing each year owing to financial difficulties, the National Society 
had become receptive to the strategy of seeking a compromise while 
the Church still retained a strong bargaining position. Indeed the 
Society, with the support of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall 
Davidson, had both originated the post-war conferences with the Free 
Churches and drafted the ideas put forward on an impartial basis
g
by the education minister. The Fisher proposals were subsequently 
supported by a small body of Unionist opinion which believed that 
it was necessary to sacrifice the dual system for the benefits of 
variety under unified local authority control. The most prominent 
advocate of this view was Sir Thomas Davies, the Unionist member
7. Fisher to C. Addison, 31 Mar. 1922, P.R.O. ED 24/1498.
8. G.E. Sherington, English education, social change and war, p.155.
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for Cirencester and Tewkesbury and a former chairman of the education 
committee for Gloucestershire. Davies frequently referred in the 
Commons to the difficulties, under the existing religious settlement, 
of promoting advanced elementary education in rural areas where the 
majority of schools were non-provided; and he claimed that any national 
agreement should ’abolish the dual system and have one national service
Q
right throughout’. In November 1921 Davies introduced a private
members’ bill into the House which followed closely the lines of
Fisher’s plan. The bill, which went no further than a first reading,
was independent of government influence: it was effectively the work
of the National Society, which was keen to revive discussion and
subsequently published a statement of policy incorporating the ideas
10put forward by Davies. Many Unionists, however, remained unconvinced
of the merits of transferring church schools to local authority control.
This scepticism was championed by high church Tories such as the
fourth Marquis of Salisbury and his brothers Robert and . Hugh
Cecil - all veterans of the pre-war struggle to prevent the Liberals
11from imposing public control. As the Archbishop of Canterbury
noted, the possibility of progress along the lines of the Davies
bill was remote in 1922 not only because of the response of other
interested parties, but also in view of the damaging division likely
to result in the Church itself by the opposition of ’Parraoor, the
12Cecil family. Sir William Worsley, and such like’.
9. 153 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.8l1, 27 Apr. 1922.
10. National Society, Memorandum of the education committee and 
standing committee of the National Society (London, 1922), National 
Society archive. Church house, Westminster.
U.K. Rose, The later Cecils (London, 1975), p.74. See also Viscount 
Chelwood, All the way (.London, 1949), p. 105.
12. Diary entry, 1b June 1922, Archbishop Davidson papers, Lambeth 
Palace Library, private papers vol.14.
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The period of the Lloyd George coalition thus highlighted the 
difficulties of bringing about any change in the dual system of 
elementary education, Fisher, like many of his officials at the 
Board of Education, was less concerned with Nonconformist grievances 
than with the administrative obstacles which dual control presented 
to the improvement of the elementary system under the 1918 Act.
However, even his pragmatic approach, which recognised as a starting 
point the need to satisfy the Church of England as the owner of the 
majority of voluntary schools, made no headway in the face of the 
conflicting demands made by the various interest groups. Despite 
the general movement of opinion encouraged by the war, the religious 
issue still held its place as the primary educational divide between 
the major political parties, who continued to employ the rhetoric 
of pre-1914 debates. In the Unionist Party, the course of action 
suggested by the Davies bill attracted little support, especially 
at a time of rigid economy when the demands made on the voluntary 
bodies for new building were relaxed. The Cecil interest remained 
strong within the party, and found its cause assisted in the short­
term by the existence of coalition. In February 1922 the party leader, 
Austen Chamberlain, made it clear to a gathering of prominent Unionists 
that the religious problem would not be reopened. The denominational 
question, he said, ’is settled’, and the major issue in education
was now to decide how far ’you can make economies in a service which
13has become excessively costly’. In the aftermath of the war, the 
Unionist leadership appeared to come down strongly on the side of 
that body of party opinion which opposed any major revision of the 
1902 settlement.
13. National Unionist Association, The campaign guide, (London, 1922), 
pp.863-4.
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first sight, this impression was confirmed by the collapse
of the coalition and the return of a Unionist government under Bonar
Law in October 1922. The Prime Minister’s choice of a minister to
preside over the dual system was Edward Wood, the son of the Earl
of Halifax, who had been strongly influenced by his strict Anglo-
Catholic upbringing.^  ^ Wood had already indicated that he shared
the general Unionist conviction that religious instruction must
provide the foundation of any education. He had consistently defied
the government whips to support National Society amendments to the
1918 Act, in spite of his sympathy for Fisher’s reforms; and his
work The great opportunity argued that children should not be prevented
from receiving teaching in the faith professed by their parents.
Indeed, Wood later admitted that during his early career he regarded
religious education as worthwhile only if it reflected ’the full
doctrine of the Church’ - an attack on ’the learning about Joseph
and his coat’ which Unionists suspected took place in council schools,
and an implicit rejection of the need for church schools to come
16under local authority control. In these circumstances. Wood’s 
appointment to the Board of Education was warmly welcomed by those 
who regarded the Dâvies bill as a betrayal of the Church. One 
correspondent exhorted the new President, now that Lloyd George and 
Fisher were out of the way and a ’Cabinet of Churchmen’ once more 
in office, to take more dramatic steps in defending Church of England
14. Viscount Halifax, Fulness of days, pp.17-25.
15. 105 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2052, 7 May 1918; Sir George Lloyd and 
Edward Wood, The great opportunity, p.98.
16. This was noted by R.A. Butler in a diary entry for 9 Sept. 1943 - 
Butler papers, Trinity College, Cambridge, G15, f.89. It was 
also observed at the Board during the Second World War that Wood, 
although devoutly religious, was not above ’pulling a fast one 
for the good of the cause’. See Chuter Ede diary, 1 May 1942, 
British Museum, Add. Mss. 59694, p. 13.
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schools and colleges.Wood certainly arrived in office with a 
willingness, if not to take extreme measures, then at least to defend 
the status quo. As he informed the Archbishop of York, Cosmo Gordon 
Lang, there was unlikely to be pressure from the government for an 
alteration in the dual system: the pressure of economy in the next 
few years would probably prevent both central and local government 
frcxn pressing for the expansion of education, which would itself 
relieve the Church from the need for immediate action.
During his short spell at the Board, however, Edward Wood gradually 
became more aware of the intricacies of the religious issue. The 
President’s officials made him conscious of the administrative obstacles 
vriiich the dual system posed to educational progress; and the need 
to reconcile conflicting viewpoints led to the recognition that any 
policy towards the dual system had to be framed within well-defined 
limits. Hence the President refused a request that he associate himself 
with a petition in favour of denominational teaching in state-aided 
schools, claiming that the minister should not be identified with 
such a contentious issue.In particular. Wood became increasingly 
aware of the division of opinion among Anglicans, and Lang was struck 
by his developing consciousness of the view held by the National 
Society. This emerged most clearly during the estimates debate in 
1923, when the President claimed that owing to the good sense of 
managers, teachers and local authorities, the dual system no longer 
aroused fierce controversy, and that certain considerations of ’finance 
and organisation’ would soon have to be taken into account. He added.
17. Rev. P.D. Eyre to Wood, 9 Nov. 1922, P.R.O. ED 24/1506.
18. Diary entry, 30 Dec. 1922, Davidson papers, vol.14.
19. L.G. Duke to Miss E.M. Solly, 20 Dec. 1922, P.R.O. ED 24/1492.
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before being interrupted by the Speaker for hinting at legislation
outside the scope of the debate, that all those who supported religious
education as an integral part of the state system should strive to
20reach an agreement. In accordance with this declaration, the Board
gave its tacit approval to the renewal of talks between Anglican and
Free Church representatives, in an attempt to revive the spirit of
the 1919 conferences. These moves hardly amounted to a major step
forward in government policy, although they marked the first recognition
by a Unionist minister in the post-war period that an amendment of
the 1902 settlement mi^t ultimately prove necessary. In view of
his background and temperatmental desire not to diminish the role
of religious teaching. Wood's assumption that the Church may have
to make some concessions to public control represented a novel
departure in Unionist policy, and was greeted with dismay by those
21party members who had most vigorously welcomed his appointment.
This section of opinion was given further cause for concern by 
the formation of the first Labour government in 1924 and the arrival 
at the Board of Education of Charles Trevelyan - a former Liberal 
junior minister at the Board during the height of the pre-war religious 
controversies. The fears of the denominationalists, however, proved 
to be largely unfounded. Although the early Labour party had 
consistently favoured the exclusion of religious education from schools
receiving public funds, the dual system had not been raised at the
22party conference since before the war. Labour's inability to produce 
a clear strategy for the church schools stemmed primarily from a division
20. 164 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1507, 31 May 1923.
21. See the correspondence with Wood in P.R.O. ED 24/1506.
22. Murphy, op.cit., p.100.
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of loyalty in party ranks. The Labour ranks did contain an influential
Nonconformist element, giving the appearance of being a natural successor
to the Liberal Party in seeking unity of control, but this influence
was offset by a heavy reliance on Roman Catholic members and voters,
especially in the industrial north-west. In addition, Trevelyan was
both unfamiliar with new developments and constrained from immediate
action - like his predecessors - by the fear of sparking off another
period of intense controversy.^^ Hence in March 1924 the new minister
informed the Archbishop of Canterbury that Labour had no intention
of disturbing the 1902 settlement: his own personal preference was
for purely secular education, but attempts to create a single system
24under public control would be a serious mistake. In so far as the
Labour government of 1924 pursued a policy for the voluntary schools,
it was simply to imitate previous administrations in expressing approval
25of the growing agreement among all interested parties.
The Unionist party, by contrast, was less ambiguous in its approach 
to the dual system. After the election defeat at the end of 1923, 
the party set about producing new policies for a wide range of issues, 
including education. The committee set up for this purpose took 
particular care in working out its ideas on religious education: in 
March 1924 one of its leading members, William Bridgeman, approached 
the Archbishop of Canterbury for his advice on the policy which
23. He expressed this fear most clearly after leaving office, saying 
that 'of course we are not in love with the dual system with its 
educational disadvantages, but at present we are a good deal more 
afraid of the vast misfortune of another period of religious 
animosity..' - 186 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2465, 16 July 1925.
24. 'Interview at Lambeth on March 24th 1924 with Mr. Trevelyan, 
Minister of Education', memorandum by Archbishop Davidson,^  
Davidson papers. Special Subject Education, Box 18.
25. Ibid.
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Edward Wood and others were formulating, 'as we should not like to
make any proposals which the Church might feel strongly against
The Archbishop suggested that contact should be made with the National
Society in order to devise an acceptable policy, and as a result of
subsequent discussions, a reference to religious education was agreed
as part of the Conservative educational programme for the ensuing
general election. The statement limited itself to the pledge that
a future Conservative government would maintain the right of parents
to have their children educated in the religion to which they were 
27
attached. This brief declaration was of course designed to appeal 
to all sections of denominational support, although it demonstrated 
that behind the scenes the close link between the party and the Anglican 
church continued and had a direct bearing on the formation of policy.
The first Labour government marked an important turning point 
in the history of the dual system. In the immediate aftermath of 
the First World War, there had been many signs that sectarian 
controversy could still be easily aroused and that religious education 
remained politically divisive. With the emergence of the Labour Party 
and the decline of Liberal fortunes in the early 1920s, however, 
subtle changes began to occur in the terms of debate. The Labour 
government, unlike previous Liberal administrations, made no attempt 
to move towards the abolition of the dual system, despite the existence 
of an undercurrent of hostility towards religious teaching. This 
failure to act indicated that the issue of the dual system was now 
becoming less of a dividing line between successive governments, and
26. W.C. Bridgeman to Davidson, 24 Mar. 1924, ibid.
27. National Unionist Association, Baldwin's election address. Tracts 
and leaflets, no.2443, 1924.
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was coming to be seen by Unionist and Labour education ministers as 
an administrative obstacle to elementary reform in general. The 
policies of both Edward Wood and C.P. Trevelyan had aimed not at furthering 
their own conflicting preferences, but at achieving a workable compromise 
on the complex financial problems created by dual control. In August 
1924 the Archbishop of Canterbury thanked Trevelyan for his recent 
encouraging words about the prospect of eventual agreement; and having 
earlier spoken to Wood on the same issue, he added that it was 
pleasant 'to think of you and him working in harmony to the right
28end'. The most fundamental differences on the religious issue were 
now unlikely to be taken up at ministerial level, although such 
differences continued to be reflected in party political opinion.
The claims of militant Nonconformity still found favour with Liberal 
and, to a lesser extent. Labour politicians; whereas large sections 
of Unionist opinion persistently refused to countenance ideas of creating 
a unified elementary system under local authority control. As in 
the case of education for the adolescent, Unionist Party attitudes 
towards religious education after the war remained unchanged in the 
face of modest advances in ministerial policy.
Ill
The financial difficulties of the voluntary bodies were exacerbated 
during the second half of the 1920s. In the first place, the Board 
of Education publicised a 'Blacklist' of schools urgently requiring 
repair, the majority of which were church properties. Moreover, the
2 8. Davidson to Trevelyan, 5 Aug. 1924, Davidson papers. Special Subject 
Education, Box I8.
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Board committed itself to a policy of reorganising all elementary
schools into junior and senior departments - an idea popularised by
the Hadow Report of 1926. The Hadow recommendations were the latest
and most serious blow to the financial settlement reached in 1902.
The denominations could now either sit tight and refuse to participate
in the new programme of elementary reform, or else seek additional
aid for the purpose of converting their schools into separate
buildings - a course of action likely to involve increased public
control as the price of an agreement with Nonconformists, teachers
and local authorities. The problems of the dual system were therefore
becoming inextricably linked with the question of post-primary reform,
and the issues arising from this dominated Lord Eustace Percy's term
as education minister in Baldwin's government of 1924 to 1929.
Percy's own religious convictions were somewhat eccentric: in his
Oxford days he admitted to being much influenced by the school of
Christian socialism, and it was once said that the Northumberland
29family worshipped at the 'church of the Unknown God'. Nevertheless, 
like Edward Wood before him, Percy was broadly recognised as an Anglo- 
Catholic; an instinctive supporter of religious education who would 
have preferred to leave the dual system untouched.Percy soon 
recognised, however - again like his predecessor - that a more 
positive approach was required. He was to work towards a new settlement 
firstly by concentrating on the Anglican schools, and then by evolving 
a scheme as part of the wider proposal of 'higher education for all' 
after 1927.
29. This comment was made by Chuter Ede, in his diary for 28 Sep. 
1943 - Add. Mss. 59697, p. 16. On the evangelic tradition of the 
Northumberland family, see Eustace Percy, Some memories, esp.
p.123, where Percy refers to his 'somewhat supersectarian' view 
of the religious issue.
30. Report of the Cabinet church schools committee, 26 Oct. 1925, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/283.
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Eustace Percy’s policy towards the dual system was conditioned
initially by the continuing differences between the various interest
groups. This ruled out the possibility of a publicly declared plan,
which had not been seen since Fisher's abortive attempt of 1920, and
focused attention instead on improvements taking place at local level.
In areas such as Cambridgeshire, local authorities had already taken
the initiative by seeking their own agreements with the managers of
church schools. In most of the local 'concordats' agreed in the
1920s, the education authority gained control of the management and
organisation of all elementary schools in their area; in return
provision was made for 'agreed syllabus' teaching in all council schools -
regarded as sufficient by many diocesan bodies - and for denominational
31instruction where requested by parents. With little prospect of
a national agreement, the Permanent Secretary at the Board informed
Percy soon after his arrival that the only practical policy in the
short-term was to encourage local concordats by removing restrictions
32on the transfer of Anglican schools under the 1918 Act. The new
minister took up this approach vigorously, spurred into early action
)
by a request from the County Councils Association that measures be 
taken to improve voluntary school buildings, and fearing that a 
controversial discussion could revive wider religious animosity.
Hence in March 1925 Percy took his first initiative: he urged that 
the government should immediately announce its support for local 
agreements, and should aim to introduce an enabling bill within a
31. Cruickshank, op.cit., p.125.
32. 'Dual system - proposals for a settlement', minute by Selby-Bigge, 
5 Mar. 1925, P.R.O. ED 24/1510.
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year giving local authorities wider discretionary powers in making 
agreements with church school managers. 3^
The cabinet's rejection of Percy's idea indicated the continuing 
disagreement over the future position of the Anglican schools.
Criticism of the President was led by Lord Salisbury, now Lord Privy 
Seal and leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Lords. 
Salisbury wrote complaining that the government's 'friends in the 
country' would be alarmed by any move which could be interpreted - 
especially by areas such as the West Riding which were hostile to 
'definite' religious teaching - as meaning that parliament would entice 
hard pressed church schools to surrender.Percy replied that the 
real danger in places like the West Riding was no longer overt hostility, 
but the possibility that through lack of funds managers would be forced 
to transfer their properties to the local authorities with no guarantees 
in return - this had persuaded him to give the experiment of local 
settlements a full trial. This exchange highlighted the difference 
between the minister's contact with administrative realities, and 
Salisbury's persistence in thinking in pre-war terms. At this stage, 
the cabinet was still prepared to support the approach of Lord 
Salisbury. In April 1925 it was decided that the government would 
not commit itself to any course of action, and the President was left 
to inform the County Councils that an enabling bill would only be 
considered after receiving definite views on the subject from authorities 
involved in transfer schemes.
33. See 'Position of church schools', memoranda by the President of 
the Board of Education, 19 Mar. and 1 Apr. 1925, P.R.O. CAB 24/172.
34. Salisbury to Percy, 27 Mar. 1925, P.R.O. ED 24/1516.
35. Percy to Salisbury, 30 Mar. 1925, ibid.
36. Cabinet minutes, 1 Apr. 1925, P.R.O. CAB 23/49; The Times,
22 Apr. 1925.
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The immediate problems of the Anglican schools were, however,
the subject of a wider discussion by a cabinet committee established
shortly afterwards. Percy put forward the case that dual control
presented serious difficulties for the progress of elementary education.
The existing system, he argued, was ’administratively and financially
intolerable', and made impossible the fulfilment of the party's
electoral pledges about improving Blacklist schools and developing
advanced elementary instruction. He repeated the idea that the majority
of Anglicans, as well as local authorities and moderate Nonconformist
opinion, would be most interested in providing more flexible
arrangements for the local transfer of schools. Percy believed that
this plan had advantages over Fisher's proposed settlement: any change
in the dual system would be minimal and optional, and local authorities
would have responsibility for negotiating terms suitable and acceptable 
37to local opinion. The opposition to the President was again taken 
up by Salisbury, who claimed that the Church would only contemplate 
surrendering its schools if a definite 'religious gain' could be
Q  O
achieved. This argument was backed up by the Home Secretary,
William Joynson-Hicks, who added that any move towards the abolition
39of the dual system would alienate 'masses of Government supporters'.
By contrast, Percy found support from Edward Wood, now Baron Irwin,
37. The terms which Percy envisaged for the transfer of church schools 
to local authorities included the provision of agreed syllabus 
teaching in all schools, as well as denominational instruction
on certain days for senior children where requested, either in 
the school concerned or elsewhere - the latter implied an extension 
of the so-called Anson bye-law. Report of the Cabinet church 
schools committee, 26 Oct. 1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/283.
38. By this Salisbury meant the sort of scheme earlier outlined by 
the Bishop of Manchester, which aimed to safeguard religious 
teaching by establishing central and local religious committees
and by including references to the religious competence of teachers. 
See Cabinet church schools committee, 1st conclusions, 18 June 
1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/283.
39. Ibid.
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and Lord Birkenhead, who noted that the government was only intending 
to provide legislative guarantees where local agreements had been 
worked out. The recommendations of the committee ultimately 
represented a compromise between the two points of view. On the 
one hand, there would be no attempt at a comprehensive national 
settlement and - as a concession to Salisbury - encouragement should 
be given to securing ’adequate' religious teaching in all schools.
On the other hand, local initiatives were not to be discouraged, and 
the government would be prepared to introduce enabling legislation 
for such purposes if demanded. The President finally made this 
decision public in June 1926.^ ^
Percy's public statement did not speed up the pace of local
negotiations as he intended. During the summer of 1926 proposals
for transferring schools were rejected or coolly received by several
Anglican diocesan bodies, and in October the President was concerned
that legislation was unlikely when only one authority was ready to 
42act. Any slim prospect of progress was dealt a severe and unexpected 
blow by the annual Church Assembly of the following month. In the 
absence of Archbishop Davidson, the Assembly destroyed the impression 
that the Church would accept an enabling bill, and endorsed instead 
a strongly denominational alternative policy. Although the Archbishop 
quickly reaffirmed the commitment of many Anglicans to legislation, 
Percy realised that the damage already done left the government no
40. Cabinet church schools committee, 2nd conclusions, 20 Oct. 1925, 
ibid.
41. Cabinet minutes, 11 Nov. 1925, P.R.O. CAB 23/51; The Times,
25 June 1926.
42. Percy to A. Rowland Clegg, 12 Oct. 1926, P.R.O. ED 24/1518.
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nearer to acting than it had been previously.The President now 
envisaged that the only course was to gradually rebuild trust between 
local authorities and voluntary school managers, particularly through 
the recently established Archbishops*Commission on Religious Education. 
'If the Church Assembly does not commit another faux pas in the 
interval'; he noted early in 1927, *it is possible that the Commission 
may succeed in putting forward proposals which would meet with general 
goodwill, but, in the meantime, we should certainly let the whole
iiii
matter rest where it is'.
The failure to introduce an enabling bill marked the end of the
first phase of Eustace Percy's approach to the dual system. His first
two years at the Board had been dominated by the attempt to produce
an adjustment designed to benefit the Anglican schools alone. As
he told one party colleague, any fundamental changes in the 1902
settlement still appeared out of the question. If attention centred
on existing schools and undenominational teaching in council schools,
'we may be able to get somewhere, but if we stray outside these limits
45we shall merely revive old controversies'. Percy's cautious approach 
had itself aroused opposition frcxn within the Church, however, which 
in turn found political expression in the Conservative Party. Although 
the proposals for an enabling bill were never sufficiently advanced 
to be discussed by parliament, there were signs that Conservative 
supporters shared sane of the reservations of Lord Salisbury. In 
1926 one local party, for example, attacked the threatened 'closure'
43. Cruickshank, op.cit., pp.126-7; Percy to Davidson, 7 Dec. 1926, 
P.R.O. ED 24/1510.
44. 'Proposals for an enabling bill to deal with church schools', 
memorandum by Percy, 9 Feb. 1927, P.R.O. CAB 24/184.
45. Percy to W. Smithers, 7 Dec. 1926, P.R.O. ED 24/1518.
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of church schools, adding that the present administration should be 
more vigorously defending religious education.This did not mean 
that all Conservatives were opposed to local concordats, but it did 
highlight the difficulties of achieving even moderate reform. Percy 
had clearly hoped that by dealing with the Anglican schools the problem 
of the Roman Catholics, which had been ignored in discussions on 
enabling legislation, could then be faced separately. After the decision 
of the Church Assembly had jeopardised this two-stage approach, the 
President began to contemplate for the first time the necessity of 
a wider settlement. This shift in the second half of Percy * s term 
at the Board was primarily due to one major development - the effect 
on educational and religious opinion of the 1926 Hadow Report.
The Board's first reaction to the Report was to reject the idea 
of raising the school-leaving age within six years, a proposal which 
would have placed considerable extra burden on the voluntary bodies.
The President did, however, welcome new developments in post-primary 
instruction, and he declared that voluntary as well as local authorities 
must face up to the need for 'Hadow reorganisation'.This commitment 
to reform of the elementary system raised in more acute form the 
financial shortcomings of the church schools. The problems for Percy 
were accentuated at this stage by the attitude of the Roman Catholics, 
who had played little part in post-war discussions on the dual system.
The Catholic community was determined to defend the religious atmosphere 
of their schools, and the immediate reaction of Catholic spokesmen 
to the Hadow Report was to oppose any measures likely to result in
46. H. Blain to Percy, 5 July 1926, ibid., refers to the complaints 
of the Burnley Conservative and Unionist Association, which had 
been passed on to the party's Central Office.
47. The Times Educational Supplement, 8 Jan. 1927.
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the loss of senior pupils - an attitude which in areas such as London
helped to underpin the initial scepticism about reorganisation.^^
In July 1928 a deputation led by the Archbishop of Westminster,
Cardinal Bourne, complained that the Hadow Report was unsympathetic
to the voluntary schools. Percy hoped initially that soothing
assurances would be enough to calm Catholic fears: he replied that
children would not be forced into council schools at the age of eleven,
and he expected only experiments in reorganisation from the 
49 .denominations. The President's kind words proved only temporarily 
effective, however, and in the face of continuing Catholic agitation, 
he began to revise his strategy for the dual system.
The President's new approach derived in the first place from 
his commitment to elementary reorganisation, which pointed ultimately 
to the need for a revision of the 1902 settlement. If, however - 
as Percy hoped - the denominations were to be able to maintain their 
position within the elementary system, it was no longer possible to 
concentrate only on the Anglican schools. The persistence of Catholic 
agitation, he realised, also raised an important tactical consideration: 
the need to secure Catholic support in the face of efforts to use 
the election as a lever for improving the position of church schools. 
Percy's response was to suggest a twin policy for the dual system.
The idea of enabling legislation was to be retained, though now confined 
to the repair of schools on the Board's Blacklist. More important, 
the religious problem was to be a central feature of the minister's
48. For the role played by John Gilbert, chairman of the Catholic 
Education Council, in the response of the London County Council,
see below, p.253.
4 9. Deputation from the Joint Committee of the Hierarchy and the 
Catholic Education Council, 13 July 1928, P.R.O. ED 24/1521.
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wider policy of ’higher education for all'. The idea of creating 
a unified administrative code for all children over eleven was of 
course to be presented primarily in terms of its educ/ational 
advantages, but for Percy it possessed additional merit. The statutory 
restrictions in force on both religious teaching and grants of public 
money to the voluntary bodies applied only to elementary, and not 
to higher, education. The abolition of the existing elementary category 
would therefore remove many of the disabilities of church schools 
and enable effective assistance to be given for reorganisation into 
senior schools.The President's new approach remained at the centre 
of his policy for the dual system throughout his final months at the 
Board, and raised difficulties with both the major denominations.
In November 1928 Percy made his new policy known for the first
51time to a deputation of Roman Catholics. He was aware that this
private delcaration alone would not be enough to satisfy the deputation;
many Catholics were still demanding the introduction of the 'Scottish
solution' - the transfer of schools to local authority control with
absolute guarantees that denominational instruction would be given
52by specially appointed teachers. As a result, the President made
strenuous efforts to pacify Catholic opinion, establishing for example
closer links with the chairman of the Catholic Education Council,
53F.N. Blundell, a Conservative back-bencher. He also introduced 
some important concessions in policy, notably by modifying the shape
50. 'Church schools', memorandum by Percy, 26 Sep. 1928, P.R.O.
CAB 24/197; Percy to Churchill, 1 Oct. 1928, P.R.O. ED 24/1389.
51. 'Memorandum of interview with the Catholic Education Council and 
the Hierarchy', 22 Nov. 1928, P.R.O. ED 24/1521.
52. e.g. The Universe, 15 Oct. 1928.
53. Percy to F.Ü. Blundell, 23 Oct. 1928, P.R.O. ED 24/1521: he confessed 
to being 'quite at seas' as to what the Catholic community as
a whole wanted, since individuals freely expressed their opinions.
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of the proposed enabling legislation into such a form as to make it
acceptable as an interim measure of relief pending a general 
54
settlement. In March 1929 he secured approval from the Treasury
to spend one million pounds over a five year period in special grants,
designed to assist Catholic schools on the Blacklist in making
essential repairs. Percy subsequently had reason to believe that
he had secured his objectives. The Catholic Hierarchy reversed its
hostile attitude towards the government, with Cardinal Bourne refusing
to commit himself to any controversial proposals and claiming on the
eve of the election that one party at least had accepted Catholic 
55demands.
The President's main fears in the latter context were, if anything,
caused by the Church of England. In the immediate aftermath of the
Hadow Report, Percy believed that as far as enabling legislation to
assist the Anglicans was concerned, 'we have missed the bus'.^^
With the decision to formulate a new policy, however, he became more
anxious about the proceedings of the Archbishops* Commission on
Religious Education, a further body chaired by Sir Henry Hadow.
Percy feared that any report from the commission before the election
might identify the Church with a definite form of settlement and so
57'draw the fire' of the other interested bodies. In addition, 
some of the commission's likely recommendations were a cause for
54. See the anonymous note of discussion with the President on 7 May 
1929, P.R.O. ED 24/1518, and Percy to Gilbert, 7 May 1929, P.R.O. 
ED 24/1523.
55. 'Note of interview with Treasury officials', 23 Mar. 1929, P.R.O. 
ED 24/1523. Cardinal Bourne said that by comparison with the 
Conservatives, the other parties were 'shy and reticent' - The 
Times Educational Supplement, 1 June 1929.
56. Percy to Sir Henry Hadow, TJ Apr. 1927, P.R.O. ED 24/1519.
57. Symonds minute to Percy, 19 Dec. 1928, ibid.
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concern. Above all, the abolition of the elementary education category 
for the specific purpose of aiding the church schools would, in Percy’s 
words, ’blow the gaff*, and prevent the government bringing forward 
the measure purely on its educational merits.He noted that concern 
not to prejudice future progress had led the Catholics to confine 
themselves to an ’extraordinarily good’ statement of general principles, 
rather than becoming identified with one form of settlement. 9^ By 
using his influence behind the scenes, the President was able to 
persuade Sir Henry Hadow to follow this example. The commission 
produced no statements before the election and, equally important, 
left open the negotiating position of the Anglican church.
The prospects for the inclusion of Percy’s ideas in the Conservative 
election programme in 1929 did not at first sight appear encouraging.
The Duchess of Atholl had already expressed her fear that Nonconformists 
would object strongly to the abolition of the Cowper-Temple clause 
and to the possibility of denominational teaching in council schools.
Some of the Parliamentary Secretary’s reservations were echoed in 
the cabinet by Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for Air. The 
objections of Lord Salisbury, however, were now less strident than 
in earlier years. In private, Salisbury was now admitting that the 
education question had altered considerably in the last few years, 
and he was even moving towards the opinion that the dual system in 
its present form could not be sustained.With only a minimum of
5 8. Percy minute to Symonds, 21 Dec. 1928, ibid.
59. Percy to W. Buchanan-Riddell, 3 May 1929, ibid.
60. Memorandum by the Duchess of Atholl, 18 Mar. 1929, Atholl papers, 
file 41.
61. Notes of a conversation with Holland of the National Society,
27 Mar. 1929, Salisbury papers, 4M 129/91-4.
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discussion, the President was able to secure permission to proceed
with the drafting of his proposals. The party’s official statement
of policy subsequently contained the claim that ’the Government feel
confident that the time is ripe for a permanent settlement by agreement
based on a common recognition of the vital importance of religious
instruction in accordance with the wishes of the parents’. A commitment
was also made to an immediate measure enabling Blacklisted schools
to be brought up to date, along the lines of the legislation
fip
contemplated in 1926.
The, Labour Party’s success at the general election prevented 
Eustace Percy’s ideas from proceeding further. The period of 
Baldwin’s second government had nevertheless confirmed many of the 
underlying changes taking place since the early 1920s. By the time 
Percy left office, the dual system was the source of much less party 
political controversy than previously. The President believed that 
throughout his term at the Board, the Liberal Party machine in the 
constituencies was more alive to the value of old war-cries than Labour, 
though the importance of this had in fact been reduced by the electoral 
decline of the Liberals and the softening of moderate Nonconformist 
opinion.Moreover, Labour as the major party of opposition since 
1924 had given few signs of seeking to emulate the Liberals by pursuing 
an actively secular policy. Trevelyan had stressed his desire not 
to revive old disputes, and at the 1929 election some Labour members
62. National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations (N.U.C.U.A.), 
Official statement of Conservative educational policy (1929).
63. ’Church schools', memorandum by Percy, 26 Sep. 192Ü, P.R.O. CAB 
24/197; Percy to J. Scott Lidget, 10 Apr. 1929, P.R.O. ED 24/1523.
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even competed with the Conservatives by pledging help for the Catholic 
64 . .
schools. Within the Conservative Party, the attitude of Lord 
Salisbury indicated a new willingness to contemplate at least a 
modification of the dual system. These party views highlighted the 
underlying change in the religious issue: since the war the problem 
for successive governments had become one of reconciling denominational 
differences in order to facilitate the overall progress of elementary 
education. Eustace Percy had of course sought to maintain the position 
of religious instruction, introducing various administrative measures 
and regarding the likely benefits to the voluntary bodies as an 
essential aspect of 'higher education for all'.^^ Before the war, 
however, the ideas advocated by Percy would have been inconceivable 
coming from a Conservative minister. The plan put forward in 1929 
marked a novel attempt to shift the problems of dual control away 
from the elementary system into the higher education sector, where 
local authorities were free to make their own arrangements. Moreover, 
Percy had followed the example of Fisher in aiming at a comprehensive 
national agreement which would, in his own words, 'turn the flank' 
of 1902. In religious education, as in policy towards the adolescent 
as a whole, the focus of attention was to shift and become narrower 
in the decade after Percy left the Board of Education.
64. Every Labour candidate at the election was informed by party 
headquarters that they should avoid pledges of financial support, 
although this did not prevent many Catholic Labour candidates 
from giving sympathetic assurances - D.W. Dean, 'The difficulties 
of a Labour educational policy: the failure of the Trevelyan bill, 
1929-31', British Journal of Educational Studies (1969), p.293.
65. The administrative measures taken by Percy included the removal 
of obstacles to the recognition of voluntary training colleges 
and the sanctioning of an increased building programme for 
elementary church schools. 'Notes on the church school problem', 
the Duchess of Atholl, 30 Apr. 1929, P.R.O. ED 24/1523.
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IV
The determination of the Labour minister C.P. Trevelyan to raise 
the school-leaving age to fifteen after 1929 had two important effects 
on the issue of religious education. In the first place, attention 
turned away from the possibility of a comprehensive revision of the 
1902 terms and centred instead on the problem of how the voluntary 
bodies were to participate in Labour’s projected reform. The second, 
and directly related effect, was to highlight the need for immediate 
agreement: unless the church schools were to be excluded from the 
twin reforms of reorganisation and raising the leaving age, it was 
necessary to secure a short-term compromise between the voluntary 
bodies on the one hand and the Nonconformists, teachers and local 
authorities on the other. When he first returned to the Board, Trevelyan 
in fact contemplated the bypassing of this issue. In December 1929 
he introduced a short bill designed to raise the school age by April 
1931, making no reference to children educated in the non-provided 
elementary schools.As a result of this omission, agitation for 
increased financial assistance was renewed by both the Roman Catholics 
and Anglicans, and was taken up in the political arena by the 
Conservative opposition. Conservative back-benchers still remained 
divided over long-term policy for the dual system, as was shown by 
the recommendations of the Anglican Archbishops*Commission, finally 
published in October 1929. The majority report of the Commission 
had backed the conciliatory approach of the National Society, and
66. Trevelyan had decided soon after coming to office that a one-clause 
bill should be sufficient to raise the school age within two 
years - Trevelyan to J.R. MacDonald, 31 July 1929, Ramsay MacDonald 
papers, P.R.O. 30/69/251.
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was supported by M.P.a such as Sir John Birchall, a Church Estates
commissioner; but demands for a firmer attitude by the Church had 
also resulted in the production of a minority report, which was signed 
by Harold Macmillan and Cyril Cobb as the only back-benchers serving 
on the Commission. Despite these differences, however, the exclusion 
of church schools from Trevelyan's bill provided a natural rallying 
point for the party. Eustace Percy devised the wording of the argument, 
widely used by Conservatives in the constituencies, that the government 
was acting unreasonably in offering local authorities special grants 
for raising the school age which were not available to church bodies. 
This sense of indignation was expressed at all levels. A former cabinet 
colleague of Percy's passed on the complaints of local churchmen, 
adding that Percy too had no doubt been 'inundated with these and 
others like them from all quarters'.In the face of this and other 
forms of widespread protest, Trevelyan's school attendance bill was 
withdrawn early in 1930.
Behind the scenes the Labour minister now initiated a series
of negotiations aimed at incorporating the voluntary bodies in plans
for raising the leaving age. The results of these negotiations were
reflected in a second education bill introduced in May 1930, under
which local authorities would be able to contribute to voluntary
school costs in return for greater control over the appointment of 
70teachers. Trevelyan's proposals were based primarily on the wishes
67. The Times Educational Supplement, 2 Nov. 1929.
68. * Answer drawn up by Lord Eustace Percy', Feb. 1930, P.R.O. ED 
24/1523.
69. A. Steel-Maitland to Percy, 8 Jan. 1930, Conservative Research 
Department papers. Education: folder 1G.
7 0. Board of Education, Proposals for enabling local education 
authorities to enter into agreements with the managers of non­
provided schools for purposes of reorganisation, Cmd.3551 (1930).
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of the National Society and the Anglican episcopate, and for this
reason found favour with Eustace Percy. Under his guidance, the
parliamentary party as a whole was now more willing to accept
increased public control. Annesley Somerville, for example, claimed
that the difficulties facing the church schools following the Hadow
Report of 1926 were widely recognised, and that the moves initiated
by Percy and continued by Trevelyan deserved full support. In spite
of the reservations of Lord Salisbury, the Conservative opposition
in parliament distinguished clearly between opposition to a higher
school-leaving age and support for additional aid to the voluntary 
71bodies. The real problems for Trevelyan at this stage were created
in other quarters. The Catholics complained bitterly that permanent
concessions were being demanded in return for short-term financial
assistance. The operation of the party whip meant that this hostility
was not reflected on the Conservative side in May 1930; and Trevelyan
was embarrassed to find instead that Catholic members of his own
party - led by John Scurr - were threatening to vote against the
72government unless amendments were made. The public campaign 
undertaken by the Catholics produced a corresponding reaction among 
Nonconformists, whose complaints were taken up by Liberals: one M.P. 
asserted that such a measure could be expected from the Conservatives 
but was inexplicable from a Labour minister with a Nonconformist 
background.The government’s dependence on Liberal support naturally
71. The Times, 2 May 1930; Archbishop Lang to Salisbury, 24 May 1930, 
Salisbury papers, 4M 135/54; Percy - 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1530-1, 
29 May 1930.
72. Ibid., C.1546.
73. Rev. R.M. Kedward - 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.l660, 30 May 1930.
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enhanced the significance of this attitude, which persisted throughout 
the committee stage in parliament.7^  Trevelyan's attempt to combine two 
measures into one ultimately strengthened the opposition to both, 
and in the summer of 1930 the education bill was once more withdrawn.
In October the President made a third attempt to raise the school 
age by reverting to the original idea of omitting reference to the 
religious issue. The Conservative Party in turn simply went back 
to its position of a year ago. At the committee stage Herwald Ramsbotham, 
a new member representing Lancaster, tabled an amendment suggesting 
that the school-leaving age should not be raised until local authorities 
were able to contribute to the costs of voluntary schools.7^  The 
amendment had complete backing from all sections of the party, and 
although not called, it foreshadowed a similar amendment being threatened 
by Roman Catholic Labour members. Faced with this ultimatum,
Trevelyan held a series of conferences aimed at narrowing denominational 
differences. These produced some new ideas which the government 
published as a White Paper, but in the absence of complete agreement 
the President was unable to give Scurr and his followers a definite 
assurance that a religious settlement would follow the passage of 
his bill. Hence in January 1931 the notorious 'Scurr amendment' was 
carried by an alliance of Labour dissidents and the Conservative
74. Percy to Steel-Maitland, 14 Jan. 1930, Conservative Research 
Department papers. Education: folder 1G, had already observed 
that Trevelyan was 'frightened to death of the Free Churches'. 
Nonconformists (and Catholics) in fact tabled nearly all the 
proposed amendments at the committee stage; the Conservatives 
concentrated solely on the school-leaving age aspects of the bill.
75. N.U.C.U.A., Fighting points for Conservatives (London, 193D,
pp.88-9. Freed from the need to back the party line of supporting 
the scheme of May 1930, Roman Catholic Conservative M.P.s now 
denounced the bill as an 'outrageous act of injustice': e.g. 
Colonel Reynolds - 244 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1149, 6 Nov. 1930.
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opposition, making the bill inoperative pending agreement on the
religious issue.7^  This defeat made any further progress unlikely,
although the defeat of the bill in the House of Lords was not now
inevitable. The majority of Conservative peers wanted to reject the
government's bill on the grounds of extravagance, but others felt
that in view of the paramount importance of assisting the church
schools, the measure should be carried after the safeguard of the
Scurr amendment. The outcome was a compromise which reflected the
party's approach throughout the period of opposition. Trevelyan's
bill was voted down in February 1931 on the grounds of cost, but
Conservative spokesmen pledged their support for any future measure
77which might ease the position of the voluntary schools.
The prolonged financial crisis of the early 1930s brought further 
temporary relief to the voluntary schools. After Trevelyan's 
resignation and the fall of the Labour government, the pressure of 
economy was such that the National government gave little attention 
to the problems of the dual system for some three years. During this 
period the Liberal minister at the Board of Education, Sir Donald
78Maclean - whose appointment had caused some disquiet among Anglicans -
died unexpectedly, and was replaced by Irwin, who returned for his 
second spell at the Board. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Gordon 
Lang, had taken the unusual step of privately urging the Prime Minister
7 6. Scurr was dubbed by one of his colleagues the 'Scurrge of God', 
but for the idea of the amendment as a 'Tory intrigue', see below, 
pp. 254-5.
77. The Times Educational Supplement, 31 Jan. 1931; Lord Hailsham 
to Salisbury, 4 Feb. 1931, Salisbury papers, 4M 139/75; 79 H.L. 
Deb., 5s., cc.1071-2 , 18 Feb. 1931.
7 8. Holland to Lord Grey, 22 June 1932, Archbishop Lang papers, Lambeth 
Palace Library, vol.31, f.194.
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to appoint a Churchman in succession to Maclean, and Irwin's arrival
certainly altered the tone of the government's approach in the short- 
79term. As the economic situation improved in 1934, the President
also began to revive the question of the dual system. His main concern
was to pick up precisely where Trevelyan had left off: Irwin, now
Lord Halifax, argued that for educational and political reasons the
government's policy must return to the questions of raising the school-
8nleaving age and providing capital grants for the church schools.
This line of reasoning initially made little headway among Halifax's 
cabinet colleagues. The traditional suspicions of the Treasury were 
voiced by the Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain, who persuaded the cabinet 
that nothing more than the formulation of a general policy was required 
before the next election. In addition, the composition of the government 
provided obstacles to the Board's case. Nonconformist members of 
the cabinet such as Kingsley Wood and Walter Runciman warned of the 
possible revival of sectarian controversy, and it was generally agreed 
that although a Conservative administration might have acted to assist 
the voluntary bodies, the introduction of such grants at the present 
moment would alienate the Liberal supporters of the National 
government. As a result Halifax was forced to go slow throughout
79. Lang to Baldwin, 24 June 1932, Lang papers, vol.31, f.196.
80. 'Future educational policy' , memorandum by Halifax, 8 Feb. 1934, 
P.R.O. CAB 24/247: educationally, Halifax argued that Hadow 
reorganisation could not be completed without enabling the church 
senior schools to be brought up to standard; politically. 
Nonconformists, teachers and local authorities would be hostile 
to the separation of the school age and building grant issues.
81. Cabinet educational policy committee, first and second meetings,
1 Mar. and 27 June 1934, P.R.O. CAB 27/574. Kingsley Wood was 
one of only 36 Conservative M.P.s (from a total of 1195) who were 
Nonconformists in the inter-war period - J.M. McEwen, 'Unionist 
and Conservative Members of Parliament, 1914-1939*, unpublished 
University of London Ph.D thesis, 1959, p.37.
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1934, and could secure permission only to continue 'exploring the 
state of opinion in the country'.
The state of opinion in the country had in fact altered considerably
since the disputes over Trevelyan's legislation. Within months of
the Scurr amendment, the Catholic Hierarchy had for the first time
declared a willingness to contemplate small changes in the dual system;
and there were several signs of a change of heart among Nonconformists
about the White Paper proposals of 1931.^ 3 These changes were reflected
in negotiations with the government after Halifax had finally secured
permission in 1935 to devise a policy for the forthcoming general
election. The movement in denominational views was sufficient to
allow the President to decide quickly on a scheme of grants for the
voluntary schools, based primarily on the ideas of the 1931 conferences.
Local authorities were to be empowered to provide grants covering
between fifty and seventy five per cent of the cost of repairing
denominational schools for the purposes of elementary reorganisation
or raising the leaving age. In return the teachers employed in such
schools were to be employed by the local authority, with a certain
number 'reserved' for the approval of voluntary managers, and agreed
syllabus instruction was to be available in all so-called single- 
84school areas. These ideas were retained as the basis for future 
action after Halifax had been replaced by Oliver Stanley in the cabinet
82. Cabinet educational policy committee, third meeting, 6 Nov. 1934, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/574.
83. G.A. Beck (ed.). The English Catholics, 1850-1950 (London, 1950), 
p.392; Viscount Wolmer to Irwin, 2 May 1933, 3rd Earl Selborne 
papers, Bodleian Library, c.992, f.l80: many leading Nonconformists 
'now bitterly regret what I may call the Dr Clifford policy in 
regard to education'.
84. 'Educational policy of the government', notes by Archbishop Lang,
4 June 1935, Lang papers, vol.32, f.124.
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reshuffle of June 1935. The new cabinet committee established to 
advise on education was much more sympathetic to action on the religious 
issue than its predecessor. Stanley could now rely on the support 
not only of Halifax, but also of Eustace Percy as Minister without 
Portfolio; and even Kingsley Wood, impressed by the willingness of 
the Free Churches to accept building grants in return for a time limit 
of three years, was prepared to drop his main objections.The Board's 
proposals were subsequently printed as official government policy 
for the election of October 1935, and after the return of the National 
government, Stanley included building grants as part of the education 
bill which he quickly presented to parliament.
In party terms, the debates which preceded the passage of the 
1936 Education Act witnessed something of a reversal from those 
accompanying Trevelyan's abortive school age bills. The Labour Party 
now declared itself opposed to the proposed raising of the leaving 
age, owing to the provision for ' beneficial exemptions ', but made 
clear its support for a religious agreement which built upon Trevelyan's 
initiative.Conservative back-benchers, in the meantime, reaffirmed 
the position spelt out during the period of the Labour government.
In many areas Roman Catholics agitated against the bill in early 1936, 
in some cases misunderstanding its terms, but in parliament Conservative 
spokesmen remained loyal to the government and expressed the more
85. Cabinet educational policy committee, fifth meeting, 4 July 1935, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/574. Stanley did introduce two modifications: in 
order to satisfy Nonconformists, the grants were limited to a 
fixed period of three years, thereby highlighting their emergency 
nature; and the Catholic reluctance to relinquish control over 
appointment of teachers was overcome by extending the grants to 
cover new senior schools.
86. H.B. Lees-Smith - 312 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2029, 27 May 1936.
I8l
moderate case of the Hierarchy. Sir John Shute, in particular, the
member for Liverpool Exchange, welcomed the measure as a step in the
right direction, while making it clear that a final settlement was
still required. At the committee stage the Catholic attitude was
equally moderate: Shute and his associates made clear Catholic fears,
such as the need for a right of appeal in cases where local authorities
refused to give grants, but then refrained from pressing their
87
amendments to a division. Conservative members were also prominent
in conveying the views of the National Society, which had originated
many of the ideas contained in the bill. The lead in this context
was taken by Sir John Birchall, who supported two contentious amendments
which the government felt unable to accept. The first was designed
to extend financial aid to junior as well as senior schools in cases
where expenditure was necessitated by reorganisation; and the second
aimed at allowing the right of entry in certain council senior schools.
The latter was sponsored personally by Archbishop Lang in the House
of Lords, and raised such disquiet among teachers and Nonconformists
that the President felt compelled to personally intervene and delete
88the clause when the bill returned to the Commons.
Under the terms of the 1936 Act, some five hundred proposals 
for improved or new senior accommodation were submitted by the voluntary 
bodies in the period before the outbreak of war. The postponement 
of these schemes in 1939 meant that the voluntary schools still contained
87. 'Discussion with Roman Catholic representatives on January 9th 
1936', note by G.G. Williams, 10 Jan. 1936, P.R.O. ED 136/44;
'Education bill. The denominational issue', memo by D. Du B.
Davidson, 12 June 1936, P.R.O. ED 136/59.
88. Birchall - 308 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1209-10, 13 Feb. 1936; Cruickshank, 
op.cit., p.133.
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far fewer pupils in reorganised departments than the council schools, 
and still faced the problem of how to find a permanent and enduring 
place in the national system. The need for a wider settlement was 
reiterated by the publication of the Spens Report, which if officially 
endorsed, would have required the voluntary bodies to build a large 
amount of superior secondary accommodation or else confine themselves 
to the elementary system. Throughout the decade after 1929, however, 
government policy had concentrated not on the need for a long-term 
settlement but on the immediate issue of enabling church schools to 
participate in elementary reorganisation and the raising of the leaving 
age. On this twin issue, the views of the political parties had steadily 
converged. Although some Liberals remained committed to old 
Nonconformist slogans, the Labour Party had accepted that it was not 
possible to exclude church schools from new developments, and the 
Conservative Party threw its weight unanimously behind a limited
go
amendment of the dual system. By the time of the 1936 Act, the 
parties diverged only to the extent that individuals identified 
themselves with particular denominational reservations. The real 
obstacle to further reform of the dual system was now the difficulty 
of finding a basis for agreement among Anglicans, Catholics and 
Nonconformists, all of whom had only reluctantly accepted the 1936 
terms. As one observer said of this first encroachment into the 1902 
settlement, ’here is a bill which nobody likes, but which nobody., 
is anxious to take the responsibility of wrecking, with the result 
that by threatening withdrawal if any amendments are carried against
89. Birchall noted that at the committee stage many of the Church 
members were prepared to vote with the government rather than 
the National Society. See R. Holland to Lang, 25 Mar. 1936, 
Lang papers, vol.32, f.302.
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them, the Government have succeeded in getting it through committee 
practically unchanged’.
V
Religious instruction, more so than any other issue concerning
the state schools, held a special place in the Conservative Party’s
approach to education between the wars. It was widely agreed, in
the words of Lord Salisbury, that education ’must have a Christian
foundation. Religion must be taught in all schools - many of us would
say, religion as far as possible in the form prescribed by the wishes 
91of the parents’. The desire to make religious, preferably
denominational, teaching the basis of every school curriculum was
such that interest was aroused well beyond the narrow parliamentary
group usually associated with educational affairs. Many Conservatives
expressed their concern as active members of particular denominations,
especially the Anglican church, or even as managers of individual
92voluntary schools. The traditional desire to defend religious 
education thus remained fundamental for Conservatives, but this should 
not obscure the important changes which took place in policy and 
attitudes towards the dual system after the First World War. Edward 
Wood had led the way by recognising that some form of modification
90. R. Martin to Lang, 8 May 1936, Lang papers, vol.32, f.312. Oliver 
Stanley concluded that ’the fires are damped down, but they are 
still there’ - 312 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2088, 27 May 1936.
91. 'An outline of Christian anti-socialism’. The Nineteenth Century, 
97 (1925), p.171.
92. e.g. Sir George Courthorpe, M.P. for Rye, who complained about 
the effects of Hadow reorganisation on the church schools in his 
area of Sussex, many of which had been built by his family - 
Courthorpe to Percy, 6 Dec. 1929, Conservative Research Department 
papers. Education: folder 1G.
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of the 1902 settlement would ultimately be necessary. The moves made 
by Eustace Percy towards a comprehensive revision of the 1902 terms 
had attracted little support from the party as a whole, but one of 
the chief obstacles to reform - the hostility of high church 
Conservatives - had gradually diminished in importance. Salisbury 
came to believe that the dual system ’is clearly doomed sooner or 
later - probably sooner’, and the party readily endorsed the limited 
encroachment into the terms of dual control made by the 1936 Act.
Two concurrent changes therefore took place in the Conservative 
approach to the dual system, both of which were vital in explaining 
the settlement ultimately achieved during the Second World War. 
Conservative ministers had come to recognise the need for a change 
in the system so fervently defended during the Edwardian period; and 
party opinion as a whole - mirroring the shift in attitude towards 
the adolescent during the 1930s - increasingly accepted such reform 
as inevitable.
These changes reflected the manner in which the religious issue 
altered during the inter-war years. By 1939 the dual system was much 
less intimately linked with social and political divisions than it 
had been before or immediately after the First World War. This did 
not mean that denominational differences had disappeared or that such 
differences no longer found expression in the political arena. As 
late as 1930 a Liberal back-bencher could be found claiming that 
Nonconformists would resist change to the last, and that one of his 
Conservative opponents represented ’the very arrogant side of the
94Anglican Church, erecting its mitred front in Court and Parliament’.
93. Salisbury to Earl Grey, 1 Sep. 1930, Salisbury papers, 4M 137/1-4.
94. Isaac Foot - 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., C.I66O, 30 May 1930.
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This use of pre-war rhetoric, however, only served to blur the manner 
in which religion had declined as the source and generator of political 
opinion. With the decline of the Liberal Party in the early 1920s, 
religious education had become much less politically contentious. 
Thereafter, two major characteristics had stood out. At ministerial 
level, successive administrations worked within well-defined limits, 
aiming at finding a workable compromise between the desire of Anglicans 
and Roman Catholics for maximum grants, of Nonconformists for public 
control, and of teachers and local authorities for efficiency and 
freedom from religious tests. In the meantime, party opinion towards 
the dual system showed an increasing willingness to accept a compromise 
solution. The Labour Party, despite an undercurrent of hostility 
to religious teaching, had adopted a cautious approach to the question 
of dual control, and even took some of the credit for the modest advance 
secured in 1936. Conservatives also became increasingly conscious 
of the need to incorporate the church schools more fully into the 
national education system. Religious education therefore highlighted 
two of the central features of education as a political issue between 
the wars - the similarities in the ministerial policies of successive 
administrations, and the growing area of agreement between the political 
parties. These features were also evident in the case of a further 




THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE PROBLEMS 
OF EDUCATION FOR EMPLOYMENT, 1918-1939
Educational debate between the wars was mainly concerned with 
the full-time system of schooling. The politics of educational reform 
revolved around the twin themes of grammar school education and elementary 
reorganisation; other widely discussed issues - the dual system in 
particular - were intimately bound up with the central problem of 
educating children during their period of compulsory school attendance.
The education of the adolescent overlapped with, and at several points 
touched directly upon, the question of the relationship between education 
and the nation's industrial performance, or between schooling and 
employment. This broad issue, which embraced part-time as well as 
full-time education, acted as a persistent undercurrent in debates 
during the inter-war period, but has received little systematic 
attention from historians.^ The neglect of this important area of 
educational history stems in part from the difficulty of identifying 
a single, recognisable problem of relating school and work. In an 
attempt to tackle the 'boy labour problem', as it was known to many 
contemporaries, politicians and educationists promoted a whole range 
of policies, some of which were directed to specific ends and not
1. This neglect is pointed out by H. Silver, Education as history: 
interpreting nineteenth- and twentieth-century education (London, 
19Ü3), pp.151-59. The only attempt at a broad treatment is made 
by G.A.N. Lowndes, The silent social revolution, pp.146-68.
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conceived as part of a larger whole. In the Edwardian period the 
emphasis had been on technical education, a composite term which covered 
both full-time instruction for adolescents in a small number of junior 
technical schools, and voluntary, part-time education up to the age 
of twenty-one in technical colleges and agricultural institutes.
After the First World War, however, new methods of preparing children 
for their working lives came to be canvassed. The idea of making 
further part-time education compulsory was for the first time embodied 
in legislation with the passing of the 1918 Act, which introduced 
day continuation schools on a national basis. In addition, full-time 
schooling increasingly entered into the debate. The desirability 
of a curriculum with a practical bias in the new senior elementary 
schools was frequently discussed following the Hadow Report, and the 
effects on the labour market of raising the compulsory school-leaving 
age increasingly occupied attention. The problem was thus many-sided 
and difficult to define, affecting a wide range of age groups and 
touching several areas of policy, often separately administered by 
the Board of Education. The underlying questions nevertheless 
persisted: the content of the school curriculum as a preparation for 
employment; the nature of the transition period between school and 
work and the need for further part-time education; and the extent 
of the formal relationship between educationists and industrialists 
in defining their respective needs. These questions were regarded 
by contemporaries as the central concerns of the issue of 'education 
and industry', or of 'education for employment’.
This chapter sets out to examine the manner in which the political 
parties, and in particular the Conservative Party, approached the 
problems of education for employment between the wars. This framework
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does not allow room for detailed study of many important questions,
such as the function of particular institutions within their localities
or the role played by semi-official committees, industrial leaders
and professional interest groups. The following account concentrates
instead on the way in which politicians perceived the problems of
education for employment as they affected those in the fourteen to
eighteen age group. Within this context, three individual problems
require special consideration: the day continuation schools; juvenile
unemployment, which became a matter of public policy for the first
time in the 1920s; and technical education, which for a variety of
reasons was regarded as a traditionally weak area of the education 
2
system. From an analysis of these and related questions concerning 
full-time education for adolescents, two main conclusions emerge.
The first is that government policy produced only modest improvements: 
although individual ministers presented bold strategies for education 
and industry, their hopes were largely frustrated and Board policy 
in the 1930s especially resorted to a series of narrowly conceived, 
short-term expedients. The second is that party political opinion 
provided little concerted pressure for any major changes in policy, 
with the Conservative Party in particular paying only intermittent 
attention to the ill-defined problems of education for employment.
2. The reasons behind the weakness of technical education in the Edwardian 
period included the traditional prestige accorded to an 'academic’ 
training; the absence of a strong lead from either politicians 
or leaders of industry; and the reliance on local rates rather 
than central government funds for technical colleges and junior 
technical schools - see M. Angles, South Kensington to Robbins: 
an account of English technical and scientific education since 
1851 (London, l9b4), pp.5ü-b5; A.J. Peters, 'The changing idea 
o f  technical education', British Journal of Educational Studies,
XI, 2 (1963), p.164; and L.O. Ward, 'Technical education and the 




In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the problems 
of education for employment were dominated by the day continuation 
school. There was to be some discussion in the post-war period about 
the need to improve technical education as a whole, but attention 
focused nationally on the continuation school as a novel method of 
meeting the educational needs of the juvenile worker. During the 
Edwardian period, the Board of Education had gradually become more 
receptive to the idea of compulsory attendance at continuation classes, 
and the war ultimately provided the circumstances necessary for the 
introduction of a national scheme. The education bill introduced 
by Fisher in 1917 adapted pre-war Liberal ideas and imposed upon local 
authorities the duty of establishing continuation schools in their 
areas. These were to provide part-time education of a general nature 
for all adolescents between the ages of fourteen and eighteen no longer 
in full-time attendance at school.3 Fisher's experiment was soon 
to be curtailed and then abandoned altogether. The prospect of 
elementary school leavers continuing their education after entering 
employment was opposed by various industrial interests, and when this 
opposition was taken up in parliament, the education minister was 
forced to make important modifications to his original scheme.
The necessary hours of attendance were reduced from 320 to 280 each 
year; compulsory attendance was only to apply up to the age of sixteen 
in the first instance; and extension of the scheme to cover all those
3. H. Hendrick, "'A race of intelligent unskilled labourers”: the 
adolescent worker and the debate on compulsory part-time day 
continuation schools, 1900-1922', History of Education, 9, 2 
(1980), p.159; G.E. Sherington, English education, social change 
and war, pp.29-30.
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up to eighteen was only to occur after a period of seven years.
Several local authorities proceeded to open new continuation schools 
following the passage of the 1918 Act, but the possibility of a national 
network was undermined by the post-war economic recession. The new 
schools were quickly closed down, and after Fisher's departure from 
the Board in 1922 the réintroduction of continuation classes was never 
seriously considered. The failure of Fisher's efforts resulted from 
several interrelated factors - local and national, as well as economic 
and political.^ The aim of the following account is not to reconsider 
each of these factors: it is rather to examine the role of the political 
parties, particularly the Unionist Party, in attempting to meet the 
problems of education for employment during the period of the Lloyd 
George coalition.
Fisher's education bill was of course an agreed measure between 
the Liberal and Unionist wings of the wartime coalition. The scheme 
of continuation schools which it promoted, however, had already 
attracted support from politicians for a wide variety of reasons.
Fisher himself tended to combine both educational and industrial 
considerations. His desire to improve opportunities for the elementary 
school pupil was reflected in the claim that the new schools aimed 
at ' being 'half educational, half social'; but at the same time his 
awareness of industrial needs was illustrated by the declaration 
that continuation was essential if young workers were to be adequately
5
supervised and so 'more disciplined and reasonably tempered'.
4. See D.W. Thoms, 'The emergence and failure of the day continuation 
school experiment', History of Education, 4, 1 (1975).
5. H.A.L. Fisher, The place of the University in national life (London, 
1919), p.10; 104 H.G. beb., 5s., c.392, Ij Mar. l9l8".
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The assumptions of the other political parties were more clearly stated. 
The Labour movement had on the whole followed the Liberal lead in 
advocating part-time instruction before the war, although some wanted 
it to be provided on the most comprehensive basis possible. The Workers’ 
Educational Association, for example, called for twenty hours of part- 
time education each week up to the age of eighteen, fearing that working- 
class children would otherwise be confined to vocational training 
aimed at increasing economic efficiency.^ This fear was based less 
on the policy of the Board of Education, which favoured a liberal 
curriculum, than on the suspected intentions of the Unionist Party’s 
attitude. Continuation schools - like nearly all aspects of education 
apart from the religious issue - had received little attention from 
the party as a whole before the war, but those Unionists who did press 
for reform in this direction tended to emphasise the possible 
industrial, rather than educational, benefits. Unionists believed 
that only the most gifted children should be encouraged to continue 
with their schooling beyond the elementary stage: for the remainder 
it was a matter of common sense that the curriculum be linked up with 
their future working lives. This view was embraced nationally by 
the Unionist Social Reform Committee and locally by the Municipal 
Reform Party in London; in a more extreme form it justified the need 
for continuation schools on the grounds of improving ’national
7
efficiency’ and emulating the German example. In these circumstances, 
it appeared that considerable scope existed for party differences 
over the precise form of further part-time instruction, if not its 
general necessity. This was to be confirmed by the debates which 
preceded the passage of the 1918 Act.
6. Sherington, op.cit., p.64.
7. Thoms, op.cit., pp.39-40; for the London example, see below, pp.237-8
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The complex response of Unionists to Fisher’s education bill 
was reflected above all in the discussion of clause ten - the proposed 
introduction of continuation schools. The hostility of industrialists 
to reductions in their child labour force was certainly echoed on 
the Unionist back-benches, but an exclusive concern with this section 
of opinion ignores in the first place the capacity of party members
g
to voice independent views. For many Unionists, their response to 
clause ten was conditioned primarily by their overall attitude to 
educational reform. Those back-benchers who gave general support 
to Fisher’s bill were frequently found defending the need for continuation 
classes. This applied to those professionally associated with the 
educational world, such as J.A.R. Marriott; and to the younger members 
identified with social reform, notably Edward Wood, who argued that
Q
the value of further training was now widely recognised. By contrast, 
the small minority of Unionists hostile to the education bill directed 
part of their criticism towards clause ten. Basil Peto, for example, 
complained that the threatened reduction in child labour would 
dislocate post-war trade, and Frederick Banbury expressed his anxiety 
that young agricultural labourers ’who are most useful in getting 
in the hay harvest., will be stopped work two hours before they ought 
to stop work because they have to go to s c h o o l P e t o  and Banbury 
were not, however, acting as formal representatives of industry in 
putting forward these arguments. Their opposition to continuation 
schools was rather one aspect of their die-hard resistance to
8. For an example of the emphasis on the industrialist response, see 
L. Andrews, The Education Act. 1918. p.52ff.
9. Marriott - 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.678-9, 18 Mar. 1018; Wood - 
ibid., c.714.
10. Peto - 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.344 and 348, 13 Mar. 1918;
Banbury - ibid., c.433.
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educational reform in general; and it was offset by the attitude of 
members such as Marriott and Wood, who conversely supported clause 
ten as part of their sympathy for the bill as a whole.
The opposition of industry was of course channelled through the
Unionist Party in parliament, although again the nature of this
opposition has been over-simplified in existing accounts. Hostility
to the continuation schools had been spearheaded at an early stage
by the Federation of British Industries, which operated mainly through
its own internal committee system. In early 1918 the Federation suggested
that, as an alternative to continuation classes, full-time education
11should be extended for selected children. This idea was referred
to during the second reading of the bill by General T.E. Hickman,
the Unionist M.P. for Wolverhampton South, who officially voiced the
Federation's concern that trade would be disrupted by a full system
of continuation schools. At the committee stage, Hickman also
sponsored amendments designed to limit the scope of clause ten,
12notably by proposing that attendance should be made voluntary.
The arguments put forward on behalf of the Federation attracted 
considerable publicity in the educational press, but in practice had 
little impact on the shape of the bill. Hickman made no attempt to 
press the Federation’s alternative scheme at the committee stage, 
and he was joined by only one other back-bencher - J.S. Harmood-Banner, 
representing the Everton constituency - in officially presenting the
11. ’Note of meeting’, education committee, 3 Apr. 1917, Federation 
of British Industries archive. Modern Records Centre, Warwick 
University, MSS.200/F/3/D1/4/2; Federation of British Industries, 
(F.B.I.), Memorandum on education (London, 1918), p.2.
12. 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.Yld-9, l8 Mr. 1918; 106 H.C. Deb., 5s., 
cc.1115-6, 30 May 1918.
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industrialist case. The letter’s grasp of the issues involved was
so unsure that he was interrupted at one point by Hickman for inadvertently
giving the impression that the Federation position was not representative
13of employers as a whole.
The reservations of the Federation were echoed most loudly by
employers in Lancashire, who had a long tradition of using juvenile
labour in the cotton and textile trades. The fear of a reduction
in child earning capacity also concerned the textile unions, with
the result that Unionist and Labour back-benchers representing Lancashire
seats joined forces to put the case of their constituents against
the proposed continuation schools. The opposition of the ’Lancashire
group’, however, was tempered by a sympathy for educational reform
which Hickman had not displayed. The Unionist leader of the group,
Henry Hibbert, was a well-known advocate of reform as chairman of
the Education Committee on the Lancashire County Council, and he openly
declared his support for the main principles of the bill during the 
14second reading. Hibbert stressed that the Lancashire members were 
primarily concerned about the particular form of Fisher’s scheme.
In the spring of 1918 his own suggestion - for fifteen hours in school 
every week between the ages of fourteen and sixteen - was widely discussed 
as a possible alternative. As one newspaper observed, the compulsory 
principle was now accepted by all but the ’reactionaries’ - a direct 
reference to the Federation of British Industries - but opinion was 
still divided as to whether a two or four year course would prove 
most beneficial. On this question, the W.E.A. amongst others sided
13. The Times Educational Supplement, 28 Feb. 1918; 104 H.C. Deb., 
5s., C.717, 18 MkrV W18.
14. 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.370-5, 13 Mar. 1918. For Hibbert’s wider 
views on educational reform, see above, pp. 36-7.
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with Hibbert's plan as a means of causing less interference with industry, 
providing it could be enforced up to the age of eighteen.Fisher, 
however, felt unable to accept the alternative plan. After realising 
that the opposition of Lancashire members threatened a parliamentary 
defeat for the education bill, the President modified his scheme to 
make it acceptable without a division. This outcome led to complaints 
that Lancashire had once more acted as the 'Ulster of Education', 
although in fact Hibbert shared neither the hostility of Banbury to 
educational reform nor the distrust of Hickman for all forms of 
continuation. The real problem for Lancashire members was, as one 
Unionist noted, that 'their constituencies are stronger than their 
principles *.^  ^
The continuation school debates in some ways cut across the main
party divisions seen during the passage of the 1918 Act. Clause ten,
like all other sections of the Act, had received formal endorsement
from members of all parties; but there had nevertheless emerged
significant underlying differences about the purpose and future shape
of continuation schools. The only enthusiastic support for clause
ten had been provided by the coalition Liberals, who praised the
minister's attempt to fuse the 'technical' and the 'cultural' aims 
17of education. By contrast, the small Labour group in parliament 
had emphasised the potential importance of continuation in improving
15. The Times Educational Supplement, 7 Mar. 1918; The Journal of 
Education, Apr.1918.
16. 'Memorandum of interview with Lancashire M.P.s', 30 May 1918, 
P.R.O. ED 24/670; Fisher diary, 31 May 1918, Fisher papers, 
unclassified series; The Westminster Gazette, 6 June 1918; 
C.W. Crook - The Times Educational Supplement, 13 June 1918.
17. e.g. E. Parrott - 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., c . y49,  18 Mar. 1918.
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educational opportunities for working-class children. Labour spokesmen
attacked the assumptions of the Unionist die-hards rather than those
of Hibbert’s alternative plan, and their anxiety about premature
specialisation for industrial purposes was reflected particularly
in the insistence that 'works schools' should not be recognised as
places of continuation schooling under the Act. The real potential
of the schools for the Labour Party lay in the possibility that when
fully developed, they would provide the great majority of children
with a substitute for secondary education, which would remain a minority 
18provision. Unionists, in the meantime, tended to regard the schools
in far more functional terms. Banbury's view that book-learning was
a waste of time for labourers and mechanics indicated that on this -
as on other issues - a small minority stood apart in denying the value
of any further education for most children. Moreover, those Unionists
who did support the bill stressed neither the need for an alternative
form of secondary training nor the importance of fusing 'technical'
with 'cultural' traditions. For most party members, the aim was rather
to improve economic efficiency by ensuring that the demands of industry
19for a better equipped workforce were met. Hence at the end of the 
war. Liberals alone placed great hope in the continuation school as 
a comprehensive method of tackling the problems of education and 
employment. Both the Labour and Unionist parties had given cautious 
backing to clause ten, and now waited to see how the new schools would 
develop.
18. A. Smith - 104 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.378, 13 Mar. 1918; A. Henderson - 
The Times Educational Supplement, 30 May 1918.
19. Hibbert was something of an exception here, arguing that 'if you 
place fetters round industry you must.. so synchronise education 
with commerce that you may develop the former without handicapping 
the latter' - 106 H.C, Deb., 5s., c.l629, 5 June 1918.
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In the event the continuation schools did not outlast the period
of the post-war coalition. Following the passage of the 1918 Act,
local authorities began devising their own plans and new schools were
soon opened in several areas, including London and Birmingham. When
the economic situation deteriorated, however, these authorities quickly
reversed their policies in an effort to save money, and by 1921 the
government had effectively abandoned its attempt to introduce a national
system of compulsory continuation. In political terms, the arguments
previously used in favour of continuation classes were rapidly overtaken
by events. This applied particularly within the Unionist Party, where
at cabinet level the party leader and Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Austen Chamberlain, played the leading role in forcing the abandonment
of Fisher's experiment. Chamberlain had no concern for continuation
as part of an educational or industrial strategy; he was simply alarmed
that the new schools posed the threat of an increased burden on the
Treasury at a time of recession. In 1920 he therefore took steps
to ensure that no further 'appointed days' would be granted to local
authorities for the opening of new continuation classes, and he even
20pressed Fisher to close down those schools already in operation.
The education minister fought off this last demand in the short-term, 
but his rearguard action was ultimately unsuccessful in the face of 
a worsening economic situation. The Board of Education, like other 
departments, placed severe restrictions on expenditure, and in 1921 
many local authorities began to avail themselves of the option - 
insisted upon by Chamberlain - of being able to avoid their
20. 'The growth of expenditure on education', memorandum by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, 21 Dec. 1920, P.R.O. CAB 24/97; Cabinet finance 
committee, 'Expenditure on education', memorandum by Chamberlain,
21 Dec. 1920, P.R.O. CAB 24/117.
198
responsibilities under clause ten. Thereafter the Chancellor became
more confident of holding down fresh expenditure under the 1918 Act,
for political opinion was increasingly swinging behind the orthodox
Treasury view of strict deflation as the necessary remedy pending
PIthe revival of international trade.
At the party political level, many Liberals maintained their
commitment to continuation in the new circumstances after 1919, but
the earlier reservations of both Labour and Unionist opinion
now rapidly intensified. This partly reflected a general hardening
22of attitudes in the face of growing industrial and social unrest.
As the parties lined up behind their respective electoral supporters, 
so the nature of the continuation school curriculum became a focus 
of debate. Hence in London for example. Unionists took up the complaints 
of local businessmen by stressing the need for a vocational rather 
than general curriculum. Labour spokesmen in turn used the attitude 
of hostile employers as a pretext for demanding more radical change
2P
in education. For the most part, however, Unionists objected to 
the new schools simply on the grounds of cost. Some party members, 
such as Cyril Cobb, chairman of the Education Committee on the London 
County Council, had acted to ensure the introduction of continuation 
classes in their areas, and continued to give them support. This 
encouragement was quickly undermined in 1921 by the criticisms first 
of die-hard and ’anti-waste’ sympathisers and then of wide sections 
of Unionist opinion. The most persistent critics of continuation 
in parliament all held seats in the London area, and so consciously
21. Chamberlain to Fisher, 30 Dec. 1920, P.R.O. ED 24/1258.
22. K.O. Morgan, Consensus and disunity, pp.287-301.
23. Sir Reginald Blair - 144 B.C. Deb., 5s., c.935, 11 July 1921; 
Will Thorne - 152 B.C. Deb., 5s., c.1325, 29 Mar. 1922.
199
directed their attacks on the schools in the capital.The eventual 
closure of the London schools in 1922 highlighted the party's new 
found concern with economy at all costs. The desire of a minority 
of local Unionists to continue with the new schools was overcome by 
the determination of the majority - prompted behind the scenes by 
national party figures - to make savings wherever possible.The 
continuation schools were thus abandoned by Unionists as a convenient 
scapegoat in a time of recession, rather than because of any 
consideration of their intrinsic value. As one back-bencher remarked 
in 1922, in the present conditions it was far better to have the nation 
'half educated and solvent, than to have it well educated and bankrupt'.
The immediate post-war years ultimately resulted in only partial 
success for efforts to improve education for employment. In the area 
of technical education, the war had underlined the need for technical 
and scientific training, and resulted in a personal request from the 
Prime Minister that further action be taken in this direction. Fisher 
responded by proposing the establishment of special committees to 
assess the needs of individual industries, but this initiative had 
not been taken up. In the meantime the President ignored pressure 
to amend the regulations for junior technical schools, which still 
prepared their pupils for specific trades, in order to allow them
24. e.g. Colonel John Newman - 138 B.C. Deb., 5s., c.597, 21 Feb.
1921 ; Sir John Bopkins - 139 B.C. Deb., 5s., c.666, 10 Mar. 1921.
25. For further details of the London example, see below, pp.238-42. 
In Birmingham, the new schools were opened in January 1921, but 
closed three weeks later after the City Council called upon the 
Education Committee to discontinue the scheme. For the pressure 
exerted by Chamberlain in this instance, see P.R.O. ED 24/1443.
26. Sir Gerald Burst - 152 B.C. Deb., 5s., c.1179, 28 Mar. 1922.
The Permanent Secretary to the Treasury is reported to have said 
early on that unless the continuation schools were stopped, the 
government would be unable to show any real savings to its 
Unionist supporters. See Selby-Bigge to Fisher, 11 Dec. 1920, 
P.R.O. ED 24/1258.
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to prepare students for higher technical and university training.  ^
As a result the slow development of voluntary, part-time courses in 
the technical colleges remained the main hope for progress, and the 
prospects for technical instruction were left uncertain with Fisher's 
departure from the Board. As one official report observed, 'technical 
education represents a debatable country with limits not very clearly
27defined lying upon the borders of Secondary and University education'.
The reasons behind this lack of progress had been many and varied.
Amongst those most directly concerned, employers had given little
backing to the continuation schools, and industrialists as a whole
had been slow in outlining their demands of technical training. The
Board of Education, for its part, had viewed continuation and technical
education as separately administered policy issues, rather than as
twin aspects of the same problem. The Permanent Secretary, Selby-
Bigge, had seen no need for a direct national lead in introducing
continuation classes, and he envisaged only a modest expansion of
junior technical schools. The central element of Board policy, he
believed, must be to develop the academic training given in the
secondary schools, which alone were to remain the route to higher 
28education. In the political arena attention had centred almost 
exclusively on the continuation schools: here Fisher's experiment 
had suffered from the additional pressures of economic recession and 
political indifference, the latter of which had wider implications 
for party attitudes towards education for employment.
27. 'Junior technical schools', memorandum by Selby-Bigge, Jan. 1918, 
P.R.O. ED 24/1849, which notes that 61 such schools were now in 
existence; Sherington, op.cit., pp.142-5.
28. 'Memorandum on the facilities open to scholars in public elementary 
schools for a continuance of their full-time education beyond
age of 14’, 29 Nov. 1918, P.R.O. ED 24/1411.
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The failure of the continuation schools was vital in determining 
the shape of party education policies for much of the inter-war period. 
This applied particularly to the general approach necessary for 
adolescents. The Liberals under Fisher continued to believe that 
without continuation classes, the majority of adolescents would escape 
all educational influence after fourteen. For Fisher, the necessary 
direction of policy was to widen but preserve the minority training 
given in secondary schools, improve the upper standards of the elementary 
school, and cater for juvenile workers in continuation classes.
The scenario of compulsory part-time and permissive full-time higher 
education, however, was no longer favoured either by local authorities 
or by the other political parties. The Labour Party had come to regard 
the continuation schools as only a temporary expedient, and in fact 
the failure of Fisher's efforts paved the way for the alternative 
policy drawn up by Tawney in 1922 - a wholesale reorganisation aimed 
at developing advanced elementary instruction up to the standard of 
existing secondary schools.For some Unionists, in the meantime, 
the idea of continuation education remained attractive in the absence 
of a national scheme, but the party now concentrated primarily on 
the same issues as Labour - those affecting the full-time system of 
education for adolescents. With the decline of the Liberal Party 
in the early 1920s, this was to have the long-term effect of transferring 
party controversy away from issues of education for employment and 
towards the full-time secondary and post-primary schools. Technical 
education, which after the failure of the continuation schools stood
29. H.A.L. Fisher, 'Lines of educational advance'. Contemporary Review, 
124 (1923), pp.443-4; Fisher, An unfinished autobiography,
pp. 109-10.
30. E.A. Waterfall, The day continuation school in England (London, 
1923); R.S. Barker, Education and politics, p.43.
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alone as a method for tackling education for employment, had always 
been accorded a low priority in educational and political debate.
Hence after 1922 the parties were left only with the legacy of early 
post-war controversies, and instead of presenting broad strategies, 
they fell back upon earlier prejudices. Labour spokesmen attacked 
any ideas of a vocational bias in the curriculum, while in the Unionist 
Party - where educational opinion was still largely made on the back­
benches - there was still a strong feeling that vocational training
31'is better done by the factory'. These prejudices were to hinder 
fresh attempts later in the 1920s to produce a comprehensive policy 
for the problems of education and industry.
Ill
After the fall of the Lloyd George coalition, debates about the 
relationship between education and the nation's industrial performance 
centred on two main issues. The first of these, juvenile unemployment, 
highlighted the extent to which the optimism of Fisher's continuation 
experiment had been overtaken. At the height of the post-war economic 
recession nearly 150,000 young people between fourteen and eighteen 
were out of work, and for several years education ministers were forced 
to concentrate on the problems caused by the dislocation of industry 
and decline in apprenticeship.^^ After 1926, however, the Board of
31. This comment was made by Francis Harrison, who added that expenditure 
on evening institutes was 'a gross waste of public money'. See 
'Deputation of Conservative M.P.s to the Prime Minister', 11 July 
1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1259.
32. For a detailed study of this question, see W.R. Garside, 'Juvenile 
unemployment and public policy between the wars', Economic History 
Review, XXX, 2 (1977), pp.322-39.
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Education gave much greater prominence to a second issue - that of 
technical education. Despite the pressure of foreign competition, 
this area of policy had received little public attention in the post­
war years, and it was only after the publication of the Hadow Report 
that technical training ceased to be overshadowed by continuation 
and juvenile unemployment. The two central problems of the 1920s 
both raised questions which directly concerned full-time schooling 
for adolescents. The seriousness of juvenile unemployment heightened 
controversy about the need to raise the compulsory school-leaving 
age to fifteen; and the role of technical education was increasingly 
discussed in terms of its relationship with the new forms of post­
primary instruction. The object of this section is to trace the various 
problems of education for employment which faced central government 
in the 1920s, and to indicate that this period saw the only attempt 
by a Conservative minister between the wars to emulate the aim of 
Fisher - to present a broad policy for those between fourteen and 
eighteen which would meet both educational and industrial needs.
There were few signs of a positive approach by the Board of Education 
in the early 1920s. Edward Wood’s term as President was dominated 
by the need for financial stringency, which allowed little discussion 
either of technical education or of the desirability of reintroducing 
continuation schools. The Unionist government was faced instead with 
an alarming increase in the level of juvenile unemployment, and this 
prompted the Prime Minister to establish a cabinet committee in order 
to suggest possible remedies.The report of this committee 
concentrated on three measures which were to be frequently considered 
by successive governments. In accordance with the thinking of Board
33. Selby-Bigge to Wood, 20 Dec. 1923, P.R.O. ED 24/1645.
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officials, the idea of raising the school-leaving age to tackle the 
problems of the young unemployed was rejected as a 'striking reversal' 
of declared policy. The Ministry of Labour, however, ensured a more 
sympathetic attitude to two further proposals - the lowering of the 
minimum age of unemployment insurance from sixteen to fourteen; and 
the extension of Juvenile Unemployment Centres, which had been set 
up as an emergency measure in 1919 to provide training for unemployed
. 3 4juveniles. In order to consider these ideas further, a second 
committee was set up late in 1923 under the Chancellor, Neville 
Chamberlain, but the influence of the Treasury ensured a retreat in 
policy. The reduction in the age of unemployment insurance was ruled 
out, and the Unemployment Centres - although recognised as the 'most 
hopeful and economic solution of the problem' - were only to receive 
full Exchequer support in exceptional cases. The fall of the 
government shortly afterwards prevented the necessity for any further 
action, but the underlying assumptions of the government's policy 
had already emerged. Juvenile unemployment was regarded as a temporary 
problem which required a temporary solution: under pressure from the 
Treasury, the government sought to tackle the effects rather than 
the causes of the problem through the cheap expedient of Unemployment 
Centres, guided as much by electoral as by educational or industrial 
considerations.
34. Report of the Cabinet juvenile unemployment committee, 15 Dec. 1923, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/228. For the views of the Minister of Labour, see 
Montague-Barlow to Chamberlain, (?) Dec. 1923, P.R.O. T 161/518
s.22666/1.
35. Report of the Cabinet juvenile unemployment committee, Jan. 1924, 
P.R.O. CAB 27/228. The Unemployment Centres clearly attracted 
little support from the Treasury, where one leading official 
complained that they should not receive support because 'both 
education and the relief of distress are local responsibilities 
and not primarily the responsibility of the Government' - 'Juvenile 
unemployment', minute by A.W. Hurst, 31 Dec. 1923, P.R.O. T 161/518 
s.22666/1.
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The Labour government of 1924 similarly concentrated on short­
term responses to the immediate problem. In March a cabinet committee 
established by C.P. Trevelyan advocated a more flexible attitude on 
each of the three proposals considered by its Unionist predecessor.
The committee recommended that plans by individual local authorities 
to raise the leaving age under existing bye-laws should be 
sympathetically considered; that the age of entry into unemployment 
insurance be lowered to coincide with that of entry into employment; 
and that the Exchequer grant to the Unemployment Centres be raised 
for as long as the problem remained acute.Trevelyan was soon made 
aware of the limitations of this approach. Few authorities were prepared 
to raise the leaving age for all children when unemployment affected 
only limited numbers in their areas; and the proposal to extend 
unemployment cover to all juveniles in insured trades met with such 
opposition from all quarters in the Commons that it was eventually 
abandoned. As a result the minister was left to fall back on the
advice of his officials that Unemployment Centres constituted the 
37best solution. The Labour administration thus brought a more 
energetic approach to office, but was unable to produce any fundamental 
shift in policy. Trevelyan's main interests lay elsewhere, in the 
grammar schools and the upper stages of the elementary system; and 
like his predecessor, he did not see the need for a broad strategy 
specifically addressed to the issues of education for employment.
36. Cabinet unemployment committee, juvenile unemployment Report,
4 Mar. 1924, P.R.O. CAB 27/202.
37. Barker, op.cit., p.51. In encouraging individual local authorities 
to raise the leaving age, the cabinet committee endorsed special 
arrangements for considering exemptions 'on such grounds as beneficial 
employment' - Report of juvenile unemployment sub-committee,
3 Mar. 1924, P.R.O. CAB 27/202. This marks the first appearance 
in official thinking of the concept which was later to be embodied 
in the 1936 Act.
206
He made no attempt to revive the continuation schools, and when pressed 
by back-benchers from all parties to initiate the first major enquiry 
into technical education since the l880s, Trevelyan replied that no 
demand for such an enquiry existed at present and that he preferred 
smaller studies into individual aspects of the problem.
The first eighteen months of Eustace Percy’s term at the Board
also saw few new departures in official thinking on juvenile unemployment
The new Conservative government was soon faced with the problem of
putting something in the place of the abortive measures of 1924.
The idea of reintroducing continuation schools was rejected as both
financially prohibitive and unrelated to the immediate issue, as the
unemployed could only attend for certain hours in the week. In
1925 a newly formed cabinet committee therefore returned to the three
well-established lines of policy. The raising of the leaving age
purely for the purposes of easing pressure on the juvenile labour
market was ruled out, and the committee were also reluctant to continue
encouraging individual authorities in this direction, on the grounds
that the high levels of exemption involved turned the schools into
40’waiting rooms’ until work was found. The lowering of the insurance 
age had already been ruled out for the time being by its reception 
in the Commons, and the further possibility of making attendance at 
Unemployment Centres rank as contribution to the insurance fund was 
considered likely to leave the government open to the charge of putting
38. 175 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.572, 26 June 1924.
39. ’Juvenile unemployment’, Joint memorandum by the President of 
the Board of Education and the Minister of Labour, 20 Jan. 1925, 
P.R.O. CAB 24/173.
40. Cabinet juvenile unemployment committee, 1st Conclusions, 5 Feb. 
1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/265.
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children on the dole. Eustace Percy, like his predecessors, was 
therefore left to make do with the existing Unemployment Centres, 
and for some time he canvassed the idea of giving local authorities 
the power to compel juveniles to attend the Centres while out of work.
At the same time, the government established a further committee under 
the chairmanship of the industrialist Dougal Malcolm, charged initially 
with reviewing the whole problem of juvenile unemployment. In 1926 
the Malcolm committee recommended that the main responsibility for 
the problem should be assumed by the Ministry of Labour rather than 
the Board of Education. Hence the Board’s direct interest in juvenile 
unemployment disappeared suddenly: the difficulties faced by successive 
education ministers were largely removed by the simple expedient of 
relinquishing responsibility.
The problem of juvenile unemployment was not a major policy issue 
in the post-war period as it affected only limited numbers of adolescents 
The persistence and difficulty of the problem, however, was such that 
it shed light on the wider assumptions of the political parties in 
approaching those in the fourteen to eighteen age group. In practice 
successive governments concentrated on seeking to ameliorate the worst 
effects of unemployment through the specially established Centres.
In private, the leading party spokesmen regarded the Centres as useful 
in the short-term, but inadequate as a permanent contribution to the 
needs of the juvenile worker. When questioned about the government’s 
policy in 1925, Fisher still maintained that the real remedy lay in 
the réintroduction of continuation schools. For the Labour Party,
41. Cabinet juvenile unemployment committee, interim Report, 6 Feb. 
1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/265.
42. Malcolm committee, First report of the committee on education 
and industry (England and Wales;, (London, 192b;, pp.90-4.
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Trevelyan claimed that the Unemployment Centres should be continued 
as palliatives%'but that the only long-term solution was to 'keep 
children in school' until the age of fifteen.Eustace Percy had 
also recognised the limitations of the Centres. In personally 
initiating the appointment of the Malcolm Committee, the President 
was adamant that juvenile unemployment should be regarded as only 
one aspect of a much wider problem. He argued that any enquiry must 
'get out of the old rut' of discussing the school-leaving age and 
the age of entry into insurance, and address instead the more 
fundamental question of 'what kind of education industry wants and 
what kind of recognition it is prepared to give to good education'. 
These front-bench strategies had not been the source of controversy 
amongst the parties as a whole before 1926. The Unemployment Centres 
were generally acceptable to political opinion, and in the absence 
of a nationally declared policy such as Fisher's continuation schools, 
there was little place for discussion of wider issues. The ideas 
of Trevelyan and Percy nevertheless foreshadowed the emergence of 
the major dividing line between the parties in the second half of 
the 1920s : Labour became committed to raising the compulsory leaving 
age, partly as a means of tackling juvenile unemployment, but this 
reform was resolutely opposed by Conservatives. For Eustace Percy, 
the school age was only one small aspect of the problem of adjusting 
educational and industrial needs - a problem which dominated the second 
half of his term at the Board.
43. 'H. of C.', notes by the Duchess of Atholl, 26 Feb. 1925, P.R.O.
ED 24/1352, which reveals the close interest of the Duchess in 
this issue.
44. 'Draft memorandum for consideration by representatives of employers' 
and workers' organisations in regard to juvenile unemployment', 
Eustace Percy, Apr. 1925, ibid.; Percy to P. Cunliffe-Lister,
18 May 1925, P.R.O. ED 24/1354.
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During his early months in office, Percy had shown few signs
of working towards a comprehensive policy for the whole issue of education
for employment. He made only vague references to the need for improved
technical training, commenting for example on the value of amending
the secondary school curriculum to industrial needs in certain areas -
a reflection of the long-standing Board belief that effective technical
education could only be based upon a sound grammar school system.
The government's concern with juvenile unemployment, although
preoccupying the President in 1925, did make him aware for the first
time of the importance of widening consideration of the issues involved.
Hence he not only prompted the appointment of the Malcolm committee
as a means of reviewing education in relation to the requirements
of trade and industry, but also introduced administrative measures
such as the revision of the regulations for junior technical schools,
46which had developed only slowly since the end of the war. The transfer
of the Board's responsibility for juvenile unemployment in 1926 left
Percy free to develop his ideas. In November he reviewed the Board's
future financial commitments and consciously adopted a broad approach
to the question of education for employment. The main lines of reform,
Percy argued, should be to expand the part-time evening classes grouped
under the name technical education; to encourage continuation schools,
at least on a voluntary basis; and to develop new post-primary schools
47of 'more practical character'. By the end of 1926, the President 
had therefore recognised the need for a broad strategy which concerned
45. The Times, 15 Dec. 1924: the secondary school 'should furnish 
the salt of the workshop as much as that of the business or 
profession'.
46. The Times Educational Supplement, 3 July 1926.
47. 'Memorandum on educational policy', Eustace Percy, 23 Nov. 1926, 
P.R.O. CAB 24/182.
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both part- and full-time education for adolescents.. This strategy 
was to be further developed following the publication of the Hadow 
Report.
After 1927 Percy's policy was based on two new assumptions.
The first was that industrial circumstances had altered so rapidly
that the anti-vocational bias in the education system had to be overturned:
the ultimate aim must be to improve the social status of the worker
in order to match that of the liberal professions. The second,
and closely related belief, was that technical training must be built
upon the foundations of a sound elementary, or post-primary, structure.
In contrast to his earlier speeches, he now warned against the danger
of the 'grammar school tradition becoming rather a fetish'.These
convictions underpinned Percy's twin approach to the issue of education
for employment. In order to stimulate part-time training for the
fourteen to eighteen age group, he widened the training courses for
technical education teachers; established inquiries into particular
branches of industry, notably the Clerk committee on engineering and
the Goodenough committee on salesmanship; and he initiated a move
towards regional councils to oversee policy in technical instruction
50by setting up a major inquiry in the West Midlands. At the same 
time, Percy stressed that an important aspect of reorganisation in 
the full-time system was to ensure that the proposed modern schools
48. See, for example, his speech at the Regent Street Polytechnic ,
recorded in The Times Educational Supplement, 9 Apr. 1927.
4 9. Ibid., 4 June 1927.
5 0. 'Note of discussion between the President, Sir Aubrey Symonds,
Sir Edward Crowe and Mr Goodenough with regard to the proposed 
inquiry into salesmanship', G.A.N. Lowndes, 21 June 1928, P.R.O. 
ED 24/1882; Percy to Sir Dugald Clerk, 25 June 1928, P.R.O.
ED 24/1878; J. Graves, Policy and progress in secondary education,
1902-1942 (London, 1943), pp.l40-ll
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worked out a practical curriculum, leading to higher courses in the
technical and commercial colleges. These two themes were now
inextricably interwoven in the President’s thinking. 'The development
of education in our technical institutes and colleges in co-operation
with industry', he argued in 1928, 'offers tremendous opportunities
for further education, and those are the opportunities at which our
new system of senior and secondary schools must largely aim at introducing 
51their scholars'. The concept of 'higher education for all' which 
Percy presented to the electorate in the following year was intended 
to further this approach. The ultimate aim, he later recorded, was 
to establish parity between two educational ladders: one leading from 
the secondary school to university and the other through the senior 
and technical schools to the college of technology.
The complexities of the minister's policy went largely unnoticed
by Conservative Party opinion as a whole. In the early 1920s, the 
party had been reluctant to sanction any new initiatives designed 
to reduce juvenile unemployment. Lady Astor had been shouted down 
by the annual conference for urging the need to raise the compulsory
leaving age, and in 1925 members of the cabinet had baulked at the
proposal for an Unemployment Centres bill, noting the cool response 
of employers.This concern not to tread on the toes of the party's
51. 217 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1104, 16 May 1928. See also Board of Education, 
Pamphlet No.60, The new prospect in education (1928).
52. Percy, Some memories, p.101; National Union of Conservative and 
Unionist Associations (N.U.C.U.A.), To all engaged in the work 
of education (1929).
53. National Unionist Association, Annual Conference, minutes, 1922; 
the anxiety of the Minister of Health and the President of the 
Board of Trade is recorded in P.R.O. ED 24/1352 and 1354. See 
also Colonel J. Lithgow to Duchess of Atholl, 5 May 1925, British 
Employers' Confederation (B.E.C.) archive, Warwick University, 
MSS.2OO/B/3/2/C.66O pt.1, which indicates that leading employers 
were likely to oppose the bill. Percy dropped the idea of the 
bill, which he said had received 'rather faint praise' - 25 May 
1925, P.R.O. ED 24/1352.
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industrial supporters was later repeated when the Board of Trade rejected
Percy's suggestion for joint action in encouraging particular industries
to set up reviewing machinery. The President justified such action
on the grounds that there existed a 'considerable feeling' amongst
Conservatives in favour of linking up education with industry. This
claim, however, clearly overstated the extent to which party members
sympathised with, or even comprehended, the subtleties of the minister's
policy. Members of the education group in the Commons once more fell
in line slowly behind the President, but other sections of Conservative
opinion were much less enthusiastic. The largest back-bench groupings
representing industrial interests took no part in discussions about
education for employment, and many M.P.s reiterated the prejudices
earlier shown in the continuation school debates. The arguments frequently
emphasised by members representing constituencies in the industrial
north-west - and echoed at every level of the party - were that juveniles
should enter industry at the earliest possible moment, and that public
money should not be wasted on an 'M.A. education' when the real need
54was for directly vocational training.
The last three years of Baldwin's second administration had witnessed 
a novel attempt by a Conservative education minister to tackle education 
for employment as an identifiable policy issue. Percy's approach 
was distinctive in several respects. He often cited the need to follow
54. Percy to Cunliffe-Lister, 5 Oct. 1927, P.R.O. ED 24/1875.
Cunliffe-Lister's reply, 21 Nov. 1927, asserted that in the present 
circumstances 'harassed manufacturers' were unlikely to pay attention 
to proposals involving 'a good deal of work and trouble'. On 
the attitude of back-benchers, compare, for example, Somerville - 
217 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1114-6, 16 May 1928, with Edmund Radford,
M.P. for Salford - 182 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2369, 8 Apr. 1925.
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the example of the United States — where he had spent much of his 
career — in eradicating the anti—vocational bias peculiar 
to English education. He also advanced his reforms, in striking contrast 
to mainstream Conservative opinion, within a context of industrial 
co-operation. According to Percy, peace in industry would be secured 
not by ingenuous attempts to tidy up industrial relations - a direct 
reference to the Trade Disputes Act which followed the General Strike - 
but by 'the "spiritual architecture" of which Milton spoke, and the 
stones of that spiritual architecture must... be sought in the quarry 
of technical education'By the time he left office, however, Percy's 
vision of equal social and academic prestige between secondary and 
senior schools, between universities and technical colleges, had come 
nowhere near realisation. This was of course due to a whole range 
of circumstances: the reluctance of the cabinet to impose additional 
demands upon industry; the power of the Treasury in holding down 
expenditure; and the continued suspicions of industrial and commercial 
leaders.Percy himself also bore some of the responsibility: for 
example, the criticism that he tended to wait on events was later 
conceded by Board officials, particularly in not using the second
55. The need to emulate the Federal Board for Vocational Education 
in the U.S.A. was a particular theme of Percy's preface to Board 
of Education, Pamphlet No. 64, Education for industry and commerce 
(1928), the most comprehensive summary of his views on the whole 
issue. His concern with industrial co-operation is recorded in 
the Daily Express, 9 Apr. 1929.
56. The National Confederation of Employers' Organisations believed 
that the fundamental problem was that of allowing 'the breath 
of industry inside the doors of the Board of Education' -
J.B. Forbes-Watson to J. Richmond, 3 Jan. 1928, B.E.C. archive, 
MSS.200/B/3/2/c . 660 pt.9. A further reason why industry proved 
reluctant to act was of course that in the 1920s demands for 
trained personnel were fully met by existing provision. See
S.F. Cotgrove, Technical education and social change (London, 
1958), p.8l; and T. Cook, 'The Great Debate continues..',
History of Education Society Bulletin, 23 (1979), pp.52-3.
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report of the Malcolm committee to establish permanent national contact
with employers and trade unions.5? Finally, educational opinion as
a whole still maintained that the problems of the fourteen to eighteen
age group could be settled by much less complicated methods. In
contrast to the strident demands of Conservatives for more vocational
training in the schools, many Liberals still favoured the revival
of continuation schools, while the Labour Party had become more firmly
committed to the raising of the school-leaving age as the necessary
policy. Thus if Eustace Percy was, in the words of G.A.N. Lowndes,
the first President of the Board to fully realise the importance of
technical education, then by going against the main lines of thinking
in the 1920s, he also had - to employ an earlier judgement on Lord
Haldane's attitude towards education and industry - 'too heroic an
58idea of what was necessary'.
IV
The decade after 1929 witnessed a retreat from Percy's attempt 
to present a broad strategy for the problems of education for 
employment. The pattern for much of the period was set by the Labour 
administration of 1929 to 1931, which introduced three separate bills 
aimed at raising the compulsory school-leaving age to fifteen. This 
reform was pursued primarily in terms of the educational advantages 
to be gained, but the renewed increase in juvenile unemployment after
57. M. Holmes to Sir Horace Wilson, 15 Aug. 1941, P.R.O. ED 136/269: 
Holmes nevertheless recalls that Percy made much more vigorous 
attempts to stimulate action than many other ministers.
58. Lowndes, op.cit., p.151; The Times, 18 July 1916, for the comments 
of Henry Bentinck on Haldane.
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1930 added an extra dimension to the debate. For many Labour members, 
a higher leaving age was now a viable method of reducing competition 
from juvenile workers for scarce jobs.^  ^ Until at least 1936, when 
the National government finally carried an Education Act which raised 
the leaving age to fifteen with exemptions for 'beneficial employment', 
educational policy and discussion concerning the fourteen to eighteen 
age group was inextricably bound up with the problems of full-time 
schooling for the adolescent. This process not only transferred 
controversy once more away from education for employment as an 
identifiable issue, but also overshadowed the specific difficulties 
of technical education, which became a matter of concern for the Board 
in the years preceding the outbreak of war. The final section of 
this chapter sets out to examine the lack of progress made by successive 
governments in the 1930s, and indicates that despite the efforts of 
Eustace Percy to build upon his approach in office. Conservative ministers 
and politicians as a whole produced few new remedies for the disparate 
problems of education for employment.
C.P. Trevelyan's second spell as President of the Board after 
1929 was dominated by his concern to raise the leaving age in accordance 
with the recommendation of the Hadow Report. As a result of the 
minister's preoccupation with this single issue, other areas of policy 
were accorded only a low priority. In technical education, for example, 
the government was content to wait upon the publication of the various 
reports initiated by the previous administration. It was also decided 
that the inclusion of junior technical schools within the new post­
primary system, which would require reducing the age of entry from
59. Barker, op.cit., pp.58-61; Garside, op.cit., on the fluctuating 
levels of juvenile unemployment,
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thirteen to eleven, was unnecessary in the interests of both technical
training and elementary reorganisation.^^ The unsuccessful school
attendance bills which Trevelyan sponsored were of course blocked
1by the Conservative opposition for a variety of reasons. In so 
far as the Board’s legislation was intended to remedy juvenile 
unemployment, however. Conservative back-benchers found a particular 
cause for concern. Vernon Davies, the M.P. for Royston, officially 
voiced the objections of the National Confederation of Employers' 
Organisations in stressing that a higher school-leaving age would 
have adverse effects on the supply of juvenile labour in the Lancashire 
textile industries.The support given to Davies by other Lancashire 
members representing industrial constituencies illustrated the continued 
concern of Conservatives to meet demands for cheap juvenile labour.
This attitude was the main cause of the party controversy which arose 
from the juvenile unemployment aspects of the leaving age debates: 
the demands of a small but influential body of back-benchers for more 
vocational training led to complaints from Labour that premature 
specialisation for industrial purposes was being openly encouraged.
In opposition, as in government, Eustace Percy's thinking was 
clearly distinguishable from that of his party colleagues. His initial 
concern was with the school-leaving age as an aspect of post-primary 
reorganisation, but with the sudden increase in the level of 
unemployment, he soon returned to the wider ramifications of education
60. E.H. Pelham minute to Trevelyan, 15 Nov. 1930, P.R.O. ED 24/1849;
Board of Education, Pamphlet No.83, Memorandum on the place of the 
junior technical school in the educational system (1930), p.30.
61. See above, pp. 108-15.
62. H.M. Piper to A.V. Davies, 10 Nov. 1930, B.E.C. archive, MSS.200/B/3/2/ 
C.I85 pts.1-6; 239 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1bOO-5, 29 May 1930. See also 
W.R. Garside, 'Unemployment and the school-leaving age in inter-war 
Britain', International Review of Social History, XXVI, 2 (1981).
63. e.g. 239 H.CV Deb.',' 5s., cc.Wb-b, 29 May 1930.
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for employment. Percy’s criticism of Trevelyan’s second bill in May 
1930 concentrated wholly on the link between juvenile unemployment 
and the transition between schooling and work. By taking the short 
cut of compelling all children to remain in school, he argued, the 
Labour government had not offered the ’faintest tinge of that industrial 
statesmanship which is our only hope’ As the economic situation 
deteriorated further, Percy’s argument underwent two important changes. 
The first of these was to turn on its head the idea that raising the 
school age alone would solve juvenile unemployment: the only long­
term solution, which would also ease the transition between school 
and work, was to rationalise the demand of industry for juvenile labour. 
This could be achieved on the one hand by employers and workers outlining 
their needs through industrial associations; and on the other by 
educationists devising a leaving certificate for senior schools and 
encouraging exemptions from a higher leaving age in particular areas, 
both in order to satisfy industrial needs.The second change was 
to reintroduce the argument in favour of continuation schools.
Despite having promoted Hadow reorganisation, Percy increasingly came 
to believe that it was only possible to meet educational and industrial 
needs if the Hadow scheme of full-time courses was expanded into the 
wider ideal of full-time education up to fourteen, followed by a further 
two years either full- or part-time according to pupils’ requirements.^^ 
At this stage the former minister’s complex strategy was echoed by 
some of his close adherents, such as Annesley Somerville, but most
64. ’The school-leaving age’, Empire Review, 50, 345 (1929), pp. 266-9; 
239 H.C. Deb., 5s., cc.1541-2, 29 May 1930.
6 5. Percy to E.M.H. Galbraith, 12 Feb. 1930, Conservative Research 
Department papers, Education: folder 1G.
66. The Times Educational Supplement, 13 Sept. 1930, recording his 
speech to the British Association for the Advancement of Science.
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members of the parliamentary party were content simply with Percy’s 
opposition to Labour’s legislation. This in fact hardened when the 
proposed date for raising the school age was put back by eighteen 
months: this made the bill ’ten times worse’ to Percy by removing 
any pretence of acting swiftly for those out of work. Thereafter 
he threw his weight behind the party manoeuvres which helped to ensure 
the final abandonment of Trevelyan’s proposals early in 1931.^^
The ideas of Eustace Percy, which derived from his visit to the 
United States and Canada in 1930, were to have an important indirect 
effect on the subsequent policy of the National government. This 
was not apparent until at least 1934, however, for Percy was excluded 
from office and Board policy was overshadowed by the need for stringent 
economies. As President of the Board after 1932, Irwin, later Lord 
Halifax, presented no new remedies for the problems of education for 
employment, although he did take some interest in the continuation 
school as a method of easing the transition between school and work.^^ 
In Herwald Ramsbotham, the Parliamentary Secretary during this period, 
the government did possess the only Conservative minister apart from 
Percy to advocate sweeping changes in policy. Ramsbotham, who had 
spent much of his earlier career in merchant banking, recognised that 
the major problem for most school-leavers was the ’plunge into 
employment’. In order to remedy this, he called for a wide variety 
of reforms: the development of junior technical schools, which now
67. Ibid., 6 Dec. 1930; Lord Hailsham to Salisbury, 4 Feb.1931, Salisbury paper; 
4M 139/75. See also the presidential address delivered by Percy
at the annual conference of the Association for Education in 
Industry and Commerce, An educational policy for an industrial 
nation (1931), pp.6-13.
68. Halifax to C.H. Turner, 26 Feb. 1935, Ramsay MacDonald papers,
P.R.O. 30/69/681, f.224.
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numbered nearly two hundred; the adaptation of the grammar school
curriculum; the expansion of voluntary continuation schools; the pursuit
of regional industrial policies; and the encouragement of technical
colleges as a viable alternative to the universities.^^ The economic
circumstances of the early 1930s, however, rendered these proposals
less likely to succeed than the earlier reforms upon which they were
based. The Treasury's control over expenditure ruled out the provision
of much-needed funds for technical education, and the Board took little
action to implement the final reports of the committees on Salesmanship 
70and Engineering. The predominant concern of the government in this 
period, in fact, was once more the high levels of juvenile unemployment.
The National government's initial response was to return to the
pragmatic and palliative measures favoured by the Board in the 1920s.
The Unemployment Act of 1934 finally implemented two of the proposals
widely discussed previously: the reduction of the minimum age of entry
into unemployment insurance to fourteen and the enforcement of
attendance at Unemployment Centres - now renamed Junior Instruction
71Centres - which were to receive full Exchequer support. Halifax, 
while taking a close personal interest in the fluctuating levels of 
juvenile unemployment, did not dissent from the widely held view that 
the government * s measures - introduced by the Ministry of Labour - 
would be'sufficient to tackle the problem in distressed areas. When 
the high levels of unemployment were presented as a justification
69. The Times Educational Supplement, 11 Mar., 15 Apr., and 16 Dec. 
1933; 290" H'.C. Deb., 5s.','C.T97T 30 May 1934.
70. Holmes to Wilson, 15 Aug. 1941, P.R.O. ED 136/269, recalls that 
despite the moderate tone of these reports, the N.C.E.O. did not 
even commend them to their constituent members.
71. Garside, 'Juvenile unemployment and public policy', pp.332-3.
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for the additional measure of raising the school-leaving age, the
Board remained sceptical of its likely effects in reducing the numbers 
72
out of work. Juvenile unemployment thus occupied only a minor role
in the government's move towards legislation to raise the compulsory
leaving age. This move did involve some consideration of the wider
problems of the fourteen to eighteen age group. Halifax argued that
'on broad grounds of social policy' he favoured the revival of the
Fisher scheme to ease the transition into industry; and for a time
the Board seriously contemplated making attendance at continuation
classes compulsory until sixteen for all those exempted from remaining 
73at school. This course of action was ruled out, however, on the
grounds of cost and owing to the desire not to jeopardise the electoral
and financial backing of industrialists by imposing new duties upon
them. Halifax's successor as President, Oliver Stanley, informed
a deputation from the National Confederation of Employers' Organisations -
which complained about a shortage of juvenile labour if the school
age were raised - that the government bore the possibility of increased
industrial costs 'very fully in mind and might be trusted to be alive
74to its reactions'. The Act carried by the re-elected National 
government in 1936, which raised the leaving age but provided exemptions 
for those able to find 'beneficial employment', therefore indicated 
the obvious limitations of Conservative policy. Far from applying
72. Chamberlain to Halifax, 6 Feb. 1934, P.R.O. ED 24/1550; 'The Junior 
Instruction Centre scheme', unsigned memorandum, n.d., P.R.O.
ED 24/1356; Halifax to MacDonald, 30 Jan. 1935, ibid.; Garside, 
'Unemployment and the school-leaving age', p.167.
73. 'Compulsory education beyond 14', memorandum by the President
of the Board of Education, 23 Jan. 1935, P.R.O. CAB 27/574; 'Thirty 
years of educational progress', Politics in Review (Apr.-June 
1935), p.10.
74. 'Industrialists. N.C.E.O.', unsigned notes, 25 July 1935, P.R.O.
ED 24/1557.
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any comprehensive remedies to the problems of education for employment, 
ministers at the Board were primarily concerned to yield to the 
immediate wishes of the party's industrial supporters.
The 1936 Act was accepted, though without any great enthusiasm, 
by the Conservative Party as a whole. This included Eustace Percy, 
who was eventually reappointed to the government as Minister without 
Portfolio in June 1935. On the back-benches in the early 1930s, Percy 
had become closely identified with a small group of Conservative M.P.s 
who called for a national policy of industrial reorganisation, and 
his views on education rapidly became linked with his belief in 
industrial unification or 'planning*.In 1933 Percy, with the support 
of back-benchers such as Harold Macmillan, Hugh Molson and Noel Lindsay, 
introduced a private members' bill designed to 'regulate the entry 
of young persons into employment on leaving school and to provide 
for their further education'. The bill was not given a second reading, 
but it did form the basis for a similar measure introduced by the 
Liberal M.P. Percy Harris. This laid down that the leaving age should 
be raised by 1937, with exemptions for 'suitable employment'; although 
unlike Percy's bill, on which it was consciously based, there was 
no provision for further part-time instruction up to sixteen for all 
exempted children. The Harris bill, which was only narrowly defeated 
in the Commons, thus reflected Percy's belief that by controlling 
the flow of juvenile labour it would be possible to emulate the American 
example of a joint employment policy with industry. The Board opposed
75. See L.B. Carpenter, 'Corporatism in Britain, 1930-46', Journal 
of Contemporary History, XI, I (1976), pp.3-8. See also Mary 
Adams (ed.), The modern state (London, 1933), pp.156-7; and 
Percy's introduction to A.A. Abbott, Education for industry and 
commerce in England (London, 1933).
76. The Times Educational Supplement, I8 Nov. 1933; 283 H.C. Deb., 
BsV, C.12Z9, 1 Dec. 1933.
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the bill on the grounds that juvenile unemployment was best tackled
by the government’s own unemployment bill. When it later came to
formulate plans for educational reform, however, it found that the
only suitable alternative to universally raising the leaving age or
introducing continuation schools was to fall back on a modified version
of Percy's scheme; this volte face could be justified by including
more adequate safeguards about the granting of employment certificates
77to exempted children. Percy had little option but to support the
Board's reform once he had returned to the front-bench, although he
did fight in cabinet to retain the proviso that exempted children
should attend further instruction. In parliament Percy now dropped
his rhetoric about 'planning', and on the same day as the second reading
he took the unprecedented step of informing the British Association
of Commercial and Industrial Education that his own desire to combine
a higher leaving with age with part-time instruction was not likely
78to be achieved by the present bill. In this sense Eustace Percy 
was the reluctant architect of the 1936 Act, which turned out to be 
a pale reflection of his own elaborate remedies for education and 
industry.
The actual date for raising the school-leaving age was set for 
1939, and with a gradual improvement in the rate of juvenile employment, 
the Board's attention in the years preceding the outbreak of war turned
77. 'Raising of school age. Some points for discussion', E.H. Pelham,
6 Mar. 1935, P.R.O. ED 24/1557.
7 8. For the alteration in Percy's views during 1935 compare, for example, 
his comments in E.T. Cook (ed.). Conservatism and the future 
(London, 1935), pp.29-30, and in R.W. Ferguson and A.A. Abbott,
Day continuation schools (London, 1935), pp.vii-x, with his 
parliamentary speech - 308 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1268, 13 Feb. 1936.
See also 'Proceedings of the British Association of Commercial 
and Industrial Education', 13 July 1936, P.R.O. ED 31/463.
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to technical education. In 1935 Board inspectors had carried out 
a thorou^ survey of the existing provision for technical instruction, 
and found that many areas either needed new facilities or were handicapped 
by unsuitable buildings. The government’s election manifesto in 1935 
subsequently contained a pledge to put technical education ’on a 
thoroughly sound and up-to-date basis’, and in the following year 
Oliver Stanley announced that a seven year programme of improvement 
was to be undertaken at a maximum cost of twelve million pounds.
This initiative, the first since Percy left office, did not bring 
any major development in technical training. The possibility of a 
higher rate of government grant to speed up the building programme 
was blocked by the cabinet, and less than one hundred projects were 
sanctioned under the scheme before the war intervened.Despite 
the calls of Stanley and his National Labour successors to rival 
Britain’s industrial competitors - a theme given added urgency by 
the approach of war - any improvement of technical training continued 
to run up against a network of obstacles. In addition to the lack 
of enthusiasm from employers, the government itself was unable to 
take a positive approach. In the spring of 1939 the Treasury reiterated 
its opposition to any increased spending on technical education, which 
it made clear would have to be balanced by economies elsewhere. The 
persistence of departmental rivalry was illustrated by the Ministry 
of Labour’s refusal to reopen the idea of permanent national contact 
between educationists and industrialists, and the Board of Education 
itself remained unsure of the precise status of technical education.
79. Board of Education, Circular 1444, Administrative programme of 
educational development, Jan. 1936.
80. Note's by ÏÏ.B'." WiTlis,“‘T3 Aug. 1941, P.R.O. ED 136/269.
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Following the publication of the Spens Report, Board officials prevaricated 
over the proposal that junior technical schools should be made an 
integral part of the secondary system, and finally recommended that 
they should continue to be administered separately - a reflection 
on the inability of technical instruction to command either priority 
or attention in the 1930s.
V
Conservative ministers between the wars were largely unsuccessful
in their attempts to tackle the problems of education for employment.
Edward Wood had initially been preoccupied with alleviating the distress
caused by juvenile unemployment, and when he returned to the Board
in the 1930s he initiated the moves towards a generous system of
exemptions to accompany the raising of the school-leaving age. The
most ambitious approach to the whole question of relating educational
and industrial needs had been provided by Eustace Percy in the 1920s.
His aim was to eradicate the inherent distrust of vocational training
and bring about 'a profound change in the whole structure and conception
82of our national system’. This change, which Percy increasingly 
linked with the need for industrial ’planning’, indicated a novel 
attempt to use education as a means of altering the social structure. 
Percy was to find, however - like Fisher before him with the 
continuation schools - that serious difficulties attended his plans
81. Wilson to Holmes, 13 June 1939, P.R.O. ED 136/146; De La Warr 
to Sir John Simon, 19 June 1939, ibid.; P.H.J.H. Gosden,
Education in the Second World War, p.411-2.
82. N.U.C.U.A., What the Conservative government has done for education,
1925-2 8, p.in:
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for reform. Some of these obstacles, such as the reluctance of industrial 
leaders to become actively involved, fell outside the control of 
government; but in the political arena also problems arose, especially 
from the common assumption of ministers and Board officials that 
specific issues always required self-contained responses. As a result, 
the inter-war years produced no significant move, in either legislative 
or administrative terms, towards a school system more closely related 
to industrial needs. In the area of part-time education, the small 
number of remaining continuation schools operated on a voluntary basis, 
and the numbers attending technical colleges and agricultural institutes 
rose only slowly. For those in full-time schooling, the raising of 
the leaving age as a remedy for juvenile unemployment was prevented 
by the outbreak of war, and the only institutions catering directly 
for vocational needs - the junior technical schools - continued to 
suffer in competition with the prestigious grammar schools.
One of the obstacles preventing successful ministerial initiatives 
for much of the inter-war period had been the attitude of the Conservative 
party as a whole. Unionists had given lukewarm approval to Fisher's 
continuation school experiment, but this commitment was soon reversed 
in the face of economic recession. For many party members - 
especially those professionally involved in industry or commerce - 
the introduction of directly vocational teaching in the elementary 
schools remained the primary objective. Eustace Percy’s elaborate 
programme fell on largely deaf ears, and the desire to maintain existing 
forms of juvenile labour was illustrated as late as 1936 by pressure
83. D.W. Thoms, ’Market forces and recruitment to technical education: 
the example of the junior technical schools’, History of Education, 
10, 2 (1981), pp.125-32.
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for exemptions to an extended school course. There were, however,
some indications that by the end of the 1930s Conservative opinion
was becoming aware of the case for more fundamental reform. Percy’s
concern with planning had already been echoed by back-bench advocates
of industrial reorganisation and members of the education group ;
and Conservatives later pressed for a debate on the Spens Report in
terms of ’the growing severity of international competition in trade
and the consequent need to attract into the service of commerce and
industry a sufficient supply of persons of well trained character 
84
and brains’. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the Conservative 
Research Department confirmed the growing desire among party members 
for a new programme to improve technical education, though uncertainty 
remained as to how it might be paid for As in the case of education 
for the adolescent and religious instruction, the second half of the 
1930s therefore witnessed a subtle shift in Conservative Party opinion - 
in this instance recognising for the first time the necessity for 
a comprehensive approach to the question of education for employment.
The problems of relating educational and industrial needs highlighted 
finally the working of education as a political issue between the 
wars. The inability to promote reform successfully was not exclusive 
to Conservative ministers. Fisher’s plans for continuation schools 
had not been realised, and Trevelyan never gave the issue of education 
for employment the same priority as reform of the secondary and 
elementary schools. In practice, lack of progress resulted not only 
from the absence of any effective ministerial lead, but also from 
the perennial problems which faced all governments - the constant
84. 343 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1757, 15 Feb. 1939.
85. J.A. Ramsden, The making of Conservative Party policy, p.91.
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intransigence of the Treasury in this case being matched by departmental
rivalry between the Board and the Ministry of Labour. Furthermore,
political opinion remained uncertain as to the necessary direction
of policy. Party controversy had been most acute immediately after
the war, though by the 1930s a slow convergence of views was taking
place. The remaining Liberals, on the evidence of the Harris bill,
were now unable to produce their own initiatives; and Labour continued
to focus on the twin themes of raising the leaving age and resisting
premature vocational training. Here again were two of the central
features of education as a political issue: ministerial policy, despite
the efforts of Percy in particular, was uniform in its lack of success;
and party views, while agreeing that something should be done, provided
no concerted pressure for action. It was not surprising that in the
case of the ill-defined problems of education for employment, 'the
86baby' - as Eustace Percy put it - 'was passed on to Butler'.




EDUCATION AND LOCAL CONSERVATISM BETWEEN THE WARS;
THE MUNICIPAL REFORM PARTY AND THE EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 
OF THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL
The local history of English education in the first half of the
twentieth century has traditionally been written in terms of
institutions and individuals, and little attention has been paid to
the complex variety of political, administrative, social and economic
forces which combined to shape the system of schools in particular
districts or regions.^  The neglect of the contribution to education
made by political initiatives reflects in part the uneven development
of local politics during the period: in certain rural areas, for example,
the influence of administrators and educationists was clearly paramount
2
in the absence of strong party affiliations. An understanding of 
Conservative Party education policy between the wars nevertheless 
requires some consideration of education as a local political issue, 
and the object of this chapter is to analyse the policies and opinions 
of Conservatives in the administrative area of the London County Council,
1. An exception to this pattern is P.H.J.H. Gosden and R.P. Sharp, 
The development of an education service: the West Riding, 1889- 
1974 (Oxford, 1978). For a summary of the main writings, see 
PTTunningham, Local history of education in England and Wales: 
a bibliography (Leeds, 197b).
2. e.g. B. S‘imôn"'(ed.), Education in Leicestershire, 1540-1940 
(Leicester, 1968). The local government situation was further 
complicated in the inter-war period by the numerous Conservative- 
Liberal pacts established in, for example, Sheffield and Bristol, 
to resist the Labour Party - J.A. Ramsden, The age of Balfour 
and Baldwin, p.258.
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the largest local education authority in the country. This examination 
is intended to provide both a contribution to the history of education 
in London and a basis for approaching outstanding questions about 
Conservative policy, such as the motives and assumptions which underpinned 
the policies pursued by local party members and the nature of the 
relationship between local and national Conservatism.
The London County Council (L.C.C.) formed the top tier of local
government in the capital between the wars; it covered an area of
over one hundred square miles and contained some four million 
3inhabitants. The Council's long established tradition of administering 
municipal services from County Hall along party political lines allows 
a closer study of local Conservative attitudes than is often possible 
elsewhere, and also provides - owing to the electoral changes which 
took place at successive triennial elections - an important opportunity 
to examine the educational policies of the three major parties at 
local level. At the end of the First World War the main opposition 
to the dominant Municipal Reform (Conservative) Party still came from 
the Progressives (Liberal), but during the 1920s the Progressives 
were eclipsed throughout the capital by the emergence of the London 
Labour Party, whose support increased steadily until it was able to 
claim a majority on the Council for the first time in 1934.^  In 
addition, the example of the L.C.C. illustrates the wide variety of 
local groupings able to influence the direction of education policy.
The twenty nine metropolitan boroughs within the administrative county 
were invested with no executive powers over education, and for the 
most part policy decisions remained under the control of the Council's
3. See Appendix 1, 'The administrative county of London between the 
wars'.
4. See Appendix 2, 'L.C.C. election results, 1913-1946'.
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Education Committee, whose leading members were carefully chosen by 
the majority party. The experience of the inter-war years indicates, 
however, not only significant differences between L.C.C. representatives, 
but also the influence on education policy at particular moments made 
by the other bodies which constituted London Conservatism: the local 
constituency associations, the group of London M.P.s, and the powerful 
London Municipal Society.^
The difficulties of attempting to assess Conservative Party policy 
locally from a single case-study are certainly compounded by the 
unique nature of the L.C.C. The scope of educational provision and 
the clearly defined system of party politics in particular highlight 
the caution necessary in treating London as an indicator of trends 
elsewhere. To this general reservation must be added the limitations 
of the following account, which concentrates on the development of 
policy towards secondary and elementary schools rather than on the 
complete range of the Council's educational activities. Within this 
framework the role of Conservative members and supporters provides 
the main focus: this in turn does not allow full weight to be given 
to the overlapping network of individuals and ideas that helped to 
shape the school system between the wars. The administrative guidance 
of the Chief Education Officer and his staff, for example, and the 
crucial role of social and economic factors such as demographic change 
in determining educational provision, are both considered primarily
5. See Appendix 3, 'Chairmen and vice-chairmen of the L.C.C. Education 
Committee, 1918-1944'.
6. On the London Municipal Society and its relationship with the L.C.C., 
see K. Young, Local politics and the rise of party. The London 
Municipal Society and the Conservative intervention in local 
elections, 1894-1963 (Leicester, 197b), esp. pp.218-9.
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in terms of how they impinged on the politics of London education.?
At the same time these limitations do not detract from the value of 
concentrating on Municipal Reform policy towards secondary and 
elementary schools. Municipal Reformers dominated London politics 
for much of the inter-war period and occupied a central position in 
educational policy-making; and the problem of the nature and extent 
of provision to be made for adolescents in secondary and elementary 
schools formed the major theme of educational debate in the capital.
Before the First World War the pattern of London education had 
become firmly established, partly under the direction of Municipal 
Reformers in power continuously at County Hall after 1907. Under 
the terms of the 1902 Education Act the Council had established a 
number of municipal secondary schools. These were primarily fee-paying, 
although in accordance with government regulations a proportion of 
places were provided free of charge to pupils from the public elementary 
schools. The majority of children, however, were educated between 
the ages of five and thirteen in the voluntary or the council provided 
elementary schools, which were characterised in London by their 
exceptional numbers and by the generous treatment accorded to the
g
denominational managers of the non-provided schools. The features 
which most distinguished the L.C.C. from other education authorities 
before the war were the provision of advanced instruction for the
7. On the Education Officer, see D.W. Thoms, Policy-making in education: 
Robert Blair and the London County Council, 1904-1924 (Leeds, 19Ü0). 
Appendix 4, 'L.C.C. schools and pupils in attendance, 1918-1939', 
illustrates a continual fall in school numbers after 1921.
8 . P.H. Andrews, 'The organisation, development and administration 
of public education in the area of the London County Council,
1903-1922', unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1963, 
p.273.
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older and more capable elementary, pupils, notably in the central schools 
first established in 1910; and the extent of the provision made for 
technical and vocational education, primarily in part-time evening 
institutes but also in a small number of pioneering, full-time junior
9
technical schools. These schools focused increasing attention on 
the problem of education for the adolescent, an issue which forms 
the main connecting theme for the three chronological periods into 
which education in London between the wars divides: the immediate 
post-war years, the period of Municipal Reform domination between 
1922 and 1934, and the years of Labour Party control before the outbreak 
of the Second World War.
II
In 1915 the Progressive opposition in London had agreed to co­
operate with the ruling Municipal Reform Party in the transaction 
of council business, with the result that an informal L.C.C. coalition 
emerged to mirror the agreement between the Liberal government and 
the Unionist Party nationally during the war. At the first post-war 
election of March 1919, the two major parties combined to concentrate 
their rhetoric on the ’pacifist’ and ’extremist’ London Labour Party, 
and an element of co-operation between Municipal Reformers and 
Progressives remained through to the triennial election of 1922.^ ^
The numerical strength of Municipal Reform members nevertheless allowed 
the party to exercise ultimate control over council policy. This 
was reflected in the party’s monopolisation of leading appointments
9. Ibid., pp.400-4.
10. Sir I.e. Gibbon and R.G. Bell, History of the London County Council, 
1889-1939 (London, 1939), pp.109-11.
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on the Education Committee, a body of fifty members traditionally 
dominated - according to the Chief Education Officer - by about twelve 
prominent individuals. As a result effective control of education 
policy in London in the immediate post-war years rested with a small 
number of Municipal Reform representatives, the most prominent of 
whom was Cyril Cobb, chairman of the Education Committee until 1921
1 pand a leading figure in the London Unionist movement. The two main 
issues which concerned Cobb and his associates during these years 
both stemmed from the passage of the government’s Education Act in 
1918 - the so-called London scheme of 1920 resulted from the requirement 
that local authorities submit programmes of educational development 
for their areas; and the introduction of day continuation schools 
in the capital reflected an attempt to act upon a crucial section 
of the government’s legislation.
In early 1917 the L.C.C. Education Committee had outlined various 
reforms in education which anticipated the government’s proposals 
for post-war reconstruction, and in October Cyril Cobb wrote to the 
President of the Board of Education, H.A.L. Fisher, expressing his 
committee’s strong approval of the educational sections of the new 
legislation.The government’s main proposals - to remove the limit 
on the rate which local authorities could levy for higher education, 
to raise the school-leaving age to fourteen, provide for advanced 
elementary instruction and to introduce continuation schools - had 
become widely acceptable before the war. The Committee did, however.
11. Thoms, op.cit., p.6 .
12. See Appendix 5, ’Biographical details of Municipal Reformers’
13. L.C.C., Minutes of Proceedings (Minutes), 3 Apr. 1917, p.291; 
The Times, 25 Oct. 191'/.
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have reservations about other aspects of the education bill, notably
the possible extension of central government power to the detriment
of local authorities and the proposed formula for financing elementary
education. The proportion of educational expenditure met from the
rates was traditionally far higher in London than elsewhere in the
country, but after prolonged discussions with Council representatives
during the war this grievance was removed when Fisher eventually
agreed to provide a minimum Exchequer grant of fifty per cent on
all approved spending. After achieving this concession, which proved
the most important financial provision made by the 1918 Act and which
was to have a significant effect on the proportion of rates levied
in London, it was not surprising that Municipal Reformers praised
Fisher's work as a reform of 'great magnitude', recommending that
London M.P.s provide every possible assistance in guiding the measure
14through parliament.
The warm reception accorded to the 1918 Act indicated that at 
the end of the First World War education was not a politically divisive 
issue in London. John Scott Lidget, the leader of the Progressive 
party and a long-standing member of the Education Committee, later 
recalled that one of the benefits of the informal coalition on the 
L.C.C. was to secure 'practically unanimous agreement, for the time 
being, with Mr. Fisher's education p o l i c y T h i s  bipartisan approach 
was broken down, however, as the Council set about implementing the 
new legislation in the following years. The first stage in the erosion 
of cross-party agreement resulted from the plan for educational development 
within the administrative county, drawn up by the Education Committee
14. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 23 Jan. 1918, p.5.
15. J. Scott Lidgett, My guided life (London, 1936), pp.211-7.
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under the terms of the Act and published in July 1920 as the 'London 
Scheme'. This lengthy document was largely drafted by the Education 
Officer, Sir Robert Blair, and reflected many of his concerns; although 
it required political endorsement for effectiveness and represented 
an important statement of Municipal Reform policy. For the statutory 
category of higher education, the main suggestions of the London 
Scheme were to proceed cautiously with an expansion of secondary 
school places; to extend the Council's system of scholarships and ■ 
free places, bringing it in line with the Board of Education's policy 
that no young person be debarred from the education of which they 
were 'capable of profiting' through inability to pay fees; and to 
remedy the shortages in technical education caused by the war. In 
the area of elementary education, it was proposed to revive the pre­
war policy of reducing the maximum size of classes, known as the 
'40/48' scheme; to improve the teaching and curriculum of the upper 
standards of elementary schools; and to double the existing provision
of fifty central schools. The issue of continuation schools had
16already been the subject of a separate report.
The London Scheme was soon to be suspended temporarily in the 
face of economic recession, but it did illustrate many of the 
assumptions which underpinned Municipal Reform policy at the beginning 
of the 1920s. In essence the plan sought to maintain, on a more generous 
level, the basic features of London's pre-war education structure.
The secondary schools were defended as selective institutions preparing 
for higher education and professional training, with fee-paying 
remaining prominent despite the proposed extension of scholarships;
16. L.C.C., Education Act, 1918. Scheme of the local education authority 
(London, 1920), pp.bj-4, 7b-b1 and 96-10Ü.
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and in elementary education a clear distinction was made between
the need to develop central schools, which were conceived as a
preparation for commercial or industrial employment, and the problem
of improving general standards for 'the great mass of children 11+
to 14 and over, who are not considered suitable for transfer to
secondary and central schools'The fundamental belief which linked
these twin concerns was an adherence to the educational 'ladder' -
the idea that the necessary and desirable direction of reform was
to extend the opportunities for clever children to receive the highest
forms of education, irrespective of background. Hence the L.C.C.'s
scholarships were tenable at either secondary or central schools,
and Municipal Reformers often referred to the existence of a 'complete
educational ladder for those who are in a position to avail themselves 
18of it'. Although the priorities of Municipal Reformers were still
shared by many other education authorities, it was not the case -
as some Education Committee members claimed - that the London Scheme
19had no 'party significance'. Scott Lidget for the Progressives
said the proposals for the adolescent would be outdated within a
decade; and more significantly. Labour Party spokesmen criticised
both the nature and extent of the scholarships provided, and the
failure to provide a distinctive course of education for all children 
20over eleven. These new party divisions were to be hardened and
17. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 15 Oct. 1919, p.679.
18. London Municipal Society (L.M.S.), Education and the care of 
London's children (London Questions No.3, 1921), p.3.
19. e.g. Cyril Jackson in The Times, 1 July 1920.
20. Scott Lidget's comments were also made in pie Times. L. Haden 
Guest (ed.), The new education (London, 1920) provides criticism 
of the Scheme by Labour members of the Education Committee mainly 
on the grounds of its lack of generosity, especially in improving 
access to the secondary schools for working-class children (p.55). 
One essay did go further in calling for a universal system of 
secondary education, but significantly envisaged that for some 
pupils such provision would be made in continuation schools
(pp.114-5).
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clarified in the following two years, as attention turned to the 
Council's attempt to introduce continuation schools throughout London.
The idea of compulsory part-time education for school leavers 
who had entered employment was supported in principle by Municipal 
Reformers before 1914. This support was maintained during the war 
years as the government moved towards advocacy of a universal system 
of continuation schools, and the L.C.C. was amongst the first education 
authorities to act upon the section of the 1918 Act which required 
attendance for a limited period from all those between the ages of 
fourteen and sixteen no longer in full-time schooling. On the whole. 
Municipal Reformers regarded continuation schools as the best method 
of easing the transition from school to work and tackling the thorny 
problem of the relationship between education and industry, although 
behind this agreement individual motives varied considerably. Some 
Unionists emphasised the importance of vocational training and wanted 
to emulate the example of continental systems by introducing schools 
which would contribute to 'national efficiency'; others such as Major 
Ernest Gray, a teachers' representative who frequently criticised 
party policy, stressed the virtues of a liberal curriculum and the 
value of providing some form of contact with the educational system 
for the majority of children who left the elementary schools at fourteen. 
Gray's concern pointed to one of the fundamental reasons behind the 
support of Municipal Reformers for the educational ladder: in the 
immediate post-war years the party was as yet unconvinced of the 
value of a distinct course of full-time schooling for all children
21. Thoms, op.cit., p.43; Ernest Gray, 'Education and economy', 
The Nineteenth Century, 91 (1922), p.946.
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after the age of eleven - the needs of both education and industry 
would be best served by providing full-time higher instruction for 
the select few in secondary or central schools and part-time higher 
education for the majority in continuation schools.
The enthusiasm of Education Committee members was ironically
being undermined even before the first set of twenty continuation
schools were opened in January 1921. The severe downturn in the
economy during the previous year had produced renewed calls for
economies in public expenditure both nationally and locally, and
in London attention quickly turned to the probable cost of establishing
new schools. Within Unionist Party circles, there were criticisms
from both M.P.s with London constituencies, who called for the
abandonment of the whole scheme as part of a suspension of the 1918
Act; and from the officers of the London Municipal Society, whose
complaints about incurring fresh expenditure in the prevailing
circumstances received a sympathetic hearing from the Chancellor
22of the Exchequer in November 1920. An equally ominous note was 
struck in the following month by Cyril Cobb, who informed the Board 
of Education that the Municipal Reform majority on the L.C.C. was 
likely to defeat his desire to proceed with the new schools.
Although there would be considerable controversy, Cobb predicted 
that ’the reactionaries would win and the majority of the Council 
would be glad to take the opportunity of dropping the schools 
altogether’. I n  the short-term the education minister was able 
to secure reluctant cabinet approval for submitted plans such as
22. e.g. Sir William Davison (M.P. Kensington South) - 136 H.C. Deb., 
5s., C.1732, 23 Dec. 1920; The Daily Telegraph, 10 Nov. 1920.
23. ’Continuation schools’, memorandum by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 17 Dec. 
1920, P.R.O. ED 24/1528.
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those of London to go ahead, but the opening of the continuation 
schools further polarised opinion in the capital and set the scene 
for controversy between influential sections of Unionist support 
on the one hand, and an alliance of the opposition parties with certain 
Municipal Reform members of the Education Committee on the other.
During the spring of 1921 the pressure on the Education Committee
to take some form of action mounted, especially as the inability
of adjacent authorities in Greater London to produce similar
continuation schemes led to complaints from parents and employers
that children in the L.C.C. area were being unfairly treated. The
Committee reacted by producing a report in May which suggested that
the London scheme might be modified, and the necessary savings made,
by reducing the length of compulsory attendance from two years to
one for the present. This suggestion caused sufficient disquiet
amongst members such as Ernest Gray, however, that the chairman of
the Committee, now H.C. Gooch, agreed that the alternative of saving
money by amending the curriculum to include domestic economy and
manual training should first be examined, thereby allowing the
24retention of the full two year course. When the findings of the 
Education Officer ruled out this option, the Committee returned to 
its original proposal, but suffered an unprecedented defeat by the 
margin of one vote owing to the combination of Progressive and Labour 
forces, the absence of Gooch from the crucial meeting, and the equivocal 
attitude of the majority party. At this stage the weight of Unionist 
opinion in London was brought fully to bear on the Education Committee.
24. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 9 May 1921, pp.335-^ 6; 
The Times Educational Supplement, l2 May 1921; untitled notes 
(n.d./, Greater London Record Office (G.L.R.O.), EO/HFE/1/109
25. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 1 June 1921, pp.373-4.
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A week later the executive committee of the London Municipal Society, 
meeting in private with leaders of the L.C.C., decided that the 
extension of the continuation schools beyond the age of fifteen should 
not be allowed until national finances improved; and it was urged 
that members of the cabinet be approached with a view to securing 
the necessary government action. In the event such action was 
not required: the Education Committee responded to this new pressure 
by pushing through its original resolution, and the curtailment of 
the continuation scheme was subsequently adopted as official policy 
after a stormy four hour debate in the full Council.
The divisions within the London Unionist movement over the 
continuation schools hardened in the following year. The Geddes 
axe encouraged many M.P.s to call openly for complete suspension, 
and the leaders of the London Municipal Society succeeded in securing 
a manifesto commitment at the election of March 1922 to release the 
capital from its obligation to provide continuation schools until
pO
financial stability had returned. When the Municipal Reform Party
increased its majority at County Hall, Gooch’s successor as chairman
of the Education Committee, Cyril Jackson, realised that it would
29be ’useless for me to propose any form of continuance’. His warning 
was borne out in May 1922 when the Committee carried a recommendation 
to close the London schools until the 1918 Act had been more fully 
applied elsewhere, despite the abstention of prominent Municipal
26. L.M.S., Minutes of Executive Committee, 9 June 1921, Guildhall 
Library, London, Ms.19528, Vol.2.
27. The Times Educational Supplement, 25 June 1921.
28. L.M.S., London County Council Election, Thursday March 2nd 1922, 
Manifesto of the Municipal Reform Party, 18 Jan. 1922, p.5.
29. C.-JIckson to H.A.L. Either, 1 May 1922, P.R.O. ED 24/1447.
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Reformers such as Gray, Cobb and F.R. Anderton, leader of the Council.
An observer at the meeting said ’it was obvious that the resolution 
was due to party pressure’, noting the example of a new member of 
the Committee who had been impressed by visiting one of the schools 
but who felt bound by his earlier electoral pledge.A deputation 
from the Education Committee subsequently visited the Board of Education 
to inform the minister of the Council’s decision, with the result 
that in the summer of 1922 the majority of London’s continuation 
schools were closed, leaving only a small number of schools run at 
a minimal cost in co-operation with individual employers.
The episode of the day continuation schools brought out clearly
the manner in which education policy locally had to be framed with
reference to competing political and economic pressures. The Education
Committee, with the full administrative backing of Blair and his
officers, had devised and implemented a scheme of continuation, only
to find its policy overturned by the power of the party machinery
in London. There was of course no simple, clear-cut division in
Unionist opinion, and certain members of the Education Committee,
31for example, made no secret of their dislike for the schools ; but 
there was nevertheless a general distinction between those who 
administered the education service and considered the interests of 
the schools first and foremost, and those who were primarily guided 
by alternative influences. The latter was not confined only to those
30. M. Holmes minute to W.R. Davies, 4 May 1922, ibid.; Board of 
Education, ’Deputation from the London County Council’, 18 May 
1922, G.L.R.O., EO/HFE/1/110.
31. An important illustration was Mrs. J. Wilton Phipps, who became 
chairman of the Education Committee in 1923. See the untitled 
notes on the Committee meeting of May 1921 in G.L.R.O.,
EO/HFE/1/109.
242
who put the rates before education, such as the L.C.C.*s finance 
committee, which was said to exercise 'a control not untinged with 
Treasury tradition in the thrifty stewardship of public funds'.
It also included those who were conscious of wider considerations: 
the London Municipal Society in particular, as the co-ordinating 
body of London Unionism, was concerned both by the stiffening of 
party opinion nationally and by the growing unpopularity of continuation 
schools with voters locally. At the Education Committee meeting 
of May 1922, the main complaints about the schools concerned the 
absence of a directly vocational curriculum and the inconvenience 
caused to London parents and employers; only one new member of the 
Committee based opposition on financial considerations, and the savings 
actually made from the abandonment of the scheme turned out to be 
insignificant. The fate of London's continuation schools was thus 
determined by financial, political and electoral rather than 
educational considerations.
The closure of the continuation schools set the seal on the . 
period between 1918 and 1922 as one of frustrated hopes for London's 
education service. The two major planks of the Education Committee's 
policy - the London Scheme and the continuation schools - had been 
rendered inoperative, and the need for economy in all areas quickly 
took precedence. After the initial increase in expenditure generated
32. The Times Educational Supplement, 6 Jan. 1921.
33. Holmes minute to Davies, 4 May 1922, P.R.O. ED 24/1447; L.C.C., 
Education Committee, Minutes, 12 July 1922, p.407. The importance 
of political expediency was indicated, perhaps inadvertently,
in an early study of the continuation schools which pointed out 
that London was still making provision for the 14-18 age group 
in Unemployment Centres. See L. Brooks, 'The London compulsory 
day continuation schools', unpublished University of London 
M.A. thesis, 1923, p.151.
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by wartime inflation and Fisher's legislation, there was a large 
reduction in the education estimates aimed at bringing down the county 
rate levied for educational purposes.As a result the basic 
configuration of the L.C.C.'s pre-war structure remained intact in 
the new circumstances of the 1920s. At the top the authority continued 
to provide secondary education only for an able minority: despite 
the dramatically increased demand for secondary schooling during 
and after the war, the London Scheme was reticent about aiming at 
the Board of Education's suggested provision of ten places per thousand 
of the population; and as supply far outstripped demand, London's 
amended scholarship scheme was no longer able to stand out as one 
of the most generous in the country. By 1921 Board officials were 
referring to 'the paucity of Secondary provision' in the capital, 
and attributing the blame partly on a reluctance to develop or convert 
the central schools into higher institutions.^^  The central schools, 
which had themselves been pioneered before 1914 with the object of 
providing a practically-biased curriculum, were clearly regarded 
as a vital part of the elementary system after the war; but with 
the advent of economic recession, the planned extension of the central 
schools was shelved and the majority of schoolchildren remained where 
they had been before the war - in the council's all-age elementary 
schools.
34. See Appendix 6 , 'Total expenditure of the L.C.C. on higher and 
elementary education, 1917-1937’, which highlights the reduction 
in spending after 1921.
35. See Apprndix 4, which indicates the fall in the total number 
of secondary school places between 1921 and 1924.
36. See the deliberations of Board officers at the Assistant 
Secretaries' committee, 10 Mar. 1921, P.R.O. ED 120/64.
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The school structure of the post-war period clearly reflected 
the priorities of the Municipal Reform Party, which was generally 
agreed about the necessary direction and intentions of education 
policy. Apart from the continuation school debates, actual defiance 
of the party whip by Education Committee members was rare; few were 
inclined to follow the example of the young Lord.Eustace Percy, who 
on one occasion voted with the opposition parties in an attempt to 
prevent children from being able to work before school hours.3?
The mainspring of the Committee's approach had been to cautiously 
expand facilities as finances permitted, seeking in particular to 
implement the 1918 Act as a continuation and development of London's 
existing system. This legislation had facilitated a dual approach 
to the problems of the adolescent: to the traditional ladder provided 
by the secondary and central schools was now to be added the innovation 
of part-time day continuation for the majority. The continuation 
school in fact lay at the heart of the whole Municipal Reform strategy 
for the adolescent, as it highlighted the fundamental underlying 
concern about the need to link up the hitherto separate worlds of 
school and work. The Education Committee had thus sought to increase 
the vocational content of the continuation school curriculum, and 
the London Municipal Society even inserted a suggestion in the 1922 
manifesto calling for the appointment of a Royal Commission to 
investigate whether the present schools prepared children adequately 
for their working lives.The failure of the continuation experiment,
37. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 10 Dec. 1919, p.904. Percy was 
a Municipal Reform representative for Holborn for a short period 
before entering parliament in 1921.
38. L.M.S., Manifesto of the Municipal Reform Party, Jan. 1922. See 
also, in addition to the complaints of London M.P.s, constituency 
views such as L.C.C. Election 1919, Address to the electors (n.d.), 
St. George's Conservative Association^ Westminster City Archives,
Ms.1267/7/5. Some Unionist supporters were much more blatant than 
the Education Committee in pressing for training to be given to 'the 
children of the industrial and commercial classes in the last two
.years of their school life' - L.M.S., The Ratepayer (July 1921), p.47.
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however, brought out clearly the party differences which had developed 
by 1922. The Progressives alone remained committed to a full scheme 
of continuation classes as the first essential of reform, whereas 
the emerging Labour group had become only lukewarm in support, arguing 
that the schools should be closed unless a system of maintenance 
grants was devised for children in attendance. Some Municipal 
Reformers remained in the meantime fond of the idea of continuation, 
although in practice the party had abandoned a major plank of its 
policy and was left to fall back upon advocacy of the educational 
ladder alone as the best method of securing progress - the adequacy 
of this policy was to dominate party debates on education in London 
throughout the following decade, as attention turned increasingly 
to the nature and extent of post-elementary instruction to be provided 
for the adolescent.
Ill
The Municipal Reform Party remained as the dominant force on 
the London County Council for twelve years after the municipal election 
of March 1922. During this period the Progressives were rapidly 
eclipsed as the main opposition at County Hall by the London Labour 
Party, whose support increased steadily under the leadership of Herbert 
Morrison until Labour was able to claim a majority of seats in 1934 - 
thus bringing to an end nearly thirty years of consecutive Conservative 
rule in the capital. The leading role in determining important 
statements of Municipal Reform education policy between 1922 and 
1934 was once again taken by key individuals on the Education Committee,
39. J. Scott Lidget to Fisher, 8 Apr. 1922, P.R.O. ED 24/1447.
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notably successive chairmen Harold Webbe, Sir John Gilbert and Captain 
Edward Cobb, After the experience of the immediate post-war years, 
these men were careful not to antagonise party feeling and Conservative 
opinion in London. As a result, the need to control the rate burden 
became a consistent theme, and in the place of the high ideals of 
1918 and the attempt to anticipate national developments such as 
continuation schools, there emerged a reluctance to adopt new policies 
being suggested by the Board of Education. This applied in particular 
to the issues which came to dominate educational debate after the 
publication of the Hadow Report in 1926: the idea of dividing the 
elementary schools into junior and senior departments in order to 
provide post-primary instruction for all children over the age of 
eleven, and the proposal to raise the compulsory school-leaving age 
from fourteen to fifteen.
The economy measures associated with the Geddes axe dominated
London education for nearly two years after the re-election of the
Municipal Reformers in 1922. The chairman of the Education Committee
defended the economies as a necessary evil at a time of national
emergency and claimed that essential educational facilities were
unimpaired, although the opposition parties complained that London
40had been forced to suffer more than other authorities. In spite 
of these circumstances, the Committee did return to the planning 
of future policy during 1923: the particular teaching difficulties 
of older children in the elementary schools were given consideration.
40. The Times Educational Supplement, 24 Feb. 1923, which also indicates 
Cyril Jackson's concern - unusual in his party - to raise the 
school-leaving age to fifteen when finances permitted.
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and it was decided that in order to provide greater continuity in 
policy, a new three year programme should be drawn up to replace 
the suspended scheme of 1920. The new programme, which was eventually 
presented to the full Council in 1924, contained many familiar proposals. 
Higher education was to be developed by building or extending twenty 
secondary schools, by providing additional scholarships and free 
places, and by expanding technical training; and in elementary education 
the main improvements were to result from the resumption of the '40/48' 
scheme of accommodation, the building of twelve new central schools 
and the extension of junior county scholarships. 'On the whole', 
the document concluded, 'it will be seen that there is a close 
correspondnece between the scheme of 1920 and the programme for the 
three years 1925-28'.^  ^
The new programme indicated the extent to which Municipal Reform 
attitudes towards education remained unchanged in the early 1920s.
The upper stages of the elementary schools were to be improved by 
changes in the curriculum, but beyond this two out of every three 
adolescents were to be excluded from the benefits of secondary or 
central school education. This commitment to the 1920 scheme without 
continuation now begun to arouse criticisms from outside Progressive 
and Labour circles. The Board of Education became more critical 
of the L.C.C.'s reluctance to link up secondary and central schools, 
which it attributed both to the manner in which the various sub­
committees of the Education Committee operated independently, and 
to the survival of the old School Board tradition that 'higher grade' 
education of the central school type was most beneficial to children
41. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 16 July 1924, p.496.
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of poor parents. A more radical criticism came from sections of
the educational press, who attacked London’s inability to follow
the lead of other education authorities now working towards a distinct
course of education for all children after the age of eleven in a
variety of post-elementary schools.This criticism was not, however,
taken up by the London Labour Party, now the major opposition at
County Hall: the Labour minister C.P. Trevelyan made a point of approving
the L.C.C.'s initiative in presenting a programne; and at the Council
election of March 1925, Labour’s manifesto referred not to post-primary
reform but to the concern of ’those impressed by the desirability
of carrying out the proposals’, that economy measures might once 
44more intervene. In other words education was not the cause of 
acute party controversy in the aftermath of the Progressive decline, 
although clear areas of disagreement existed between Municipal 
Reformers and Labour, most notably over the provision of free 
secondary education. Blair’s successor as Education Officer, George 
Cater, nevertheless pointed out in 1925 that the new programme was 
acceptable to all parties on the Council, and that the main differences
45concerned the speed with which agreed proposals were to be implemented.
The steady implementation of the new three year programme, which 
began to operate from April 1925, was threatened at the end of the 
year by the publication of the Board of Education’s restrictive
42. E.H. Pelham to Mrs. Phipps, 11 Oct. 1923, P.R.O. ED 97/208; 
Selby-Bigge to Mr. Chambers, 7 Nov. 1923, ibid. - indicating 
the Permanent Secretary’s concern at the ’very unsatisfactory’ 
central school position.
43. The Times Educational Supplement, 1 Sep. 1923.
44. C.P. Trevelyan - 17V H.C. Deb., 5s., c.2230, 31 July 1924; Labour 
Party. The London Labour Party’s manifesto (n.d.), p.4.
45. G. Cater to C. Cobb,'"I Oct'.' 1924, G.L.k.uV, EO/PS/1/28.
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Circular, No, 1371. This intrusion of national politics into local
affairs threatened a return to the economies of the early 1920s,
and posed for London the twin problems of finding immediate savings
and the possible abandonment of the cherished percentage grant from
the Exchequer. The President of the Board, now the Conservative
Lord Eustace Percy, quickly sensed that the circular had been a mistake,
however, partly through a consideration of the special circumstances
of London: he had been keen to encourage the revival of local authority
programmes, and realised that a modification of the L.C.C.’s scheme
could have serious political consequences.^^ In return the Municipal
Reform majority made clear its attachment to the percentage grant
but refused to join with other authorities in condemning the circular,
and the Education Committee chairman Harold Webbe later noted that
the small reduction made in 1926-27 did not affect progress under
47the three year programme. As the threat of economies receded,
the Committee returned its attention to policy for the adolescent
by devising another three year programme to cover the years 1927
to 1930. This move was designed to bring London into line with all
other local authorities submitting programmes under the minister’s
initiative, although the result was an overlap between the existing
and proposed schemes. The new programme, which once more followed
the proposals of ’the Council’s scheme of 1920.. and those now in
48operation under the 1925-28 programme’, was formally adopted in
46. Cabinet standing committee on expenditure, 11th meeting, 21 Dec. 
1925, P.R.O. CAB 27/303; E. Percy to J.M. Gatti, 9 Dec. 1925, 
P.R.O. ED 24/1480.
47. L.C.C. Education Committee, Minutes, 22 Jan. 1926, pp.1-2; L.M.S., 
London County Council Election, March 1928, London education, 
speech by W.H. Webbe, 28 Nov. 1927, pp.7-8.
48. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 2 Feb. 1927, p.2.
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February 1927; the Education Committee had thus reaffirmed its 
determination to proceed along well established lines, despite the 
recent findings of the influential Hadow Report.
Municipal Reform members had played a minor role during the 
early 1920s in the deliberations of the Hadow committee, whose final 
report recommended post-primary instruction for all children and 
the raising of the school-leaving age to fifteen within six years.
Harold Webbe had served as a member of the committee, and others 
gave evidence to be considered, notably John Gilbert, acting on this 
occasion as a spokesman for the Catholic Education Council. After 
the publication of the Hadow Report, officials and members of the 
Education Committee combined to produce a statement claiming that 
L.C.C. policy was in accordance with the Hadow suggestions for post­
primary reform, although falling far short of the ultimate ideal.
At the same time it was claimed that school life should only be extended 
at the behest of individual education authorities - a reflection 
of Webbe’s role as one of three members of the Hadow committee to 
dissociate himself from the idea of raising the school-leaving age 
nationally.This response was strongly criticised by educational 
associations in the capital, but after a long delay it was ultimately 
adopted as official Council policy. In November 1927 the Municipal 
Reform majority, in the face of amendments from the opposition parties 
on the Education Committee, carried resolutions declaring that it 
was not desirable at present to alter the existing nomenclature in 
order to provide primary and post-primary education; that it was
49. Ibid., 6 July 1927, pp.383-4.
251
not possible in view of the cost to standardise teachers* salaries 
and accommodation in proposed modern schools to match that of secondary 
schools; and that it was not intended to put forward plans for raising 
the school-leaving age.^^
Municipal Reform policy towards the adolescent therefore remained 
essentially unchanged throughout the 1920s. At.the L.C.C. election 
of March 1928, the party gave an undertaking to continue extending 
the ladder provided by the secondary and central schools, but the 
raising of the leaving age was firmly opposed and there was no mention 
of reorganising the elementary schools into junior and senior 
departments - a policy which the Board of Education now officially 
sanctioned.There were several reasons behind the attitude which 
Municipal Reformers adopted towards the adolescent, the most important 
being the continuing strength of the belief that extending the 
educational ladder alone constituted a sufficient policy. Cyril 
Cobb, still an active member of the Education Committee, encapsulated 
this when he said that there was common agreement about every child 
having the opportunity to go on to higher education at eleven, but 
not about the need for every child to be transferred to a separate 
school and compulsorily retained until the age of fifteen. The 
tradition of supporting the voluntary bodies, which were initially 
lukewarm about carrying out Hadow reorganisation, and a preference 
for continuation schools as a better alternative than keeping the
50. Ibid., 2 Nov. 1927, p.610.
5 1. L.M.S., London County Council Election, Thursday March 8th 1928, 
Manifesto of the Municipal Reform Party, 24 Jan. 1928, p.6.
Since l925 the L.C.C. had been experimenting with a small number 
of reorganised elementary schools, but after considering the 
Board of Education's Circular, No.1397, it agreed only to extend 
the experiment: L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 20 Mar. 
1929, p.165.
252
majority in school until fifteen, further accounted for the equivocal 
attitude of the Committee towards post-primary reform.In addition 
to these educational considerations, Conservative opinion in London 
as a whole showed little enthusiasm for a new direction in policy.
Many leading party members still held the view that any education 
beyond fourteen was wasteful, on the grounds that ’the true education 
of the boy and gir1 begins when they go out to work’; and a sensitivity 
to electoral needs was evident in the complaint of one parliamentary 
candidate that the idea of reorganising schools in his area broke 
'the custom of over fifty years, and the parents are protesting'
The determination of Municipal Reformers to retain the essence of 
London's pre-war education caused disquiet at the Board of Education, 
where the President expressed private concern at the cautious approach 
to reorganisation; and it acted as an important dividing line between 
the parties at County Hall. The Labour group had in fact been ambivalent 
in public about the need for elementary reorganisation, but its 
commitment to raising the school-leaving age was clear, and came 
to be reinforced by the actions of the second Labour government in 
office after 1929.^ ^
The Labour minister Charles Trevelyan returned to the Board 
of Education with a commitment to raise the leaving age to fifteen 
by April 1931, although he was quickly made aware that little support 
would be forthcoming from the majority party on the L.C.C. In July
52. See the comments of Cobb and Gilbert in The Schoolmaster and 
Woman Teacher's Chronicle, 10 Nov. 1927.
53. VT.G. Towler (Secretary L.M.S.) in L.M.S., London municipal parties 
and policies, 12 Dec. 1927, p.13; A.W. Goodman (Candidate Bow
& Bromley) to Percy, 14 Mar. 1929, P.R.O. ED 97/210.
54. For Percy's anxiety, see Pelham to A.V. Symonds, 14 Dec. 1927, 
P.R.O. ED 16/502.
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1929 London stood alone as a 'doubtful quantity' at a conference
of local authority representatives, with John Gilbert, now chairman
of the Education Committee, arguing that the projected date did not
allow time for adequate preparations and reiterating his personal
preference for continuation s c h o o l s . The Committee did, however,
during the course of 1929, begin to revise its attitude towards
elementary reorganisation as the second major element of post-primary
reform. In October 1929 the Council's Chief Inspector produced a
report which commented favourably on the experimental senior divisions
introduced in the mid-1920s, and under this administrative guidance
the idea of wholesale reorganisation became a possibility for the
first time; according to one observer, Gilbert's volte face would
be important to Catholic opinion and so allow the problem of dividing
56the voluntary schools to be faced. At the same time the Municipal 
Reform conversion to Hadow reorganisation was only partial and 
reluctant; the new three year programme introduced to cover the period
1930 to 1933 contained no specific reference to this issue, promising
instead to consider individual proposals for reorganisation on their 
57merits. In the short-term the more flexible attitude towards 
reorganisation primarily served to provide Municipal Reformers with 
an additional objection to raising the school-leaving age, since 
it could now be claimed that the standard of post-primary instruction
55. 'Conference between the President of the Board of Education and 
representatives of the three associations of local education 
authorities and of the L.C.C. with reference to the raising of 
the school leaving age', minute by S.H. Wood, 30 July 1929, 
G.L.R.O., EO/PS/1/28. See also the later account by Wood (12 
Aug. 1930) in P.R.O. ED 24/1138.
56. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 30 Oct. 1929, p.432;
G.G. Williams to Pelham, 8 Nov. 1929, P.R.O. ED 97/210. Williams 
added that Gilbert's attempt to justify his change of heart was 
'a masterpiece'.
57. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 30 Jan. 1930, pp.25-6.
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had to be raised before any benefit was possible from an extended 
course of study.
The withdrawal of Trevelyan’s first school attendance bill and
the introduction of a second measure in May 1930 infused into the
debates about post-primary education the question of how far the
voluntary bodies should be given financial assistance for the purposes
of reorganisation and raising the school age. The decline of the
Progressive Tarty meant that there had been very little controversy
surrounding the church schools during the previous decade: in 1925
one London official thought that the government's recently revised
attitude towards attending church in school hours would provoke 'very
considerable excitement', although in practice it was accepted calmly
58by all parties on the Education Committee. The tradition of strong 
support for the voluntary schools by Municipal Reformers emerged 
clearly in the context of the Committee's revised attitude towards 
elementary reorganisation, when at the request of the Bishop of London 
an extensive survey of Anglican schools was carried out with a view 
to creating junior and senior departments. Similarly in response 
to Trevelyan's new bill, the Committee reaffirmed its original position 
on the school-leaving age but declared support for the moves aimed 
at reaching an agreement about providing additional grants to the 
voluntary bodies.This attitude was strengthened by the introduction 
of a third school attendance bill in October 1930, which again omitted 
any reference to a religious settlement. Municipal Reform leaders
58. E.M. Rich to G.E. Sykes, 11 Dec. 1925, P.R.O. ED 106/23.
59. Gilbert minute to Cater, 24 May 1930, G.L.R.O., EO/GEN/1/4; 
L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 3 June 1930, p.335.
255
acted quickly to stimulate discussions designed to secure denominational 
agreement, and after these talks failed it was clear that John Gilbert 
exercised considerable influence behind the scenes in the passage 
of the ’Scurr amendment’ - an alliance of Conservative and Roman 
Catholic Labour M.P.s which undermined the government’s bill by carrying 
the motion that the school age could not be raised without prior 
agreement on extra grants to the church schools.These twin concerns 
were made the centrepiece of the Municipal Reform education proposals 
at the L.C.C. election of March 1931: the party would continue to 
oppose the raising of the leaving age and would continue to support 
the voluntary bodies, upon whom it was said the Labour Party were 
seeking to place heavy burdens.
The experience of the second Labour government between 1929 
and 1931 had both clarified and modified Municipal Reform policy 
towards the adolescent. The proposed extension of the period of 
compulsory attendance, to which the government and the London Labour 
Party attached considerable importance, had been resisted for a variety 
of reasons. The London Municipal Society believed that such a reform 
would be highly unpopular electorally, and at one point challenged 
the legality of the government requesting advance preparations from 
local authorities in the absence of parliamentary legislation. The 
likely cost to the ratepayer was a further concern of Conservative 
opinion as a whole, especially as economic conditions deteriorated
60. Gilbert to Cobb, 30 Dec. 1930, G.L.R.O., EO/GEN/1/4. For the 
influence of Gilbert and the idea of the Scurr amendment as a 
’Tory intrigue’, see the later comments in the Chuter Ede diary, 
7 Dec. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.187.
61. L.M.S., London County Council Election, Thursday March 5th 1931, 




during 1930. The Education Committee had equally raised numerous 
objections, including a disingenuous claim by Cyril Cobb that finding 
accommodation for the ’bulge’ passing through the schools would be 
difficult. The primary complaint, however, voiced in a letter signed 
by all the chairmen of the Education Committee since the war, was 
that the quality and form of post-primary instruction must come before 
the length of the school course.  ^ The Committee’s recent conversion 
to Hadow reorganisation marked the only major modification in Municipal 
Reform policy in the 1920s, although party spokesmen had only been 
reluctantly weaned from their reliance on the value of the educational 
ladder by the combined influence of administrative guidance and advice 
from national party figures.In fact neither the new London programme 
nor the Municipal Reform electoral programme espoused the cause of 
reorganisation; rather in response to the Labour party’s accusation 
that parents* wishes were being ignored, it was claimed that any reform 
had been cautious in order not to antagonise parents, school managers 
and teachers, and that only the government’s proposed legislation 
had required a more forward policy.The implications of this view 
were that the position of secondary and central schools would remain 
vital to London education, and that the process of elementary 
reorganisation in the capital was undertaken in spite of, and not 
because of, the attitude of the majority party.
62. L.M.S., Minutes of Executive committee, 3 June 1930, Guildhall 
Library, Ms.19528, Vol.2; The Times Educational Supplement,
12 July 1930.
63. Cyril Cobb - 244 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1133, 6 Nov. 1930; The Daily 
Telegraph, 6 Nov. 1930 - the only exception here was Cyril Jackson, 
who had died in 1924.
64. For the influence of Lord Eustace Percy in particular, see below, 
p. 268.
65. L.M.S., Typed Memo. No.3, ’L.C.C. election. Labour misrepresentations 
The reorganisation of schools’, n.d.
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The remaining three years of Municipal Reform rule were once 
more overshadowed by the need for economies in expenditure. The 
Education Committee approached the task with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
with members such as William Ray, a former vice-chairman, declaring 
insistently that at a time of national crisis even cherished aspects 
of the London service such as scholarships would have to suffer.
The unprecedented reductions imposed by the Committee in line with 
this attitude aroused widespread criticism, notably over the scrapping 
of school prizes, although the Council’s difficulties had been greatly 
compounded by the government’s decision to withdraw the percentage 
grant on educational expenditure. This action threw a considerable 
extra burden on the rates at a time when the Exchequer contribution 
had been curtailed, and the Committee retained the right to reopen 
the issue of finance as soon as the national emergency had passed.
In the meantime policy towards the adolescent tended to revolve around 
economy, especially after the National government introduced means 
tested ’special places’ as a substitute for the traditional ’free 
places’ in secondary schools. The labour movement nationally regarded 
the Board of Education Circular, No. 1421, as a direct assault upon 
the principle of access to secondary schooling for children of poor 
parents, and in the most strongly worded protest of the inter-war 
period, the Labour opposition in London also denounced this ’reactionary 
and class policy’. The Education Committee, however, agreed to 
implement the policy, and Gilbert’s successor Edward Cobb defended
66. L.M.S., Minutes of the council, 9 Dec. 1931, Guildhall Library, 
Ms.19527, Vol.2.
67. L.M.S., London education, speech by E.G. Cobb, 9 Nov. 1933, p.l6
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the new system as a means of securing reductions without inflicting 
hardship. The debates over special places nevertheless pushed 
Municipal Reformers onto the defensive, and the party’s defeat in 
the L.C.C. election of March 1934 was ironically accompanied by the 
most complacent statement of education policy since the war. The 
emphasis was placed exclusively on the party’s record since 1922 
in extending secondary and central schools and in promoting 
technical instruction: there were no promises of advances to come 
and no indication of any intention to depart from well-established 
policies.
The Municipal Reform record in the period between 1922 and 1934 
had in fact resulted in steady but unspectacular progress for London 
education. Secondary education remained the weakest element: although 
there was a gradual increase in the number of school places available, 
this rise never reached the standard mentioned by the 1920 Scheme 
and consistently lagged behind the provision made by other authorities. 
In elementary education there had been continuous development of 
the central schools, though again without reaching the target set 
in 1920; as well as recent attention to providing junior and senior 
departments, which resulted in nearly eighty per cent of the provided 
schools being reorganised by 1934 - an outcome which compared favourably
68. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 12 Oct. 1932, p.364; L.M.S., 
speech by Cobb. p.9.
69. L.M.S., London County Council Election, Thursday March 8th 1934, 
Manifesto of the Municipal Reform Party (Leaflet No.4, 1934),
2b Jan. 1934, pp.5-6.
259
70with many other areas. The manner in which reorganisation had
occurred indicated the variety of forces that combined to shape the
school structure, with the Municipal Reformers in this instance playing
only a minor role. Thelma Cazalet-Keir, in later recalling her
activities as head of the elementary education sub-committee in the
later 1920s, referred not to reorganisation but to the difficulty
of persuading Gilbert as chairman that the cost of providing toilet
paper in the schools must be borne by the authority.Within this
context of the recurrent need for economy, the developments of the
period did for the most part reflect the wishes of the majority party.
The sole emphasis on the educational ladder had now been slightly
modified, but the key underlying theme of linking up school and work
remained as before - hence the expansion of central schools and the
new priority of the 1930 programme on improving access from the
elementary school to the university on the technical rather than 
72academic side. In party terms, it was not quite the case - as 
Gilbert suggested - that Labour amendments in education were always 
of the ’Oliver Twist variety’. The London Labour Party had clearly 
expressed its wish for improved access to the secondary schools and
70. See Appendix 7, ’Local education authority provision of secondary 
and technical education, 1925-1935’, which illustrates the manner 
in which the L.C.C. remained behind in secondary education while 
continuing its predominance in technical instruction. In March 
1934, 78.1% of children in provided elementary schools in London 
had been reorganised, compared with 62.6% in England and Wales
as a whole, 70.9% in all County Boroughs and 47.9% in all County 
Councils. The corresponding figures for non-provided schools 
were much lower at under 20%. See L.C.C., Education Committee, 
Minutes, 15 May 1935, p.216.
71. T. Cazalet-Keir, From the wings (London, 1967), pp.88-9.
72. L.M.S., London education, speech by Gilbert, 17 Nov. 1930,
pp.9-10, from which the quote below is also taken. The emphasis 
on technical studies had remained the central concern of London 
Conservatism throughout the previous decade: see, for example, 
Kennington Conservative Association, Executive Council minutes,
19 Feb. 1926, p.93, London School of Economics,Coll. Misc. 463.1 .
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greater urgency in post-primary reform, or at least in raising the 
school-leaving age - it remained to be seen whether these preferences 
would produce any major alterations in the nature and scope of the 
London education service.
IV
The majority secured by the London Labour Party in 1934 marked
a personal triumph for Herbert Morrison, who had dominated the party
during the 1920s and who subsequently directed L.C.C. policy in many 
73areas. For the Municipal Reform Party, a further defeat in the
municipal election of March 1937 was to have a profound effect, leading
to pressure from the party nationally to carry out a wholesale
74reorganisation of local Conservative forces. In the short-term
the party's relegation to the role of opposition in London resulted 
in many changes in personnel, a process reflected on the Education 
Committee. Cyril Cobb and H.C. Cooch, for example, were not reappointed, 
and the death of Sir John Gilbert shortly afterwards in 1934 enhanced 
the break with the past and left responsibility for Municipal Reform 
education policy to less well-known councillors such as Eric Hall 
and W.F. Marchant. The issues which concerned Municipal Reformers 
in the years before the outbreak of war had generally been raised 
in the previous decade: the school-leaving age, which was raised 
to fifteen with exemptions by the re-elected National government 
in 1936; and the nature and extent of post-primary reform, which
73. B. Donoughue and C.W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: portrait of a 
politician (London, 1973), pp.1ü9-2lu.
74. Young, opTcit., pp.171-9.
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was raised by a further investigation of the Board of Education's 
Consultative Committee. The aim of this final section is to examine 
in what ways Municipal Reform attitudes altered in the second half 
of the 1930s, and to analyse whether the Labour controlled Education 
Committee initiated any important changes in education for the 
adolescent in the capital.
Under the leadership of Eveline Lowe, the new Education Committee 
acted swiftly to reverse the Council's policy towards the school- 
leaving age. In May 1934 a report was adopted recommending that 
the government both raise the leaving age to fifteen and provide 
maintenance allowances where n e c e s s a r y .The Municipal Reform minority 
similarly adhered to its earlier position, with Marchant moving an 
unsuccessful amendment suggesting that the Committee concentrate 
instead on ensuring that maximum educational benefit was being secured 
from the division into junior and senior schools.This long-standing 
attitude was modified, however, as the government moved towards advocacy 
of raising the school-leaving age with exemptions for 'beneficial 
employment'. Municipal Reformers quickly fell in behind this proposal, 
with Harold Webbe - now the leader of the party on the L.C.C. - 
claiming that it was desirable to take up employment where available 
and that any comprehensive system of maintenance allowances would 
be only 'the thin end of the wedge'.Despite the Labour Party's 
hostility to the 1936 Education Act, the L.C.C. was among the first 
local authorities to hold a regional conference aimed at finding 
ways of implementing the new legislation; and the Education Committee
75. L.C.C. Education Committee, Minutes, 9 May 1934, p.156.
76. Ibid., 7 Nov. 1934, p.406.
77. L.M.S., Notes for speakers and workers (n.d. (1937)), pp.61-2,
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was ready to operate the new system in 1939 when the war intervened.
The issue of the school-leaving age thus remained throughout the 
1930s an important dividing line between the parties in London; the 
majority party had consistently sought to extend school life but 
found itself frustrated by the government; while Municipal Reformers 
remained lukewarm about the whole issue, although they had for the 
first time accepted in principle the need to raise the leaving age.
The general nature of post-primary reform also received early 
attention from the Labour Education Committee, in the first place 
in the context of the decision to reintroduce the suspended programme 
procedure. The scheme initiated for the years 1935 to 1938 indicated 
Labour's greater sense of urgency on this issue; for the secondary 
schools, it was proposed to increase both the number of places available 
and the proportion of scholarships; while in the context of elementary 
reorganisation, the staffing and accommodation of senior elementary 
schools was to be improved with a view to working towards the Hadow
78
proposal of standards approximating to those of the secondary schools.
In May 1935 a joint sub-committee report took this thinking further
by producing a report which suggested that post-primary education
should be organised so that all children after the age of eleven
attended a single multilateral school rather than proceeding to one
7Qof several types of institution. This proposal would have entailed 
a radical new direction in policy towards the adolescent in the capital, 
although at the time the report was not adopted by the Education 
Committee as a whole - a decision which reflected both the restrictive 
influence of existing government regulations and a division of opinion
78. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 30 Jan. 1935, p.17.
79. Ibid., 29 May 1935, pp.264-5.
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among Labour members themselves. As the Education Officer noted 
in his submission to the Board's Consultative committee, the Labour 
administration in London had yet to make up its mind about the form 
of post-primary organisation it favoured when elementary reorganisation
80was finally completed. In the meantime the Committee's main concern 
was to proceed more rapidly with the expansion of the pre-existing 
structure for the adolescent, a theme repeated in a second programme 
for the years 1938 to 1941 which was suspended following the outbreak 
of war.®^
The main objections raised by Municipal Reformers to the Labour 
programmes concentrated not on the ultimate status of post-primary 
schools but on the emphasis given to expanding the secondary schools. 
Both Eric Hall and Harold Webbe took up the theme that Labour policy 
was too heavily biased towards academic education at the expense 
of technical and practical instruction, which it was claimed 'is 
thrust in the background'. This concern about technical studies 
was reflected in the unsuccessful attempts of the Municipal Reform 
minority on the Education Committee to move amendments to the first 
three year programme aimed at increasing trade scholarships at the
82expense of junior county scholarships. There were other issues 
which concerned the wider Conservative movement in London in the 
years after 1934, notably the anxiety about the influence of socialist
80. Board of Education, Consultative Committee, 'Summary of oral 
evidence given by Mr. E.M. Rich' (Paper No.U6(58)), 26 Nov. 1935, 
P.R.O. ED 10/152.
81. L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes, 9 Feb. 1938, pp.62-3.
82. L.M.S., Two years of Socialist rule on the London County Council 
(Pamphlfff. n.d.. p.9; L.M.S., The Ratepayer (Feb.
1937), p.681.
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ideas in the schools and the alleged anti-patriotism of the Education 
Committee in discouraging military training in maintained secondary
83
schools. For the most part, however, party differences about 
education for the adolescent centred on the importance to be attached 
to different forms of post-primary instruction. In these debates, 
the Labour Party ironically emerged as the principal defender of 
the traditional grammar school, arguing that Conservatives wanted 
to restrict opportunities for higher education only to those whose 
parents could afford to pay fees. In reply, the Municipal Reform 
Party pledged that it would continue to improve the secondary schools 
but would also place more emphasis on technical and commercial studies, 
'which the Socialists have neglected', on the basis that 'true education 
is something wider than the imparting of academic knowledge'.
The five year period between 1934 and 1939 therefore witnessed 
subtle changes in Municipal Reform attitudes towards the adolescent, 
some of which had been taking place over a longer period. In the 
absence of interference from the party either locally or nationally, 
members of the Education Committee now embraced a more flexible view 
of post-primary reform than previously. Edward Cobb, for example, 
maintained that the statutory distinction between secondary and 
elementary should be replaced by a division into primary and post­
primary, with the latter being available to all children over the 
age of eleven - an idea which had been directly rejected by Cobb's
83. L.M.S., London education, speech by E. Hall, 13 July 1936, esp.
p.8.
84. L.M.S., London County Council Election, Thursday March 4th 1937, 
The election manifesto of the Municipal Reform and Municipal 
Progressive parties, b Feb. 1937, pp.6-7.
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namesake after the publication of the Hadow Report.in the place 
of the educational ladder alone, Municipal Reformers were now coming 
to advocate a post-primary system in which some children at least 
would remain until fifteen and in which all would receive a distinct 
course at eleven plus: the minority in the form of an academic 
secondary training and the remainder benefiting from vocational (in 
junior technical schools) or at least practical (central schools 
or senior departments) instruction. This conception overlapped in 
certain respects with the policy pursued by the Labour Education 
Committee after 1934, while differing in tone and emphasis. The 
Committee, aided by the improvement in the national economy, increased 
education spending slowly and directed resources in particular to 
the expansion of London's secondary schools and scholarships. By 
contrast, the development of central schools was taken no further 
and elementary reorganisation proceeded gradually, hindered by the 
problem of bringing in the voluntary schools, despite the terms of 
the 1936 Act.^^ Herbert Morrison was known to attach little value 
to education as a vote-winner, and Harold Webbe was able to conclude 
that the Labour administration had introduced nothing new into London's
Qrr
education service. In education, as has been shown to be the case 
with the other major domestic problem of the period, housing, changes 
in L.C.C. policy after 1934 were difficult to make and reflected
85. E.C. Cobb - 325 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.105, 14 June 1937.
86. On Labour's increased spending, see G.W. Jones, 'How Herbert 
Morrison governed London, 1934-1940', Local Government Studies 
(June 1973), p.8. The increase in secondary places can be seen 
in Appendix 4; while the lack of progress in reorganisation is 
mentioned in S. Maclure, One hundred years of London education, 
1870-1970 (London, 1970), p.128.
87. Chuter EHe diary, 4 Feb. 1943, Add. Mss. 59696, p.19; The Spectator, 
5 Feb. 1937.
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just as much responses to a network of constraints as they did
deliberate choices.
V
The period between the wars ultimately witnessed only modest 
improvements in educational provision for the adolescent in the capital. 
The number of secondary school places and scholarships available 
had grown steadily, particularly under the Labour administration, 
but London's rate of progress never equalled the standard set by 
other education authorities; and despite the constant attention paid 
to the reorganisation of the elementary schools, the benefits of 
a senior education were still not available to all children by the 
outbreak, of war in 1939. This outcome was of course due to many 
forces - local and national, administrative as well as economic - 
operating to varying degrees of importance at given moments. The 
primary political responsibility, however, rested with the Municipal 
Reform Party, which controlled proceedings at County Hall for most 
of the inter-war period. The leading members of the Education Committee 
in particular had consciously defended the shape of London's school 
structure. Their record was aptly summarised by the well-known critic 
of London government, William Robson, who commented that education 
and one or two other services in the capital 'are not things to be 
ashamed of by any means. They could with advantage have been conceived 
and carried out on a far broader and more comprehensive basis, but 
that would have contravened the limits of the Municipal Reformers' outlook'.
88. K. Young and P. Garside, Metropolitan London: politics and urban 
change, 1837-1981 (London, 19 ^ 2 ), p.188.
89. W.A. Robson, 'Thouÿits on the L.C.C. Election: The chaos of London 
government', The Political Quarterly (July 1934), p.169.
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The outlook of local party members in London as a whole had 
certainly favoured, especially in the 1920s, a high degree of continuity 
with the school system established before the First World War. The 
concerns of most Municipal Reformers were clear-cut: the preservation 
and extension of the educational ladder to the secondary and central 
schools; defence of religious education; and the encouragement of 
practical and vocational teaching in order to equip local schoolchildren 
for their working lives. These priorities do not mean, however, 
that education as a political issue in London corresponds to a national 
model of concerted opposition to radical demands. In the first place, 
the London Labour Tarty - while bringing greater urgency to office 
after 1934 - found like its predecessor that various constraints 
prevented the possibility of rapid change. The Labour group, though 
divided internally over the scope and direction of reform, was of 
course in favour of progressive policies to benefit the adolescent, 
but this should not obscure the related point that Municipal Reform 
opinion gradually came to embrace certain minimum reforms demanded 
by Labour. During the late 1930s local spokesmen accepted, for example, 
that some children would remain in school for longer - an idea hitherto 
fiercely resisted - and also adopted a more flexible approach to 
post-primary reform. The London example therefore reinforces the 
idea that continuities, as much as sharp differences, characterised 
inter-war education policy; and indicates that local party opinions 
were gradually converging on the question of improving facilities 
for the adolescent. In London, as with the Conservative Party 
nationally, the acceptance of the 1944 Act can only be explained 
with reference to pre-war policies and attitudes.
The framework adopted in this study, which permits room for 
an assessment of only one area, cannot of course allow judgements
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to be made of Conservative controlled education authorities as a 
whole between the wars. Any final judgements require further and 
extensive case-studies, especially as the limited number of surveys 
already undertaken indicate the scope which existed for variations 
on the London pattern in accordance with particular circumstances.
In Liverpool, for example, religious education continued to be 
politically divisive throughout the period; whereas in Birmingham 
local Conservatives endorsed elementary reorganisation prior to the 
publication of the Hadow Report.It is possible, however, to comment 
finally on the particular traditions of London and the links which 
existed between local and national policy. The close connection 
between locality and centre in the case of the L.C.C. in fact highlighted 
the complex operation of party policy. In one direction, several 
Municipal Reformers went on to parliament to serve on the Conservative 
education group, thus indicating the importance of local government 
representatives in shaping national opinion. Conversely, policy 
in London could equally be influenced by national considerations.
This was shown first in the abandonment of the capital’s continuation 
schools, and later in the debates about raising the school-leaving 
age, when one M.P. complained about the number of 'friends and
Q1
admirers' that Eustace Percy had on the Council. For much of the 
time, of course, London's policy was devised by a few individuals 
acting in accordance with local considerations, such as the practical 
need to prepare children for employment. The close links which existed
90. P.J. Waller, Democracy and sectarianism. A political and social 
history of Liverpool, 1858-1939 ILiverpool, 1981), esp. pp. 
3J4Û-'4'3V 'A. Briggs, History of Birmingham, Vol.2, Borough and 
city, 1865-1938 (London, 1952), pp.239-40.
91. P. Harris - 2j9 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.1557, 29 May 1930.
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were nevertheless important in explaining the similarities between 
Municipal Reform and national party attitudes - in defending the 
concept of the educational ladder, resisting the compulsory extension 
of school life, and only slowly becoming more flexible about post­
primary reform. In their unexceptional administration of the London 
education authority, Municipal Reformers mirrored many of the 
aspirations and limitations of Conservative Party education policy 
between the wars.
Appendix 1
The administrative county of London between the wars
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Appendix 2
L.C.C. election results, 1913-1946







1913 67 49 2
1919 68 40 15 1
1922 82 26 16 _
1925 83 6 35 _
1928 77 5 42 —
1931 83 6 35 —
1934 55 - 69 —
1937 49 - 75 —
1946 30 2 90 2
Source: K. Young, Local politics and the rise of party (Leicester,
1975), p.2 ^
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Sir Cyril Cobb (M.R.)
Mr. H.C. Gooch (M.R.)
Sir Cyril Jackson (M.R.)
Mrs. Wilton Phipps (M.R.)
Mr. W.H. Webbe (M.R.)
Sir John Gilbert (M.R.)
Captain E.C. Cobb (M.R.) 
Mrs. Eveline Lowe (Lab)
Mr. Charles Robertson (Lab)
Mr. H.W. Liversidge (M.R.) 
Viscount Hill (M.R.)
Sir John Gilbert (M.R.)
Mrs. Wilton Phipps (M.R.) 
Mr. William Ray (M.R.)
Mr. W.H. Webbe (M.R.)
Mr. Harold Swann (M.R.)
Mr. Harold Swann (M.R.) 
Captain E.C. Cobb (M.R.)
Mr. W.F. Marchant (M.R.)
Mr. Charles Robertson (Lab) 
Mr. T.H. Jones (Lab)
Source: L.C.C., Education Committee, Minutes of Proceedings.
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Appendix 4
L.C.C. schools and pupils in attendance, 1918-1939
Date Number of Elementary Schools No. of Secondary Schools
Central Provided Non-Provided Total Maintained Aided Total
1918 51 539 361 951 21 31 52
1921 55 542 358 955 23 52 75
1924 62 543 356 961 24 50 74
1927 68 546 356 970 26 50 76
1930 80 553 357 990 27 52 79
1933 84 548 356 988 27 52 79
1936 84 542 358 984 27 52 79
1939 84 531 353 968 27 52 79
Date No. of Elementary School Pupils* No. of Secondary Pupils
Central Provided Non-Provided Total Maintained Aided Total
1918 479,700 123,285 604,353 8,269 10,542 18,811
1921 — 479,842 126,098 625,017 10,310 21,701 32,011
1924 — 471,921 119,797 592,564 9,342 20,289 29,631
1927 21,409 433,946 116,215 571,570 10,520 20,159 30,679
1930 24,370 400,777 109,365 534,512 10,987 20,730 31,717
1933 26,870 374,493 107,431 509,244 11,765 21,236 33,001
1936 27,779 318,423 98,147 444,349 12,213 21,809 34,022
1939 26,911 266,538 85,390 378,839 11,950 22,047 33,997
*Based on average attendance.
N.B. Figures for Central Schools unavailable 1918-24; number of 
elementary pupils for these years do not tally with total 
because small number of other schools not maintained by the 
Council are excluded.




Biographical details of Municipal Reformers
Cohb (1861-1938) Educ: Newton Abbott College and Merton College, 
Oxford; Barrister-at-Law; Chairman L.C.C. 1913-14; Conservative M.P. 
Fulham West 1918-29 and 1930-38.
Edward Cobb (1891-1957) Educ: St. Paul’s School and R.M.C., Sandhurst; 
military service First World War, cr. Captain 1915; Member L.C.C.
1925-34; Conservative M.P. Preston 1936-45; Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to Under-Secretary of State for Air 1938-39, to President 
of Board of Trade 1939-40, to Secretary of State for India 1940-41.
John Gilbert (1871-1934) Educ: St. Joseph’s College, Clapham; assistant 
master London secondary schools 1892-96; Vice-Chairman L.C.C. 1917- 
18; Chairman L.C.C. 1920-21; Chairman General Purposes Committee 
L.C.C. 1921-27; Chairman Catholic Education Council 1920-27; Secretary 
Catholic Education Council 1927-34; contested seat of London University 
(Conservative) 1929; member Burnham Committee 1931-34.
Henry Gooch (1871-1959) Educ: Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge; 
called to the Bar 1894; member of London School Board 1897-1904; 
Conservative M.P. Peckham 1908-10; member L.C.C. 1907-10 and 1914- 
34; Vice-Chairman L.C.C. 1922-23; Chairman L.C.C. 1923-24; member 
General Nursing Council.
Ernest Gray (1857-1932) Educ: St. John’s Training College; master 
of public elementary schools; member Board of Education Consultative 
Committee 1900-08; member L.C.C. 1907-25; Vice-Chairman L.C.C. 1915; 
Conservative M.P. Brixton 1918-22; President and Secretary National 
Union of Teachers.
Cyril Jackson (1863-1924) Educ: Charterhouse and New College, Oxford; 
Barrister, Inner Temple; member London School Board; Head of Education 
Department, West Australia 1896-1903; Chief Inspector, Board of Education 
I903-O6; member L.C.C. 1907-23; Chairman L.C.C. 1916; Governor of 
Imperial College, London.
Thelma Cazalet-Keir (1899- ) Member L.C.C. 1925-31; Conservative 
M.P. Islington East 1931-45; P.P.S. to the Parliamentary Secretary 
at the Board of Education 1937-40; Chairman London Area Women’s Advisory 
Committee 1943-46; Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Education
1945.
William Ray (1876-1937) Educ: St. Thomas’ School, Lancaster; military 
service First World War; member L.C.C. 1913-34; Conservative M.P.
Richmond 1932-37; Chairman British Electrical Development Association 
1933-36; leader Municipal Reform party 1925-34.
Harold Webbe (1885-1965) Educ: King Edward’s School Birmingham_and 
Queen’s College, Cambridge; H.M.I. Board of Education 1910-14; Director 
Merantile Credit Co.; member L.C.C. 1925-49; member Board of Education 
Consultative Committee 1925-26; Chairman General Purposes Committee 
L.C.C. 1935; leader Municipal Reform party 1934-45; Conservative 
M.P. Westminster Abbey 1939-50, Cities of London and Westminster 1950-59.
Source : Who’s Who, Who was Who, Dictionary of National Biography.
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Appendix 6
Total expenditure of the L.C.C. on higher and 
elementary education, 1917-1937








1917-18 6,678,824 142,576 2,528,351 4,007,897 21.821d
1918-19 7,823,547 163,067 2,840,567 4,819,913 25.408
1919-20 9,712,510 276,280 4,692,270 4,743,960 24.972
1920-21 13,780,981 233,217 6,721,209 6,826,555 35.912
1922-23 12,824,809 331,876 6,l8l,610 6,311,323 31.088
1924-25 12,192,541 370,276 5,767,227 6,055,038 29.210
1925-26 12,564,257 385,784 5,925,631 6,252,842 29.759
1926-27 12,269,868 409,490 5,737,136 6,123,242 26.305
1927-28 12,450,154 482,898 5,835,712 6,131,544 26.341
1928-29 12,888,851 452,333 6,065,549 6,370,969 26,947
1929-30 12,971,461 465,103 6,093,864 6,412,494 26.784
1930-31 13,185,494 461,542 6,224,441 6,499,511 28.539
1931-32 12,617,310 485,126 5,359,639 6,792,545 27.475
1933-34 11,922,251 454,290 4,273,679 7,194,282 28.716
1934-35 12,244,541 450,999 4,499,811 7,293,731 28.796
1935-36 12,879,344 463,020 4,848,187 7,568,137 29.615
1936-37 13,099,268 481,368 5,089,665 7,528,235 30.052
Source: L.C.C., London statistics (London, 1917-37).
Appendix 7
Local education authority provision of secondary and technical education,
1925-1935
Secondary Education Technical Education





















































CONCLUSICaJ: R.A. BUTLER, TOE CONSERVATIVE 
PARTY AND THE 1944 EDUCATION ACT
The shape of the state education system was significantly transformed 
during the Second World War. The effects of war stimulated widespread 
discussion of educational issues, and in 1944 the coalition government 
introduced legislation which reformed many aspects of the inter-war 
education service. The old statutory division between secondary 
and elementary schools was finally abandoned, and in future all children 
were to receive a connected course of first primary and then secondary 
education, which was usually to be provided in grammar, technical 
or modern schools. Fees for this compulsory secondary training were 
abolished, except in a limited number of ’direct-grant’ grammar schools; 
and the school-leaving age was raised to fifteen, with a further 
extension to sixteen planned when circumstances permitted. In the 
newly defined area of further education, the 1944 Act improved the 
provision made for technical instruction and revived the continuation 
school idea, stipulating that all young people no longer in full­
time education were to attend County Colleges until the age of eighteen. 
•The Act also succeeded where previous attempts had failed in reaching 
a settlement to the problems of the dual system. The church schools 
were now to be integrated into the national system by giving them 
the option of choosing between ’controlled status’, which relieved 
the owners of all financial obligations but vested control over the 
appointment of teachers in the local authority : _ .
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and confined denominational instruction to not more than two 
,periods per week; or - with the Roman Catholics in mind - 'aided 
status', which offered financial assistance for half the capital I
cost of adapting or building schools where managers retained the 
power of appointing teachers and providing denominational teaching.
The wide-ranging nature of this reform - which also reorganised both 
the central and local administration of education - thus marked the 
first major legislative change for over twenty years, and laid the 
foundations of the modern school system in England and Wales.
The 1944 Act has been discussed in two main contexts by historians. 
The first concerns the origins of the legislation traditionally associated 
with the Conservative minister, R.A. Butler. The idea that the success 
of the measure owed much to the personal qualities of the President 
was emphasised by early biographers of Butler and by historians of 
education such as Nigel Middleton, who concluded that the education 
bill clearly reflected the personal ideas of its sponsor and architect.^
In recent years, however, this emphasis on the ’Butler Act’ has been 
challenged and turned on its head. Paul Addison, for example, in 
his study of wartime politics, has claimed that the President himself 
acknowledged the influence of senior Board officials in originating 
the plans for which he later took credit; and a more vigorous assault 
on the traditional notion of the Butler Act has been made by R.G. Wallace, 
who claims that the leading civil servants who devised the so-called
1. F. Boyd, Richard Austen Butler (London, 1956), pp.71-83; R. Harris,
Politics without prejudice. A political appreciation of the Rt.
Hon. Richard Austen Butler (London, 195b), pp.57-8; N. Middleton,
'Lord Butler and the Education Act of 1944', British Journal of Educational 
Studies, XX, 2 (1972), p.191.
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reen Book were in fact the ’principal authors’ of the education
2
bill. The second context in which the 1944 Act can be considered 
concerns the relationship between war and social reform. Historians 
of education have generally fought shy of this question, preferring 
instead to concentrate on the Act purely in terms of its educational 
importance as a triumph for progressive reform.^ Peter Gosden’s 
study of wartime education does, however, provide some guidance in 
this respect, concluding that the experience of war produced a new 
public awareness of the importance of education, so stimulating the 
official action which resulted in legislation.^
These existing debates will inevitably be raised by any examination 
of the background to the 1944 Act, but they do not provide the main 
focus of attention in the following account. Similarly, the framework 
adopted here does not permit a detailed discussion of the wide-ranging 
debates on education which took place in various quarters after 1939, 
or of the diverse aspects of policy raised by a string of official 
reports during the war years. These issues are instead considered 
only where they impinge upon the central theme of this chapter - 
the Conservative Party’s role in educational reform. By examining 
the involvement of ministers and party members in the movement for 
reform, it becomes possible to make judgements not only about
2. P. Addison, The road to 1945. British politics and the Second 
World War (London,1975), p.172; R.G. Wallace, ’The origins and 
authorship of the 1944 Education Act’, History of Education, 10,
4 (1981), pp.283-90.
3. H.C. Dent, 1870-1970: century of growth in English education 
(London, 1970), p.11b.
4. P.H.J.H. Gosden, Education in the Second World War, pp.431-3.
See also K. Jefferys, ’R.A. Butler, the Board of Education and 
the 1944 Education Act’, History (forthcoming), which attempts 
to link these debates by modifying the emphasis on civil service 
influence - without reverting to the idea of the ’Butler Act’ - 
and by indicating the ambiguous nature of educational reform within 
the context of wartime social policy.
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Conservative education policy after 1939, but also between the wars.
The party's approach during the Second World War must be considered 
within a wider context: the extent to which policy derived or departed 
from attitudes already expressed in the inter-war years. The aim 
of the following account is therefore to examine the significance 
of the 1944 Act for the major concerns emphasised throughout this 
study, the nature of Conservative ministerial policy and party opinion; 
the implications of education policy for the working of the Conservative 
Party; and the operation of education as a political issue. The 
chronology of events which led to reform during the war, from the 
Board's Green Book through to the publication of a White Paper in 
1943 and the subsequent passage of the education bill, has been well 
documented elsewhere ; and so provides only a background for the two 
main issues raised here - the Conservative Party's responsibility 
for, and reaction to, the 1944 Education Act.
II
The impact of war led to widespread public and private discussion 
about the need for educational reform. At the Board of Education 
several senior officials began to formulate their ideas on the desirable 
direction of post-war policy, and by the summer of 1941 the views 
of these officials had been summarised in a document known as the 
Green Book. This called for many reforms popularised between the 
wars - the creation of a new code of regulations governing secondary 
education, the raising of the school-leaving age to fifteen, and 
the revival of continuation schools. Although the Green Book achieved
5. Board of Education, Education after the war (London, 1941), chs. 
1 and 2.
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considerable publicity and many of its ideas were eventually embodied 
in the education bill, it does not follow - as R.G. Wallace claims - 
that 'Rab* Butler, who only arrived at the Board shortly afterwards, 
was 'too late to influence the main points of the Act which now bears 
his name ' This can be demonstrated by looking at the circumstances 
in which Butler was appointed to office, and by concentrating in 
this first part of the chapter on the role of Conservative ministers 
in promoting reform.
In order to become anything more than a collection of ideas, 
the Green Book required at the outset some form of ministerial 
endorsement. This in fact had been provided by Herwald Ramsbotham, 
the Conservative minister serving at the Board since the creation 
of the Churchill coalition in May 1940. Ramsbotham had looked forward 
to the remodelling of the education system when serving as a junior 
minister in the 1930s, and it was not surprising that he now supported
7
the Green Book as a suitable basis for action at the end of the war.
An unrecognised feature of this period, however, was that Ramsbotham's 
public support for the Green Book provided the main cause of his 
removal from office in July 1941. The Prime Minister had made it 
clear that he would not consider controversial measures which might 
threaten the continuance of coalition between the Conservative and 
Labour parties; and with prompting from some of his associates, 
Churchill was soon persuaded that the education minister posed a 
danger. As his successor was later to observe, under the circumstances
6. Wallace, op.cit., p.287.
7. For Ramsbotham's earlier views, see above, pp. 123-4. On the 
war period, see Ramsbotham to Lang, 18 Feb. 1941, Lang papers, 
vol.33, f.227; and The Times, 17 Mar. 1941,
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of war Ramsbotham had managed to publicise ideas for which he would 
have been severely rebuked by senior Conservatives in peacetime.^
The implications of this incident were clear: with the removal of 
a minister committed to the Green Book, there was little prospect 
in the summer of 1941 that reform of any sort would reach the statute 
book. In order to account fully for Conservative involvement in 
educational reform, it is necessary to concentrate on events which 
followed, rather than preceded, Butler's appointment to the Board.
The government changes of July 1941 were accompanied by some 
press speculation that Churchill was seeking to disperse those ministers 
identified with 'appeasement', and that Butler had been neutralised 
by being sent to the 'dumping ground' at the Board of Education.
A more plausible explanation was simply that on his past record - 
as a conscientious junior minister at the India and Foreign Offices - 
Butler was more likely than his predecessor to stick to the Prime
9
Minister's instruction about concentrating on evacuation. It was 
thus ironic that the subsequent progress of educational reform should 
owe so much to the character and style of the new President. In 
1940 Butler had already taken on the chairmanship of the Conservative 
Party's committee on post-war problems - an indication that he 
understood the domestic consequences of the war much more clearly
8. Chuter Ede diary, 21 July and 8 Aug.1941, Add. Mss. 59690, p.6
and p.28. Butler added that 'whispers of displeasure at Ramsbotham's 
advanced ideas' had been conveyed to him.
9. Lord Butler, The art of the possible (London, 1971), p.90: '"You 
will move poor children from here to here", and he lifted up and 
evacuated imaginery children from one side of his blotting pad 
to the other; "this will be very difficult"'. It was also felt 
later at the Board that Butler may have been moved because he 
did not get on with his political chief at the Foreign Office,
Anthony Eden. See Ede diary, 12 Jan. 1942, Add. Mss. 59692, p.30.
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than many of his colleagues. He believed that if the party was to
accommodate itself to the wartime shift in popular opinion, a more
positive approach to social issues such as education was required.
Before being offered the post at the Board, Butler had indicated
his interest in education and was aware that it posed an important
area of possible reform in the near future.As a result, he was
keen to accept the Prime Minister's offer, and at his first meeting
with the Labour Parliamentary Secretary at the Board, James Chuter
Ede, dwelled on the idea that the war provided a unique opportunity
11for improving the educational system. This attitude highlights 
the importance of examining proceedings at the Board after July 1941. 
Without the minister's determination, there would have been little 
prospect of reform, but his willingness to act in itself provided 
only a starting point from which to tackle the first obvious obstacle - 
that of determining the shape of possible legislation.
The Board adopted a dual procedure during 1942 in order to determine
the necessary scope of reform. Externally a long series of negotiations
were held with the various pressure groups interested in education,
and internally these discussions were used as the basis upon which
12ministers and civil servants jointly formulated policy. The 
combination of ministerial and official influence in reaching decisions 
after July 1941 can be illustrated by the main items ultimately
10. J.A. Ramsden, The making of Conservative Party policy, pp.97-8; 
Note by R.A. Butler, b May 1941, Butler papers. Trinity College, 
Cambridge, G13, f.4: '..I thought India and education were the 
two problems most needing solution'.
11. Ede diary, 22 July 1941, Add. Mss. 59690, p.7.
12. At a later stage when internal discussions reached a controversial 
stage, Butler was to tell Board officers that it would be 
necessary to 'stick to the main items which we have defined 
together' - Butler minute to M. Holmes, 3 Feb. 1943, P.R.O.
ED 136/378.
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incorporated in the government’s bill. The most serious problem 
confronting the President, which was to dominate discussion for at 
least eighteen months, was that of securing agreement over the position 
of the church schools. The proposals of the Green Book for reform 
of the dual system were quickly abandoned, as Nonconformists proved 
irreconcilable to the implied perpetuation of dual control. In the 
spring of 1942 the Board put forward an alternative scheme, known 
as the White Memorandum, which was rejected in turn by Anglicans 
on the grounds that it required the compulsory transfer of their 
schools to local authority control. By the end of the year, however, 
a plan for controlled or aided status had been devised which was 
broadly acceptable to Anglicans and Nonconformists, although Roman 
Catholics remained hostile. This plan was not primarily the 
responsibility of Board officials. The Permanent Secretary, Maurice 
Holmes, had become so frustrated that he urged Butler to end the 
dual system altogether - a suggestion unlikely to appeal to a Conservative 
minister with Anglican sympathies.^  ^ The lead in discussions with 
the voluntary bodies had in fact been taken by Chuter Ede, who drew 
up the White Memorandum and urged the President to make the Anglican 
managers face up to their failure as a building body.^^ In the 
reconciliation of denominational differences, Ede played a more prominent 
role than he has been credited with.
13. M.A. Cruickshank, Church and state in English education, chs.9 
and 10; 'The dual system', note by the Permanent Secretary, n.d. 
(Feb. 1942), P.R.O. ED 136/219.
14. It was Ede who pointed out that less than two hundred of the 
Church's nine thousand elementary schools had been built after 
1905. These figures clearly impressed Butler, who took the credit 
for placing them in front of an Anglican deputation in June 1942. 
Butler later conceded that this was perhaps the vital moment
in shifting the Church of England towards an acceptance of a 
compromise solution. See Ede diary, 29 May 1942, Add. Mss. 59693, 
p.49; and Butler, op.cit., p.102.
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■ The achievement of a workable compromise on the religious issue 
has of course been regarded as one of Butler’s major contributions 
to the 1944 Act, an impression enhanced by his own later writings.
In 1942, however, the President was less confident of achieving a 
settlement than his recollections suggest. He questioned at one 
point whether the whole issue could not be bypassed altogether, and 
his willingness to sanction any scheme which promised success was 
illustrated by his support for both the Green Book and the White
16Memorandum, despite the latter being coolly received by Anglicans.
Butler’s frustration at the lack of progress also vented itself in
private criticism of those involved in the negotiations, such as
17Archbishop Lang, who was said to have ’little religion in him’. 
Nevertheless, private reservations did not prevent the minister from 
conducting a skilful and conciliatory course in public. The negotiations 
with the Church improved after William Temple succeeded Lang as 
Archbishop of Canterbury, and Butler subsequently made painstaking 
efforts to reconcile Anglo-Catholics still opposed to the government's 
plan. He also refused to be provoked by the continued intransigence 
of Catholics, even when they appeared to regard him - as in one case -
18as a 'forthcoming ox who was about to be laid upon the faggots'.
The President's ability to reconcile divergent viewpoints, which 
was consciously based on his experience of the India bill in the
15. Ibid., pp.95-107; Lord Butler, The art of memory (London, 1982), 
pp.143-63.
16. Ede diary, 29 Jan. 1942, Add. Mss. 59692, p.62.
17. Ibid., 15 Aug. 1941, Add. Mss. 59690, p.38.
18. Butler originally hoped that Temple would not succeed Lang at 
Canterbury - note by Butler, 21 Jan. 1942, Butler papers, G14, 
f.23. Later, however. Temple admitted that the proposals eventually 
adopted by the Church had been 'distinctly suggested' by the 
President - Temple to the Archdeacon of Lancaster, 9 Nov. 1942, 
Archbishop Temple papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.20, f.l4.
On the Roman Catholics, see the note by Butler, I8 Feb. 1943,
P.R.O. ED 136/226.
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1930s, ultimately confirms his important role and responsibility 
for achieving a settlement which eluded his inter-war predecessors.
In a wider context, the religious issue provides an obvious example 
of decisions about the scope of legislation being taken after July 
1941, with ministers rather than civil servants in this instance 
taking the initiative in the formation of policy.
A similar pattern was evident in the sections of the Board's 
proposals relating to compulsory full-time schooling. R.G. Wallace 
has claimed that the main ideas in this respect all derived from 
the Green Book, and were successfully defended by Board officials 
in spite of 'considerable doubts on Butler's part'.  ^^ It was the 
case that Butler, shortly after his arrival at the Board, had watered 
down a speech by Ede commenting favourably on the Green Book proposals; 
and himself refused to make a public commitment to a remodelled 
secondary system until the spring of 1942. This reticence stemmed, 
however, from the President's awareness that he would have to tread 
carefully if he was not to suffer the same fate as Ramsbotham.
Hence his public references to reform post-dated both a degree of 
support from government colleagues and a special series of meeting 
with Board officers in 1942 on the scope of any legislation. At 
these meetings Butler, far from having considerable doubts, expressed 
himself as in agreement with the broad line of advance favoured by 
officials and embodied in the Green Book. He regarded a school-leaving 
age of sixteen as desirable but impracticable in the short-term, 
and although he had some sympathy for the multilateral school, this 
was only as an addition - not an alternative - to the 'tripartite'
19. Wallace, op.cit., p.286.
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structure of secondary schools advocated by officials. The real
need,he maintained, was to aim for ’social equality in the secondary
20schools of various types’. The President’s only major doubts were 
about the retention of fees in direct-grant grammar schools. His 
views on this remained open until a late stage, and at one point 
he appeared to be close to endorsing the desire of a special report 
from the Fleming Canmittee in favour of abolishing fees altogether.
The final decision to retain fees in certain schools was reached,
moreover, not in accordance with departmental views, but as a result
22of pressure from Butler's Conservative colleagues - an indication 
that if the Board's ideas on reform were to proceed any further, 
they would have to command an acceptable level of political support.
The problem of translating ideas into legislative reality had 
of course required simultaneous attention to political obstacles 
from the outset. The most celebrated difficulty with his government 
colleagues, which Butler himself later emphasised, was that of overcoming 
the Prime Minister's hostility to controversial reform while the 
war was in progress. The importance of this obstacle has arguably 
been exaggerated, however, especially in claims that the President 
was taking a 'political risk' in defying Churchill's famous injunction
20. Ede diary, 10 Dec. 1941, Add. Mss. 59691, p.94. See also Butler 
to H.G. Wells,, 2 July 1942, P.R.O. ED 136/215: the real need 
was not for the 'common school', but to 'hasten the day when 
the four types of secondary schooling will be equal in quality, 
though different in character'.
21. R.G. Wallace, 'Labour, the Board of Education and the preparation 
of the 1944 Education Act', unpublished University of London 
Ph.D., 1980, pp.168-71.
22. H. Kopsch, 'The approach of the Conservative Party to social 
policy during World War Two', unpublished University of London 
Ph.D., 1970, p.269; note of interview with Conservative M.P.s,
23 Sep. 1943, P.R.O. ED 136/428.
286
of September 1941.  ^ Butler was, after all, keenly aware of the 
need to proceed cautiously behind the scenes, at least in the short­
term when both the political and educational situations remained 
uncertain. The Prime Minister’s attitude also became of less 
importance as the war situation improved, although Butler realised 
that he could not approach Churchill again without the prospect of 
an advance on the religious issue. In November 1942 he noted that 
Churchill was 'watching us with some amusement, thinking we were 
squelching about in the mud'; for several days the Prime Minister 
was reported to be carrying round in his pocket a letter to The Times 
from the Catholic leader Cardinal Hinsley, attacking the Board's
p i i
latest plan for a religious settlement. By this time Butler was
nevertheless confident that Anglican acceptance of controlled status
for the church schools would sway Churchill. He even predicted -
before approval for an education bill had been given - that if a
religious compromise was possible, Churchill 'would want the thing
done - he was like that'. Thereafter the Prime Minister's
indifference to education was unlikely to pose a serious obstacle.
The President periodically informed Churchill of developments, and
was now only concerned that unless the Board kept proceeding,
Churchill's 'sinister bodyguard' - Lords Beaverbrook and Cherwell -
might take charge of reorganising export trade and so push education
26
'out of the picture'.
23. Addison, op.cit., p.173; Churchill to Butler, 13 Sep. 1941, cited 
in Butler, The art of the possible, pp.94-5, where the Prime 
Minister warns that he would not tolerate the revival of religious 
or political controversy.
24. Ede diary, 27 Nov. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.176; Major Morton 
to Miss Goodfellow, 9 Nov. 1942, P.R.O. ED 136/226.
25. Ede diary, 4 and 27 Nov. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, pp.142-3 and
p.176.
26. Ibid., 1 Nov. 1943, Add. Mss. 59697, p.45.
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An equally serious difficulty for Butler in 1942 was that of
securing support from members of the coalition government as a whole.
His major concern here was not with the war cabinet, whose acquiescence
seemed certain after the reshuffle of February 1942. The main problems
arose rather among the home front ministers, notably at the Lord
President's Committee, where the sensitive nature of the religious
issue was reflected in the denominational allegiances of individual 
27 . .ministers. In addition, the general sympathy for educational reform 
shown by Labour ministers was offset for a while by the reluctance 
of some Conservative ministers; when plans for legislation were
pQ
discussed in July 1942, sharp divisions along party lines were revealed.
These divisions were narrowed during the autumn, however, partly
because Anglican members of the government became reconciled to controlled
status, and partly as a result of encouragement given by individual
ministers. Ernest Bevin in particular intervened at this critical
stage. He was, in the words of Chuter Ede, a tough statesman capable
of giving the Tories 'a good kick up the pants' when necessary -
a tactic which succeeded in December 1942 when the Lord President's
Committee gave Butler permission to proceed with the drafting of
29an education bill. This marked the crucial point in winning support 
for the principle of educational reform, although opposition from 
individual ministers continued in the year which elapsed before the
27. Note by Butler, 4 May 1942, P.R.O. ED 136/228.
28. Ede diary, 13 July 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.4.
29. Even at an early stage, some High Churchmen, notably Lord Cranborne, 
believed that the church schools were '"done"', especially as
the council schools were 'better equipped and had "vita" glass., 
which appealed to the parents' - note by Butler, 4 May 1942,
P.R.O. ED 136/228. On the influence of Bevin, see R.G. Wallace,
'The man behind Butler', The Times Educational Supplement,
27 Mar. 1981. See also Ede diary, 21 Oct. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, 
p.122, and Lord President's Committee, conclusions of meeting,
18 Dec. 1942, P.R.O. CAB 71/10.
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introduction of legislation. Herbert Morrison, for example, thought 
that education would not command public attention, and wanted to 
see the Beveridge plan for social security made the centrepiece of 
the government's reform programme.
The reservations of Morrison indicated the related problem which 
Butler faced with his government colleagues: that of securing permission 
to proceed in advance of other schemes of social reform already under 
consideration. In April 1942 the President had been alarmed to discover 
that plans for a new system of social insurance were well advanced, 
and he complained that Beveridge had no right to broadcast his views
31when they had not been put before any official government committees.
In the following months, however, Butler became more confident that
his cautious and thorough approach behind the scenes would pay dividends.
In June he noted that 'my only competition appears to be Sir William
Beveridge, whose shield is fortunately tarnished by grimy coal and 
32oil stains'. The President also had the advantage, which he stressed
when seeking permission to draft a bill, that the cost of educational
reform was likely to be much lower than a comprehensive scheme of
social security. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a sentiment
shared by the influential Lord President of the Council, told Butler
that he would rather provide money for education than 'throw it down
33the sink with Sir William Beveridge'This attitude persisted
30. Ede's diary confirms Morrison's attachment to the Beveridge 
proposals, noted in Addison, op.cit., pp.222-3.
31. Butler minute to Holmes and R.S. Wood, 11 Apr. 1942, P.R.O.
ED 136/351.
32. Ibid., 6 July 1942.
33. Note by Butler, 14 Sep. 1942, P.R.O. ED 136/229. A year later
he noted that 'John Anderson said to me that he and the Chancellor 
had decided to back the education proposals, because they were 
not yet ready for Beveridge' - 'Diary', notes by Butler, 9 Sept. 
1943; Butler papers, 015, f.8l.
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throughout 1943, with the result that no rival schemes were sufficiently 
advanced to be presented to parliament. The President therefore 
secured priority and permission to go ahead for a variety of reasons, 
though overall he thought that his government colleagues had not 
gone ’very deeply' into the subject. 'They have been prompted to 
come the way of education', he concluded, 'because it has been very 
difficult to obtain agreement between the Parties on any matters 
which involve property or the p o c k e t T h i s  points to the importance 
of considering a further crucial element in the background to educational 
reform, which has been prominent throughout this study - the attitude 
towards reform of the political parties, especially the Conservative 
Party.
Ill
Butler's concern with political opinion focused primarily on 
finding agreement among the Conservative and Labour forces at 
Westminster. There was, however, a new element which occupied the 
minister's attention in the political arena, especially in the early 
years of the war. This was the Conservative sub-committee on education, 
one of several bodies set up by Butler himself as chairman of the 
party's machinery on post-war problems. The work of the sub-committee 
has already received some attention from historians, but several 
questions remain outstanding, and the object of the following account 
is to highlight the sub-committee's purpose and role in educational 
reform, as well as its place in party thinking towards education.
34. Ibid., f.90; Butler, op.cit., p.117.
35. For the most detailed study of the committee, see D.W. Dean, 
'Problems of the Conservative sub-committee on education,
1941-45', Journal of Educational Administration and History,
III, 1 (1970), pp.26-35.
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The aims of the sub-committee - the only Conservative body established
since 1918 specifically to investigate education - were in fact ambiguous
from the outset. The chairman of the sub-committee was the publisher
Geoffrey Faber, who had recently joined the party in the belief that
it was becoming capable of promoting a 'really national programme'.
Faber was initially confident that the committee could serve a ’useful’
purpose: this would require acting independently of both the party’s
national machinery and the President, who interfered little in the
37early proceedings. Butler, however, was clear in his own mind 
about guiding and controlling the findings of the sub-committee.
He was not only instrumental in determining the composition of the 
group - a mixture of representatives from industry, local government 
and the parliamentary party - but also laid down the terms of reference 
and remained confident about intervening when necessary. For the 
President, the sub-committee's main task was simply to provide publicity
qO
which would identify the Conservative Party with the cause of reform.
In this, the committee was to have mixed fortunes, as became evident
I ,
when its first two reports were published in September 1942.
Faber was personally responsible for the drafting of the first 
report, Educational aims. This novel attempt to define the purposes 
of education developed four main themes : that too much emphasis had
36. See Appendix II for biographical details of Faber; Faber to Sir 
Fred Clarke, 18 Aug. 1942, cited in Dean, op.cit., pp.26-7.
37. Faber to J.G. Barrington-Ward, 23 Jan. 1942, Conservative sub­
committee on education papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box I, 
'Correspondence with Committee I'.
38. The committee, which usually numbered about fifteen members, 
included I.J. Pitman of Pitman's Commercial Colleges; Byng 
Kenrick, former chairman of the Birmingham Education Committee ; 
and M.P.s such as R.H. Morgan and Harold Webbe. For Butler's 
confidence in his ability to control the sub-committee, see his 
minute to Holmes, 3 Apr. 1942, Butler papers, H70, f.51.
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been placed on individual self-development, and not enough on fostering
an understanding of the needs of the state; that religious instruction
should be made the basis of any school curriculum; that education
should help to revive ’civic morale', which reinforced the idea of
the individual acting as part of the community; and that the necessity
for training future leaders should never be overlooked. Hartmut
Kopsch, in his study of wartime Conservative policy, has placed this
forty page document in the context of a dilemma between Tory and
Neo-Liberal strands of thinking.It could be argued, however,
that the report was essentially a reflection of Faber’s social
background and personal experience, in particular his family's long
association with the Anglican Church and his public school education
at Rugby. Educational aims above all sought to apply public school
values and traditions to the state system. The report made no mention
of the state elementary schools, and its four major themes were all
recognised characteristics of private education. Faber had in fact
drafted a special section on the public schools, which he only omitted
on grounds of length ; the assumptions upon which his arguments were
based emerged clearly in his references to self-discipline, the training
of 'character' and the need to aim at 'the bold qualities of
adventurousness, initiative, enjoyment of difficulty and danger,
41the fighting spirit - in a word, grit'.
39. National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations (N.U.C.U.A.), 
Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction, Looking ahead: 
educational aims, the first interim report of the Conservative 
sub-committee on education (1942), pp.5-39.
40. Kopsch, op.cit., pp.239-40.
41. Faber hoped to publish a separate report supporting the continued 
independence of public schools from central and local control - 
see his 'Memorandum on educational aims. Appendix', n.d.. 
Conservative sub-committee papers. Box III. See also Educational 
aims, pp.32-4.
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The reverence shown to the public schools did not, however,
attract attention following the publication of the report. Instead,
the emphasis on education serving the needs of the state produced
some concern about sinister - possibly authoritarian - motives.
For the most part, though, political and educational opinion raised
few objections to Faber's bland conclusions. From the President's
point of view, the sub-committee had provided useful publicity at
a time when the Board was seeking to encourage reform. Butler
congratulated the chairman on the reception given to his report,
and took particular pleasure in noting - with the Prime Minister's
attitude still uncertain - that Churchill was pleased by references
42to the training of the young. Butler was also fortunate in avoiding
a remaining area of potential criticism. Faber's determination to
defend religious education had prompted him to make certain contentious
proposals for the dual system, in particular the suggestion that
the Cowper-Temple clause be abolished in order to allow denominational
teaching in council schools. This proposal was of course likely
to embarrass the minister's negotiations for a religious settlement,
especially with the Nonconformists, and attempts had been made behind
the scenes to modify this section of the report. Fortunately for
Butler, however, the publication of Educational aims was preceded
by a hostile statement from the Trades Union Congress. This called
for a radical approach to the dual system and the incorporation of
all voluntary schools into the state sector, unless they were able
43to provide their own funds. The President was therefore concerned
42. Butler to Faber, 9 Sep. 1942, ibid.. Box I, 'Correspondence with 
R.A.B. ECI'. For the generally favourable reaction of the Labour 
party, see Ede diary, 1 and 8 Sep. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.60 
and p.71.
43. Educational aims, pp.28-9; Butler to Faber, 11 Apr. 1942, Conservative 
sub-committee papers. Box. I,'Correspondence with R.A.B. ECI';
Trades Union Congress, Memorandum on education after the war 
(London, 1942).
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that some observers were 'nervous of the "churchy" aspects' of Faber's 
approach, but he remained satisfied that the sub-committee had served 
a useful purpose. The report would primarily cancel out the claims 
of the T.U.C., rather than prejudicing a religious settlement
Butler's satisfaction with the sub-committee was almost immediately
undermined by the reception given to a second report published soon
afterwards. This document, A plan for youth, was primarily the
responsibility of another committee member, William Oakeshott, a
master at St. Paul's school who served at Faber's request, despite
not being a party member. Oakeshott argued that pending the
introduction of continuation schools, it was necessary to establish
a national movement for training all young people between the ages
of fourteen and eighteen. This movement was to be supervised by
a new body called the 'Federation of Youth', and it was suggested
that all adolescents should be required to attend classes at specific
times. The storm of criticism which followed, with accusations
that a compulsory scheme smacked of fascism, completely overshadowed
the reception given to the first report. On the basis of this reaction,
46the sub-committee has even been depicted as a 'quasi-fascist' group.
Faber defended the scheme against 'malicious misrepresentation' by
pointing out that the Federation of Youth was only a temporary measure,
47and by denying any intention of suppressing existing youth movements.
44. Butler to Faber, 9 Sep. 1942, Conservative sub-committee papers. 
Box I, 'Correspondence with R.A.B. ECI'.
45. N.U.C.U.A., Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction, Looking 
ahead: a plan for youth, the second interim report of the 
Conservative sub-committee on education (1942), pp.3-18.
46. N. Middleton and S. Weitzman, A place for everyone, p.262.
47. The Daily Telegraph, 22 Sep. 1942; Faber to Maxwell Garnett,
2 Oct. 1942, Conservative sub-committee papers, Box II,
'Correspondence with outsiders and outside bodies I'.
294
Although A plan for youth must be treated with caution as an example 
of Conservative thinking on education, the assumptions behind the 
plan make it difficult to justify charges of fascism. If anything, 
Oakeshott was following the example of his predecessor in unconsciously 
seeking to apply public school values to the state system. His approach 
was based on the view that youth training could only be tackled by 
inculcating military values - a subject which the public schools
h O
had been considering for some time.
In the short-term, the attacks made on the report in the press
and educational circles proved highly embarrassing for the President,
especially when Conservative Party supporters of voluntary youth
49organisations joined in the criticism. Butler was now caught between 
strongly expressed disapproval of the document on the one hand, and 
the desire not to discredit a party group for which he was effectively 
responsible on the other. In order to escape from this dilemma, 
he refused to accept offers of resignation made in private by Faber 
and Oakeshott, but made his own views obvious when the issue came 
before the party's annual conference in October. After stating in 
his 'judicial' capacity as President that the sub-committee was free 
to promote its views alongside others, Butler referred warmly to 
the first report while carefully distancing himself from A plan 
for youth. The government, he claimed, at present still favoured
48. Oakeshott to Faber, 18 Feb. 1942, ibid.. Box I, 'Correspondence 
with Committee I'; Dean, op.cit., p.29, who notes that Oakeshott 
was much influenced by activities at Gordonstoun.
49. e.g. The Observer, 4 Oct. 1942, where an anonymous article signed 
by 'a Conservative M.P.' stated that the report badly underrated 
the strength of the view that democracy and the compulsion of 
youth were incompatible.
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compulsory continuation schools and voluntary youth service. With 
careful management, the conference was unable to pass any resolutions 
on Oakeshott's controversial scheme, thus leaving the President to 
wait for the storm to pass.^^ He was naturally displeased with this 
sudden public controversy, though not entirely unhappy with the recent 
course of events. The two reports of the sub-committee had indicated 
the difficulty of finding common policies to unite Conservative opinion, 
but they had at least pushed education to the forefront as pressure 
for the introduction of legislation intensified. As the editor of 
The Times told Faber, statements of Conserjvative policy had rarely 
'compelled so many in other quarters of politics to put on their 
thinking caps'.
After the controversy over the first two reports, and with the
publication of the government's plan for educational reform, the
sub-committee became less prominent during 1943. Faber was largely
left to his own devices, and still looked forward to an investigation
into the future of the public schools, 'which is so evidently a question
in which the Conservative Party is vigorously interested, that we
52think it impossible for us to ignore it'. In the meantime, the 
committee drafted a report on the school-leaving age and continuation 
classes, but the possibility of this being taken any further was 
prevented by Faber's absence on a long visit abroad and by the decision
50. For the offers of resignation, see Faber to Butler, 5 Oct. 1942, 
Butler papers, H70, f.139. On the party conference, see Ede 
diary, 29 Sep. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.94, where the President 
was reported to be 'sweating blood' about his speech; and
The Times Educational Supplement, 3 Oct. 1942.
51. Barrington-Ward to Faber, 7 Oct. 1942, Conservative sub-committee 
papers. Box II, 'Letters from Outside Bodies and People II'.
52. Faber to Butler, 28 Jan. 1943, ibid.. Box II, 'Correspondence 
with R.A.B. ECU'.
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of the government to go ahead first with a White Paper and then an
education bill. Butler's real concern now was that the sub-committee
should be seen to support his plans, and in fact the draft report
was subsequently rewritten and published under the title The statutory
educational system in January 1944. This third report approved the
inain lines of the education bill: the introduction of primary and
secondary education for all, the raising of the leaving age, the
revival of continuation schools, and even the religious settlement,
which came as near to the committee's preferences as 'an accepted
53compromise could'. The existing accounts of the Conservative sub­
committee have depicted this outcome as the product of intervention 
by Butler and national party leaders. D.W. Dean has argued that 
the final version of the third report was so different from earlier 
drafts that it did not represent committee views; and Nigel Middleton
has taken this further by claiming that the President had to coerce
54a show of support from a 'thoroughly reactionary' body. These 
interpretations, however, arguably misunderstand the working of the 
sub-committee once more, and so fail to grasp the significance of 
the report for Conservative attitudes towards education.
There were only two major changes made to the committee's report 
on the statutory system during 1943. The first concerned a long 
statement originally included as a critique of the Nuffield report 
on education and industry. Butler believed that the sub-committee's 
own views on this subject would be more beneficial; Faber readily
53. N.U.C.U.A., Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction,
Looking ahead: the statutory educational system, the third interim 
report of the Conservative sub-committee on education (1944),
pp.9-12.
54. Dean, op.cit., p.32; Middleton and Weitzman, op.cit., p.241 and 
p.287.
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agreed and rewrote the appropriate section in August 1943.^  ^ The
second serious amendment came after the introduction of the education
bill, when Butler argued that it would be impolitic to make further
references to youth service. Faber subsequently worked intensively
to prepare the report for publication, and included some further
minor amendments suggested by the President, but there was no attempt
at coercion on important points of principle. It was the case that
individual members still favoured exemptions to a higher school-leaving
age, but - as in the earlier period - they were not representative
56of the committee as a whole. In fact as far back as December 1942,
the sub-committee's attitude towards the state schools had been
indicated by Faber's response to the programme of reform outlined
by the Council of Educational Advance. He had written to The Times
unofficially expressing approval of many of the ideas now being
canvassed: the provision of free secondary education for all, the
raising of the leaving age to fifteen and ultimately to sixteen,
57and the revival of continuation schools. The letter was not 
accepted for publication, but its significance was clear. It both 
undermines the idea that the third report did not represent the views 
of committee members, and casts doubt on the concept of a 'thoroughly 
reactionary' body. When the sub-committee had finally come to look
55. Butler to Faber, 15 July 1943, and Faber to Butler, 14 Aug. 1943, 
Conservative sub-committee papers. Box I, 'Correspondence with 
R.A.B. ECU'.
56. Dean, op.cit., cites one such pronouncement, but a commitment
to exemptions was not evident in the committee's official draft. 
Third interim report: the school-leaving age and continued 
education, Apr. 1943, Conservative sub-committee papers. Box III.
57. Faber to The Times, n.d. (Oct. 1942), ibid.. Box II, 'Letters 
from Outside Bodies and People II'.
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at state education, it provided further evidence of Conservative 
Party opinion becoming more receptive to the need for reform.
The public role of the committee effectively ended with the
publication of the third report. Although remaining in existence
until the end of the war, Faber admitted that the committee had gone
’stale', and further publications were never seriously considered.
To the chairman's disappointment, the sub-committee had never succeeded
in seriously affecting the course of educational reform. Faber's
sense of frustration owed much to the committee's ambiguous place
in the party's policy-making machinery, and to the difficulty of
persuading Conservative leaders of the importance of investigating
education. In the aftermath of the first two reports, he urged Central
Office to avoid the impression that the documents were 'mere kite-
59flying' and would soon be forgotten. A more important factor behind 
the committee's circumscribed role, however, was the attitude of 
the President. Butler was of course willing to consider all views 
when formulating policy, but fortunately for him the committee provided 
ready agreement on the reshaping of the school structure, and even 
reversed its initial scepticism about a religious settlement. Beyond 
this, Butler was only looking for publicity for his cause, and in 
this he could be satisfied with the sub-committee. The first report 
had aroused both interest and support; the second he regarded as 
unfortunate in not being thought out from the 'political angle'; 
but the third report was particularly welcome, 'if only out of self- 
interest, since it will be a great help in getting the Bill through
58. Faber to Butler, 17 May 1945, ibid.. Box I, 'Correspondence 
with R.A.B. ECIII'.
59. Faber to Sir Robert Topping, 26 Nov. 1942, ibid.. Box I, 
'Correspondence with R.A.B. ECU'.
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to have a published statement of Conservative views which is virtually 
an endorsement of many of the points of principle underlying the 
m e a s u r e T h e  remaining, and more pressing, problem for the President 
was to convince the Conservative Party in parliament of the need 
for educational reform.
IV
As far as political opinion generally was concerned, Butler
was aware that his chances of success rested ultimately on the
continuance of the wartime coalition. This in fact was coming under
increasing strain as the Board prepared its draft legislation. The
Allied successes in the war during and after 1942 gradually removed
some of the constraints on party controversy, and dissident elements
on both the Conservative and Labour benches were becoming more confident
61in their attacks on the government. By the end of the year there 
was growing discontent among Labour members at the absence of any 
concrete measures of social reform. In November Chuter Ede warned 
Butler that his party were prepared to cause trouble unless 'something 
on account' was provided in social policy, adding that Labour feared 
in particular a repetition of what he termed the '1918 trick' - keeping
them in government until victory was assured, and then pushing them
Ç\0
out to restore pre-war standards. The chief difficulty with politic 
opinion, however, was undoubtedly provided by the Conservative Party,
60. Butler to Faber, 30 Dec. 1943, ibid.. Box I, 'Correspondence 
with R.A.B. ECIII'.
61. Addison, op.cit., p.232, cites the example of the Catering 
Wages bill introduced by Ernest Bevin in 1943, which was opposed 
by many Conservatives.
62. Ede diary, 7 Aug. and 27 Nov. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.34 and 
p.175.
300
which held a large majority of parliamentary seats. The President 
had some reason for being grateful that the Beveridge Report had 
been ’bruited abroad’, thereby ruining its chance of acceptance.
The Report, he noted, ’has not marched hand in hand with that 
gentlemanly instinct which is so vital a feature of the Conservative 
Party, and without which the Conservative Party cannot be brought 
to undertake any reform. There is a feeling that Beveridge is a 
sinister old man who wishes to give away a great deal of other people's 
moneyAlthough in this sense Butler gained what Beveridge had 
lost, it did not mean - as the President soon discovered - that 
Conservatives in parliament showed any great enthusiasm for educational 
reform.
The nervousness which Butler showed about Conservative opinion
in his early months at the Board clearly continued into 1942, when
he was warned by one supporter about the 'abysmal ignorance of the
64Tory M.P.s on education'. Similarly, it required the belligerence 
of Ernest Bevin to secure final approval for the drafting of an 
education bill, for Butler himself held back in the autumn: he had 
been warned by senior colleagues that Conservative back-benchers 
did not want legislation, especially if the opposition was thought 
to be gaining an advantage.The hostility or indifference of many
63. 'Diary', notes by Butler, 9 Sep. 1943, Butler papers, G15, f.91.
64. Ede diary, 8 Apr. 1942, Add. Mss. 59693, p.82 - the comments 
were made by Byng Kenrick, one of the leading members of the 
Conservative sub-committee.
65. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.120. Butler himself 
(p.131), was scathing about the party, which he said was at 
'sixes and sevens'. Most back-benchers simply 'spent their time 
in the Smoking Room consuming expensive drinks and intriguing 
amongst themselves'.
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back-benchers - a characteristic feature of Conservative opinion 
between the wars - could be more readily faced, however, once the 
decision to introduce legislation had been taken; the party's commitment 
to the war effort would now make unlikely any wholesale defiance 
of the government line. Butler could also take comfort from the 
wide variety of attitudes traditionally expressed by Conservatives, 
which ensured support from certain sections of the party at least.
The Education Committee, for example, which numbered about thirty 
members during the war, continued its pre-war tradition of supporting 
ministerial initiatives. In addition, the education bill was actively 
encouraged by the Tory Reform Committee, a back-bench group of some 
forty M.P.s established in 1943 to promote more progressive social 
policies. It was ironic that the 'young Tories', regarded by the 
President as the surest source of support within his own party, were 
to provide the most serious threat to the successful passage of the 
government's legislation.
After the decision to proceed had been reached in December 1942, 
Butler had to ensure that the actual details of a bill would be 
acceptable to both the parties. The concerns of the parties had 
of course been taken into account from an early stage, but an extended 
consideration of parliamentary views developed when difficulties 
in drafting led first to the introduction of a White Paper. The 
President, in the recent recollection of his private secretary, 'took 
advantage of this turn of events by proclaiming it as a thoroughly
66. E. Brocklebank to Miss Goodfellow, 27 Jan. 1943, P.R.O. ED 136/659, 
provides a full list of members on the Education Committee in 
parliament. On the Tory Reform Committee, see Ramsden, op.cit.,
pp.99-100.
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democratic way of proceeding, publishing the Government's proposals
in advance and taking account of the reactions to them in the Bill'
In practice, the minister was far more concerned with overcoming
the reservations of the senior partner in the coalition. This had
been evident from early on, particularly in the decision that the
problems of the public schools - which had been widely discussed
during the war - would be excluded from any reform. Butler hoped
that the whole question would 'lie quiet' under the consideration
of the Fleming Committee, conscious that Conservatives would be 'up
in arms' if the public schools were challenged.An equally important
consideration for the party was the religious settlement: 'they,
like the Prime Minister', Butler noted, 'are satisfied that the
established Church and the Cecil interest have accepted the need
for a measure of this s o r t ' A s  the prospects for reform came
closer, the President gave in to Conservative views on the direct-
grant school, and deliberately introduced the ideas of diversity
and variety as integral parts of the White Paper - themes which were
further encouraged by the publication of the Norwood Report shortly 
70afterwards. Butler also went to considerable lengths to side-step 
potential points of criticism in the education bill itself. He was 
concerned, for example, that separate clauses were to be used for 
introducing the statutory duty of providing secondary education and 
for the abolition of fees; this, he said, would cause grave misgivings
67. Neville Heaton, 'Forty years on'. The Times Educational Supplement, 
20 Jan. 1984.
68. Butler to Faber, 11 Sep. 1942, Butler papers, H70, f.110; Ede 
diary, 14 Jan. 1942, Add. Mss. 59692, p.33.
6 9. 'Diary', notes by Butler, 9 Sep. 1943, Butler papers, G15, f.92.
7 0. Ibid.; Board of Education, Curriculum and examinations in secondary 
schools (Norwood Report), (1943).
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among Conservatives, who were ’a stupid lot'. As a result the idea of 
using one clause only, declaring that in consequence of secondary 
education becoming a duty fees were to be abolished, was adopted 
as a fonn of words which Butler felt would make the change appear 
inevitable to the Tory mind.^ ^
Butler's concessions to Conservative opinion paid off when
educational reform eventually came before parliament. The concern
most widely expressed on the back-benches was with the religious
settlement. The tradition of resistance to reform of the dual system,
which had been championed before 1939 by Lord Salisbury, clearly
continued into the early years of the war. Lord Selborne, in particular,
the chairman of a parliamentary committee on Christian education,
stood out against proposals such as the White Memorandum on the grounds
that 'Blackmoor school happened to be my own private property, and
72I certainly would not give it up to anybody for such a scheme'.
The concept of controlled status, however, effectively overcame the
hostility of High Church Conservatives, and in parliament Henry Brooke
took a prominent part in conveying the view of the National Society
and the Anglican episcopate that a suitable compromise had been 
73reached. The most persistent opposition to the religious settlement 
came from Roman Catholic M.P.s, some of whom threatened a repeat 
of the Scurr amendment; but Butler remained confident that most party
71. Ede diary, 27 Oct. 1942, Add. Mss. 59695, p.134.
72. Selborne to Earl Grey, 1 May 1942, 3rd Earl Selborne papers, 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, Mss. Eng. Hist, c.985, f.l45.
73. 396 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.273, 19 Jan. 1944: 'the majority opinion 
in the Church of England, I believe, accepts this offer with 
thankfulness'.
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74members would not be prepared to jeopardise the hard-won agreement.
The remaining sections of the bill were endorsed with much less
controversy. Although some members expressed regret at the abolition
of fees, the need to provide secondary education for all children
up to the age of fifteen was accepted without challenge. The revival
of continuation schools was welcomed by Conservative back-benchers,
who also took the lead - through members such as Patrick Hannon,
Vice-President of the Federation of British Industries - in encouraging
75the development of technical education. At the committee stage 
the President faced some criticism from members of the Tory Reform 
Committee for not acting decisively enough, especially on the question 
of raising the school-leaving age to sixteen. Most back-benchers, 
however, were now content to acquiesce quietly in the passage of 
the bill. The main danger, as Butler noted, was simply that the 
Tories were quickly getting bored.
By contrast, the enthusiasm already shown by Labour ministers 
for reform was shared throughout Labour ranks. When G.D.H. Cole 
and Harold Laski visited the Board as spokesmen for Labour's education 
advisory committee, Butler found that they were generally sympathetic; 
and in March 1943 Ede noted that the parliamentary Labour Party was
7 4. e.g. Arthur Evans (M.P. Cardiff) - ibid., cc.309-10, called for 
the Scottish solution. Butler was aware, however, that his 
proposals had driven a wedge between Anglicans and Roman 
Catholics. This was reflected in the Conservative party itself: 
at the 1943 party conference, for example, one speaker accused 
the Catholics of exploiting the situation to discredit the 
government, 'at which the "colonels in the back row" applauded 
vigorously' - Ede diary, 7 Oct. 1943, Add. Mss. 59697, p.26.
75. e.g. 396 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.l679, 8 Feb. 1944, where Harold Webbe 
calls for a Central Advisory Council to deal with technical 
education. See also B.J. Evans, 'Further education pressure 
groups: the campaign for continued and technical education
in 1944', History of Education, 11, 1 (1982), pp.50-3.
7 6. Ede diary, 8 Feb. 1944, Add. Mss. 59698, p.30.
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'most cordial' in its reception of the draft education bill.^^ At 
the parliamentary stage, Labour members accepted the necessity of 
both compromise on the dual system and improvements in further education, 
though there were criticisms of the bill for not going far enough 
in certain respects. The major complaints were over the retention 
of fees in direct-grant schools and the absence of any prospective 
date for raising the leaving age to sixteen, and on both these points 
Labour members were defeated in divisions at the committee stage.
The majority of the parliamentary party did not, however, share the 
view expressed with force by some sections of Labour opinion - 
especially the National Association of Labour Teachers - that genuine 
equality of opportunity was only possible if all children attended 
a common secondary school. Most Labour members during the war, including 
consciously 'right-wing' figures such as Ede, regarded multilateral 
schools as useful additions to the secondary system, but the main 
goal was still seen as the achievement of parity between different 
types of school. By the time that Labour opinion began to polarise 
between those who regarded multilateralism as a necessary alternative 
to a tripartite structure, and those who still saw it as a notable 
addition, the success of the government's education bill was already
70
assured.
77. Note by Butler, 12 May 1942, P.R.O. ED 136/215; Ede minute to 
Butler, 30 Mar. 1943, P.R.O. ED 136/378.
78. 398 H.C. Deb., 5s., c.755 and c.1300, 21 Mar. 1944.
79. R.S. Barker, Education and politics, pp.75-80. R.G. Wallace, 
in 'Labour, the Board of Education and the preparation of the 
1944 Education Act', claims that the Act represented a defeat 
for Labour, although it could be argued that this only applied 
to those sections of party opinion which demanded multilateral 
schools as a complete alternative.
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The parliamentary obstacles to educational reform were therefore 
overcome for a variety of reasons. To an extent of course party 
reactions were constrained by the practical need for holding together 
the coalition while the war was in progress; and the government always 
retained the ultimate power to treat opposition to the bill as an 
issue of confidence. This was demonstrated just when it appeared 
that the committee stage would pass off smoothly, with the defeat 
of the government on an amendment designed to secure equal pay for 
women teachers. The sponsors of the amendment, Mrs. Cazalet-Keir 
and other members of the Tory Reform Committee, were themselves 
disconcerted by their success; they were now left to face the 
consequences of Butler's anger at being defeated on what he considered 
a minor issue. The Prime Minister, concerned that Tory Reformers 
were seeking to make a name for themselves by criticising government 
policy, immediately seized upon the opportunity to 'rub their noses 
in it' by calling for a confidence motion in the Commons; as a result, 
his continued leadership was overwhelmingly endorsed.With the 
easing of constraints on party controversy, however, parliamentary 
management and the position of the coalition were not alone sufficient 
to explain the success of the education bill. It was equally important 
that Butler had managed to find common ground among the parties: 
there was little in his legislation which the Labour Party had not 
previously demanded, and nothing to which Conservatives could not 
be reconciled.
80. T. Cazalet-Keir, From the wings (London, 1967), pp. 143-5. See 
also Ede diary, 3 Apr. 1944, Add. Mss. 59698, p.62, for the 
surprise of Tory Reformers ; and notes by Butler, Apr. 1944, Butler 




What then was the significance of the Second World War for the
main themes emphasised throughout this study - the nature of Conservative
ministerial policy and party opinion, the implications for Conservatism,
and the operation of education as a political issue? These themes
can all in fact be linked with developments during the inter-war
period. This is particularly evident in the case of the first issue,
the nature of Conservative policy, which can best be judged within
the context of the historical debates which have dominated existing
accounts. On the origins of reform, it has been indicated here that
R.A. Butler's personal contribution to the success of the 1944 Act
was considerable, both in devising the Board's plans and in circumventing
the political obstacles to reform. This does not of course imply
the need to return to the traditional idea of the 'Butler Act', bearing
the indelible imprint of a sole author; an interpretation which
clearly understates the complexity of the forces contributing to
the final outcome. The role played by the President does, however,
highlight the inadequacy of accounts which place the primary emphasis
on the Green Book in determining the shape of legislation. The background
to the Act, it may be argued, is only fully explicable in terms of
pre-war origins of the measure being taken up and developed as a
particular product of the wartime coalition. The most important
features in this process were clearly short-term: the ideas given
currency by the Spens Report of 1938; the concern with social equality
which arose early in the war; the combined efforts at the Board to
draw up reform proposals; and the success of these proposals in
8lpolitical circles. Several of the principles eventually embodied
81. These were the features emphasised by Butler himself in his
memorandum written for the official historian, Sophia Weitzman, 
in May 1945 - P.R.O. ED 136/692.
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in the Act, however - in particular the recasting of education for 
the adolescent, the religious settlement and linking of education 
with industry - had been promoted over a much longer period. In 
these earlier endeavours, Eustace Percy among Conservative ministers 
had played a prominent part, indicating that Butler's success was 
to an extent built upon pre-war foundations. This would suggest - 
to adapt the wording of R.G. Wallace - that there was a distinction 
between the authorship of the 1944 Act, which involved ministers 
and officials acting jointly after Butler's appointment; and the 
origins of the measure, which embraced Percy's policy as part of 
an accumulated body of educational thinking stretching back to the 
1920s.
The idea of consolidation rather than innovation as a characteristic 
feature of Conservative ministerial policy also emerges from a 
consideration of the Act in terms of the second existing debate - 
the relationship between war and social reform. The impact of war 
clearly had an important bearing on the speed with which it was possible 
to implement reform, helping for example to soften denominational 
tensions. There were also some signs that the war helped to alter 
official attitudes: the Green Book may have derived from the 
conventional wisdom of inter-war reformers, but it nevertheless 
marked a significant shift on the part of Board officials. Under 
the pressure of war, the Board began to promote reforms which had 
been sternly resisted following the publication of the Spens Report.
In this sense, it is possible to endorse the idea of the war 
stimulating the action which resulted in legislation. It does not 
follow, however, that 1944 represented a straightforward triumph 
for progressive reform, or that in the case of education, the war 
had produced decisively new attitudes towards social policy in
309
82official circles. The Board's new approach stemmed at least in 
part from a fear of more radical changes being enforced later in 
the absence of immediate action; and judging by the example of the 
Prime Minister, the coalition government as a whole attached little 
new importance to education.Butler's attitude in private reinforces 
the point. Although he received considerable personal credit as 
a reforming minister, the President conceded that he had made only 
cautious progress. The public, he said, always imagined that legislation 
of this sort was quite new, when in fact it was really 'codifying 
existing practice, which always seems to me to be the hallmark of 
good legislation'.^^ The 1944 Act thus represented in this further 
context a continuation of pre-war ideas: the Second World War had 
altered the terms of debate and hastened the introduction of reform, 
but it produced no radical departure in official education policy.
The theme of continuity can also be reinforced by commenting 
on the nature of Conservative Party opinion as a whole during the 
war years. The main characteristics of party thinking on education 
remained unaltered. Attitudes ranged from the enthusiasm of the 
Tory Reform Committee to the intransigence of individual back-benchers; 
and it was social background and practical experience - especially
82. This is the traditional idea of the war put forward by R.M. Titmuss, 
Problems of social policy (London, 1950), esp. pp.507-9.
83. On the Deputy Secretary's fears about the wartime shift in public
opinion, see 'Policy and planning for post-war education',
R.S. Wood, 17 Jan. 1941, cited in Gosden, op.cit., p.248. After 
the defeat on the equal pay amendment, Churchill at first intended 
to refer to the bill in the Commons as a 'milk-cart'. He 
eventually settled for 'perambulator'; Butler reflected that 
he clearly did not regard it as a 'sherman tank' - notes by Butler,
Apr. 1944, Butler papers, G16, fos.91-5.
84. Note by Butler, 25 May 1943, ibid., G15, f.37.
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that of public school training - which continued to determine opinion, 
rather than any attachment to 'Tory' or 'Neo-Liberal' theories. 
Similarly, many Conservatives still had no interest in educational 
issues. This was made clear by Butler's reticence about the 
introduction of legislation and by his efforts to safeguard certain 
party concerns - diversity and variety in the state system, the 
importance of religious education, and the autonomy of the public 
schools. The President in fact ascribed his success in winning over 
the party entirely to careful handling on his part. By a variety 
of means, he concluded privately, 'the Conservative Party has been 
brought to think the reforms less awful than they m i g h t T h e  
importance of ministerial persuasion should not, however, obscure 
the role of pre-war attitudes in accounting for the acceptance of 
reform. The aspects of the Act most readily agreed to by Conservatives 
in parliament - the provision of secondary education for all, the 
raising of the school-leaving age, the religious settlement and the 
revival of continuation schools - had all been foreshadowed by the 
movement in party views during the 1930s. The sub-committee needed 
little encouragement to endorse the proposals put forward by Butler, 
and at local level also - at least in the case of London - existing 
attitudes acted as a platform from which to welcome the education 
bill.^^ This once more highlights the place of developments between 
the wars: the Conservative Party's acquiescence in reform during 
the war resulted from preference as well as persuasion.
85. 'Diary', notes by Butler, 9 Sep. 1943, ibid., G15, f.92.
86. London County Council, Education Committee, Minutes, 22 July 
1942, p.226.
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The question remains of Butler’s underlying motives and assumptions
in promoting educational reform. This can most conveniently be considered
within the context of the third major theme pursued here - the
implications of education for the working of the Conservative Party,
and for the relationship between thinking and practice in particular.
It has been shown that before 1939 most Conservatives opposed the
extension of state power in education, and with it the creation of
a more flexible social order. R.A. Butler, however - like Eustace
Percy before him - was genuinely concerned to apply the Baldwinian
concept of ’one nation’ to education policy, especially by creating
87equal opportunities at the secondary stage. The President’s approach 
owed much of course to his understanding of wartime politics. He 
believed that Conservatives must encourage social reform in order 
to counter the growing public sympathy for the Labour Party. The 
nation, he told the 1922 Committee, was ’in for change’, and
88Conservatives would have to ’fashion it now, or rue it later’.
At the same time, his concern with change implied some fundamental
adjustments of pre-war Conservatism. Butler was convinced, for example,
that the power of the state should be increased after the war, though
still used to enhance individual enterprise; and he urged that the
Beveridge idea of universal provision in social policy be adopted,
but never turned into uniformity - hence his desire that secondary
89schools provide ’equivalent opportunities to be different’. This
87. Ede diary, 21 Oct. 1941, Add. Mss. 59691, p.27.
88. Notes for speech to 1922 Committee, 17 Mar. 1943, Butler papers, 
H6l, fos.208-14. He initially wrote, but then scribbled out: 
’chance to change and to conserve new conquests for Party*.
89. Butler to C. Allport, 21 Aug. 1942, ibid., 014, f.68; notes 
for speech, 17 Mar. 1943, ibid., fos.208-14.
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points to the paradox of Butler’s reform: the 1944 Act, by removing 
many of the iniquities of the inter-war education service, was presented 
and accepted as a progressive measure, but it was simultaneously 
designed to accommodate Conservative Party interests. By reinterpreting 
these interests in the light of wartime circumstances, Butler 
foreshadowed the new style of Conservatism which was to emerge after 
1945, accepting a more active role for the state and encouraging 
the creation of a more flexible, meritocratic social order.
The ambiguities of Butler’s Act should also be borne in mind 
when commenting finally on the operation of education as a political 
issue during the war years. The parliamentary debates on education 
had shown that the parties remained sharply divided on several aspects 
of policy, notably the direct-grant schools, the raising of the leaving 
age to sixteen, and the future shape of secondary education. The 
latter issue was technically excluded from the terms of the bill, 
though Labour members declared their support for multilateralism 
and for parity of esteem, whereas some Conservatives rallied behind 
the preservation of grammar school standards. The continued existence 
of party differences does not, however, justify the contention that 
policy-making in education revolved around concerted hostility to 
a well-defined series of radical demands. This conclusion ignores 
not only the complexity of wartime reform, but also the various 
constraints which continually helped to shape and define policy.
Butler was fortunate in that some of the difficulties facing his 
predecessors - especially the attitude of the Treasury - had altered 
under the impact of war, though it still required his political 
abilities to overcome the remaining obstacles to reform. Moreover, 
the focusing of party disputes on new areas of policy indicated that
313
the proposals contained in the education bill had now become more 
widely acceptable. In this sense, the Second World War both highlighted 
and brought together the two central features of education as a political 
issue between the wars - the element of continuity in the policies 
of successive administrations and the increased level of overlap 
in party thinking. The 1944 Act was the particular product of wartime 
politics, but it was based on ideas popularised before 1939. The 
Act was accepted by Labour, vdio were willing in the circumstances 
to settle for what Butler was prepared to offer - the minimum demands 
of party policy for the past twenty years; and by Conservatives, 
partly as a result of prompting from above, but also because reform 
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Appendix II
Conservative education policy; biographical details of ministers,
M.P.s and party supporters
Nancy, Viscountess Astor (1879-1964) M.P. Plymouth Sutton 1919-45; 
first woman to enter parliament.
Katharine, Duchess of Atholl (1874-1960) Educ; Wimbledon High School 
and Royal College of Music;member of Central Agricultural Wages Committee 
for Scotland 1918-20; member of Perthshire education authority; Vice- 
President Association of Education Authorities in Scotland 1919-24;
M.P. Kinross and West Perth 1923-38; Parliamentary Secretary, Board 
of Education 1924-29; member of the Royal Commission on the Civil 
Service 1929-31.
George Banbury, Baron Southam (1850-1936) Educ: Winchester; M.P. Peckham
1892-1905, City of London 1906-24; Chairman, Great Northern Railway.
J.S. Harmood-Banner (1876-1950) Educ: Wellington and New College,
Oxford; served South African War, Major of South Wales Borderers; 
member Governing Body Welsh Church, member Montgomeryshire County 
Council 1927-33.
Clement Anderson Montague-Barlow (1868-1951) Educ: Repton and King’s 
College, Cambridge; called to Bar, Lincoln’s Inn 1895; Lecturer, Law 
Society and London School of Economics; Municipal Reform member of 
L.C.C. 1907-10; M.P. Salford South 1910-23; Chairman of Sotheby &
Co. 1909-28; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Labour 1920-22;
Minister of Labour 1922-24; member of Church Assembly.
Michael Beaumont (1903-58) Educ: Eton, Oundle and R.M.C. Sandhurst; 
military career; M.P. Aylesbury 1929-38; J.P. Buckinghamshire.
Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck (1863-1931) Educ: Eton and Christ Church, 
Oxford; M.P. Nottingham South 1895-1906 and 1910-29; Municipal Reform 
member of L.C.C. 1907-10; Lt. Colonel, Derbyshire Yeomanry; served 
in South African War, First World War.
John Birchall (1875-1941) Educ: Eton and New College, Oxford;
Major, Gloucestershire Yeomanry; military service. First World War; 
Alderman, Gloucester County Council; M.P. Leeds North East 1918-40; 
second Church Estates Commissioner; member of National Assembly of 
Anglican Church.
F.N. Blundell (1880-1936) Educ: the Oratory School and Merton College, 
Oxford ; member of Lancashire County Council; landowner and farmer; 
military service. First World War; Chairman of Catholic Education 
Council, 1927-36.
Henry Brooke, Baron Brooke of Cumnor (1903-84) Educ: Marlborough and 
Balliol College, Oxford; M.P. Lewisham West 1938-45, Hampstead 1950- 
66; Minister of Housing and Local Government 1957-61; Home Secretary 
1962-64.
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R.A. Butler, Baron Butler of Saffron Walden (1902-82) Educ:
Marlborough and Pembroke College, Cambridge; Fellow Corpus Christi 
College, Cambridge; M.P. Saffron Walden 1929-65; Under-Secretary of 
State, India Office 1932-37; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of 
Labour 1937-38; Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1938- 
41; President of the Board of Education 1941-45; Minister of Labour 
1945; Chancellor of the Exchequer 1951-55; Home Secretary 1957-62.
Edward Cadogan (1880-1962) Educ: Eton and Balliol College, Oxford; 
military service. First World War; Barrister; Secretary to the Speaker 
of the House of Commons 1911-21; M.P. Reading 1922-23, Finchley 
1924-35, Bolton 1940-45; Deputy Chairman, Great Western Railway; 
Chairman, Board of Education Juvenile Organisations Committee; 
co-opted member of L.C.C.
Lord Hugh Cecil, Baron Quickswood (1869-1956) Educ: Eton and University 
College, Oxford; Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford; Lieutenant, Royal 
Flying Corps; M.P. Greenwich 1895-1906, Oxford University 1910-37; 
Provost of Eton 1936-44.
James Gascoyne-Cecil, fourth Marquis of Salisbury (1861-1947)
Educ: University College, Oxford; M.P. Darwen 1885-92, Rochester
1893-1903; Chairman of the Church Parliamentary Committee until 1900; 
served South African War; Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs 1900- 
03; Lord Privy Seal 1903-05; President of the Board of Trade 1905;
Lord President of the Council 1922-24; Lord Privy Seal 1924-29; Leader 
of the House of Lords 1925-30; member of the National Assembly of 
the Church of England.
Cyril Cobb - see above, p. 27^ ’Biographical details of Municipal 
Reformers’.
Edward Cobb - see above, p. 273 , ’Biographical details of Municipal 
Reformers*.
Henry Craik (1846-1927) Educ: High School, Glasgow, Glasgow University 
and Balliol College, Oxford ; Senior Examiner in Education Department; 
Secretary Scottish Education Department 1885-1904; M.P. Glasgow and 
Aberdeen Universities 1906-18, Scottish Universities 1918-27;
Principal Queen’s College, Harley Street 1911-14.
C.W. Crook (1862-1926) Educ: St. James’ National School, Barrow and 
St. John’s College, Battersea; headmaster of Wood Green Secondary 
School; member of executive. National Union of Teachers; President 
N.U.T. 1916-17; member of Burnham salary committees; member of the 
Senate of London University; M.P. East Ham North 1922-23 and 1924- 
26 ; Secretary Conservative Teachers* Advisory Committee.
Thomas Davies (1858-1939) Educ: private study; pupil-teacher and 
certificated teacher ; County Councillor for Campden 1899-1910; Alderman 
Gloucester County Council 1910-21; Vice-Chairman and Chairman of 
Education Committee 1910-21; M.P. Cirencester and Tewkesbury 1918- 
29; Governor, Royal Agricultural College.
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William Davison, Baron Broughshane (1872-1953) Educ: Shrewsbury and 
Oxford; Barrister; military service. First World War; Chairman, East 
Surrey Water Co.; President of Kensington Chamber of Commerce;
Mayor of Kensington; M.P. Kensington South 1918-45; Chairman, 
Metropolitan Division of the National Union of Conservative 
Associations.
William Duckworth (1879-1952) Educ: private study and grammar school; 
chartered accountant; military service. First World War; member of 
Blackpool Town Council 1921-39; Chairman of Blackpool Education 
Committee 1930-37; member and Vice-President of the Association of 
Education Committees 1932-39; M.P. Manchester Moss Side 1935-45.
Geoffrey Faber (1889-1961) Educ: Rugby and Christ Church, Oxford; 
military service. First World War; Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford; 
called to the Bar, Inner Temple 1921; President of Faber and Faber, 
publishers; President of the Publishers’ Association 1939-41.
Ernest Gray - see above, p.273 , ’Biographical details of Municipal 
Reformers’.
Patrick Hannon (1874-1963) Educ: Royal College of Science and Royal 
University of Ireland; M.P. Birmingham Moseley 1921-50; Vice-President, 
Federation of British Industries; Secretary, Industrial Group of M.P.s 
1921-29; member of the House of Commons Estimates Committee 1921-38; 
President, Central Chamber of Agriculture; Vice-President, National 
Association of British Manufacturers.
Henry Hibbert (1850-1927) Educ: Hutton and Chorley grammar schools ; 
flour merchant; Mayor of Chorley 1889-91; Chairman of Education 
Committee, Lancashire County Council; Chairman of Education Committee, 
County Councils Association; M.P. Chorley 1913-18; Chairman, Lancashire 
County Council 1921-27; member of Board of Education Consultative 
Committee.
T.E. Hickman (1859-1930) Educ: Cheltenham College; military career, 
Brigadier-General in South African War; M.P. Wolverhampton South
1910-22; Director Haunchwood Collieries Ltd. and other companies.
Geoffrey Hutchinson, Baron Ilford (1893-1974) Educ: Cheltenham 
College and Clare College, Cambridge; military service, First World 
War; member Hampstead Borough Council 1931-37; President, Non-County 
Boroughs Association 1937-44; M.P. Ilford 1937-45, Ilford North 
1950-54; Alderman London County Council 1964-69; Chairman, water 
companies.
Thelma Cazalet-Keir - see above, p.273 , ’Biographical details of 
Municipal Reformers’.
Philip Magnus (1842-1933) Educ: University College School and 
University College, London; Lecturer and examiner in Mathematics; 
Secretary, City and Guilds of London Institute 1880-88; member of 
London School Board; member of the Senate of London University 
1898-1931; M.P. London University 1906-22; member of Education 
Committee, Surrey County Council.
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J.A.R. Marriott (1859-1945) Educ: Repton and New College, Oxford;
Fellow and Lecturer of Worcester College, Oxford; Secretary to Oxford 
University Extension Delegacy 1895-1920; M.P. Oxford City 1917-22,
York 1923-29; Chairman of Select Committee on Estimates 1924-25.
R.H. Morgan (1880-1960) Educ: St. Thomas' Higher Grade School, Dudley 
and Saltley College, Birmingham; headmaster of St. Thomas’ and Dudley 
Bluecoat School 1907-31; military service. First World War;
Parliamentary Secretary, N.U.T.; M.P. Stourbridge 1931-45.
Richard Onslow, fifth Earl of Onslow (1876-1945) - Educ: Eton and New 
College, Oxford; diplomatic service; military service. First World 
War; Civil Lord of the Admiralty 1920-21; Parliamentary Secretary 
Board of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Board of Education 1921- 
24 ; Under-Secretary for War 1924-28 ; Paymaster-General 1928-29 ; Deputy 
Speaker, House of Lords 1931-44.
Roundell Palmer, Viscount Wolmer and third Earl of Selborne (1887- 
T9tl) Educ: Winchester and New College, Oxford; M.P. Newton 1910- 
18, Aldershot 1918-40; Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade 1922- 
24; Assistant Postmaster-General 1924-29; Minister of Economic Warfare
1942-45; Member of House of Laymen, Province of Canterbury.
Eustace Percy,Baron Percy of Newcastle (1887-1958) Educ: Oxford; 
diplomatic service; M.P. Hastings 1921-37; Parliamentary Secretary 
Board of Education 1923, Ministry of Health 1923-24; President of 
the Board of Education 1924-29; Minister without Portfolio 1935-37; 
Rector, Newcastle Division of Durham University 1937-52.
Basil Peto (1862-1945) Educ: Harrow; building contractor; Director, 
Morgan Crucible Co.; M.P. Devizes 1910-18, Barnstaple 1922-23.
Kenneth Pickthorn (1892-1975) Educ: Aldenham School and Trinity 
College, Cambridge; Fellow, Dean and President of Corpus Christi College 
Cambridge 1914-44; M.P. Cambridge University 1935-50, Carlton . 
(Nottinghamshire) 1950-66; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of 
Education 1951-54.
Herwald Ramsbotham, Viscount Soulbury (1887-1971) Educ: Uppingham 
and University College, Oxford; called to Bar 1911; military service, 
First World War; M.P. Lancaster 1929-41; Parliamentary Secretary Board 
of Education 1931-35, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1935-36; 
Minister of Pensions 1936-39; First Commissioner of Works 1939-40; 
President of the Board of Education 1940-41; Chairman of the 
Assistance Board 1941-48; Chairman of Burnham Committees 1942-49.
William Ray - see above, p.273 , ’Biographical details of Municipal 
Reformers'.
Annesley Somerville (1858-1942) Educ: Queen’s College, Cork and 
Trinity College, Cambridge; assistant master at Eton 1885-1922; 
member of Eton Board of Guardians; Chairman of Eton Urban District 
Council; M.P. Windsor 1922-42; President, Independent Schools 
Association 1927-42.
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Oliver Stanley (1896-1950) Educ: Eton; military service, First World 
War; called to Bar 1919; M.P. Westmorland 1922-45, Bristol West 1945- 
50; Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office 1931-33; Minister of 
Transport 1933-34; Minister of Labour 1934-35; President of the Board 
of Education 1935-37; President of the Board of Trade 1937-40; Secretary 
of State for War 1940.
Harold Webbe - see above, p.273 , ’Biographical details of Municipal 
Reformers’.
Edward Wood, Baron Irwin and Viscount Halifax (1881-1959) Educ: Eton 
and Christ Church, Oxford; M.P. Ripon 1910-25; Parliamentary Under­
secretary, Colonies 1921-22; President of the Board of Education 1922- 
24; Minister of Agriculture 1924-25; Viceroy of India 1926-31; President 
of the Board of Education 1932-25; Secretary of State for War 1935;
Lord Privy Seal 1935-37; Lord President of the Council 1937-38;
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1938-40; British Ambassador 
in Washington 1941-46.
Howard Kingsley Wood (1881-1943) Solicitor; member of L.C.C. for 
Woolwich 1911-1$; member of National Insurance Advisory Committee
1911-19; M.P. Woolwich West 1918-43; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry 
of Health 1924-29, Board of Education 1931; Postmaster-General 1931- 
35; Minister of Health 1935-38; Secretary of State for Air 1938-40;
Lord Privy Seal 1940; Chancellor of the Exchequer 1940-45.





(a) Public Record Office Papers (Kew)
Cabinet: CAB 23 - Cabinet minutes (1918-39).
CAB 24 - Cabinet memoranda (1918-39). 
CAB 26 - Cabinet Committees.
CAB 65 - War Cabinet minutes (1939-45) 
CAB 71 - Lord President’s Committee. 
















General education, general files.
Secondary education, general files.
Schemes under the 1918 and 1921 Acts.
Elementary education, local authority supply files. 
Private office papers (1918-35).
Further education, general files.
Secondary education, local education authority files 
Reorganisation of schools, local authority files. 
Junior technical school files.
Religious instruction, local authority files. 
Education Acts 1918 and 1921, local authority files. 
Private office papers (1936-44).
History of education in the war (1939-44).
Treasury: T l6l - Supply files.
T 163 - General files.
T 171 - Budget and finance bill papers.
T 172 - Chancellor of the Exchequer’s miscellaneous papers
T 227 - Social services division files.
321
(b) Private Papers
Lady Astor papers (Reading University Library).
Duchess of Atholl papers (Blair Castle, Scotland).
Stanley Baldwin papers (Cambridge University Library).
A.J. Balfour papers (British Library).
Andrew Bonar Law papers (House of Lords Record Office).
R.A. Butler papers (Trinity College, Cambridge).
Robert Cecil, Viscount Chelwood papers (British Library).
Neville Chamberlain diaries and papers (Birmin^am University Library). 
James Chuter Ede diaries (British Library).
Harry Crookshank diary (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
Randall Davidson diaries and papers (Lambeth Palace Library).
William Davison, Lord Broughshane papers (Kensington and Chelsea Library). 
H.A.L. Fisher diary and papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
Patrick Hannon papers (House of Lords Record Office).
Percy Harris papers (House of Lords Record Office).
Cosmo Gordon Lang papers (Lambeth Palace Library).
David Lloyd George papers (House of Lords Record Office).
James Ramsay MacDonald papers (Public Record Office, Kew).
Donald MacLean papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
J.A.R. Marriott papers (North Yorkshire Record Office).
Fourth Marquis of Salisbury papers (Hatfield House, Hertfordshire).
Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford diary (Conservative Central Office).
Viscount Simon papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
William Temple papers (Lambeth Palace Library).
Viscount Templewood papers (Cambridge University Library).
Viscount Wolmer, 3rd Earl Selborne papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
Lord Woblton papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
Laming Worthington-Evans papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
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(c) Conservative Party Records
(Bodleian Library, Oxford, unless otherwise specified).
National Union: Executive Committee minutes.
Central Council minutes.
Annual Conference minutes.
Conservative Research Department papers.
Conservative Party education sub-committee papers (1941-45).
Junior Imperial League and Young Britons’ papers.
Local records: City of London Conservative Association (Westminster
Public Library).
Kennington Conservative Association (London School 
of Economics).
St. George’s Conservative Association (Westminster 
Public Library).
(d) Other manuscript collections
Federation of British Industries (Warwick University).
London County Council, Education Office (Greater London Record Office). 
London Municipal Society (Guildhall Library, London).
National Confederation of Employers’ Organisations (Warwick University) 
National Society (Church House, Westminister).
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2. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
(a) Board of Education
Final report of the Departmental Committee on juvenile education in 
relation to employment after the war, Cd.8512 (1917-18).
Report of the Departmental Committee on scholarships, free places
and maintenance allowances (Hilton Young Report), Cmd.968 (1920).
Report of the Board of Education for the year 1922-23, Cmd.2179 (1924).
Report of the Board of Education for the year 1923-24, Cmd.2443 (1925).
Report of the Consultative Committee on the education of the adolescent 
(Hadow Report), (1926).
Memorandum on the estimates, 1927, Cmd.2885 (1927).
Emmott Committee, Report of an enquiry into the relationship of technical 
education to other forms of education and to industry and commerce 
(1927).
Malcolm Committee, Second report of the Committee on education and 
industry (England and Wales) (1928).
Pamphlet No.60, The new prospect in education (1928).
Pamphlet No.64, Education for industry and commerce (1928).
Education in 1928: report of the Board of Education and statistics 
of public education for England and Wales, Cmd.3307 (1929).
Pamphlet No.83, Memorandum on the place of the junior technical school 
in the educational system (1930).
Proposals for enabling local education authorities to enter into 
agreements with the managers of non-provided schools for the 
purposes of reorganisation, Cmd.3551 (1930).
Clerk Committee, Report of the Committee on education for the engineering 
industry (1931).
Pamphlet No.100, Public education in England and Wales. Historical
tables as reprinted from the statistical abstracts for the United 
Kingdom (1934).
Memorandum on the estimates, 1938, Cmd.5678 (1938).
Report of the Consultative Committee on secondary education with
special reference to grammar and technical high schools (Spens 
Report), (1938).
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Education in 1938: report of the Board of Education and statistics 
of public education for England and Wales, Cmd.6013 (1939).
Educational reconstruction (White Paper), Cmd.6458 (1943).
Curriculum and examinations in secondary schools (Norwood Report), (1943).
Abolition of tuition fees in grant-aided secondary schools (Interim 
Fleming Report), (1943).
The public schools and the general education system (Fleming Report), 
(1944).
Ministry of Education, Education 1900-1950: report of the Ministry 
of Education, Cmd.8244 (1950).
(b) Other Government Reports
First interim report of the Committee on national expenditure 
(Geddes Report), Cmd.158l (1922).
Report of the Committee on national expenditure (May Report), 
Cmd.3920 (1931).
Report of the Committee on local expenditure in England and Wales 
(Ray Report), Cmd.4200 (1932).
(c) London County Council 
Minutes of Proceedings (1918-44).
Education Act, 1918. Scheme of the local education authority (1920) 
Education Committee, Minutes of Proceedings (1918-44).
(d) Hansard
Parliamentary Debates, fifth series (1918-44)
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3. CONSERVATIVE PARTY PUBLICATIONS
(a) London Municipal Society 
The Ratepayer
Day continuation schools (London Questions No.1, 1921).
Education and the care of London's children (London Questions No.3, 
1921).
Fair play for London's day continuation schools (Leaflet No.5, 1922). 
London County Council election. Manifesto of the Municipal Reform 
Party (1922-37).
London education (Speeches, 1925-36).
London municipal parties and policies (1927).
The Labour-Socialist manifesto. A reply (London Questions No.8, 1928) 
Raising the school age. Labour-Socialist compulsion (Leaflet No.15, 
1934).
Two years of Socialist rule on the London County Council (Pamphlet 
No.58, 1936).
Notes for speakers and workers (1937).
(b) National Unionist Association
Gleanings and Memoranda.
The campaign guide (l4th edn., 1922).
Looking ahead. A re-statement of Unionist principles and aims (1924) 
Baldwin's election address (Tracts and leaflets. No.2443, 1924).
(c) National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations 
Politics in Review
What the Conservative government has done for education, 1925-1928 
(1928).
To all engaged in the work of education (1929).
Official statement of Conservative educational policy (1929).
326
Election notes for Conservative speakers and workers. General 
election, 1929 (1929).
Fighting points for Conservatives (1931).
Election notes for Conservative speakers and workers. General 
election, 1931 (1931).
Notes for speakers and workers (general election 1935) (1935).
Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction, Looking ahead; educational
aims, the first interim report of the Conservative sub-committee on 
education (1942).
  Looking ahead: a plan for youth, the second interim report of
the Conservative sub-committee on education (1942).
  Looking ahead: the statutory educational system, the third
interim report of the Conservative sub-committee on education 
(1944).
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